摘要
A REDD scheme would involve the transfer of financial resources to forested developing countries taking part in it. This paper simulates different approaches to the design of intergovernmental fiscal transfers (IFTs), a possible means to channel a REDD international payment to local governments which, in several countries, have a certain degree of authority over forest management. Using Indonesia as a case study, the cost-reimbursement and the derivation approaches are tested. It is demonstrated that both approaches could be used. Using the cost-reimbursement approach, localities with more degraded forests would receive a higher compensation per unit of carbon emission reduction than districts with primary forests. Avoiding further conversion of logged-over areas is associated with higher opportunity costs when compared with preventing the conversion of primary forests. In contrast, the derivation approach sets a fixed percentage and rate to distribute REDD revenues and ignores the opportunity costs of REDD incurred by local governments. The distribution of REDD revenues to eligible local governments is based on an assumed market price of carbon credits from REDD . This paper concludes by discussing the implications of the findings for designing the distribution of REDD revenues, both for Indonesia and more generically for other developing countries.