基于服务损失厌恶消费者的多渠道供应链博弈研究
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摘要
考虑制造商线上线下销售,零售商实体店销售,制造商与零售商共同承担网络平台建设,消费者存在服务损失厌恶心理,在Stackelberg博弈、竞合博弈、价格不统一合作博弈、价格统一合作博弈四种情形下,分析消费者服务损失厌恶心理对企业定价决策、利润的影响。主要结论是:服务损失厌恶心理导致零售价格、网络销售价格、批发价格下降; Stackelberg博弈下的零售价格高于其他情形下的零售价格;供应链利润、制造商利润、零售商利润先下降后递增,存在导致利润最小的服务损失厌恶系数临界值;竞合博弈下的供应链利润最高,Stackelberg博弈下的供应链利润最低。
Due to a manufacturer sales online and offline and a retailer sales on entity,manufacturer and retailer undertake network platform construction together. Consumers exist service-loss averse psychology. Under four situations of Stackelberg game,competitive and cooperative games,cooperative game of decentralized price,cooperative game of centralized price,the paper analyzed the effect on enterprise's pricing decision,and profits. The main conclusions are drawn that service-loss averse psychology makes retail price,network sale price,wholesale price decrease. Retail price of Stackelberg game is higher than other games. Supply chain's profits,manufacturer's profits,retailer's profits firstly decrease and then increase,AND there is a critical value of service-loss averse coefficient which leads to minimize profits. Supply chain's profits of competitive and cooperative games are highest,instead supply chain's profits of Stackelberg game are lowest.
Due to a manufacturer sales online and offline and a retailer sales on entity,manufacturer and retailer undertake network platform construction together. Consumers exist service-loss averse psychology. Under four situations of Stackelberg game,competitive and cooperative games,cooperative game of decentralized price,cooperative game of centralized price,the paper analyzed the effect on enterprise's pricing decision,and profits. The main conclusions are drawn that service-loss averse psychology makes retail price,network sale price,wholesale price decrease. Retail price of Stackelberg game is higher than other games. Supply chain's profits,manufacturer's profits,retailer's profits firstly decrease and then increase,AND there is a critical value of service-loss averse coefficient which leads to minimize profits. Supply chain's profits of competitive and cooperative games are highest,instead supply chain's profits of Stackelberg game are lowest.
引文
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[3]Li B,Zhu M Y,Jiang Y S,et al.Pricing Policies of a Competitive Dual-channel Green Supply chain[J].Journal of Cleaner Production,2016,112(20):2029-2042.
[4]禹爱民,刘丽文.随机需求和联合促销下双渠道供应链的竞争与协调[J].管理工程学报,2012,26(1):151-155.
[5]Moutusy M,Mayukh D.Consumer Decision-making Across Modern and Traditional Channels:E-commerce,m-commerce,in-store[J].Decision Support Systems,2014,61(5):34-46..
[6]Liu Q,Shum S.Pricing and Capacity Rationing with Customer Disappointment Aversion[J].Production and Operations Management,2013,22(5):1269-1286.
[7]Yao D,Liu J.Competitive Pricing of Mixed Retail and e-tail Distribution Channels[J].Omega,2005,33(3):235-247.
[8]张学龙,王军进.考虑价格和服务竞争的供应链决策与协调模型研究[J].系统科学学报,2016,24(3):99-104.
[9]Iyer G.Coordinating Channels under Price and Non-price Competition[J].Marketing Science,1998,17(4):338-355.