图像再现中的想象及视觉经验——沃尔顿“视觉经验”模式初探
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摘要
作为美学的经典命题之一,想象与视觉感知的关系对于我们当下的视觉经验研究仍具启发意义。从心理学上来说,想象与视觉感知的关系提供了探讨以贡布里希为代表的间接知觉论的另一视角,并与视知觉论者所倡导的直接知觉论的视觉经验模式形成了鲜明的对比。沃尔顿作为当代探讨想象与再现艺术的代表人物,他对想象与图像再现、图像描绘及视觉经验的讨论发展了间接知觉论,构成了当下"视觉经验"讨论的另一阐释模式,这也成为视觉性研究中特定观看方式何以建构之问题的一个解释范式。
As one of the big questions of aesthetics,the relationship between imagination and visual perception is always inspiring our study on visual experience. Psychologically,the relationship between imagination and visual perception provides us another approach to study on the "indirect perception"mode of visual experience which was developed by Gombrich,in sharp contrast to the mode of "direct perception"advocated by the visual perception theorists. Walton,as outstanding figure studying on imagination and representational art,propelled the theory of indirect perception.His view on the imagination and picture representation,depiction and visual experience afforded another way of interpreting visual experience. It's also an interpretation paradigm for how to construct a particular way of seeing.
As one of the big questions of aesthetics,the relationship between imagination and visual perception is always inspiring our study on visual experience. Psychologically,the relationship between imagination and visual perception provides us another approach to study on the "indirect perception"mode of visual experience which was developed by Gombrich,in sharp contrast to the mode of "direct perception"advocated by the visual perception theorists. Walton,as outstanding figure studying on imagination and representational art,propelled the theory of indirect perception.His view on the imagination and picture representation,depiction and visual experience afforded another way of interpreting visual experience. It's also an interpretation paradigm for how to construct a particular way of seeing.
引文
(1)See Margaret A.Hagen,“Perception”,Michael Kelly ed.,Encyclopedia of Aesthetics,Vol.3.New York:Oxford University Press,1998.455-458.
(2)(3)(10)(11)(12)(17)(18)(19)(22)(23)(25)(26)(27)(28)(29)(30)(31)Kendall Walton,Mimesis as Make-Believe,Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990,p.4,pp.2-3,p.300,p.301,pp.294-295,pp.300-301,p.31,ch.1.4,ch.6,ch.7.,p.315,pp.305-307,pp.323-324,p.304,pp.349-350,p.296,p.217,p.295n.2,p.295.中译版参见沃尔顿《扮假作真的模仿》,赵新宇、陆扬、费小平译,商务印书馆2013年版。
(4)(5)(7)Roger Scruton,“Imagination”,A Companion to Aesthetics,2nd edition,Stephen Davies eds.,New Jersey:Blackwell Publishing Ltd,2009,p.346,p.346,p.350.相似论述参见Aesthetics A-Z中“imagination”词条:想象“指一种心灵能力,它也是一种行动:是形成并体验事物的形象,并创造性地思考的能力。(“Imagination”,in Eran Guter,Aesthetics A-Z,Edinburgh:Edinburgh University Press,2010.101)
(6)Thomas,Nigel J.T.,“Mental Imagery”,The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy(Spring 2018 Edition),Edward N.Zalta(ed.),URL=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/mental-imagery/.
(8)Richard Wollheim,Painting as an Art,Princeton:Princeton U-niversity Press,1990,p.73.And Richard Wollheim,“In Defense of Seeing-In”,in Looking into Pictures,Heiko Hecht,eds.,Cambridge:MIT Press,2003,p.14.
(9)沃尔顿对再现作品作为扮假作真游戏之道具的论述中,反复强调了观看者观画时,在想象中生成了一个相关的虚构世界,并生成了虚构命题,尽管该命题在现实中并非真实的,但观看者假定判断这是真实的,并不去质疑它。参见沃尔顿《扮假作真的模仿》第一章、第六章、第七章。
(13)See Malcolm Budd,“Reviewed:Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundations of the RepresentationalArts.by Kendall L.Walton”,Mind,New Series,Vol.101,No.401,1992,and Kathleen Stock,“The Role of Imagining in Seeing-In”,The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism,Vol.66,Issue 4,2008.
(14)(15)(16)(20)(21)(23)(32)(36)Kendall Walton,Marvelous Images:On Values and the Arts,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2008,p.137,pp.137-138,p.296,p.73,p.107,p.107,p.138,p.176.
(33)Kendall Walton,“Seeing-In and Seeing Fictionally”,Jim Hopkins and Anthony Savile eds,Psychoanalysis,Mind,and Art,New Jersey:Blackwell,1992,284.
(34)Gendler,Tamar,“Imagination”,The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy(Summer 2018 Edition),Edward N.Zalta(ed.),URL=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/imagination/.
(35)Richard Wollheim,Painting as an Art,361,n.21.但沃尔顿认为扮假作真的感知性想象中,对惯例和规则的意识是可内化于感知之中,并无意识地发挥作用的,因此并不影响感知。(参见Kendall Walton,Mimesis as Make-Believe,302,同时参见Kendall Walton,Marvelous Images,140)。笔者更赞同沃尔海姆的观点。
(2)(3)(10)(11)(12)(17)(18)(19)(22)(23)(25)(26)(27)(28)(29)(30)(31)Kendall Walton,Mimesis as Make-Believe,Massachusetts:Harvard University Press,1990,p.4,pp.2-3,p.300,p.301,pp.294-295,pp.300-301,p.31,ch.1.4,ch.6,ch.7.,p.315,pp.305-307,pp.323-324,p.304,pp.349-350,p.296,p.217,p.295n.2,p.295.中译版参见沃尔顿《扮假作真的模仿》,赵新宇、陆扬、费小平译,商务印书馆2013年版。
(4)(5)(7)Roger Scruton,“Imagination”,A Companion to Aesthetics,2nd edition,Stephen Davies eds.,New Jersey:Blackwell Publishing Ltd,2009,p.346,p.346,p.350.相似论述参见Aesthetics A-Z中“imagination”词条:想象“指一种心灵能力,它也是一种行动:是形成并体验事物的形象,并创造性地思考的能力。(“Imagination”,in Eran Guter,Aesthetics A-Z,Edinburgh:Edinburgh University Press,2010.101)
(6)Thomas,Nigel J.T.,“Mental Imagery”,The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy(Spring 2018 Edition),Edward N.Zalta(ed.),URL=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/mental-imagery/.
(8)Richard Wollheim,Painting as an Art,Princeton:Princeton U-niversity Press,1990,p.73.And Richard Wollheim,“In Defense of Seeing-In”,in Looking into Pictures,Heiko Hecht,eds.,Cambridge:MIT Press,2003,p.14.
(9)沃尔顿对再现作品作为扮假作真游戏之道具的论述中,反复强调了观看者观画时,在想象中生成了一个相关的虚构世界,并生成了虚构命题,尽管该命题在现实中并非真实的,但观看者假定判断这是真实的,并不去质疑它。参见沃尔顿《扮假作真的模仿》第一章、第六章、第七章。
(13)See Malcolm Budd,“Reviewed:Mimesis as Make-Believe:On the Foundations of the RepresentationalArts.by Kendall L.Walton”,Mind,New Series,Vol.101,No.401,1992,and Kathleen Stock,“The Role of Imagining in Seeing-In”,The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism,Vol.66,Issue 4,2008.
(14)(15)(16)(20)(21)(23)(32)(36)Kendall Walton,Marvelous Images:On Values and the Arts,Oxford:Oxford University Press,2008,p.137,pp.137-138,p.296,p.73,p.107,p.107,p.138,p.176.
(33)Kendall Walton,“Seeing-In and Seeing Fictionally”,Jim Hopkins and Anthony Savile eds,Psychoanalysis,Mind,and Art,New Jersey:Blackwell,1992,284.
(34)Gendler,Tamar,“Imagination”,The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy(Summer 2018 Edition),Edward N.Zalta(ed.),URL=https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/imagination/.
(35)Richard Wollheim,Painting as an Art,361,n.21.但沃尔顿认为扮假作真的感知性想象中,对惯例和规则的意识是可内化于感知之中,并无意识地发挥作用的,因此并不影响感知。(参见Kendall Walton,Mimesis as Make-Believe,302,同时参见Kendall Walton,Marvelous Images,140)。笔者更赞同沃尔海姆的观点。