机构投资者与公司治理结构
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摘要
20世纪80年代后,在以美国为代表的西方国家,机构投资者对待公司治理的态度发生了显著的变化——逐渐从消极的间接治理向积极的直接治理转变,即从“用脚投票”向“用手投票”转变。西方学者将此称为机构股东积极主义的兴起。机构股东积极主义的兴起改变了企业的权力结构,同时导致了西方国家治理结构的革命性变革。一些学者甚至认为“投资者资本主义”将替代“经理资本主义”。通过对西方国家金融市场、制度环境变化以及公司治理结构的研究,我们认为:机构股东积极主义的兴起是制度适应与市场博弈结果,同时它将随着经济、金融全球化的趋势,在世界范围内扩张;机构股东积极主义的兴起将改变“一元化”的企业权力结构,对企业权力配置失衡问题起到一定的缓解作用,从而对公司治理的改善带来积极的影响。对于中国上市公司治理结构的设计与改善而言,我们应该借鉴西方国家经验,通过大力发展机构投资者来优化上市公司的股权结构,通过倡导机构股东积极主义,缓解“内部人控制”的问题,强化内部监督机制,以达到改善公司治理的目标,使中国企业真正走上持续、健康发展之路。
Before 1980’s, institutional investors had focused on the stock price of target companies, but not their corporate governance. When they were not satisfied in the performance of firms, they would sell the stocks. After 1980’s,the situation began to change. The institutional investors of developed countries became the active role in corporate governance. In 1990’s, the change became more significant. Under the pressure of institutional investors, six famous CEOs were fired successively in 1992. They were IBM CEO John Akers, GM CEO Robert Stempel, American Express CEO James Robinson, Westinghouse CEO Paul Lego and Compaq Computer CEO Rod Canion.
The arguments about the impact of institutional shareholder activism are going on. Some authors(such as Michael Smith, 1996)suggest activist efforts as helping to ameliorate the incentive and control problems that characterize large, diffusely held corporations. Some claim that shareholder activism increases firm value by prompting specific actions. But some suggest that shareholder activism has negligible effects on target companies’operation and value. Wahal(1996) argues that activism is an ineffective alternative to more costly and aggressive efforts to influence firm decisions. Murphy(1994)and Woods(1996) hold the similar opinions.
Although the concerning arguments are continuing , institutional shareholder activism rising has already become a fact. Why do institutional investors turn into activist from pessimist? What do the change have impact on corporate governance? And what about the effect of institutional shareholders activism? This paper’s aim is to research and answer these questions. In this paper we research the rising of institutional shareholder activism, its impact on target companies’performance and value, and we put forward some suggests about encouraging the development of China’institutional investors and how to improve China’corporate governance. The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 “introduction”. In section 1, we introduce that the paper’s aim, organize and so on. Section 2 “institutional shareholders activism rising and evolving”. Firstly we define the term “shareholder activism”, and introduce shareholder activism early. Secondly the evolution of institutional shareholders activism in USA is introduced. Thirdly we survey institutional shareholders activism of USA spreads in the world scope. This paper believes that the definition of a shareholder activist is an investor who tries to change the status quo through ‘voice’, without a change in control of the firm. Section 3 “the cause of institutional shareholders activism rising”. In this section, firstly we analyze the cause of institutional shareholders activism rising from the follows :
developed countries’financial market evolving, institutional environment changing and financial theory developing. Then we investigate the investment institutionalization’s impact on the behavior of institutional investor. We suggest that the development of institutional investors, and their growing dominance as owners of corporations has had a pervasive influence on corporate governance. Section 4 “pattern corporate governances’comparison and governance fail’s institute cause”. In this section, we first discuss the corporate governance’s theory basis, and define corporate governance. Then we compare some counties’corporate governances. Last we discuss governance fail’s institute cause. Section 5 “institutional investors impact on corporate governance”. In section 5 we discuss mainly institutional investors’impact on corporate governance. We suggest that institutional shareholders activism has positive effects on corporate governance. Institutional shareholders activism may alleviate the problem of corporate power’unequilibrium, increase the expect cost of opportunist behavior and improve the level of decision. Although the effects of institutional shareholders activism have limited , we believe totality institutional shareholders activism can improve target companies’performance and corporate governance. Section 6 “corporate governance and institutional investors in china”. In this section we first discuss Chinese corporate governance’s situation and problems. Then we examine the situation
Before 1980’s, institutional investors had focused on the stock price of target companies, but not their corporate governance. When they were not satisfied in the performance of firms, they would sell the stocks. After 1980’s,the situation began to change. The institutional investors of developed countries became the active role in corporate governance. In 1990’s, the change became more significant. Under the pressure of institutional investors, six famous CEOs were fired successively in 1992. They were IBM CEO John Akers, GM CEO Robert Stempel, American Express CEO James Robinson, Westinghouse CEO Paul Lego and Compaq Computer CEO Rod Canion.
The arguments about the impact of institutional shareholder activism are going on. Some authors(such as Michael Smith, 1996)suggest activist efforts as helping to ameliorate the incentive and control problems that characterize large, diffusely held corporations. Some claim that shareholder activism increases firm value by prompting specific actions. But some suggest that shareholder activism has negligible effects on target companies’operation and value. Wahal(1996) argues that activism is an ineffective alternative to more costly and aggressive efforts to influence firm decisions. Murphy(1994)and Woods(1996) hold the similar opinions.
Although the concerning arguments are continuing , institutional shareholder activism rising has already become a fact. Why do institutional investors turn into activist from pessimist? What do the change have impact on corporate governance? And what about the effect of institutional shareholders activism? This paper’s aim is to research and answer these questions. In this paper we research the rising of institutional shareholder activism, its impact on target companies’performance and value, and we put forward some suggests about encouraging the development of China’institutional investors and how to improve China’corporate governance. The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 “introduction”. In section 1, we introduce that the paper’s aim, organize and so on. Section 2 “institutional shareholders activism rising and evolving”. Firstly we define the term “shareholder activism”, and introduce shareholder activism early. Secondly the evolution of institutional shareholders activism in USA is introduced. Thirdly we survey institutional shareholders activism of USA spreads in the world scope. This paper believes that the definition of a shareholder activist is an investor who tries to change the status quo through ‘voice’, without a change in control of the firm. Section 3 “the cause of institutional shareholders activism rising”. In this section, firstly we analyze the cause of institutional shareholders activism rising from the follows :
developed countries’financial market evolving, institutional environment changing and financial theory developing. Then we investigate the investment institutionalization’s impact on the behavior of institutional investor. We suggest that the development of institutional investors, and their growing dominance as owners of corporations has had a pervasive influence on corporate governance. Section 4 “pattern corporate governances’comparison and governance fail’s institute cause”. In this section, we first discuss the corporate governance’s theory basis, and define corporate governance. Then we compare some counties’corporate governances. Last we discuss governance fail’s institute cause. Section 5 “institutional investors impact on corporate governance”. In section 5 we discuss mainly institutional investors’impact on corporate governance. We suggest that institutional shareholders activism has positive effects on corporate governance. Institutional shareholders activism may alleviate the problem of corporate power’unequilibrium, increase the expect cost of opportunist behavior and improve the level of decision. Although the effects of institutional shareholders activism have limited , we believe totality institutional shareholders activism can improve target companies’performance and corporate governance. Section 6 “corporate governance and institutional investors in china”. In this section we first discuss Chinese corporate governance’s situation and problems. Then we examine the situation
引文
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62. Carleton Willard T. James M. Nelson and Michael Weisbach: The Influence of Institutions on Corporate Governance through Private Negotiations: Evidence from TIAA-CREF, University of Arizona Working Paper, 1997.
63. Huson M.: Does Governance Matter? Evidence from CalPERS Interventions, University of Alberta Working Paper, 1997.
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