认知困境与信念伦理
摘要
克利福德认为任何人都不应该相信没有充分证据的东西,在信念形成过程中我们应该始终保持理智上的高度诚实和认真负责的态度,让信念跟证据相称,这是人类应该遵循的信念伦理。从知识论的角度看,克利福德至少面临三种反驳,即认知不胜任反驳,零认知条件反驳和自证信念反驳。但事实上根本不存在克利福德原则无法适用的认知困境,此三种反驳皆归于无效,我们依然有捍卫克利福德原则的正当理由。
引文
[1]文学平:《可错论的合理证明与碰巧为真的运气:葛梯尔问题的实质及其相关错误理解》,《浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版)》2015年第2期。
[2]Nicholas Bunnin and Jiyuan Yu,The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy,Malden:Blackwell Publishing,2004,p. 229.
[3]William Kingdon Clifford,The Ethics of Belief,In his Lectures and Essays,Vol. 2,London:Macmillan and Co.,1901,pp. 163-205.此文最初是1876年4月11日克利福德在伦敦向“形而上学学会”(Metaphysical Society)成员发表的演讲。
[4][5][6][10][11]William Kingdon Clifford,Lectures and Essays,Vol. 2,London:Macmillan and Co.,1901,pp. 164,165,175,166,169.
[7]虽然克利福德并没有明白无误说这是一个道德原则,但其论文的标题(The ethics of Belief)和整个论证都在告诉人们他讨论的是道德问题,而非知识论问题。但这个道德问题又显然是以知识论问题为前提的。
[8][13]Allen W. Wood,Unsettling Obligations:Essays on Reason,Reality and the Ethics of Belief,Stanford:CSLI Publications,2002,pp. 3,9.
[9]Susan Haack,“The Ethics of Belief”Reconsidered,In:Matthias Steup(ed.),Knowledge,Truth,and Duty:Essays on Epistemic Justification,Responsibility,and Virtue,New York:Oxford University Press,2001,p. 24.
[12]外在主义的证成思路是在回应葛梯尔难题的过程中逐步形成的,而葛尔难题是1963年才出现的(Edmund L. Gettier,“Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”,Analysis,Vol. 23,No. 6,1963,pp. 121-123),那时,克利福德已经去世84年了。
[14]Jeffery Jordan,“Pascal’s Wagers and James’s Will to Believe”,In:William J. Wainwright,The Oxford handbook of philosophy of religion,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2005,p. 176.
[15]Ian Hacking,“The Logic of Pascal’s Wager”,American Philosophical Quarterly,Vol. 9,No. 2,1972,pp. 189-190.
[16]Alan Hájek,“Pascal's Wager”,The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy(Winter 2012 Edition),Edward N. Zalta(ed.),URL= [17][19][20][22][23][24][法]帕斯卡尔:《思想录》,何兆武译,北京:商务印书馆,1997年,第111,109-113,112,109-110,111,110页。
[18]Jeff Jordan,Pascal’s Wager:Pragmatic Arguments and Belief in God,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2006,p. 19.
[21]“epistemically null conditions(零认知条件)”这个词取自莫里斯(Thomas V. Morris,“Pascalian Wagering”,Canadian Journal of Philosophy,Vol. 16,No. 3,1986:pp. 437-453)。
[25][26][27][28][29][30][35][36][37][38]William James,The Will to Believe,In his The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy,New York:Longmans,Green&Co.,1897,pp. 1-31,11,8,2-4,2,3,25,24,22,26,28.此文最初刊载于1896年6月的《新世界》。
[31]H. H. Price,Belief,London:George Allen&Unwin Ltd,1969:pp. 349-375.
[32][33]William James,“Is Life Worth Living?”,“The Sentiment of Rationality,”In his The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy,New York:Longmans,Green&Co.,1897,pp. 96-97,59.
[34]William James,The Sentiment of Rationality,In his The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy,New York:Longmans,Green&Co.,1897:p. 97.
[39]Stephen T. Davis,God,Reason and Theistic Proofs,Edinburgh:Edinburgh University Press,1997,p.167.
[40]William Kingdon Clifford,Lectures and Essays,Vol.2,London:Macmillan and Co.,1901,pp.177-178.
[41][英]休谟:《人性论》(上),关文运、郑之骧译,北京:商务印书馆,1997年,第132-133页。
[2]Nicholas Bunnin and Jiyuan Yu,The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy,Malden:Blackwell Publishing,2004,p. 229.
[3]William Kingdon Clifford,The Ethics of Belief,In his Lectures and Essays,Vol. 2,London:Macmillan and Co.,1901,pp. 163-205.此文最初是1876年4月11日克利福德在伦敦向“形而上学学会”(Metaphysical Society)成员发表的演讲。
[4][5][6][10][11]William Kingdon Clifford,Lectures and Essays,Vol. 2,London:Macmillan and Co.,1901,pp. 164,165,175,166,169.
[7]虽然克利福德并没有明白无误说这是一个道德原则,但其论文的标题(The ethics of Belief)和整个论证都在告诉人们他讨论的是道德问题,而非知识论问题。但这个道德问题又显然是以知识论问题为前提的。
[8][13]Allen W. Wood,Unsettling Obligations:Essays on Reason,Reality and the Ethics of Belief,Stanford:CSLI Publications,2002,pp. 3,9.
[9]Susan Haack,“The Ethics of Belief”Reconsidered,In:Matthias Steup(ed.),Knowledge,Truth,and Duty:Essays on Epistemic Justification,Responsibility,and Virtue,New York:Oxford University Press,2001,p. 24.
[12]外在主义的证成思路是在回应葛梯尔难题的过程中逐步形成的,而葛尔难题是1963年才出现的(Edmund L. Gettier,“Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”,Analysis,Vol. 23,No. 6,1963,pp. 121-123),那时,克利福德已经去世84年了。
[14]Jeffery Jordan,“Pascal’s Wagers and James’s Will to Believe”,In:William J. Wainwright,The Oxford handbook of philosophy of religion,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2005,p. 176.
[15]Ian Hacking,“The Logic of Pascal’s Wager”,American Philosophical Quarterly,Vol. 9,No. 2,1972,pp. 189-190.
[16]Alan Hájek,“Pascal's Wager”,The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy(Winter 2012 Edition),Edward N. Zalta(ed.),URL=
[18]Jeff Jordan,Pascal’s Wager:Pragmatic Arguments and Belief in God,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2006,p. 19.
[21]“epistemically null conditions(零认知条件)”这个词取自莫里斯(Thomas V. Morris,“Pascalian Wagering”,Canadian Journal of Philosophy,Vol. 16,No. 3,1986:pp. 437-453)。
[25][26][27][28][29][30][35][36][37][38]William James,The Will to Believe,In his The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy,New York:Longmans,Green&Co.,1897,pp. 1-31,11,8,2-4,2,3,25,24,22,26,28.此文最初刊载于1896年6月的《新世界》。
[31]H. H. Price,Belief,London:George Allen&Unwin Ltd,1969:pp. 349-375.
[32][33]William James,“Is Life Worth Living?”,“The Sentiment of Rationality,”In his The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy,New York:Longmans,Green&Co.,1897,pp. 96-97,59.
[34]William James,The Sentiment of Rationality,In his The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy,New York:Longmans,Green&Co.,1897:p. 97.
[39]Stephen T. Davis,God,Reason and Theistic Proofs,Edinburgh:Edinburgh University Press,1997,p.167.
[40]William Kingdon Clifford,Lectures and Essays,Vol.2,London:Macmillan and Co.,1901,pp.177-178.
[41][英]休谟:《人性论》(上),关文运、郑之骧译,北京:商务印书馆,1997年,第132-133页。