环保税开征下的政府补贴和企业行为再选择
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摘要
政府与企业的协作配合是解决环境污染问题的关键。构建包含地方政府和企业的两阶段完美信息动态博弈模型,分析政府和企业在环保税实施过程中的均衡策略,并应用系统动力学工具对政府和企业的均衡决策进行政策模拟,进一步证明模型结论。研究表明:企业环保技术投入与地方政府补贴互成正比,企业环保技术投入、地方政府补贴与环保技术产出成反比;环保技术产出对降低企业和政府环境治理成本作用显著,是环保税实施中影响政府和企业行为的关键因素。未来政府和企业应以提高环保技术水平为攻坚目标。
The cooperation between government and enterprises is the key to solve the problem of environmental pollution. A two-stage perfect information dynamic game model including local governments and enterprises was constructed to analyze the equilibrium strategy of governments and enterprises in the implementation process of environmental protection tax. The policy simulation of the equilibrium decision of governments and enterprises was carried out with the help of system dynamics tools,and the model conclusion was further proved. The research shows that the investment of environmental protection technology in enterprises is directly proportional to the local government subsidy, while the investment of environmental protection technology in enterprises, the local government subsidy are inversely proportional to the output of environmental protection technology. The output of environmental protection technology plays a significant role in reducing the environmental governance cost of enterprises and governments, and is a key factor affecting the behavior of governments and enterprises in the implementation of environmental protection tax. In the future,the government and enterprises should aim to improve the level of environmental protection technology.
The cooperation between government and enterprises is the key to solve the problem of environmental pollution. A two-stage perfect information dynamic game model including local governments and enterprises was constructed to analyze the equilibrium strategy of governments and enterprises in the implementation process of environmental protection tax. The policy simulation of the equilibrium decision of governments and enterprises was carried out with the help of system dynamics tools,and the model conclusion was further proved. The research shows that the investment of environmental protection technology in enterprises is directly proportional to the local government subsidy, while the investment of environmental protection technology in enterprises, the local government subsidy are inversely proportional to the output of environmental protection technology. The output of environmental protection technology plays a significant role in reducing the environmental governance cost of enterprises and governments, and is a key factor affecting the behavior of governments and enterprises in the implementation of environmental protection tax. In the future,the government and enterprises should aim to improve the level of environmental protection technology.
引文
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[2]JANET E M. Carbon taxes in the United States:the context for the future[J]. Vermont journal of environmental law,2008,10(1):1-30.
[3]梁伟，朱孔来，姜巍.环境税的区域节能减排效果及经济影响分析[J].财经研究，2014,40(1):40-49.
[4]VANVLIET O,DEVRIES B,FAAIJ A,et al. Multi-agent simulation of adoption of alternative fuels[J].Transportation research part D:transport and environment,2010,15(6):326-342.
[5]BERGEK A,BERGGREN C.The impact of environmental policy instruments on innovation:a review of energy and automotive industry studies[J]. Ecological economics,2014,106(10):112-123.
[6]PORTER M,VANDERLINDE C.Green and competitive:ending the stalemate[J]. Harvard business review,1995,73(5):120-134.
[7]JANICKE M,LINDEMANN S.Governing environmental innovations[J].Environmental politics,2009,19(1):127-141.
[8]ABDULLAH S,MORLEY B.Environmental taxes and economic growth:evidence from panel causality tests[J].Energy economics,2014,42(3):27-33.
[9]WENDNER R.An applied dynamic general equilibrium model of environmental tax reforms and pension policy[J].Journal of policy modeling,2001,23(1):25-50.
[10]关华，齐卫娜，王胜洲，等.环境污染治理中企业政府间博弈分析[J].经济与管理，2014,28(6):72-75.
[11]陈真玲，王文举.环境税制下政府与污染企业演化博弈分析[J].管理评论，2017,29(5):226-236.
[12]程发新，邵世玲，徐立峰，等.基于政府补贴的企业主动碳减排最优策略研究[J].中国人口·资源与环境，2015,25(7):32-39.
[13]许家云，毛其淋.政府补贴治理环境与中国企业生存[J].世界经济，2016(2):75-99.
[14]ARFAOUI N,BROUILLAT E,SAINT J M.Policy design and technological substitution:investigating the reach regulation in an agent-based model[J].Ecological economics,2014,107(11):347-365.