压煤村庄搬迁过程的动态博弈模型及其解析研究
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摘要
煤炭资源是我国的主要能源,通过压煤村庄搬迁方式对压覆的煤炭资源进行开采是释放煤炭潜力的重要途径。压煤村庄搬迁过程实际上是煤炭企业、地方政府、农民之间的一个博弈过程,文章采用完全信息动态博弈方法,建立了地方政府、煤炭企业、农民三方参与选择的动态博弈模型。并对压煤村庄搬迁方案制定阶段和实施阶段的动态博弈过程进行了分析和研究,得出了煤炭企业和地方政府在压煤村庄搬迁方案制定过程中的选择规律和主要影响因素。通过分析提出了参与各方在压煤村庄搬迁过程中应注意的问题,对压煤村庄搬迁的动力机制的研究及搬迁模式的设计具有一定的指导意义。
Coal is the main energy sources in our country,and village relocation is the most important way to release coal resources under the village. In fact,the relocation process of coal villages is a game process among the coal enterprises,local governments and villagers. In this paper, the dynamic game model of local government, coal enterprise and Peasant Participating in the selection in turn is established by using the method of dynamic game with complete information. The dynamic game process in both planning and implementing stage of coal relocation is analyzed and solved. The strategic choice and main factors of local government,coal enterprise in the process of relocating coal villages is obtained,and the key points in the process the coal village relocation are proposed for all the participants. It is very useful for the mechanism research and the mode choice for the coal village relocation.
Coal is the main energy sources in our country,and village relocation is the most important way to release coal resources under the village. In fact,the relocation process of coal villages is a game process among the coal enterprises,local governments and villagers. In this paper, the dynamic game model of local government, coal enterprise and Peasant Participating in the selection in turn is established by using the method of dynamic game with complete information. The dynamic game process in both planning and implementing stage of coal relocation is analyzed and solved. The strategic choice and main factors of local government,coal enterprise in the process of relocating coal villages is obtained,and the key points in the process the coal village relocation are proposed for all the participants. It is very useful for the mechanism research and the mode choice for the coal village relocation.
引文
[1]国家能源局.煤炭工业发展“十三五”规划[R].北京,2016.
[2]李文彬.中国压煤村庄搬迁模式研究[D].北京:中国矿业大学(北京),2016.
[3]谢识予.经济博弈论[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2002.
[4]张晓海.压煤村庄搬迁中政府企业博弈分析[J].山西建筑,2013,39(15):209-211.
[5]张晓海.山东省矿区新农村建设模式与实证研究[D].北京:中国矿业大学(北京),2012.
[6]万雅婷,任彩玉.“三下”压煤开采中利益相关方合作博弈模型的构建[J].中国市场,2015(37):169-170.
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[8]张慧.压煤矿区和谐发展机制研究[D].北京:中国矿业大学(北京),2012.
[9]雷志刚,郭爱国.压煤村庄搬迁主要问题探讨与分析[J].能源技术与管理.2018,43(4):185-187.
[10]郎晋会,贾光胜.王坡煤矿压煤村庄搬迁方案浅析[J].煤矿开采,2017,22(2):69-71.
[11]李庆华,王文平.长三角地区两层次行为主体利益分享机制--基于讨价还价模型的分析[J].技术经济,2007(4):74-78.
[12]袁持平.多方博弈的谈判机制与政府管制[J].经济评论,2003(3):40-46.
[13]郭钰.煤电企业纵向价格形成机制研究---基于讨价还价博弈模型[D].大连:大连理工大学,2016.
[14]徐永安.讨价还价模型的拓展分析[D].兰州:西北师范大学,2016.
[15]A.Rubinstein.Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model[J].Econometrica,1982(50):97-109.
[16]陈小玉.压煤村庄土地整治利益均衡研究--以山西省泽州县司家山村为例[D].北京:中国地质大学(北京),2014.
[17]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2012.
[18]付喜娥.绿色基础设施合作建设中政府与企业演化博弈模型研究[J].建筑经济,2018,39(12):106-109.
[2]李文彬.中国压煤村庄搬迁模式研究[D].北京:中国矿业大学(北京),2016.
[3]谢识予.经济博弈论[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2002.
[4]张晓海.压煤村庄搬迁中政府企业博弈分析[J].山西建筑,2013,39(15):209-211.
[5]张晓海.山东省矿区新农村建设模式与实证研究[D].北京:中国矿业大学(北京),2012.
[6]万雅婷,任彩玉.“三下”压煤开采中利益相关方合作博弈模型的构建[J].中国市场,2015(37):169-170.
[7]赵金煜.矿建工程项目风险管理理论与方法研究[D].北京:中国矿业大学(北京),2010.
[8]张慧.压煤矿区和谐发展机制研究[D].北京:中国矿业大学(北京),2012.
[9]雷志刚,郭爱国.压煤村庄搬迁主要问题探讨与分析[J].能源技术与管理.2018,43(4):185-187.
[10]郎晋会,贾光胜.王坡煤矿压煤村庄搬迁方案浅析[J].煤矿开采,2017,22(2):69-71.
[11]李庆华,王文平.长三角地区两层次行为主体利益分享机制--基于讨价还价模型的分析[J].技术经济,2007(4):74-78.
[12]袁持平.多方博弈的谈判机制与政府管制[J].经济评论,2003(3):40-46.
[13]郭钰.煤电企业纵向价格形成机制研究---基于讨价还价博弈模型[D].大连:大连理工大学,2016.
[14]徐永安.讨价还价模型的拓展分析[D].兰州:西北师范大学,2016.
[15]A.Rubinstein.Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model[J].Econometrica,1982(50):97-109.
[16]陈小玉.压煤村庄土地整治利益均衡研究--以山西省泽州县司家山村为例[D].北京:中国地质大学(北京),2014.
[17]张维迎.博弈论与信息经济学[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2012.
[18]付喜娥.绿色基础设施合作建设中政府与企业演化博弈模型研究[J].建筑经济,2018,39(12):106-109.