权利概念的利益论
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摘要
在权利的社会实践中,权利有三个重要特征。第一,权利保障了个体利益,通过保障个体利益,权利彰显了人的尊严,体现了对人性的尊重。第二,权利浓缩了以个体利益为起点、经由事实和价值论证、以他人负担义务为终点的实践推理过程,凝聚了价值共识、提高了实践效率。第三,权利以保障个体利益为目的推动了对相关义务的论证,为解决社会生活中不断涌现的新问题提供了动力机制。利益论权利概念反映了权利在社会实践中的这些普遍特征,能够合理地解释权利与价值、义务、利益的关联和差异。
There are three important features in the social practice of rights: Firstly, individual interests is the end of rights, through protecting individual interests, rights defends the dignity of individual.Secondly, the rights in nature is a kind of practical reasoning, which begins with one's interests, by way of argumentations at the factual and value level, draws a conclusion that another undertakes certain duty. This practical reasoning condenses value consensus, and improves practical efficiency. Thirdly, rights can create new duties, thus provides a dynamical mechanism that resolves new problems emerging in social life. The interest theory of concept of rights grasps these three features, and offers reasonable explanation for the relationship of rights with value, duty and interests.
There are three important features in the social practice of rights: Firstly, individual interests is the end of rights, through protecting individual interests, rights defends the dignity of individual.Secondly, the rights in nature is a kind of practical reasoning, which begins with one's interests, by way of argumentations at the factual and value level, draws a conclusion that another undertakes certain duty. This practical reasoning condenses value consensus, and improves practical efficiency. Thirdly, rights can create new duties, thus provides a dynamical mechanism that resolves new problems emerging in social life. The interest theory of concept of rights grasps these three features, and offers reasonable explanation for the relationship of rights with value, duty and interests.
引文
(1)Matthew H. Kramer and Hillel Steiner,“Theories of Rights:Is There a Third Way?” Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2(2007), p. 298.尽管意志论是利益论的主要竞争对手,但本文不打算以批驳意志论为主线来辩护利益论。原因在于,即便证明意志论是错误的,也不自然代表利益论是正确的。反驳意志论不是利益论的有效辩护方式,应该直接面对利益论自身遇到的各类挑战,在回应中锻造出合理的利益论权利概念。
(2)[德]萨维尼:《当代罗马法体系》,朱虎译,中国法制出版社2010年版,第10页。
(3)[德]耶林:《为权利而斗争》,郑永流译,法律出版社2007年版,第21页。
(4)[德]罗伯特·阿列克西:《法·理性·商谈》,朱光、雷磊译,中国法制出版社2011年版,第227页。
(5)霍菲尔德本人并没有表露出仅仅在形式层面界定权利概念的意图,他的用意在于澄清司法推理中概念运用上的混淆与矛盾。他的这套法律关系学说被其后的权利理论研究者普遍奉为权利的结构分析经典,被接受为最优的权利的形式概念。William A. Edmundson, An Introduction to Rights, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 94.
(6)[美]霍菲尔德:《基本法律概念》,张书友编译,中国法制出版社2009年版,第28页。关于霍菲尔德法律关系学说的反思、重构,参见陈景辉:《权利与义务是对应的吗?》,《法制与社会发展》2014年第3期;雷磊:《法律权利的逻辑分析:结构与类型》,《法制与社会发展》2014年第3期。
(7)Andrew Halpin, Rights and Law:Analysis and Theory,Hart Publishing, 1997, p. 47.
(8)L. W. Sumner, The Moral Foundation of Rights, Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 27.
(9)H. L. A. Hart,“Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence”, in his Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 1983, p. 35, n. 15.
(10)John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 203.
(11)Jonathan Gorman, Rights and Reason:An Introduction to the Philosophy of Rights, Acumen Publishing, 2003, p. 113.
(12)H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 89.
(13)N. E. Simmonds,“Rights at the Cutting Edge”, in Matthew H. Kramer, N. Simmonds, and H. Steiner, A Debate Over Rights, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 212.
(14)[美]史蒂文·卢克斯:《权力:一种激进的观点》,彭斌译,江苏人民出版社2008年版,第27页。
(15)于柏华:《权利的公益构成》,《北方法学》2017年第4期,第33页。
(16)Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property, Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 88.
(17)Tom Campbell, Rights:A Critical Introduction, Routledge, 2006, p. 43.
(18)Joel Feinberg, The Nature and Value of Rights, Journal of Value Inquiry, No. 4(1970), p. 257.
(19)Michael Rosen, Dignity:Its History and Meaning,Harvard University Press, 2012, Ch. 1.
(20)Kai Mller, The Global Model of Constitutional Rights,Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 44.
(21)Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 188.
(22)MacCormick,“Rights in Legislation”, in P. M. S.Hacker and Joseph Raz(eds.), Law, Morality and Society:essays in honour of H.L.A. Hart, Oxford University Press, 1977,p. 192.
(23)Jeremy Bentham, Theory of Legislation, translated by R. Hildreth, Wertheimer, Lea and Co., Printers, 1931, p. 93.
(24)[英]边沁:《论一般法律》,毛国权译,上海三联书店2008年版,第73页。
(25)H. L. A. Hart,“Legal Rights”, in his Essays on Bentham:Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory, Oxford University Press, 1982, p.181.
(26)H. L. A. Hart,“Legal Rights”, in his Essays on Bentham:Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory, Oxford University Press, 1982, p.187.
(27)David Lyons,“Rights, Claimants, and Beneficiaries”,American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 3(1969), p.176.
(28)Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Translated and Edited by Roger Crisp, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 42.
(29)Robert Alexy,“The Reasonableness of Law”, in Giorgio Bongiovanni, Giovanni Sartor, Chiara Valentini(eds.),Reasonableness and Law, Springer, 2009, pp. 5~11.
(30)在权利概念内含的实践推理中,义务是最终的结论,在这种意义上“权利先于义务”。这并不意味着所有义务都基于权利而证立,它的准确含义是,就那些权利能够证立的义务而言,权利先于义务。是否所有义务都基于权利而证立,权利是否最终立基于(某种基本的)义务,这些问题已经超出了“权利是什么”的范畴,进入了权利的实质性道德论辩的层次,不同的道德理论对这个问题有不同的答案。Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Harvard U-niversity Press, 1977, p. 171.
(31)Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 166.
(32)Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property, Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 83.
(33)MacCormick,“Children’s Rights:a Test-Case for Theories of Right”, in his Legal Right and Social Democracy:Essays in Legal and Political Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 163.
(34)在权利理论研究中,人们普遍认为,利益论的现实解释力要优于意志论。意志论以选择作为权利的价值核心,“拥有权利者都拥有一种在法律上被尊重的选择。”H.L. A. Hart,“Legal Rights”, in his Essays on Bentham:Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory, Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 188.这使它很难合理解释众多不允许选择或限制选择的权利。例如,不可放弃的人权,宪法中的权利,刑法中的权利,胎儿、儿童、精神病人等无选择能力者的权利。利益论将“选择”视为权利的辅助性、救济性要素,不仅可以解释允许选择的权利,也可以解释不可选择的权利。在利益论看来,有些权利允许主体选择,这是为了保障权利人的自由利益。例如,允许权利人选择是否发表言论、发表什么样的言论,不论选择结果如何,都保障了权利人的言论自由利益。有些权利之所以不允许主体选择或者只允许有限的选择,这是为了保障权利人自由以外的利益。对于那些没有选择能力的人(精神病人等)来讲,不允许选择才能更好地维护他们的相关利益,例如,精神病人的财产权不允许他将财产“赠与”他人。在某些社会环境下,例如,劳资双方经济地位严重不对等,主体不受限制的选择会为其利益带来不可接受的损害后果,例如,一份工资极低而劳务繁重的合同,此时,限制选择才能真正保障他的利益。MacCormick,“Rights in Legislation”, in P. M. S.Hacker and Joseph Raz(eds.), Law, Morality and Society:essays in honour of H.L.A. Hart, Oxford University Press, 1977,p. 207.
(35)David Lyons,“Rights, Claimants, and Beneficiaries”,American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 3(1969), p. 183.
(36)Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others, Oxford University Press, 1984, p. 74.
(37)王泽鉴:《债法原理》,北京大学出版社2013年版,第13页。
(38)Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 173.
(39)Brian Barry, Political Argument, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990, p. 196.
(40)Joseph Raz,“Rights and Politics”, Indiana Law Jour-nal, Vol. 71(1995), p. 36.
(41)Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 183.
(42)Jeremy Waldron,“Rights in Conflict”, in his Liberal Rights:Collected Papers(1981-1991), Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 213.
(43)Jeremy Waldron,“Rights in Conflict”, in his Liberal Rights:Collected Papers(1981-1991), Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 212.
(44)Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 185.
(45)Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 171.
(46)于柏华:《权利认定的利益判准》,《法学家》2017年第6期,第3~7页。
(47)N. E. Simmonds,“Rights at the Cutting Edge”, in Matthew H. Kramer, N. Simmonds, and H. Steiner, A Debate Over Rights, Oxford University Press, 1998. p. 151.
(48)Andrei Marmor, Law in the Age of Pluralism, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 227.
(49)Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 181.
(50)Daniel J. Solove,“Conceptualizing Privacy”, California Law Review, Vol. 90(2002), pp.1099~1122.
(51)Andrei Marmor, Law in the Age of Pluralism, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 228.
(52)John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, 1999, p. 5.
(53)[英]约翰·穆勒:《功利主义》,徐大建译,上海人民出版社2008年版,第55页。
(54)[美]罗伯特·诺奇克:《无政府、国家和乌托邦》,姚大志译,中国社会科学出版社2008年版,第35页。
(55)Ronald Dworkin,“Rights as Trumps”, in Jeremy Waldron(ed.), Theories of Rights, Oxford University Press,1984, p. 153.
(56)[德]哈贝马斯:《在事实与规范之间——关于法律和民主法治国的商谈理论》,生活·读书·新知三联书店2003年版,第319页。
(57)近来国内学界讨论权利观的代表性作品,参见刘叶深:《权利优先性的困境及其解决》,《环球法律评论》2017年第6期;朱振:《共同善权利观的力度与限度》,《法学家》2018年第2期。
(2)[德]萨维尼:《当代罗马法体系》,朱虎译,中国法制出版社2010年版,第10页。
(3)[德]耶林:《为权利而斗争》,郑永流译,法律出版社2007年版,第21页。
(4)[德]罗伯特·阿列克西:《法·理性·商谈》,朱光、雷磊译,中国法制出版社2011年版,第227页。
(5)霍菲尔德本人并没有表露出仅仅在形式层面界定权利概念的意图,他的用意在于澄清司法推理中概念运用上的混淆与矛盾。他的这套法律关系学说被其后的权利理论研究者普遍奉为权利的结构分析经典,被接受为最优的权利的形式概念。William A. Edmundson, An Introduction to Rights, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 94.
(6)[美]霍菲尔德:《基本法律概念》,张书友编译,中国法制出版社2009年版,第28页。关于霍菲尔德法律关系学说的反思、重构,参见陈景辉:《权利与义务是对应的吗?》,《法制与社会发展》2014年第3期;雷磊:《法律权利的逻辑分析:结构与类型》,《法制与社会发展》2014年第3期。
(7)Andrew Halpin, Rights and Law:Analysis and Theory,Hart Publishing, 1997, p. 47.
(8)L. W. Sumner, The Moral Foundation of Rights, Oxford University Press, 1987, p. 27.
(9)H. L. A. Hart,“Definition and Theory in Jurisprudence”, in his Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 1983, p. 35, n. 15.
(10)John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 203.
(11)Jonathan Gorman, Rights and Reason:An Introduction to the Philosophy of Rights, Acumen Publishing, 2003, p. 113.
(12)H. L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 89.
(13)N. E. Simmonds,“Rights at the Cutting Edge”, in Matthew H. Kramer, N. Simmonds, and H. Steiner, A Debate Over Rights, Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 212.
(14)[美]史蒂文·卢克斯:《权力:一种激进的观点》,彭斌译,江苏人民出版社2008年版,第27页。
(15)于柏华:《权利的公益构成》,《北方法学》2017年第4期,第33页。
(16)Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property, Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 88.
(17)Tom Campbell, Rights:A Critical Introduction, Routledge, 2006, p. 43.
(18)Joel Feinberg, The Nature and Value of Rights, Journal of Value Inquiry, No. 4(1970), p. 257.
(19)Michael Rosen, Dignity:Its History and Meaning,Harvard University Press, 2012, Ch. 1.
(20)Kai Mller, The Global Model of Constitutional Rights,Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 44.
(21)Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 188.
(22)MacCormick,“Rights in Legislation”, in P. M. S.Hacker and Joseph Raz(eds.), Law, Morality and Society:essays in honour of H.L.A. Hart, Oxford University Press, 1977,p. 192.
(23)Jeremy Bentham, Theory of Legislation, translated by R. Hildreth, Wertheimer, Lea and Co., Printers, 1931, p. 93.
(24)[英]边沁:《论一般法律》,毛国权译,上海三联书店2008年版,第73页。
(25)H. L. A. Hart,“Legal Rights”, in his Essays on Bentham:Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory, Oxford University Press, 1982, p.181.
(26)H. L. A. Hart,“Legal Rights”, in his Essays on Bentham:Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory, Oxford University Press, 1982, p.187.
(27)David Lyons,“Rights, Claimants, and Beneficiaries”,American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 3(1969), p.176.
(28)Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Translated and Edited by Roger Crisp, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 42.
(29)Robert Alexy,“The Reasonableness of Law”, in Giorgio Bongiovanni, Giovanni Sartor, Chiara Valentini(eds.),Reasonableness and Law, Springer, 2009, pp. 5~11.
(30)在权利概念内含的实践推理中,义务是最终的结论,在这种意义上“权利先于义务”。这并不意味着所有义务都基于权利而证立,它的准确含义是,就那些权利能够证立的义务而言,权利先于义务。是否所有义务都基于权利而证立,权利是否最终立基于(某种基本的)义务,这些问题已经超出了“权利是什么”的范畴,进入了权利的实质性道德论辩的层次,不同的道德理论对这个问题有不同的答案。Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Harvard U-niversity Press, 1977, p. 171.
(31)Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 166.
(32)Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private Property, Oxford University Press, 1988, p. 83.
(33)MacCormick,“Children’s Rights:a Test-Case for Theories of Right”, in his Legal Right and Social Democracy:Essays in Legal and Political Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 163.
(34)在权利理论研究中,人们普遍认为,利益论的现实解释力要优于意志论。意志论以选择作为权利的价值核心,“拥有权利者都拥有一种在法律上被尊重的选择。”H.L. A. Hart,“Legal Rights”, in his Essays on Bentham:Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory, Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 188.这使它很难合理解释众多不允许选择或限制选择的权利。例如,不可放弃的人权,宪法中的权利,刑法中的权利,胎儿、儿童、精神病人等无选择能力者的权利。利益论将“选择”视为权利的辅助性、救济性要素,不仅可以解释允许选择的权利,也可以解释不可选择的权利。在利益论看来,有些权利允许主体选择,这是为了保障权利人的自由利益。例如,允许权利人选择是否发表言论、发表什么样的言论,不论选择结果如何,都保障了权利人的言论自由利益。有些权利之所以不允许主体选择或者只允许有限的选择,这是为了保障权利人自由以外的利益。对于那些没有选择能力的人(精神病人等)来讲,不允许选择才能更好地维护他们的相关利益,例如,精神病人的财产权不允许他将财产“赠与”他人。在某些社会环境下,例如,劳资双方经济地位严重不对等,主体不受限制的选择会为其利益带来不可接受的损害后果,例如,一份工资极低而劳务繁重的合同,此时,限制选择才能真正保障他的利益。MacCormick,“Rights in Legislation”, in P. M. S.Hacker and Joseph Raz(eds.), Law, Morality and Society:essays in honour of H.L.A. Hart, Oxford University Press, 1977,p. 207.
(35)David Lyons,“Rights, Claimants, and Beneficiaries”,American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 3(1969), p. 183.
(36)Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others, Oxford University Press, 1984, p. 74.
(37)王泽鉴:《债法原理》,北京大学出版社2013年版,第13页。
(38)Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 173.
(39)Brian Barry, Political Argument, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990, p. 196.
(40)Joseph Raz,“Rights and Politics”, Indiana Law Jour-nal, Vol. 71(1995), p. 36.
(41)Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 183.
(42)Jeremy Waldron,“Rights in Conflict”, in his Liberal Rights:Collected Papers(1981-1991), Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 213.
(43)Jeremy Waldron,“Rights in Conflict”, in his Liberal Rights:Collected Papers(1981-1991), Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 212.
(44)Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 185.
(45)Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 171.
(46)于柏华:《权利认定的利益判准》,《法学家》2017年第6期,第3~7页。
(47)N. E. Simmonds,“Rights at the Cutting Edge”, in Matthew H. Kramer, N. Simmonds, and H. Steiner, A Debate Over Rights, Oxford University Press, 1998. p. 151.
(48)Andrei Marmor, Law in the Age of Pluralism, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 227.
(49)Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 181.
(50)Daniel J. Solove,“Conceptualizing Privacy”, California Law Review, Vol. 90(2002), pp.1099~1122.
(51)Andrei Marmor, Law in the Age of Pluralism, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 228.
(52)John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, 1999, p. 5.
(53)[英]约翰·穆勒:《功利主义》,徐大建译,上海人民出版社2008年版,第55页。
(54)[美]罗伯特·诺奇克:《无政府、国家和乌托邦》,姚大志译,中国社会科学出版社2008年版,第35页。
(55)Ronald Dworkin,“Rights as Trumps”, in Jeremy Waldron(ed.), Theories of Rights, Oxford University Press,1984, p. 153.
(56)[德]哈贝马斯:《在事实与规范之间——关于法律和民主法治国的商谈理论》,生活·读书·新知三联书店2003年版,第319页。
(57)近来国内学界讨论权利观的代表性作品,参见刘叶深:《权利优先性的困境及其解决》,《环球法律评论》2017年第6期;朱振:《共同善权利观的力度与限度》,《法学家》2018年第2期。