宏观制度经济学导论——泛函原型、量化理性与分布效用分析
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摘要
提出宏观制度经济学的基本理论架构,即基于后古典主义经济学,以制度价值论与量化理性为理论基础,以泛函分析为主要方法,研究制度如何构建价值空间、管理社会理性、规定经济秩序,以及在此基础上进行制度输出与价值分配的规律。首先论述了制度、测度与结构之间的关系,将以科斯、诺斯为代表的传统制度经济学派归纳为微观制度经济学,定义了宏观制度经济学。然后论述制度如何确定经济价值的测度空间,同时指出制度分析的结构性前提,即全局(宏)-局部(域)-基础(要素)的层级结构。进而批判了以DSGE为代表的基于数-数映射的传统函数模型,引入了基于无限维空间映射的泛函结构分析方法,构建了宏观经济泛函原型与欧拉方程。给出了宏泛函原型的反函数存在性证明,指出制度如何通过规定经济测度和选择产业函数来影响宏观产出。然后基于信息不对称与交易成本更多是一种宏观制度安排的理论论断,揭示出制度化地构建信息不对称已经成为当前数字经济的普遍形态,同时指出制度重构下的私权扩张现象与公权私化趋势。通过对西蒙悖论的定义与分析,论述了量化理性与群体理性分布,定义了分布效用分析法、效用不相容现象和理性困境,同时分析了信息技术基础上的制度化精神管控与个体精神依附及其可能导致的精神奴役。通过对卢卡斯批判认知局限的批判,以及理性预期学派在微观与宏观、量变与质变等哲学关系上的认知错误,指出宏观制度经济学是对理性预期学派的终结,规定了理性预期学派的适用范畴。同时基于新社会人假说以及量化理性,构建了新理性预期学派及其逻辑框架。从产权对生产价值的索取权角度分析并定义了科斯产权悖论,并论述了制度如何规定稀缺序列、规范经济秩序,并指出制度输出的意义在于国际价值空间的重构、扩张与再分配。最后,从哲学层面进一步论述宏观与微观的本质区别,对宏观制度经济学的立论基础进行了概括,并给出了未来研究方向。
The basic theoretical framework of macro institutional economics(MIE)is proposed:in the framework of post classical economics,especially based on the theory of institution value and quantitative rationality,MIE studies how the institution constructs value space,manages social rationality,prescribes economic order,and then carries out the principles of institution output and value distribution,while adopting functional analysis as the main method.This paper first discusses the relationship between institution,measure and structure,sums up the old institutional economics represented by Coase and North as micro institutional economics,and defines macro institutional economics,then shows how the institution determines the measure space of economic value,and points out the structural premise of the institutional analysis,namely the hierarchical structure of Global(Macro)-Local(Domain)-Foundation(Element).And secondly,while criticizing the traditional function model based on the number-number mapping such as DSGE,this paper introduces a functional structure analysis method based on infinite dimensional space mapping,constructs the macroeconomic functional prototype and Euler equation,gives the proof of the existence of the inverse function of the macro functional prototype,and points out how the institution influences macro-output by stipulating the economical measure and selecting the industrial function.Thirdly,this paper points out that information asymmetry and transaction cost are more of a kind of macroscopic institutional arrangement,which has become a kind of general economic form to construct information asymmetry,and also points out the phenomenon of private right expansion under institution reconstruction and the trend of privatization of administrative power.By discussing the definition and analysis of Simon paradox,this paper puts forward the quantitative rationality and distribution of collective rationality. The distributional utility analysis method is firstly proposed,and the distribution of collective utility is measured by this method.This paper points out the incompatibility phenomenon between cardinal utility and ordinal utility and the rational dilemma under this incompatibility,and analyzes the institutional mental control and individual psychological dependence which would possibly lead to spiritual serfdom.At the same time,based on the new social man hypothesis and quantitative rationality,the new rational expectation school and its logical framework are constructed.Considering the property right of claim on production value,this paper analyses and defines the Coase Paradox,discusses how institution stipulate the scarcity sequence and regulate the economic order,and points out that the significance of the institution output lies in the reconstruction,expansion and redistribution of the international value space.In the conclusion part,while the essential difference between macro and micro is further discussed from the philosophical level,this paper summarizes the theoretical basis of macroscopic institutional economics and gives some suggestions for the future research.
The basic theoretical framework of macro institutional economics(MIE)is proposed:in the framework of post classical economics,especially based on the theory of institution value and quantitative rationality,MIE studies how the institution constructs value space,manages social rationality,prescribes economic order,and then carries out the principles of institution output and value distribution,while adopting functional analysis as the main method.This paper first discusses the relationship between institution,measure and structure,sums up the old institutional economics represented by Coase and North as micro institutional economics,and defines macro institutional economics,then shows how the institution determines the measure space of economic value,and points out the structural premise of the institutional analysis,namely the hierarchical structure of Global(Macro)-Local(Domain)-Foundation(Element).And secondly,while criticizing the traditional function model based on the number-number mapping such as DSGE,this paper introduces a functional structure analysis method based on infinite dimensional space mapping,constructs the macroeconomic functional prototype and Euler equation,gives the proof of the existence of the inverse function of the macro functional prototype,and points out how the institution influences macro-output by stipulating the economical measure and selecting the industrial function.Thirdly,this paper points out that information asymmetry and transaction cost are more of a kind of macroscopic institutional arrangement,which has become a kind of general economic form to construct information asymmetry,and also points out the phenomenon of private right expansion under institution reconstruction and the trend of privatization of administrative power.By discussing the definition and analysis of Simon paradox,this paper puts forward the quantitative rationality and distribution of collective rationality. The distributional utility analysis method is firstly proposed,and the distribution of collective utility is measured by this method.This paper points out the incompatibility phenomenon between cardinal utility and ordinal utility and the rational dilemma under this incompatibility,and analyzes the institutional mental control and individual psychological dependence which would possibly lead to spiritual serfdom.At the same time,based on the new social man hypothesis and quantitative rationality,the new rational expectation school and its logical framework are constructed.Considering the property right of claim on production value,this paper analyses and defines the Coase Paradox,discusses how institution stipulate the scarcity sequence and regulate the economic order,and points out that the significance of the institution output lies in the reconstruction,expansion and redistribution of the international value space.In the conclusion part,while the essential difference between macro and micro is further discussed from the philosophical level,this paper summarizes the theoretical basis of macroscopic institutional economics and gives some suggestions for the future research.
引文
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(1)徐晋.离散主义与后古典经济学[J].当代经济科学,2014,36(2):1-11.
(2)徐晋.后古典经济学原理[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2015.
(3)徐晋.稀缺二元性与制度价值论[J].当代经济科学,2016,38(1):1-12.
(1)Kydland F,Prescott E C.Time to build and aggregate fluctuations[J].Econometrica,1982,50(6):1345-1370.
(1)Chari V V,Kehoe P J,McGrattan E R.New keynesian models:not yet useful for policy analysis[J].American Economic Journal:Macroeconomics,2009,1(1):242-266.
(1)Coase R H.The new institutional economics[J].American Economic Review,1988,88(2):72-74.
(1)Simon H A.Bounded rationality and organizational learning[J].Organization Science,1991,2(1):125-134.
(1)Lucas,Robert E Jr.Econometric policy evaluation:a critique[C].Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy,1976,1:19-46.
(1)North D C.Institutions,Institutional change,and economic performance[M].New York:Cambridge University Press,1990.
(1)Acemoglu D,Johnson S,Robinson J A.The colonial origins of comparative development:an empirical investigation[J].American Economic Review,2001,91(5):1369-1401.
(2)Acemoglu D,Johnson S,Robinson J A.Institutions as the fundamental cause of long-run growth[J].Elsevier,2005,1(5):385-472.
(3)徐晋.稀缺二元性与制度价值论[J].当代经济科学,2016,38(1):1-12.
(1)Przeworski A,Alvarez M E,Cheibub J A,Limongi F.Democracy and development:political institutions and well-being in the world,1950-1990[M].New York:Cambridge University Press,2000.
(2)颜世元.关于宏观间接控制的哲学思考[J].山东社会科学,1989(3):71-76.
(2)Commons J R.Institutional economics[M].New York:Macmillan,1934.
(3)Galbraith J K.Power and the useful economist[J].American Economic Review,1973,63(3):1-11.
(4)Coase R H.The nature of the firm[J].Economica,1937,4(16):386-405.
(5)Coase R H.Problem of social cost[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1960,3(10):1-44.
(6)North D C.Institutions,institutional change,and economic performance[M].New York:Cambridge University Press,1990.
(7)Williamson O E.Hierarchical control and optimum firm size[J].The Journal of Political Economy,1967,75(2):123-138.
(8)Williamson O E.Markets and hierarchies[M].New York:Free Press,1975:26-30.
(9)Williamson O E.The economics of organization the transaction cost approach[J].The American Journal of Sociology,1981,87(3):548-577.
(10)Alchian A A,Demsetz H.Production,information costs,and economic organization[J].American Economic Review,1972,62(5):777-795.
(1)Jensen M C,Meckling W H.Theory of the firm:managerial behavior,agency costs,and ownership structure[M].Springer Netherlands,1979.
(2)Cheung S N.The contractual nature of the firm[J].Journal of Law and Economics,1983,26(1):1-21.
(3)Grossman S J,Hart O D.The costs and benefits of ownership:a theory of vertical and lateral integration[J].The Journal of Political Economy,1986,94(4):691-719.
(4)Yang X,Ng Y K.Theory of the firm and structure of residual rights[J].Journal of Economic Behavior.Organization,1995,26(1):107-128.
(5)North D C.Sources of productivity change in ocean shipping,1600-1850[J].Journal of Political Economy,1968,76(5):953-970.
(6)North D C.The rise of the western world:a new economic history[M].New York:Cambridge University Press,1973.
(7)North D C.Structure and change in economic history[M].New York:Norton Press,1981.
(8)Buchanan J.The logical foundations of constitutional liberty[M].Liberty Fund,1999,Volume 1,Indianapolis.
(9)Buchanan J,Tullock G.The calculus of consent:logical foundations of constitutional democracy[M].Indianapolis,IN:Liberty Fund,Inc,1958.
(10)Hayek F A.The constitution of liberty[M].Chicago:The University of Chicago Press,1960.
(11)Winter S G,Nelson R R.An evolutionary theory of economic change[M].Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,1985.
(1)徐晋.离散主义与后古典经济学[J].当代经济科学,2014,36(2):1-11.
(2)徐晋.后古典经济学原理[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2015.
(3)徐晋.稀缺二元性与制度价值论[J].当代经济科学,2016,38(1):1-12.
(1)Kydland F,Prescott E C.Time to build and aggregate fluctuations[J].Econometrica,1982,50(6):1345-1370.
(1)Chari V V,Kehoe P J,McGrattan E R.New keynesian models:not yet useful for policy analysis[J].American Economic Journal:Macroeconomics,2009,1(1):242-266.
(1)Coase R H.The new institutional economics[J].American Economic Review,1988,88(2):72-74.
(1)Simon H A.Bounded rationality and organizational learning[J].Organization Science,1991,2(1):125-134.
(1)Lucas,Robert E Jr.Econometric policy evaluation:a critique[C].Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy,1976,1:19-46.
(1)North D C.Institutions,Institutional change,and economic performance[M].New York:Cambridge University Press,1990.
(1)Acemoglu D,Johnson S,Robinson J A.The colonial origins of comparative development:an empirical investigation[J].American Economic Review,2001,91(5):1369-1401.
(2)Acemoglu D,Johnson S,Robinson J A.Institutions as the fundamental cause of long-run growth[J].Elsevier,2005,1(5):385-472.
(3)徐晋.稀缺二元性与制度价值论[J].当代经济科学,2016,38(1):1-12.
(1)Przeworski A,Alvarez M E,Cheibub J A,Limongi F.Democracy and development:political institutions and well-being in the world,1950-1990[M].New York:Cambridge University Press,2000.
(2)颜世元.关于宏观间接控制的哲学思考[J].山东社会科学,1989(3):71-76.