销售奖惩和回购策略对保兑仓融资下供应链协调的影响
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摘要
中小企业融资难问题是限制其发展的关键问题,保兑仓融资作为供应链金融的典型融资模式,通过制造商、零售商和银行三方合作达到共赢,增强供应链整体竞争力。但是,保兑仓融资模式下的供应链因为双重边际效应在分散决策时不能协调,且制造商承诺回购使零售商倾向于超量订货而又不付出相应的销售努力。本文为保兑仓融资模式下的供应链建立Stackelberg博弈模型,在考虑销售努力的情况下分别研究应用保兑仓融资时集中决策和分散决策下零售商的订货量和努力水平,研究销售奖惩策略下和支持回购的销售奖惩策略下供应链的协调情况,最终发现只有支持回购的销售奖惩策略可以协调应用保兑仓融资的供应链。算例研究进一步验证了研究结论。
As a typical method to finance supply chains through cooperation among manufacturers, retailers and banks, confirming warehouse financing(CWF) provides working capital to small and medium enterprises, enhances supply chain competitiveness through win-win solutions and reduces credit risk of banks. However, when decisions are decentralised, CWF cannot coordinate the entire supply chain because of double marginalisation, and manufacturer's promise to buyback unsold products makes the retailer tend to order much more products than market demand but not to pay enough effort to sell it. Assuming that final consumer demand is influenced by retailers' sales efforts, we construct a Stackelberg model of supply chain financed via CWF. This paper studies optimal order quantities and sales efforts when decisions are centralised and decentralised and shows that traditional CWF cannot coordinate the supply chain. Two coordinated policies are examined: one that employs sales rebates and penalties and the other that employs sales rebates and penalties with merchandise return privileges. We show that only the latter can coordinate a supply chain financed via CWF. A numerical example illustrates the findings of this study.
As a typical method to finance supply chains through cooperation among manufacturers, retailers and banks, confirming warehouse financing(CWF) provides working capital to small and medium enterprises, enhances supply chain competitiveness through win-win solutions and reduces credit risk of banks. However, when decisions are decentralised, CWF cannot coordinate the entire supply chain because of double marginalisation, and manufacturer's promise to buyback unsold products makes the retailer tend to order much more products than market demand but not to pay enough effort to sell it. Assuming that final consumer demand is influenced by retailers' sales efforts, we construct a Stackelberg model of supply chain financed via CWF. This paper studies optimal order quantities and sales efforts when decisions are centralised and decentralised and shows that traditional CWF cannot coordinate the supply chain. Two coordinated policies are examined: one that employs sales rebates and penalties and the other that employs sales rebates and penalties with merchandise return privileges. We show that only the latter can coordinate a supply chain financed via CWF. A numerical example illustrates the findings of this study.
引文
[1] 白少布,刘洪. 基于供应链保兑仓融资的企业风险收益合约研究[J]. 软科学, 2009,23(10):118-122
[2] 田江,姜康. 基于系统动力学的供应链融资仿真研究——以保兑仓融资模式为例[J]. 物流工程与管理, 2015,23(5):98-102
[3] 马晶晶,陈祥锋. 基于物流金融环境下企业的运营决策研究[J]. 物流技术, 2010,29(11):59-63
[4] 林强,李苗. 保兑仓融资模式下收益共享契约的参数设计[J]. 系统科学与数学, 2013,33(4):430-444
[5] 莫贞秀. 保兑仓融资模式下的决策模型与激励机制研究[D]. 电子科技大学硕士学位论文, 2014
[6] 林强,李晓征,师杰. 保兑仓融资模式下数量折扣契约的参数设计[J]. 天津大学学报(社会科学版), 2014,16(1):12-17
[7] Pasternack B. A. Optimal Pricing and Return Policies for Perishable Commodities[J]. Marketing Science, 1985,27(1):131-132
[8] Yao Z, Leung S. C. H., Lai K. K. Analysis of the Impact of Price-sensitivity Factors on the Returns Policy in Coordinating Supply Chain[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2008,187(1):275-282
[9] Ding D., Chen J. Coordinating a Three Level Supply Chain with Flexible Return Policies[J]. Omega, 2008,36(5):865-876
[10] 冯艳刚,李健,吴军. 考虑消费者止步行为的供应链回购契约研究[J]. 管理评论, 2014,26(8):181-187
[11] 窦亚芹,白少布,储俊. 基于供应商回购激励的供应链投融资协调策略[J]. 管理评论, 2016,28(6):205-215
[12] He Y., Zhao X., Zhao L., et al. Coordinating a Supply Chain with Effort and Price Dependent Stochastic Demand[J]. Applied Mathematical Modelling, 2009,33(6):2777-2790
[13] 庞庆华,蒋晖,侯岳铭,等. 需求受努力因素影响的供应链收益共享契约模型[J]. 系统管理学报, 2013,22(3):371-378
[14] Hu F., Lim C. C., Lu Z. Coordination of Supply Chains with a Flexible Ordering Policy under Yield and Demand Uncertainty[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2013,146(2):686-693
[15] 谢勇,向莉,陈双,等. 供应链返利与惩罚契约研究[J]. 系统工程学报, 2013,28(5):625-632
[16] 孟庆峰,盛昭瀚,陈敬贤,等. 考虑行为外部性的多零售商销售努力激励[J]. 管理科学学报, 2014,17(12):1-14
(1)数据来源于国家工商总局全国小型微型企业发展报告课题组《全国小型微型企业发展情况报告(摘要)》。
[2] 田江,姜康. 基于系统动力学的供应链融资仿真研究——以保兑仓融资模式为例[J]. 物流工程与管理, 2015,23(5):98-102
[3] 马晶晶,陈祥锋. 基于物流金融环境下企业的运营决策研究[J]. 物流技术, 2010,29(11):59-63
[4] 林强,李苗. 保兑仓融资模式下收益共享契约的参数设计[J]. 系统科学与数学, 2013,33(4):430-444
[5] 莫贞秀. 保兑仓融资模式下的决策模型与激励机制研究[D]. 电子科技大学硕士学位论文, 2014
[6] 林强,李晓征,师杰. 保兑仓融资模式下数量折扣契约的参数设计[J]. 天津大学学报(社会科学版), 2014,16(1):12-17
[7] Pasternack B. A. Optimal Pricing and Return Policies for Perishable Commodities[J]. Marketing Science, 1985,27(1):131-132
[8] Yao Z, Leung S. C. H., Lai K. K. Analysis of the Impact of Price-sensitivity Factors on the Returns Policy in Coordinating Supply Chain[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2008,187(1):275-282
[9] Ding D., Chen J. Coordinating a Three Level Supply Chain with Flexible Return Policies[J]. Omega, 2008,36(5):865-876
[10] 冯艳刚,李健,吴军. 考虑消费者止步行为的供应链回购契约研究[J]. 管理评论, 2014,26(8):181-187
[11] 窦亚芹,白少布,储俊. 基于供应商回购激励的供应链投融资协调策略[J]. 管理评论, 2016,28(6):205-215
[12] He Y., Zhao X., Zhao L., et al. Coordinating a Supply Chain with Effort and Price Dependent Stochastic Demand[J]. Applied Mathematical Modelling, 2009,33(6):2777-2790
[13] 庞庆华,蒋晖,侯岳铭,等. 需求受努力因素影响的供应链收益共享契约模型[J]. 系统管理学报, 2013,22(3):371-378
[14] Hu F., Lim C. C., Lu Z. Coordination of Supply Chains with a Flexible Ordering Policy under Yield and Demand Uncertainty[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2013,146(2):686-693
[15] 谢勇,向莉,陈双,等. 供应链返利与惩罚契约研究[J]. 系统工程学报, 2013,28(5):625-632
[16] 孟庆峰,盛昭瀚,陈敬贤,等. 考虑行为外部性的多零售商销售努力激励[J]. 管理科学学报, 2014,17(12):1-14
(1)数据来源于国家工商总局全国小型微型企业发展报告课题组《全国小型微型企业发展情况报告(摘要)》。