工程项目质量管理的博弈分析
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摘要
应用博弈论中的完全信息静态博弈对工程项目质量管理进行了定量分析,得出了混合战略纳什均衡点,讨论了处罚力度、检查成本与不按规范施工获利等关键因素对均衡结果的影响,详细分析了监理单位和施工单位的具体行为﹒得到如下结论:加大处罚力度、减少检查成本和加强对工程项目的检查尤其是对重点部位进行重点检查,可达到加强工程项目质量管理,提高工程质量水平,维护国家和业主利益的目的.
In this paper,the theory of complete information static game was applied to the quantitative analysis of quality management of engineering project.Based on the mixed strategy-Nashen equilibrium point,this paper discussed the influence of the key factors such as punishment,cost for inspection and unallowable profit to equilibrium result,and particularly analysed the actions of intendance units and builders.Some conclusions were found that the aims of strengthening quality management of engineering project and enhancing engineering quality and vindicating the benefit for state and owner can be achieved by increasing punishment and cutting down cost for inspection and reinforcing inspection of the engineering project,especially of key parts.
引文
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