生命主体与道德地位——动物权利论的理论缺陷与实践困境
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摘要
以汤姆·雷根为代表的动物权利论以"生命主体"概念作为其立论基础,认为非人类动物也是"生命主体",因而享有与人类同等的道德地位。然而,"生命主体"这一定义本身,以及从"生命主体"到拥有道德地位的论证过程都存在着理论缺陷与论证断裂。在实践层面,动物权利论也难以回答生产生活中的动物利用与生态环境保护等现实问题。因此,环境伦理学的发展,既要关注人类在权利话语体系内保护动物的应然性,也要考虑权利主体的扩张带来的权利虚空性代价,慎重对待动物的道德地位,积极寻求新的理论途径以解决人与动物的关系问题。
The animal rights theory represented by Tom Regan is based on the concept of"subject of life".He believes that non-human animals are also"subjects of life"and thus enjoy the same moral status as human beings.However,the definition of "subject of life" itself has theoretical flaws,and the process of argumentation from"subject of life"to possessing moral status is fractured.At the practical version,animal rights theory is also difficult to answer realistic questions such as animal utilization and environment protection.Therefore,the development of environmental ethics should not only pay attention to the human nature of protecting animals in the discourse system of rights,but also consider the cost of the void of rights brought by the expansion of rights subjects,deal with the moral status of animals cautiously,and actively seek new theoretical approaches to solving the relationship between human beings and animals.
The animal rights theory represented by Tom Regan is based on the concept of"subject of life".He believes that non-human animals are also"subjects of life"and thus enjoy the same moral status as human beings.However,the definition of "subject of life" itself has theoretical flaws,and the process of argumentation from"subject of life"to possessing moral status is fractured.At the practical version,animal rights theory is also difficult to answer realistic questions such as animal utilization and environment protection.Therefore,the development of environmental ethics should not only pay attention to the human nature of protecting animals in the discourse system of rights,but also consider the cost of the void of rights brought by the expansion of rights subjects,deal with the moral status of animals cautiously,and actively seek new theoretical approaches to solving the relationship between human beings and animals.
引文
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[2][美]加里·L·弗兰西恩.动物权利导论:孩子与狗之间[M].张守东,刘耳译.北京:中国政法大学出版社,2005.
[3][美]汤姆·雷根.动物权利研究[M].李曦译.北京:北京大学出版社,2010.
[4]马克思恩格斯文集:第九卷[M].北京:人民出版社,2009.
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[7]Catherine Wilson.Moral Animals[M].Oxford:Clarendon Press,2004.
[8]Daniel Bonevac.Today’s Moral Issues[C].London:McGraw-Hill Higher Education,2002.
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[10]武卉昕.道德价值的实现途径[J].齐鲁学刊,2017,(3).
[2][美]加里·L·弗兰西恩.动物权利导论:孩子与狗之间[M].张守东,刘耳译.北京:中国政法大学出版社,2005.
[3][美]汤姆·雷根.动物权利研究[M].李曦译.北京:北京大学出版社,2010.
[4]马克思恩格斯文集:第九卷[M].北京:人民出版社,2009.
[5]张燕.谁之权利?何以利用?——基于整体生态观的动物权利和动物利用[J].哲学研究,2015,(7).
[6][加]L.W.萨姆纳.权利的道德基础[M].李茂森译.北京:中国人民大学出版社,2011.
[7]Catherine Wilson.Moral Animals[M].Oxford:Clarendon Press,2004.
[8]Daniel Bonevac.Today’s Moral Issues[C].London:McGraw-Hill Higher Education,2002.
[9]刘湘溶.生态伦理学的权利观[J].道德与文明,2005,(6).
[10]武卉昕.道德价值的实现途径[J].齐鲁学刊,2017,(3).