我国中小商业银行资本监管研究
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摘要
银行资本监管有效性研究一直是学界和实务界讨论的热点，每次金融危机的爆发都会带来对银行监管的深入思考和变革。商业银行的资本充足性管制，是监管当局借用资本充足率这一指标对商业银行进行资本管制的重要手段，维持商业银行体系的稳健性。本文从研究我国中小商业银行资本监管是否有效角度，首先回顾了国内外对资本监管有效性和资本监管效率的研究文献，梳理了银行监管的理论发展史和历史实践脉络，探究银行资本以及银行资本充足性监管的特殊意义。总结了银行资本充足率监管的业界实践，结合后金融危机时代的到来，集中对巴塞尔资本协议体系的变迁进行了归纳和演绎，揭示了这一体系建设的最新进展，并对中国银行业实施资本协议的最新进展提出了自己的看法。
本文从资本监管现实路径上，结合理论分析与实证研究相结合的研究路径，在分析了我国中小商业银行资本监管现状基础上，提出需要研究证明我国中小商业银行监管有效性，同时提出监管在最低资本充足率要求、拨备与资本监管结合、事前监管与事后监管相互补充等方面缺乏弹性的问题。首先从银行资本监管与银行风险控制，资本监管与货币政策传导、银行信贷水平与宏观经济两方面入手，选取11家中小型商业银行2004-2012年的数据进行实证分析。研究结果表明，资本监管能有效控制银行风险，有利于维护宏观经济的长期稳定性。对商业银行损失准备金（即拨备）进行了理论分析和实证研究，为通过提足拨备最终达到资本充足提供了现实路径，表明银行资本监管的有效性是显著的。然后，通过对美国中小银行资本监管现状的分析，提出对我国中小商业银行资本监管工作的借鉴，寻找改进资本监管机制的基础。最后，本文运用博弈论研究上市银行资本充足信息披露真实性，提出建立弹性监管机制的理论构想，增强资本监管有效性，建立有利于提升监管政策针对性的多层级资本充足率监管要求，并使监管手段的实施能够符合具体监管对象的发展阶段。
通过分析研究认为：动态而言，世界上商业银行的资本充足要求一直在变化之中并总体呈现上升趋势，这与周期性爆发的金融危机具有密切的关系；静态而言，目前形成的最低资本要求是监管发展到本阶段的表现，21世纪第一次金融危机后诞生的所谓逆周期资本要求，已经在促进资本监管向弹性监管发展。加上本文对加强拨备与资本监管的结合、信息披露监管缺陷等因素的研究，建立更加具有弹性的中小商业银行资本监管机制已经成为一种选择。而从必要性的角度看，跨越历史阶段的观察会发现，当监管要求和银行自身的行为（包括信息披露和风险偏好等）没有必然关系的时候，事前承诺和事后监管的配合就要求监管必须建立一个弹性机制。而且，具体的监管实践中要区分银行的发展阶段、规模划分引入差别化的资本监管要求，这也是弹性监管机制的内在要求。
The study on the validity of banking capital regulation is always on the top list ofthe researcher and the financial practice. In history, every financial crisis certainlyevokes the introspection and revolution of banking supervision. Commercial banks’capital adequacy regulation is an important means that the regulatory authorities makeuse of the capital adequacy ratio to supervise on commerial banks’ capital and maintainthe stability of the commercial banking system. With no exception, this paper is alsoaiming at answering the question whether China’ small and medium banks’ capitalregulation is effective. Firstly we reviewed the domestic and international researchliterature on the validity and the efficiency of capital regulation. Then we reviewed thehistory of banking supervision theory and historical practice context, throwing somelight on the bank’s capital and banking capital regulation. We retrospectively studied thebanking capital regulation theory and practice. When it comes to the post-crisis era, thepaper especially summarized the changing process of Basel Capital Accord, illustratedthe latest revise and gave the opinion on how to implement Basel Capital Accord inChina.
On the path of combining theoretical analysis with empirical research, the paperanalysis China’s small and medium commercial banks’ capital regulation status andproblems,such as minimun capital requirement, the cooperation between thepre-commitment approach（PCA）and the ordinary supervision.In order to validate oursmall and medium commercial banks' capital regulatory effectiveness, we select11small and medium sized commercial banks2004-2012data for empirical analysis intwo aspects (the bank capital regulation and bank risk controls; capital supervision andmonetary policy transmission, the level of bank credit and the macroeconomy). Theresults show that bank capital regulation can effectively control the risk and helpmaintain long-term macroeconomic stability; we made a theoretical analysis andempirical research on loss reserves for commercial banks(ie debts), provided a realisticpath to reach capital adequacy ultimately by providing adequate provision, indicatingthe effectiveness of bank capital regulation is significant. The paper compared thepresent situation of medium and small sized banks’ capital supervision in American,raised several references on China’s small and medium banks’ capital supervision,attempting to search for the foundation of improving supervision’s flexibility. At last,by using the game theoretical approach, we researched the authenticity of capital adequacy information, which is disclosed by the listed banks. The paper made theproposal on the establishment of capital focused flexible banking supervisory system. Inorder to improve the supervisory efficiency, the paper suggests that the supervisoryauthority should make the capital regulation more flexible, meaning that multi-tiercapital requirement adopted to make supervisory policy more applicable, together withappropriate supervisory measures implemented according to banks development.
Generally, the study follows the ideology which lies in two aspects. On one hand,from the dynamic view, the world banks capital adequacy requirements are constantlychanging—the requirements are getting more and more strict—due to periodicallyeruption of financial crises. On the other hand, when we statically focused on thepresent situation, we came to the point that the current minimum capital requirement isrelevant with the supervisory development. Moreover, the counter-cyclical capitalrequirement resulting from subprime loan crisis has made the banking capitalsupervision push its way to flexible supervision. This ideology not only guides the study,but also offers the feasibility of the establishment of capital focused flexible bankingsupervisory system. As for the necessity is concerned, studied in a long run, thecapital focused flexible banking supervisory system has to be established to help thepre-commitment approach （PCA） and the ordinary supervision cooperate smoothly,especially when the supervisory requirement isn’t relevant with bank’s operation (suchas information disclosure and risk preference). And what’s more, this system inherentlyrequires the supervisory authority introduce different capital requirement according tobank’s development stage and size.
本文从资本监管现实路径上，结合理论分析与实证研究相结合的研究路径，在分析了我国中小商业银行资本监管现状基础上，提出需要研究证明我国中小商业银行监管有效性，同时提出监管在最低资本充足率要求、拨备与资本监管结合、事前监管与事后监管相互补充等方面缺乏弹性的问题。首先从银行资本监管与银行风险控制，资本监管与货币政策传导、银行信贷水平与宏观经济两方面入手，选取11家中小型商业银行2004-2012年的数据进行实证分析。研究结果表明，资本监管能有效控制银行风险，有利于维护宏观经济的长期稳定性。对商业银行损失准备金（即拨备）进行了理论分析和实证研究，为通过提足拨备最终达到资本充足提供了现实路径，表明银行资本监管的有效性是显著的。然后，通过对美国中小银行资本监管现状的分析，提出对我国中小商业银行资本监管工作的借鉴，寻找改进资本监管机制的基础。最后，本文运用博弈论研究上市银行资本充足信息披露真实性，提出建立弹性监管机制的理论构想，增强资本监管有效性，建立有利于提升监管政策针对性的多层级资本充足率监管要求，并使监管手段的实施能够符合具体监管对象的发展阶段。
通过分析研究认为：动态而言，世界上商业银行的资本充足要求一直在变化之中并总体呈现上升趋势，这与周期性爆发的金融危机具有密切的关系；静态而言，目前形成的最低资本要求是监管发展到本阶段的表现，21世纪第一次金融危机后诞生的所谓逆周期资本要求，已经在促进资本监管向弹性监管发展。加上本文对加强拨备与资本监管的结合、信息披露监管缺陷等因素的研究，建立更加具有弹性的中小商业银行资本监管机制已经成为一种选择。而从必要性的角度看，跨越历史阶段的观察会发现，当监管要求和银行自身的行为（包括信息披露和风险偏好等）没有必然关系的时候，事前承诺和事后监管的配合就要求监管必须建立一个弹性机制。而且，具体的监管实践中要区分银行的发展阶段、规模划分引入差别化的资本监管要求，这也是弹性监管机制的内在要求。
The study on the validity of banking capital regulation is always on the top list ofthe researcher and the financial practice. In history, every financial crisis certainlyevokes the introspection and revolution of banking supervision. Commercial banks’capital adequacy regulation is an important means that the regulatory authorities makeuse of the capital adequacy ratio to supervise on commerial banks’ capital and maintainthe stability of the commercial banking system. With no exception, this paper is alsoaiming at answering the question whether China’ small and medium banks’ capitalregulation is effective. Firstly we reviewed the domestic and international researchliterature on the validity and the efficiency of capital regulation. Then we reviewed thehistory of banking supervision theory and historical practice context, throwing somelight on the bank’s capital and banking capital regulation. We retrospectively studied thebanking capital regulation theory and practice. When it comes to the post-crisis era, thepaper especially summarized the changing process of Basel Capital Accord, illustratedthe latest revise and gave the opinion on how to implement Basel Capital Accord inChina.
On the path of combining theoretical analysis with empirical research, the paperanalysis China’s small and medium commercial banks’ capital regulation status andproblems,such as minimun capital requirement, the cooperation between thepre-commitment approach（PCA）and the ordinary supervision.In order to validate oursmall and medium commercial banks' capital regulatory effectiveness, we select11small and medium sized commercial banks2004-2012data for empirical analysis intwo aspects (the bank capital regulation and bank risk controls; capital supervision andmonetary policy transmission, the level of bank credit and the macroeconomy). Theresults show that bank capital regulation can effectively control the risk and helpmaintain long-term macroeconomic stability; we made a theoretical analysis andempirical research on loss reserves for commercial banks(ie debts), provided a realisticpath to reach capital adequacy ultimately by providing adequate provision, indicatingthe effectiveness of bank capital regulation is significant. The paper compared thepresent situation of medium and small sized banks’ capital supervision in American,raised several references on China’s small and medium banks’ capital supervision,attempting to search for the foundation of improving supervision’s flexibility. At last,by using the game theoretical approach, we researched the authenticity of capital adequacy information, which is disclosed by the listed banks. The paper made theproposal on the establishment of capital focused flexible banking supervisory system. Inorder to improve the supervisory efficiency, the paper suggests that the supervisoryauthority should make the capital regulation more flexible, meaning that multi-tiercapital requirement adopted to make supervisory policy more applicable, together withappropriate supervisory measures implemented according to banks development.
Generally, the study follows the ideology which lies in two aspects. On one hand,from the dynamic view, the world banks capital adequacy requirements are constantlychanging—the requirements are getting more and more strict—due to periodicallyeruption of financial crises. On the other hand, when we statically focused on thepresent situation, we came to the point that the current minimum capital requirement isrelevant with the supervisory development. Moreover, the counter-cyclical capitalrequirement resulting from subprime loan crisis has made the banking capitalsupervision push its way to flexible supervision. This ideology not only guides the study,but also offers the feasibility of the establishment of capital focused flexible bankingsupervisory system. As for the necessity is concerned, studied in a long run, thecapital focused flexible banking supervisory system has to be established to help thepre-commitment approach （PCA） and the ordinary supervision cooperate smoothly,especially when the supervisory requirement isn’t relevant with bank’s operation (suchas information disclosure and risk preference). And what’s more, this system inherentlyrequires the supervisory authority introduce different capital requirement according tobank’s development stage and size.
引文
①数据来源于中国银监会网站，www.cbrc.gov.cn。
②《中国银监会关于中国银行业实施新监管标准的指导意见》，中国银监会，2011年。
①见《银行监管实务（试用）》中国银监会，2006年。
①数据来源于《国际金融监管的新发展》，刘宇飞，经济科学出版社，1999年4月。
①详见《金融企业准备金计提管理办法》（财金〔2012〕20号）第一章第三条。
②详见《商业银行贷款损失准备管理办法》，中国银行业监督管理委员会令2011第4号。
③详见《有效银行监管核心原则》，巴塞尔银行监管委员会，2011年12月征求意见稿。
①《第三版巴塞尔协议：更具稳健性的银行和银行体系的全球监管框架》，巴塞尔委员会，2010年12月。
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②《中国银监会关于中国银行业实施新监管标准的指导意见》，中国银监会，2011年。
①见《银行监管实务（试用）》中国银监会，2006年。
①数据来源于《国际金融监管的新发展》，刘宇飞，经济科学出版社，1999年4月。
①详见《金融企业准备金计提管理办法》（财金〔2012〕20号）第一章第三条。
②详见《商业银行贷款损失准备管理办法》，中国银行业监督管理委员会令2011第4号。
③详见《有效银行监管核心原则》，巴塞尔银行监管委员会，2011年12月征求意见稿。
①《第三版巴塞尔协议：更具稳健性的银行和银行体系的全球监管框架》，巴塞尔委员会，2010年12月。
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