后股权分置时代上市公司大股东利益侵占问题探析
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摘要
股权分置改革是我国证券市场发展进程中一次重大制度性变革。股权分置问题的解决,克服了我国证券市场原先存在的同股不同权的缺陷,使得大股东利益侵占行为的制度性基础得到较大削弱,有助于公司治理的逐渐完善。但也须认识到,股权分置问题的解决不会立刻消除各种市场顽疾,特别是大股东与中小股东利益之间的矛盾和冲突。后股权分置时代,大股东获利方式发生转变,其必然导致其利益侵占行为方式发生转变。因此,对后股权分置时期大股东侵害行为做出理论分析并预测其动向,以及提出相关的防范措施,无疑具有重要的现实意义。
本文是在引用前人大量的实证研究结论及调查数据的基础上,遵循规范研究的方法展开论述的。文章梳理了国内外学者关于大股东利益侵占行为的研究成果,并进行了评价。在对股权分置前后大股东利益侵占的现状进行分析的基础上,借鉴西方国家的经验,对我国后股权分置时代防止大股东利益侵占行为提出了自己的建议。
全文除引言和结束语外,共分为四部分。在引言中,主要阐述研究背景、研究目的及意义、文献综述、研究方法与研究思路以及本文的框架结构。正文为一至四部分,其中,第一部分为后股权分置时代大股东利益侵占的基本理论概述,包括基本概念界定、理论基础、大股东利益侵占行为的危害、股权分置改革前大股东利益侵占的实施途径、后股权分置时代大股东利益侵占行为的特点。通过学习前人的研究成果,该部分界定了后股权分置时代、大股东、中小股东、利益侵占的概念,从产权理论和委托代理理论的角度解释了大股东的利益侵占行为。大股东利益侵占行为严重侵害中小股东利益,降低上市公司资产质量,损伤上市公司盈利能力,增加上市公司财务风险,妨碍资本市场健康发展。文章简单列举了股权分置改革前大股东利益侵占行为的实施途径,大股东往往通过非公平关联交易、资金占用、股利政策、股权再融资等手段实现侵占中小股东利益的目的。为了形成对比,论文总结出后股权分置时代大股东利益侵占行为的新特点:部分侵占性、隐蔽性、可循环性。
第二部分为后股权分置时代上市公司大股东侵占行为的现状分析,包括国家政府约束上市公司大股东侵占行为的有关情况简介、后股权分置时代大股东尚存在利益侵占行为及其原因分析。政府部门在法律层面、监管层面、公司治理层面都采取了相关措施来防范大股东利益侵占行为,也取得了一定成绩。但是,后股权分置时代仍存在大股东利益侵占行为,并变为较过去更为隐藏的新形式,包括违规信息披露、减持股份过程中操纵股价、违规短线交易、与高管合谋、关联交易非关联化等。针对这种现象,本文从内部和外部两方面进行了原因分析。从内因来看,大股东仍保留控制权优势是其利益侵占行为发生的根源;从外因来看,中小投资者保护法有待完善,我国证券监管体系也明显存在缺陷。
第三部分为美日德三国约束大股东利益侵占行为措施的经验借鉴。通过分析美日德上市公司约束大股东侵占行为措施的经验,本文发现,三国都十分重视内部股权制衡机制,内部监督主体的独立性和中小投资者利益保护,三国的防范措施也是围绕这三个方面展开的。
第四部分为完善大股东利益侵占行为监管的建议。随着股权分置改革的推进和资本市场的完善,我国畸形的股权结构将会得到改善,逐步建立起全流通条件下的股票市场,股票的全流通和多样化的持股主体有利于形成制衡型的内部治理机制,在一定程度上抑制大股东利益侵占行为。但是,只有制衡型内部治理机制并不能够完全制止大股东侵占行为,同时,还需要设计相关的外部监管机制。证监会应该将监管定位在大股东行为监管、中小股东权益保护、上市公司信息披露和违规处罚上来,同时加强资本市场和社会监督的力量,建立起全方位、多层次的监管体系,以保上市公司运行规范化和高效化。
Shareholder Structure Reform is a major system-breakthrough of securities market in China. It overcomes pre-exiting defects of securities market-the same shares having different rights in China, weakens the base on which big shareholders practices benefit expropriation, and contributes to the improvement of corporate governance. Meanwhile, Shareholder Structure Reform does not eliminate market's ills immediately. For example, the conflict between big shareholders and medium and small shareholders still exists in securities market in China. In the background of post-non-tradable share period, changes in the way big shareholders profits will inevitably lead to changes in the way of benefit expropriation behaviors of big shareholders. Therefore, it is undoubtedly of great significance that we should do a reasonable analysis and take some measures to prevent big shareholders' benefit expropriation behaviors.
In reference to a large number of previous scholars' logical positive findings and data, this paper follows normative approach to launch the elaboration. The paper combeds domestic and foreign scholars' research findings about big shareholders' benefit expropriation behaviors at the present stage, and has carried on the appraisal. On the base of analyzing current situations of big shareholders' benefit expropriation behaviors in the background of post-non-tradable share period, learning from hesperian experience, the paper puts forwards suggestions to prevent big shareholders' benefit expropriation behaviors.
Besides the introduction and the concluding remarks, the paper falls into four parts. The introduction briefly introduces the research background, purpose and significance, document summary, researc approach and idea, and content framework. The text has four parts. The first part is the general introduction to the theories of big shareholders' benefit expropriation behaviors in the background of post-non-tradable share period, including definition of main related concepts, theoretical foundation, the forms of big shareholders' benefit expropriation behaviors before Shareholder Structure Reform, the new features of big shareholders' benefit expropriation behaviors in the background of post-non-tradable share period, and the harm of big shareholders' benefit expropriation behaviors. Through studying previous scholars' research results, the paper defines the related main concepts (post-non-tradable share period, big shareholders, medium and small shareholders, benefit expropriation), and generalizes theoretical foundation of expropriation of big shareholders (property right theory, principal-agent theory). It's proved that big shareholders' benefit expropriation behaviors expropriates the interest of medium and small shareholders, impairs assets quality of listed companies, damages the profitability of listed companies, increases the financial risks of listed companies, and hampers the development of securities market in China. Then the paper simply lists the methods of big shareholders' benefit expropriation behaviors before Shareholder Structure Reform. Big shareholders often use non-fair related-party transactions, occupation of funds, dividend policy, and equity refinancing to expropriate medium and small shareholders' interest. In order to make a contract, the paper concludes the new features of big shareholders' benefit expropriation behaviors: partial expropriation, concealment and circulation.
The second part is the analysis of current situations of big shareholders' benefit expropriation behaviors in the background of post-non-tradable share period, including introduction of measures taken by the government, the forms of big shareholders' benefit expropiration behaviors in the background of post-non-tradable share period, and the causes analysis of big shareholders' benefit expropiration behaviors in the background of post-non-tradable share period. The government departments have taken many measures to prevent big shareholders' benefit expropriation behaviors in law aspects, supervision aspects and corporate governance aspects. Certain achievements have been made. Therefore, big shareholders' benefit expropriation behaviors still exist in the background of post-non-tradable share period and may change to more hidden forms, including violating disclosure, manipulating price in decreasing shareholding, using short-swing trading, colluding with executives, using related party transactions in a non-associated form. According to these phenomena, both internal and external reasons are analyzed in the paper. From the internal perspective, big shareholders' control superiority is the root that causes big shareholders' benefit expropriation behaviors. From the external perspective, protection of medium and small investors needs to be improved, and moreover, there are obvious deficiencies in securities supervision system in China.
The third part is the experience reference of measures taken to prevent big shareholders' benefit expropriation behaviors in American, German and Japan. Through the analysis, it's proved that a check and balance governance mechanism, independence of the internal supervisor, and interest protection of medium and small shareholders are very efficient to prevent big shareholders' benefit expropriation behaviors.
The fourth part is the suggestions to perfect supervision on big shreholders' benefit expropriation behaviors. With advancement of Shareholder Structure Reform and completion of securities market, the abnormal equity structure will be improved; fully circulating stock market will be established. Circulation of all stocks and diversification of shareholders contribute to the establishment of a check and balance governance mechanism. However, only a check and balance governance mechanism is not able to prevent big shareholders' benefit expropriation behaviors, but also it is necessary to design the related external supervisory mechanism. In order to set up a comprehensive and multi-level supervision system for ensuring standardization and efficient operation of listed companies, Securities Supervisory Association should lay stress on supervision of big shareholders' behaviors, protection of medium and small shareholders' rights and interests, information disclosure of listed companies and non-compliance penalties, and strengthening supervision power of securities market and society.
本文是在引用前人大量的实证研究结论及调查数据的基础上,遵循规范研究的方法展开论述的。文章梳理了国内外学者关于大股东利益侵占行为的研究成果,并进行了评价。在对股权分置前后大股东利益侵占的现状进行分析的基础上,借鉴西方国家的经验,对我国后股权分置时代防止大股东利益侵占行为提出了自己的建议。
全文除引言和结束语外,共分为四部分。在引言中,主要阐述研究背景、研究目的及意义、文献综述、研究方法与研究思路以及本文的框架结构。正文为一至四部分,其中,第一部分为后股权分置时代大股东利益侵占的基本理论概述,包括基本概念界定、理论基础、大股东利益侵占行为的危害、股权分置改革前大股东利益侵占的实施途径、后股权分置时代大股东利益侵占行为的特点。通过学习前人的研究成果,该部分界定了后股权分置时代、大股东、中小股东、利益侵占的概念,从产权理论和委托代理理论的角度解释了大股东的利益侵占行为。大股东利益侵占行为严重侵害中小股东利益,降低上市公司资产质量,损伤上市公司盈利能力,增加上市公司财务风险,妨碍资本市场健康发展。文章简单列举了股权分置改革前大股东利益侵占行为的实施途径,大股东往往通过非公平关联交易、资金占用、股利政策、股权再融资等手段实现侵占中小股东利益的目的。为了形成对比,论文总结出后股权分置时代大股东利益侵占行为的新特点:部分侵占性、隐蔽性、可循环性。
第二部分为后股权分置时代上市公司大股东侵占行为的现状分析,包括国家政府约束上市公司大股东侵占行为的有关情况简介、后股权分置时代大股东尚存在利益侵占行为及其原因分析。政府部门在法律层面、监管层面、公司治理层面都采取了相关措施来防范大股东利益侵占行为,也取得了一定成绩。但是,后股权分置时代仍存在大股东利益侵占行为,并变为较过去更为隐藏的新形式,包括违规信息披露、减持股份过程中操纵股价、违规短线交易、与高管合谋、关联交易非关联化等。针对这种现象,本文从内部和外部两方面进行了原因分析。从内因来看,大股东仍保留控制权优势是其利益侵占行为发生的根源;从外因来看,中小投资者保护法有待完善,我国证券监管体系也明显存在缺陷。
第三部分为美日德三国约束大股东利益侵占行为措施的经验借鉴。通过分析美日德上市公司约束大股东侵占行为措施的经验,本文发现,三国都十分重视内部股权制衡机制,内部监督主体的独立性和中小投资者利益保护,三国的防范措施也是围绕这三个方面展开的。
第四部分为完善大股东利益侵占行为监管的建议。随着股权分置改革的推进和资本市场的完善,我国畸形的股权结构将会得到改善,逐步建立起全流通条件下的股票市场,股票的全流通和多样化的持股主体有利于形成制衡型的内部治理机制,在一定程度上抑制大股东利益侵占行为。但是,只有制衡型内部治理机制并不能够完全制止大股东侵占行为,同时,还需要设计相关的外部监管机制。证监会应该将监管定位在大股东行为监管、中小股东权益保护、上市公司信息披露和违规处罚上来,同时加强资本市场和社会监督的力量,建立起全方位、多层次的监管体系,以保上市公司运行规范化和高效化。
Shareholder Structure Reform is a major system-breakthrough of securities market in China. It overcomes pre-exiting defects of securities market-the same shares having different rights in China, weakens the base on which big shareholders practices benefit expropriation, and contributes to the improvement of corporate governance. Meanwhile, Shareholder Structure Reform does not eliminate market's ills immediately. For example, the conflict between big shareholders and medium and small shareholders still exists in securities market in China. In the background of post-non-tradable share period, changes in the way big shareholders profits will inevitably lead to changes in the way of benefit expropriation behaviors of big shareholders. Therefore, it is undoubtedly of great significance that we should do a reasonable analysis and take some measures to prevent big shareholders' benefit expropriation behaviors.
In reference to a large number of previous scholars' logical positive findings and data, this paper follows normative approach to launch the elaboration. The paper combeds domestic and foreign scholars' research findings about big shareholders' benefit expropriation behaviors at the present stage, and has carried on the appraisal. On the base of analyzing current situations of big shareholders' benefit expropriation behaviors in the background of post-non-tradable share period, learning from hesperian experience, the paper puts forwards suggestions to prevent big shareholders' benefit expropriation behaviors.
Besides the introduction and the concluding remarks, the paper falls into four parts. The introduction briefly introduces the research background, purpose and significance, document summary, researc approach and idea, and content framework. The text has four parts. The first part is the general introduction to the theories of big shareholders' benefit expropriation behaviors in the background of post-non-tradable share period, including definition of main related concepts, theoretical foundation, the forms of big shareholders' benefit expropriation behaviors before Shareholder Structure Reform, the new features of big shareholders' benefit expropriation behaviors in the background of post-non-tradable share period, and the harm of big shareholders' benefit expropriation behaviors. Through studying previous scholars' research results, the paper defines the related main concepts (post-non-tradable share period, big shareholders, medium and small shareholders, benefit expropriation), and generalizes theoretical foundation of expropriation of big shareholders (property right theory, principal-agent theory). It's proved that big shareholders' benefit expropriation behaviors expropriates the interest of medium and small shareholders, impairs assets quality of listed companies, damages the profitability of listed companies, increases the financial risks of listed companies, and hampers the development of securities market in China. Then the paper simply lists the methods of big shareholders' benefit expropriation behaviors before Shareholder Structure Reform. Big shareholders often use non-fair related-party transactions, occupation of funds, dividend policy, and equity refinancing to expropriate medium and small shareholders' interest. In order to make a contract, the paper concludes the new features of big shareholders' benefit expropriation behaviors: partial expropriation, concealment and circulation.
The second part is the analysis of current situations of big shareholders' benefit expropriation behaviors in the background of post-non-tradable share period, including introduction of measures taken by the government, the forms of big shareholders' benefit expropiration behaviors in the background of post-non-tradable share period, and the causes analysis of big shareholders' benefit expropiration behaviors in the background of post-non-tradable share period. The government departments have taken many measures to prevent big shareholders' benefit expropriation behaviors in law aspects, supervision aspects and corporate governance aspects. Certain achievements have been made. Therefore, big shareholders' benefit expropriation behaviors still exist in the background of post-non-tradable share period and may change to more hidden forms, including violating disclosure, manipulating price in decreasing shareholding, using short-swing trading, colluding with executives, using related party transactions in a non-associated form. According to these phenomena, both internal and external reasons are analyzed in the paper. From the internal perspective, big shareholders' control superiority is the root that causes big shareholders' benefit expropriation behaviors. From the external perspective, protection of medium and small investors needs to be improved, and moreover, there are obvious deficiencies in securities supervision system in China.
The third part is the experience reference of measures taken to prevent big shareholders' benefit expropriation behaviors in American, German and Japan. Through the analysis, it's proved that a check and balance governance mechanism, independence of the internal supervisor, and interest protection of medium and small shareholders are very efficient to prevent big shareholders' benefit expropriation behaviors.
The fourth part is the suggestions to perfect supervision on big shreholders' benefit expropriation behaviors. With advancement of Shareholder Structure Reform and completion of securities market, the abnormal equity structure will be improved; fully circulating stock market will be established. Circulation of all stocks and diversification of shareholders contribute to the establishment of a check and balance governance mechanism. However, only a check and balance governance mechanism is not able to prevent big shareholders' benefit expropriation behaviors, but also it is necessary to design the related external supervisory mechanism. In order to set up a comprehensive and multi-level supervision system for ensuring standardization and efficient operation of listed companies, Securities Supervisory Association should lay stress on supervision of big shareholders' behaviors, protection of medium and small shareholders' rights and interests, information disclosure of listed companies and non-compliance penalties, and strengthening supervision power of securities market and society.
引文
[1]数据来源:中国股权分置改革网
[2]老鼠仓是指庄家在用公有资金在拉升股价之前,先用自己个人的资金在低位建,待用公有资金拉升到高位后个人仓位率先卖出获利,最后亏损的是公家资金。
[3]张宏良:挑战中央政府的“涨停板”,价值中国网,2007-05-25http://lwww.chinavalue.net/Articir/Archive/2007/5/25/66315.html.根据以上资料整理
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[3]张星明.股权分置改革对大股东“隧道行为”的遏制效应研究.吉林大学,硕士学位论文,2008,4:12
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[1]交叉持股结构是指用于控制一个由多个企业构成的企业集团的投票权是分散在集团内的各个企业之中。
[2]二元股份结构是指同一家公司的股份具有不同的投票权,但这些具有不同投票权的股票具有相同或相似的收益权。最典型的二元股份是优先股与普通股。
[3]程玲玲.中国上市公司大股东侵占行为及影响因素研究.重庆大学,硕士学位论文,2008,6:6-7
[1]宋小保.控股股东代理条件下的利益侵占及其经济后果研究.重庆大学,博士学位论文,2007,10:20
[1]王彩虹.隧道行为产生原因与可能性分析.上海外国语大学,硕士学位论文,2008,12:15-16
[1]刘健.上市公司控股股东利益输送行为探析.江西财经大学,硕士学位论文,2006,10:13-14
[1]数据来源:http://money.finance.sina.com.cn/com/go.php/vGP_RelatedTrade/stockid/600227.phtml#2005-09-09-7
[2]周沪,李宇.沪深交易所完成年报事后审查占用资金和违规担保仍较突出[N].中国证券报,2005,6
[3]数据来源:http://www.ce.cn/cjzq/cjgs/gsyw/200408/11/t20040811_1472568.shtml
[4]蔡云伟,袁克成,王璐.我国上市公司大股东占款调查:占款猛于虎[N].上海证券报,2004,8
[5]2000年证监会出台了关于上市公司申请配股或增发必须满足近三年现金分红条件的规定。
[6]数据来源:“上市公司大面积分红为哪般”,上海证券报,2005,4
[1]程玲玲.中国上市公司大股东侵占行为及影响因素研究.重庆大学,硕士学位论文,2008,6
[1]数据来源:http://money.163.com/special/00252SP2/dagudong.html
[1]数据来源:http://money.163.com/special/00252SP2/dagudong.html.
[1]2005年9月4日,证监会发布的《上市公司股权分置改革管理办法》规定,改革后公司原非流通股股份的出售,自改革方案实施之日起,在12个月内不得上市交易或者转让;持有上述公司股份总数的5%以上的原非流通股股东,在前项规定期满后,通过证券交易所挂牌交易出售原非流通股股份,出售数量占该公司股份总数的比例在12个月内不得超过5%,在24个月内不得超过10%。根据这一政策规定,非流通股股份被分成两类:持股比例超过5%的大非流通股股份和持股比例小于5%的小非流通股股份。因此,这两者被简称为“大非”和“小非”。而目前市场上所称谓的“大小非解禁”就是指,这两类非流通股股份在通过股权分置改革之后,其股份由非流通转为流通的过程。
[2]数据来源:http://www.gushi360.com/finance/yaowen/2009-05-27/349502.shtml
[1]数据来源:http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/s/20081216/11005641906.shtml
[2]数据来源:http://news.hexun.com/2007-08-02/100094037.html.
[1]数据来源:http://focus.jrj.com.cn/home/zjhgg.html
[2]秦锂,朱炎.上市公司股权激励现状分析,财会通讯,2009,6
[1]数据来源:http://enews.xwhb.com/html/2009-O6/17/content_78576.htm.
[1]数据来源:http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/companyresearch/20090511/11426208533_2.shtml.
[1]李井平.基于股权分置改革的上市公司大股东侵害行为研究.暨南大学,硕士学位论文,2008,5:45-46
[1]蔡爽.股份全流通后大股东行为变化及监管研究.深证综研字第0157号,深圳:深圳证券交易所综合研究所,2007
[2]蔡云伟,袁克成,王璐.我国上市公司大股东占款调查:占款猛于虎.上海证券报,2004,8
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[8]贺建刚.大股东控制、利益输送与投资者保护--基于上市公司资产收购关联交易的实证研究.公司财务讨论会论文集.上海财经大学出版社,2004,23-28
[9]胡炎杰.浅析美国公司结构治理模式.大众商务,2009,3
[10]张祥建,郭岚.盈余管理与控制性大股东的“隧道行为”--来自配股公司的证据.南开经济研究,2007,6:79
[11]李海英.大股东利益输送行为的研究综述.商业时代,2007,6:79
[12]李森.大股东“隧道行为”及其监管研究.山东大学,博士学位论文,2008,10
[13]李小荣,孙月忠.上市公司“掏空”问题研究综述.财会通讯,2008,12:48
[14]李增泉,孙铮,王志伟.“掏空”与所有权安排--来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据.会计研究,2004,12
[15]刘成彦,陈炜.后股权分置时代上市公司大股东交易行为研究.证券市场导报,2006,10
[16]刘丹丹.控股股东占资行为的经济危害及解决途径初探.复旦大学,博士学位论文,2006,12:13-24
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[30]孙新宇.后股权分置时代谨防大股东操纵股价.上海国贸,2006,7
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[34]王彩虹.隧道行为产生原因与可能性分析.上海外国语大学,硕士学位论文,2008,12:8-10
[35]王鹏,秦宛顺,控股股东类型与公司绩效--基于中国上市公司的证据.统计研究,2006,7:36-40
[36]王鹏,周黎安.控股股东的控制权,所有权与公司绩效:基于中国上市公司的证据.金融研究,2006,2:88-98.
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[47]张祥建,徐晋.股权再融资与大股东控制的“隧道效应”——上市公司股权再融资偏好的再解释.管理世界,2005,11
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[2]老鼠仓是指庄家在用公有资金在拉升股价之前,先用自己个人的资金在低位建,待用公有资金拉升到高位后个人仓位率先卖出获利,最后亏损的是公家资金。
[3]张宏良:挑战中央政府的“涨停板”,价值中国网,2007-05-25http://lwww.chinavalue.net/Articir/Archive/2007/5/25/66315.html.根据以上资料整理
[1]刘健.上市公司控股股东利益输送行为探析,江西财经大学,硕士学位论文,2006,10:1-2
[1]李森.大股东“隧道行为”及其监管研究.山东大学,博士学位论文,2008,10:25
[1]王彩虹.隧道行为产生原因与可能性分析.上海外国语大学,硕士学位论文,2008,12:9
[2]汪新生.上市公司控制权转移后的大股东利益输送问题研究.浙江大学,硕士学位论文,2008,4:11
[3]张祥建,郭岚.盈余管理与控制性大股东的“隧道行为”--来自配股公司的证据.南开经济研究,2007,6:79
[4]向正平.我国上市公司控制性股东隧道行为及影响因素研究.湖南大学,2007,10:4
[5]李小荣.孙月忠.上市公司“掏空”问题研究综述.财会通讯,2008,12:48
[1]李小荣,孙月忠.上市公司“掏空”问题研究综述.财会通讯,2008,12:48
[1]刘丹丹.控股股东占资行为的经济危害及解决途径初探.复旦大学,博士学位论文,2006,12:19
[2]李海英.大股东利益输送行为的研究综述.商业时代.2007,11:67
[3]程玲玲.中国上市公司大股东侵占行为及影响因素研究.重庆大学,硕士学位论文,2008,6:11
[4]刘丹丹.控股股东占资行为的经济危害及解决途径初探.复旦大学,博士学位论文,2006,12:13-24
[1]张星明.股权分置改革对大股东“隧道行为”的遏制效应研究.吉林大学,硕士学位论文,2008,4:13
[2]王彩虹.隧道行为产生原因与可能性分析.上海外国语大学,硕士学位论文,2008,12:8
[3]张星明.股权分置改革对大股东“隧道行为”的遏制效应研究.吉林大学,硕士学位论文,2008,4:12
[1]穆晓卿,侯晓红.配股融资过程中的利益转移行为分析.财会通讯,2007,3:12
[2]王彩虹.隧道行为产生原因与可能性分析.上海外国语大学,硕士学位论文,2008,12:9
[3]李小荣,孙月忠.上市公司“掏空”问题研究综述.财会通讯,2008,12:48
[4]李小荣,孙月忠.上市公司“掏空”问题研究综述.财会通讯,2008,12:49
[1]汪新生.上市公司控制权转移后的大股东利益输送问题研究.浙江大学,硕士学位论文,2008,4:42
[2]向正平.我国上市公司控制性股东隧道行为及影响因素研究.湖南大学,2007,10:6
[1]陈振兴.后股权分置时期大股东侵害行为研究.广东外语外贸大学,硕士论文。2007.10:2-3
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[1]交叉持股结构是指用于控制一个由多个企业构成的企业集团的投票权是分散在集团内的各个企业之中。
[2]二元股份结构是指同一家公司的股份具有不同的投票权,但这些具有不同投票权的股票具有相同或相似的收益权。最典型的二元股份是优先股与普通股。
[3]程玲玲.中国上市公司大股东侵占行为及影响因素研究.重庆大学,硕士学位论文,2008,6:6-7
[1]宋小保.控股股东代理条件下的利益侵占及其经济后果研究.重庆大学,博士学位论文,2007,10:20
[1]王彩虹.隧道行为产生原因与可能性分析.上海外国语大学,硕士学位论文,2008,12:15-16
[1]刘健.上市公司控股股东利益输送行为探析.江西财经大学,硕士学位论文,2006,10:13-14
[1]数据来源:http://money.finance.sina.com.cn/com/go.php/vGP_RelatedTrade/stockid/600227.phtml#2005-09-09-7
[2]周沪,李宇.沪深交易所完成年报事后审查占用资金和违规担保仍较突出[N].中国证券报,2005,6
[3]数据来源:http://www.ce.cn/cjzq/cjgs/gsyw/200408/11/t20040811_1472568.shtml
[4]蔡云伟,袁克成,王璐.我国上市公司大股东占款调查:占款猛于虎[N].上海证券报,2004,8
[5]2000年证监会出台了关于上市公司申请配股或增发必须满足近三年现金分红条件的规定。
[6]数据来源:“上市公司大面积分红为哪般”,上海证券报,2005,4
[1]程玲玲.中国上市公司大股东侵占行为及影响因素研究.重庆大学,硕士学位论文,2008,6
[1]数据来源:http://money.163.com/special/00252SP2/dagudong.html
[1]数据来源:http://money.163.com/special/00252SP2/dagudong.html.
[1]2005年9月4日,证监会发布的《上市公司股权分置改革管理办法》规定,改革后公司原非流通股股份的出售,自改革方案实施之日起,在12个月内不得上市交易或者转让;持有上述公司股份总数的5%以上的原非流通股股东,在前项规定期满后,通过证券交易所挂牌交易出售原非流通股股份,出售数量占该公司股份总数的比例在12个月内不得超过5%,在24个月内不得超过10%。根据这一政策规定,非流通股股份被分成两类:持股比例超过5%的大非流通股股份和持股比例小于5%的小非流通股股份。因此,这两者被简称为“大非”和“小非”。而目前市场上所称谓的“大小非解禁”就是指,这两类非流通股股份在通过股权分置改革之后,其股份由非流通转为流通的过程。
[2]数据来源:http://www.gushi360.com/finance/yaowen/2009-05-27/349502.shtml
[1]数据来源:http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/s/20081216/11005641906.shtml
[2]数据来源:http://news.hexun.com/2007-08-02/100094037.html.
[1]数据来源:http://focus.jrj.com.cn/home/zjhgg.html
[2]秦锂,朱炎.上市公司股权激励现状分析,财会通讯,2009,6
[1]数据来源:http://enews.xwhb.com/html/2009-O6/17/content_78576.htm.
[1]数据来源:http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/companyresearch/20090511/11426208533_2.shtml.
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