维特根斯坦前期哲学中的颜色不兼容性问题:起源、争论与出路
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摘要
颜色不兼容性问题是维特根斯坦前期哲学的一个重要问题,大多数学者接受拉姆塞对维特根斯坦的批评,认为维特根斯坦在《逻辑哲学论》(Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus)中并没有解决这一问题。学界围绕《逻辑哲学论》6.3751码段的解释形成了实在论与反实在论两种路径,典型代表就是辛迪卡的实在论观点和梅迪纳的反实在论观点。辛迪卡认为,尽管不兼容性是实在的内在特性,但我们可以区分实在的可能性的层面(镜示)和符号的可能性(图示)的层面,在镜示的层面处理语言与实在的内在关系问题,述说诸种可能性;而在符号的层面,语法是自治的(autonomous),虽然符号的层面依赖于实在的层面,但在二阶的意义上,语法不再需要对实在负责。梅迪纳则认为,在实在世界中对象没有颜色,有色性只是对象的诸形式之一,即对象具有某种特定的颜色是表征系统的一个特征;也就是说,颜色不兼容性问题只有围绕着表征和命题才能得到解释,有色性是表象系统的内在特性,所以,对于颜色不兼容性问题的正确解答离不开对表象系统的逻辑原则的阐明。但这两种路径都没有合理地解释这一问题,反而陷入了塞拉斯所指出的两类传统语言哲学的理论窠臼。实在论与反实在论,乃至塞拉斯所指出的两种语言哲学观点都是犯下了由语言的表面形式构造理论来取代其用法的错误。后期维特根斯坦改变了前期哲学中的思路,说明颜色不兼容性命题是伪装成经验命题形式的逻辑命题,它的逻辑命题本质不能够从其表面形式上推断出,而是通过它在具体的语言游戏及其关联中的使用而显示出来,从而避免了由于旧系统的经验命题和逻辑命题区分由形式设定而建立的谬误,指出了解答颜色不兼容性问题的正确路径。
The color incompatibility problem is an important issue in Wittgenstein's early philosophy. Most scholars accepted Ramsey' s criticism that Wittgenstein hadn' t solved the problem in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. There are two approaches to the interpretation of remark 6.3751 in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: realism and anti-realism. Hinttika and Medina hold the opposite representative points of view.Hinttika claims that although incompatibility is an internal character of reality, we can make the distinction of the possibility of reality(mirroring) and the possibility of symbol(picturing)and express the possibility of the relations between language and reality at the mirroring level. At the symbol level, grammar is autonomous.Though the symbol level relies on the reality level, grammar does not take responsibility for reality in the sense of second order level. Medina argues that objects have no color in reality and being with color is one of the forms of objects. An object is with a certain color is a character of a representative system. That is to say, we should turn to representation and proposition for interpretation of color incompatibility. Being with color is the internal character of representative system. Therefore, the correct interpretation of color incompatibility relies on the logical principles of representative systems. Both of the two approaches have not made reasonable interpretation of the problem. Instead, they fall into the theoretical trap Sellars once pointed out. Realism, antirealism, and the two viewpoints of language philosophy pointed out by Sellars all commit the fallacy of constructing theories on the surface form of language and substituting the use of language for the theories. Later Wittgenstein changed his early thought and stated that color incompatibility proposition is a logical problem disguised as an empirical proposition, of which the logical proposition essence cannot be deduced from the surface form, but instead it is manifested in specific language games and their relations. Therefore,Wittgenstein avoided the fallacy of surface form based on distinction of empirical and logical propositions of the old system and pointed out the correct solutions to color incompatibility problem.
The color incompatibility problem is an important issue in Wittgenstein's early philosophy. Most scholars accepted Ramsey' s criticism that Wittgenstein hadn' t solved the problem in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. There are two approaches to the interpretation of remark 6.3751 in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: realism and anti-realism. Hinttika and Medina hold the opposite representative points of view.Hinttika claims that although incompatibility is an internal character of reality, we can make the distinction of the possibility of reality(mirroring) and the possibility of symbol(picturing)and express the possibility of the relations between language and reality at the mirroring level. At the symbol level, grammar is autonomous.Though the symbol level relies on the reality level, grammar does not take responsibility for reality in the sense of second order level. Medina argues that objects have no color in reality and being with color is one of the forms of objects. An object is with a certain color is a character of a representative system. That is to say, we should turn to representation and proposition for interpretation of color incompatibility. Being with color is the internal character of representative system. Therefore, the correct interpretation of color incompatibility relies on the logical principles of representative systems. Both of the two approaches have not made reasonable interpretation of the problem. Instead, they fall into the theoretical trap Sellars once pointed out. Realism, antirealism, and the two viewpoints of language philosophy pointed out by Sellars all commit the fallacy of constructing theories on the surface form of language and substituting the use of language for the theories. Later Wittgenstein changed his early thought and stated that color incompatibility proposition is a logical problem disguised as an empirical proposition, of which the logical proposition essence cannot be deduced from the surface form, but instead it is manifested in specific language games and their relations. Therefore,Wittgenstein avoided the fallacy of surface form based on distinction of empirical and logical propositions of the old system and pointed out the correct solutions to color incompatibility problem.
引文
[1]维特根斯坦.逻辑哲学论[M].韩林合,译.北京:商务印书馆,2014.
[2]Frank Ramsey.Book review[J].Mind,1923,32(128):465-474.
[3]James Austin.Wittgenstein.s solutions to the color exclusion problem[J].Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,1980,41(1/2):143-144.
[4]David Pears.Incompatibilities of colours’in logic and language[C]//Antony.Flew.Oxford:Basil Blackwell,1953:112.
[5]Hacker.Insight and illusion[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,1986:108-109.
[6]Ray Monk.Ludwig Wittgenstein:the duty of genius[M].Vintage,1990:454.
[7]G E M Anscombe.An introduction to Wittgenstein.s tractatus[M].New York:Harper&Row,1959:2-6.
[8]Norman Malcolm.Wittgenstein:nothing is hidden[M].Blackwell,1989:3-4.
[9]David Pears.The false prison:volume I[M].Oxford:Clarendon Press,1987.
[10]Dale Jacquette.Wittgenstein and the color incompatibility problem[J].History of Philosophy Quarterly,1990,7(3):353-365.
[11]Jaakko Hintikka,Merrill B Hintikka.Some remarks on(Wittgensteinian)logical form[J].Synthese,1983,56(2):155-170.
[12]Ishiguro.Use and reference of names.studies in the philosophy of Wittgenstein[M].London:Routledge and Kegan Paul,1969:20-50.
[13]McGuinness.The So-called realism of the tractatus.perspectives on the philosophy of Wittgenstein[M].MIT Presss,1981:60-73.
[14]Diamond C.The realistic spirit.Wittgenstein,philosophy,and the mind[M].Cambridge Massachusetts:MIT Press,1991:38-40.
[15]Andrew Lugg.Wittgenstein on colour exclusion:not fatally mistaken[J].Grazer Philosophische Studien,2015,92:1-21.
[16]Sarah Moss.Solving the color incompatibility problem[J].Journal of Philosophical Logic,2012,41(5):841-851.
[17]JoséMedina.Deflationism and the true colours of necessity in Wittgenstein.s“tractatus”[J].Dialectica,2003,57(4):357-385.
[18]Ludwig Wittgenstein.Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951[M].Hackett publishing Company,1993:29-35.
[19]Sellars W.Being and being known.science,perception,and reality[M].London:Routledge,1963:41-59.
[20]Donald Davidson.A coherence theory of truth and knowledge.subjective,intersubjective,objective[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,1986:144.
[21]维特根斯坦.哲学研究[M].韩林合,译.北京:商务印书馆,2013:4-5.
[2]Frank Ramsey.Book review[J].Mind,1923,32(128):465-474.
[3]James Austin.Wittgenstein.s solutions to the color exclusion problem[J].Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,1980,41(1/2):143-144.
[4]David Pears.Incompatibilities of colours’in logic and language[C]//Antony.Flew.Oxford:Basil Blackwell,1953:112.
[5]Hacker.Insight and illusion[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,1986:108-109.
[6]Ray Monk.Ludwig Wittgenstein:the duty of genius[M].Vintage,1990:454.
[7]G E M Anscombe.An introduction to Wittgenstein.s tractatus[M].New York:Harper&Row,1959:2-6.
[8]Norman Malcolm.Wittgenstein:nothing is hidden[M].Blackwell,1989:3-4.
[9]David Pears.The false prison:volume I[M].Oxford:Clarendon Press,1987.
[10]Dale Jacquette.Wittgenstein and the color incompatibility problem[J].History of Philosophy Quarterly,1990,7(3):353-365.
[11]Jaakko Hintikka,Merrill B Hintikka.Some remarks on(Wittgensteinian)logical form[J].Synthese,1983,56(2):155-170.
[12]Ishiguro.Use and reference of names.studies in the philosophy of Wittgenstein[M].London:Routledge and Kegan Paul,1969:20-50.
[13]McGuinness.The So-called realism of the tractatus.perspectives on the philosophy of Wittgenstein[M].MIT Presss,1981:60-73.
[14]Diamond C.The realistic spirit.Wittgenstein,philosophy,and the mind[M].Cambridge Massachusetts:MIT Press,1991:38-40.
[15]Andrew Lugg.Wittgenstein on colour exclusion:not fatally mistaken[J].Grazer Philosophische Studien,2015,92:1-21.
[16]Sarah Moss.Solving the color incompatibility problem[J].Journal of Philosophical Logic,2012,41(5):841-851.
[17]JoséMedina.Deflationism and the true colours of necessity in Wittgenstein.s“tractatus”[J].Dialectica,2003,57(4):357-385.
[18]Ludwig Wittgenstein.Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951[M].Hackett publishing Company,1993:29-35.
[19]Sellars W.Being and being known.science,perception,and reality[M].London:Routledge,1963:41-59.
[20]Donald Davidson.A coherence theory of truth and knowledge.subjective,intersubjective,objective[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,1986:144.
[21]维特根斯坦.哲学研究[M].韩林合,译.北京:商务印书馆,2013:4-5.