基于费用归类操纵视角的“八项规定”有效性研究——来自中国上市公司的证据
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摘要
使用2010年~2015年A股上市公司数据,运用PSM-DID研究方法,基于费用归类操纵视角考察了"八项规定"在国有企业中的政策效应。结果表明,"八项规定"对公款消费进行约束后,国有企业存在利用会计科目进行费用归类操纵的现象,即将部分原计入管理费用中的公款消费,转移至资本性支出和非流动资产处置损失等非敏感性会计科目,且高管腐败程度高的国有企业是费用归类操纵的重灾区。国有企业表面看来减少了公款消费,实质却是通过费用归类操纵达到隐性腐败的目的。本文的研究揭示了隐性腐败账务处理的新路径,发现国有企业会利用非敏感性会计科目隐蔽公款消费,这为治理国有企业权力寻租和规避监管打开了一条新的通道。
Taking A-share listed companies in 2010-2015 as samples,and using PSM-DID,this paper examines the effectiveness of "the eight-point guidelines"in state-owned enterprises from the perspective of expense classification shifting. The results show that as the "eight-point guidelines"restrict public consumption,state-owned enterprises intentionally misclassify expenses,that is,they shift part of public consumption from administrative expenses to such non-sensitive accounts as capital expenditures accounts or losses from disposal of non-current assets. Further studies find that expense classification shifting will be more serious in state-owned enterprises with high levels of management corruption; State-owned enterprises appear to have reduced public consumption on the surface,but in essence,they achieve implicit corruption through expense classification shifting. Above all,this study illustrates the new path of implicit corruption accounting treatment,and reveals the existence of expense classification shifting using balance sheet accounts to hide public consumption,which contributes to the governance of rent-seeking and avoidance of supervision for stateowned enterprises.
Taking A-share listed companies in 2010-2015 as samples,and using PSM-DID,this paper examines the effectiveness of "the eight-point guidelines"in state-owned enterprises from the perspective of expense classification shifting. The results show that as the "eight-point guidelines"restrict public consumption,state-owned enterprises intentionally misclassify expenses,that is,they shift part of public consumption from administrative expenses to such non-sensitive accounts as capital expenditures accounts or losses from disposal of non-current assets. Further studies find that expense classification shifting will be more serious in state-owned enterprises with high levels of management corruption; State-owned enterprises appear to have reduced public consumption on the surface,but in essence,they achieve implicit corruption through expense classification shifting. Above all,this study illustrates the new path of implicit corruption accounting treatment,and reveals the existence of expense classification shifting using balance sheet accounts to hide public consumption,which contributes to the governance of rent-seeking and avoidance of supervision for stateowned enterprises.
引文
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[2]MCVAY S E.Earnings management using classification shifting:an examination of core earnings and special items[J].Accounting Review,2006,81(3):501-531.
[3]BARNEA A,RONEN J,SADAN S.Classificatory smoothing of income with extraordinary items[J].Accounting Review,1976,51(1):110-122.
[4]FAN Y,LIU X.Misclassifying core expenses as special items:cost of goods sold or selling,general,and administrative expenses?[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2017,34(1):400-426.
[5]程富,王福胜.基于分类转移的盈余管理研究---来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].财经研究,2015(7):81-94.
[6]BARUA A,LIN S,SBARAGLIA A M.Earnings management using discontinued operations[J].Accounting Review,2010,85(5):1485-1509.
[7]张子余,张天西.“特殊损失项目”与“核心费用”之间的归类变更盈余管理研究[J].财经研究,2012(3):70-80.
[8]周夏飞,魏炜.非经常性损益披露监管与归类变更盈余管理---来自中国上市公司的证据[J].浙江大学学报:人文社会科学版,2015(5):119-132.
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[10]陈冬华,陈信元,万华林.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费[J].经济研究,2005(2):92-101.
[11]杨蓉.“八项规定”、高管控制权和在职消费[J].华东师范大学学报:哲学社会科学版,2016(1):138-148.
[12]邵剑兵,朱芳芳.CEO继任来源、高管团队重组与薪酬差距的激励效应[J].广东财经大学学报,2017(4):82-91.
[13]叶康涛,臧文佼.外部监督与企业费用归类操纵[J].管理世界,2016(1):121-128.
[14]田园,万寿义.“八项规定”对我国国有上市公司费用影响研究[J].华东经济管理,2017(8):160-167.
[15]万华林.国外在职消费研究述评[J].外国经济与管理,2007(9):39-41.
[16]FAMA E F.Agency problems and the theory of the firm[J].Journal of Political Economy,1980,88(2):288-307.
[17]LUO W,ZHANG Y,ZHU N.Bank ownership and executive perquisites:new evidence from an emerging market[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2011,17(2):352-370.
[18]张楠,卢洪友.薪酬管制会减少国有企业高管收入吗---来自政府“限薪令”的准自然实验[J].经济学动态,2017(3):24-39.
[19]卢锐,魏明海,黎文靖.管理层权力、在职消费与产权效率---来自中国上市公司的证据[J].南开管理评论,2008(5):85-92.
[20]王曾,符国群,黄丹阳,等.国有企业CEO“政治晋升”与“在职消费”关系研究[J].管理世界,2014(5):157-171.
[21]BEBCHUK L A,FRIED J M,WALKER D I.Managerial power and rent extraction in the design of executive compensation[J].University of Chicago Law Review,2002,69(3):751-846.
[22]杨瑞龙,王元,聂辉华.“准官员”的晋升机制:来自中国央企的证据[J].管理世界,2013(3):23-33.
[23]DYE R A.Classifications manipulation and nash accounting standards[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2002,40(4):1125-1162.
[24]BRADSHAW M T,SLOAN R G.GAAP versus the street:an empirical assessment of two alternative definitions of earnings[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2002,40(1):41-66.
[25]LOUGEE B A,MARQUARDT C A.Earnings informativeness and strategic disclosure:an empirical examination of“pro forma”earnings[J].Accounting Review,2004,79(3):769-795.
[26]NELSON M W,ELLIOTT J A,TARPLEY R L.Evidence from auditors about managers'and auditors'earnings management decisions[J].Accounting Review,2002,77:175-202.
[27]张敦力,崔海红,江新峰.董事会特征、盈余管理动机与非流动资产处置[J].财经论丛,2016(7):68-75.
[28]权小锋,吴世农,文芳.管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵[J].经济研究,2010(11):73-87.
[29]SLOAN R G.Do stock prices fully reflect information in accruals and cash flows about future earnings?[J].Social Science Electronic Publishing,1996,71(3):289-315.
[30]SKINNER D J,SLOAN R G.Earnings surprises,growth expectations,and stock returns or don't let an earnings torpedo sink your portfolio[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2002,7(2-3):289-312.
[31]FAN Y,BARUA A,CREADY W M,et al.Managing earnings using classification shifting:evidence from quarterly special items[J].Accounting Review,2010,85(4):1303-1323.
[32]JOO J H,CHAMBERLAIN S L.The effects of governance on classification shifting and compensation shielding[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2017,34(4):1779-1811.
[33]ZALATA A,ROBERTS C.Internal corporate governance and classification shifting practices:an analysis of U.K.corporate behavior[J].Journal of Accounting Auditing and Finance,2016,40(4):394-405.
[34]刘宝华,罗宏,周微.股权激励行权限制与盈余管理优序选择[J].管理世界,2016(11):141-155.
[35]PETERSEN M A.Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets:comparing approaches[J].Review of Financial Studies,2009,22(1):435-480.
[36]YERMACK D.Flights of fancy:corporate Jets,CEO perquisites,and inferior shareholder returns[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2006,80(1):211-242.
(1)2013年初,中国铁建因2012年年报中披露的8.37亿元高额业务招待费招致强烈的舆论关注,进而引发国资委的审查与处理。
(1)对模型(Ⅰ)进行分行业分年度的OLS回归和中位数回归后,两类回归的R2都较高,分别达到89.3%和86.5%,表明模型(Ⅰ)对预期管理费用具有较强的解释力度,能较好地估计非预期管理费用。
[2]MCVAY S E.Earnings management using classification shifting:an examination of core earnings and special items[J].Accounting Review,2006,81(3):501-531.
[3]BARNEA A,RONEN J,SADAN S.Classificatory smoothing of income with extraordinary items[J].Accounting Review,1976,51(1):110-122.
[4]FAN Y,LIU X.Misclassifying core expenses as special items:cost of goods sold or selling,general,and administrative expenses?[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2017,34(1):400-426.
[5]程富,王福胜.基于分类转移的盈余管理研究---来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].财经研究,2015(7):81-94.
[6]BARUA A,LIN S,SBARAGLIA A M.Earnings management using discontinued operations[J].Accounting Review,2010,85(5):1485-1509.
[7]张子余,张天西.“特殊损失项目”与“核心费用”之间的归类变更盈余管理研究[J].财经研究,2012(3):70-80.
[8]周夏飞,魏炜.非经常性损益披露监管与归类变更盈余管理---来自中国上市公司的证据[J].浙江大学学报:人文社会科学版,2015(5):119-132.
[9]李晓溪,刘静,王克敏.公开增发公司分类转移与核心盈余异象研究[J].会计研究,2015(7):26-33.
[10]陈冬华,陈信元,万华林.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费[J].经济研究,2005(2):92-101.
[11]杨蓉.“八项规定”、高管控制权和在职消费[J].华东师范大学学报:哲学社会科学版,2016(1):138-148.
[12]邵剑兵,朱芳芳.CEO继任来源、高管团队重组与薪酬差距的激励效应[J].广东财经大学学报,2017(4):82-91.
[13]叶康涛,臧文佼.外部监督与企业费用归类操纵[J].管理世界,2016(1):121-128.
[14]田园,万寿义.“八项规定”对我国国有上市公司费用影响研究[J].华东经济管理,2017(8):160-167.
[15]万华林.国外在职消费研究述评[J].外国经济与管理,2007(9):39-41.
[16]FAMA E F.Agency problems and the theory of the firm[J].Journal of Political Economy,1980,88(2):288-307.
[17]LUO W,ZHANG Y,ZHU N.Bank ownership and executive perquisites:new evidence from an emerging market[J].Journal of Corporate Finance,2011,17(2):352-370.
[18]张楠,卢洪友.薪酬管制会减少国有企业高管收入吗---来自政府“限薪令”的准自然实验[J].经济学动态,2017(3):24-39.
[19]卢锐,魏明海,黎文靖.管理层权力、在职消费与产权效率---来自中国上市公司的证据[J].南开管理评论,2008(5):85-92.
[20]王曾,符国群,黄丹阳,等.国有企业CEO“政治晋升”与“在职消费”关系研究[J].管理世界,2014(5):157-171.
[21]BEBCHUK L A,FRIED J M,WALKER D I.Managerial power and rent extraction in the design of executive compensation[J].University of Chicago Law Review,2002,69(3):751-846.
[22]杨瑞龙,王元,聂辉华.“准官员”的晋升机制:来自中国央企的证据[J].管理世界,2013(3):23-33.
[23]DYE R A.Classifications manipulation and nash accounting standards[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2002,40(4):1125-1162.
[24]BRADSHAW M T,SLOAN R G.GAAP versus the street:an empirical assessment of two alternative definitions of earnings[J].Journal of Accounting Research,2002,40(1):41-66.
[25]LOUGEE B A,MARQUARDT C A.Earnings informativeness and strategic disclosure:an empirical examination of“pro forma”earnings[J].Accounting Review,2004,79(3):769-795.
[26]NELSON M W,ELLIOTT J A,TARPLEY R L.Evidence from auditors about managers'and auditors'earnings management decisions[J].Accounting Review,2002,77:175-202.
[27]张敦力,崔海红,江新峰.董事会特征、盈余管理动机与非流动资产处置[J].财经论丛,2016(7):68-75.
[28]权小锋,吴世农,文芳.管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵[J].经济研究,2010(11):73-87.
[29]SLOAN R G.Do stock prices fully reflect information in accruals and cash flows about future earnings?[J].Social Science Electronic Publishing,1996,71(3):289-315.
[30]SKINNER D J,SLOAN R G.Earnings surprises,growth expectations,and stock returns or don't let an earnings torpedo sink your portfolio[J].Review of Accounting Studies,2002,7(2-3):289-312.
[31]FAN Y,BARUA A,CREADY W M,et al.Managing earnings using classification shifting:evidence from quarterly special items[J].Accounting Review,2010,85(4):1303-1323.
[32]JOO J H,CHAMBERLAIN S L.The effects of governance on classification shifting and compensation shielding[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2017,34(4):1779-1811.
[33]ZALATA A,ROBERTS C.Internal corporate governance and classification shifting practices:an analysis of U.K.corporate behavior[J].Journal of Accounting Auditing and Finance,2016,40(4):394-405.
[34]刘宝华,罗宏,周微.股权激励行权限制与盈余管理优序选择[J].管理世界,2016(11):141-155.
[35]PETERSEN M A.Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets:comparing approaches[J].Review of Financial Studies,2009,22(1):435-480.
[36]YERMACK D.Flights of fancy:corporate Jets,CEO perquisites,and inferior shareholder returns[J].Journal of Financial Economics,2006,80(1):211-242.
(1)2013年初,中国铁建因2012年年报中披露的8.37亿元高额业务招待费招致强烈的舆论关注,进而引发国资委的审查与处理。
(1)对模型(Ⅰ)进行分行业分年度的OLS回归和中位数回归后,两类回归的R2都较高,分别达到89.3%和86.5%,表明模型(Ⅰ)对预期管理费用具有较强的解释力度,能较好地估计非预期管理费用。