信贷资源错配与僵尸企业贷款
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摘要
信贷资源错配及由此衍生的僵尸企业贷款问题在政策实践中备受关注。但现有研究对"僵尸企业"界定和"僵尸贷款"成因仍存在广泛争议。本研究规避了对僵尸企业的主观界定和形而上的成因分析,试图从中观层面验证国内信贷资源配置的微观模式,并综合不同影响因素的比较以剖析其存在的问题。基于中国工业企业数据库提供的规模以上钢铁企业样本,综合运用统计描述和计量分析方法,本文对各种可能影响微观企业信贷资源配置的因素进行了综合检验。实证结果显示:钢铁企业的信贷资源配置更多取决于政府影响、存量债务、抵押品价值和所有制因素,而与市场需求和盈利指标相背离,由此呈现出典型的非市场化特征。结合基于所有制类型和产业链特质的统计描述结果,共同说明钢铁行业内部信贷资源错配和僵尸企业贷款的现实存在性。要解决这一问题,就不应局限于简单的金融市场化改革,而必须理顺政企关系并重构银企关系,同时深化金融机构自身改革,推动形成科学有效的信贷决策体系。
Credit resource mismatch and zombie corporate loans have attracted much attention in policy practice. However,the existing research on the definition of "zombie enterprise" and the cause of "zombie loan" still has wide disputes.This study evades the subjective definition of zombie firms and the metaphysical analysis of their causes and tries to verify the micro-model of china's credit resource allocation from the meso-industrial level and compare the different influencing factors to analyze its existing problems. Based on the large sample data of steel enterprises above designated size provided by the China Industrial Enterprise Database, this paper uses the statistical description and econometric analytic methods to comprehensively test the related factors which could influence micro-enterprise credit resource allocation. The empirical results show that credit resources allocation of steel enterprises depends more on government influence, historical debt, collateral value and ownership, and deviates from market demand and profit indicators,thus showing typical non-marketization characteristics. The statistical description of the ownership type and the characteristics of the industrial chain together explain the real existence of credit resource mismatch and zombie corporate loans in the steel industry.
Credit resource mismatch and zombie corporate loans have attracted much attention in policy practice. However,the existing research on the definition of "zombie enterprise" and the cause of "zombie loan" still has wide disputes.This study evades the subjective definition of zombie firms and the metaphysical analysis of their causes and tries to verify the micro-model of china's credit resource allocation from the meso-industrial level and compare the different influencing factors to analyze its existing problems. Based on the large sample data of steel enterprises above designated size provided by the China Industrial Enterprise Database, this paper uses the statistical description and econometric analytic methods to comprehensively test the related factors which could influence micro-enterprise credit resource allocation. The empirical results show that credit resources allocation of steel enterprises depends more on government influence, historical debt, collateral value and ownership, and deviates from market demand and profit indicators,thus showing typical non-marketization characteristics. The statistical description of the ownership type and the characteristics of the industrial chain together explain the real existence of credit resource mismatch and zombie corporate loans in the steel industry.
引文
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[2]Caballero, R. J.,T. Hoshi, and A. K. Kashyap, Zombie Lending and Depressed Restructuring in Japan[J].American Economic Review,2008,98(5):1943-1977.
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[11]张杰,郑文平,翟福昕.融资约束影响企业资本劳动比吗?中国的经验证据[J].经济学(季刊),2016(3):1029-1056.
[12]纪洋,谭语嫣,黄益平.金融双轨制与利率市场化[J].经济研究,2016(6):45-57.
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[14]谭语嫣,谭之博,黄益平,等,僵尸企业的投资挤出效应:基于中国工业企业的证据[J].经济研究,2017(5):175-188.
[15]王宇伟,盛天翔,周耿.宏观政策、金融资源配置与企业部门高杠杆率[J].金融研究,2018(1):36-52.
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[17]余明桂,潘红波.政治关系、制度环境与民营企业银行贷款[J].管理世界,2008(8):9-21
[18]王仲兵,刘颖.国有僵尸企业概念、机理与治理方略[J].地方财政研究,2017(5):45-49.
[19]谢千里,罗斯基,张轶凡.中国工业生产率的增长与收敛[J].经济学(季刊),2008(3):34-51.
[20]聂辉华,江艇,杨汝岱.中国工业企业数据库的使用现状和潜在问题[J].世界经济,2012(5):142-158.
[21]Gulen, H., and Ion, M., Policy Uncertainty and Corporate Investment[J]. Review of Financial Studies,2016,29(3):523-564.
[22]纪洋,王旭,谭语嫣,等,经济政策不确定性、政府隐性担保与企业杠杆率分化[J].经济学(季刊),2018,17(2):449-470.
[23]路江涌.外商直接投资对内资企业效率的影响和渠道[J].经济研究,2008(6):95-106.
[24]马红旗,黄桂田,王韧,等,我国钢铁企业产能过剩的成因及所有制差异分析[J].经济研究,2018(3):79-90.
[25]江小涓.国有企业的能力过剩、退出及退出援助政策[J].经济研究,1995(2):46-54.
[26]Rajan.,and Raghuram,G.,Insiders and Outsiders:The Choice between Informed and Arm's-Length Debt[J].Journal of Finance,1992,47(4):1367-400.
[27]荀琴,黄益平,刘晓光.银行信贷配置真的存在所有制歧视吗?[J].管理世界,2014(1):16-26.
[28]纪志宏,周黎安,王鹏,等,地方官员普升激励与银行信贷-来自中国城市商业银行的经验证据[J].金融研究,2014(1):1-15.
[2]Caballero, R. J.,T. Hoshi, and A. K. Kashyap, Zombie Lending and Depressed Restructuring in Japan[J].American Economic Review,2008,98(5):1943-1977.
[3]Kwon,H.,F. Narita and M. Narita, Resource Reallocation and Zombie Lending in Japan in the 1990s[J].Review of Economic Dynamics,2015,18(4):709-732.
[4]Lin Y P, Srinivasan A, Yamada T., The effect of government bank lending:Evidence from the financial crisis in Japan”, Working Paper,2015.
[5]Fukuda,S and J.Nakamura, Why Did Zombie Firms Recover in Japan?[J].World Economy, 2011,34(7):1124-1137.
[6]聂辉华,江艇,张雨潇,方明月.我国僵尸企业的现状、原因与对策[J].宏观经济管理,2016(9):63-68.
[7]申广军.比较优势与僵尸企业:基于新结构经济学视角的研究[J].管理世界,2016(12):13-24.
[8]Willam D.,Zombie banks and forbearance lending:Causes,effects,and policy measures[J].Leipzig:Universitat Leipzig,2014.
[9]Boeckx J,Cordemans N,Dossche M.,Causes and implications of the low level of the risk-free interest rate[J].Economic Review,2013(2):63-88.
[10]Uchida H,Miyakawa D, Hosono K,et al.,Financial shocks, bankruptcy, and natural selection[J].Japan and the World Economy,2015(36):123-135.
[11]张杰,郑文平,翟福昕.融资约束影响企业资本劳动比吗?中国的经验证据[J].经济学(季刊),2016(3):1029-1056.
[12]纪洋,谭语嫣,黄益平.金融双轨制与利率市场化[J].经济研究,2016(6):45-57.
[13]刘奎甫,茅宁.“僵尸企业”国外研究述评[J].外国经济与管理,2016(10):3-18.
[14]谭语嫣,谭之博,黄益平,等,僵尸企业的投资挤出效应:基于中国工业企业的证据[J].经济研究,2017(5):175-188.
[15]王宇伟,盛天翔,周耿.宏观政策、金融资源配置与企业部门高杠杆率[J].金融研究,2018(1):36-52.
[16]Hirata W.,Financial market imperfections and aggregate fluctuations[J].Working Paper,Boston:Boston College, 2010.
[17]余明桂,潘红波.政治关系、制度环境与民营企业银行贷款[J].管理世界,2008(8):9-21
[18]王仲兵,刘颖.国有僵尸企业概念、机理与治理方略[J].地方财政研究,2017(5):45-49.
[19]谢千里,罗斯基,张轶凡.中国工业生产率的增长与收敛[J].经济学(季刊),2008(3):34-51.
[20]聂辉华,江艇,杨汝岱.中国工业企业数据库的使用现状和潜在问题[J].世界经济,2012(5):142-158.
[21]Gulen, H., and Ion, M., Policy Uncertainty and Corporate Investment[J]. Review of Financial Studies,2016,29(3):523-564.
[22]纪洋,王旭,谭语嫣,等,经济政策不确定性、政府隐性担保与企业杠杆率分化[J].经济学(季刊),2018,17(2):449-470.
[23]路江涌.外商直接投资对内资企业效率的影响和渠道[J].经济研究,2008(6):95-106.
[24]马红旗,黄桂田,王韧,等,我国钢铁企业产能过剩的成因及所有制差异分析[J].经济研究,2018(3):79-90.
[25]江小涓.国有企业的能力过剩、退出及退出援助政策[J].经济研究,1995(2):46-54.
[26]Rajan.,and Raghuram,G.,Insiders and Outsiders:The Choice between Informed and Arm's-Length Debt[J].Journal of Finance,1992,47(4):1367-400.
[27]荀琴,黄益平,刘晓光.银行信贷配置真的存在所有制歧视吗?[J].管理世界,2014(1):16-26.
[28]纪志宏,周黎安,王鹏,等,地方官员普升激励与银行信贷-来自中国城市商业银行的经验证据[J].金融研究,2014(1):1-15.