考虑公平关切和损失厌恶下的低碳供应链决策分析
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摘要
本文构建由制造商和零售商组成的二级供应链系统,分别分析了仅零售商考虑公平关切和仅制造商考虑公平关切两种情况下公平关切系数和损失厌恶程度对低碳供应链决策的影响,研究表明:当零售商考虑公平关切且制造商为公平中性时,零售价格和单位碳减排量都随着损失厌恶程度的增加而减少;其次,零售价格随着其公平关切系数的增加而增加,单位碳减排量则与公平关切系数无关。当制造商考虑公平关切且零售商为公平中性的情况下,且制造商提供的批发价格满足某一水平时,零售价格和单位碳减排量都随着损失厌恶程度的增加而减少,单位碳减排量随着其公平关切系数的增加而减少;零售价格随着其公平关切系数的增加而减少。最后通过算例得到了验证。
This paper constructs a two-level supply chain system composed of manufacturers and retailers, and analyzes the effects of fairness of interest coefficient and loss aversion on decision-making of low-carbon supply chain, considering both only retailers consider fairness concerns and only manufacturers consider fairness concerns respectively. The results show that when retailers consider equity concerns and manufacturers are fair and neutral, retail prices and unit of carbon emission reductions all decrease with the increase of loss aversion. Then, as retail prices decrease with their fairness of interest Increase and increase, unit of carbon emission reduction has nothing to do with the fairness of concern coefficient. When the manufacturer considers fairness concerns and retailers are fair and neutral, and the wholesale price provided by the manufacturer meets a certain level, both the retail price and carbon emission reduction unit decreases as the degree of loss aversion looms. Unit of carbon emission reduction decreases as their fairness cutoffs increase; retail prices decrease as their fairness cutoffs increase. Finally, it is tested and verified by a numerical example.
This paper constructs a two-level supply chain system composed of manufacturers and retailers, and analyzes the effects of fairness of interest coefficient and loss aversion on decision-making of low-carbon supply chain, considering both only retailers consider fairness concerns and only manufacturers consider fairness concerns respectively. The results show that when retailers consider equity concerns and manufacturers are fair and neutral, retail prices and unit of carbon emission reductions all decrease with the increase of loss aversion. Then, as retail prices decrease with their fairness of interest Increase and increase, unit of carbon emission reduction has nothing to do with the fairness of concern coefficient. When the manufacturer considers fairness concerns and retailers are fair and neutral, and the wholesale price provided by the manufacturer meets a certain level, both the retail price and carbon emission reduction unit decreases as the degree of loss aversion looms. Unit of carbon emission reduction decreases as their fairness cutoffs increase; retail prices decrease as their fairness cutoffs increase. Finally, it is tested and verified by a numerical example.
引文
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[13]孙浩,吴亚婷,达庆利.需求价格敏感下具有损失厌恶零售商的闭环供应链定价与协调[J].控制与决策,2014,29(10):1885-1892.
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[2]周永务,李璐,曾小燕.两层供应链协调契约:考虑价格与碳排放量敏感需求[J].科技管理研究,2017,37(03):190-195.
[3]蓝海燕,兰海鹏.基于碳交易的供应链运作研究进展[J].中国流通经济,2017,31(02):73-79.
[4]程发新,袁猛,徐静.碳限额约束下考虑碳税的随机需求型闭环供应链网络均衡决策[J].科技管理研究,2017,37(01):233-237.
[5]周艳菊,鲍茂景,陈晓红,徐选华.基于公平关切的低碳供应链广告合作——减排成本分担契约与协调[J].中国管理科学,2017,25(02):121-129.
[6]杜少甫,杜婵,梁樑,刘天卓.考虑公平关切的供应链契约与协调[J].管理科学学报,2010,13(11):41-48.
[7]刘琦铀,张成科,宾宁,周雅,石平.公平关切及低碳视角下供应链两部定价契约问题研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(10):60-68.
[8]柳键,张志坚,张诚.基于公平关切的逆向供应链定价策略研究[J].华东经济管理,2015,29(11):167-172.
[9]王佳,金秀,苑莹,王旭.基于动态参照点的损失厌恶投资组合优化模型[J].运筹与管理,2015,24(06):51-57.
[10]胡支军,叶丹.基于损失厌恶的非线性投资组合问题[J].中国管理科学,2010,18(04):28-33.
[11]魏光兴,唐瑶,覃燕红.同时考虑损失厌恶和过度自信的供应链Stackelberg博弈与决策[J].江西师范大学学报(自然科学版),2017,41(01):20-27+34.
[12]段永瑞,代祥艳.考虑损失厌恶和退货因素的双渠道定价策略[J].华中师范大学学报(自然科学版),2017,51(01):84-92.
[13]孙浩,吴亚婷,达庆利.需求价格敏感下具有损失厌恶零售商的闭环供应链定价与协调[J].控制与决策,2014,29(10):1885-1892.
[14]胡支军,常佳佳,向淑文.基于多个损失厌恶型零售商的提前订购策略[J].控制工程,2013,20(05):938-942.
[15]褚宏睿,冉伦,李金林,张冉.带有回购和缺货惩罚的损失厌恶报童问题[J].管理评论,2014,26(04):101-110.
[16]罗伟伟,刘伟,邵东国.不确定环境下具有损失厌恶偏好零售商的供应链协调[J].计算机集成制造系统,2016,22(12):2867-2874.