不同竞争结构下损失厌恶及公平关切供应链决策优化研究
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摘要
考虑消费者的损失厌恶心理和零售商的公平关切心理,在四种不同竞争结构下,分析损失厌恶、公平关切对制造商、零售商定价和供应链绩效的影响。结果表明,随着损失厌恶的增强,企业和供应链绩效下降,在纳什均衡博弈、制造商主导Stackelberg博弈和零售商主导Stackelberg博弈下,批发价格和零售价格均下降,在供应链集中下,批发价格不变,零售价格下降;随着公平关切的增强,供应链绩效提高,在纳什均衡博弈、制造商主导Stackelberg博弈和零售商主导Stackelberg博弈下,批发价格下降,零售价格分别增大、不变和增大,制造商与零售商绩效分别下降和提高,在供应链集中下,企业定价不受影响;供应链绩效在供应链集中下最大,在制造商主导Stackelberg博弈下最小。
Considering the loss-aversion of consumer and the fair-concern of retailer,effects on pricing decisions of manufacture,retailer and supply chain performances are discussed under four competition structures in this paper.Results show that,with the loss-aversion increasing,performances of enterprises and supply chain will decrease,under Nash equilibrium game,manufacturer dominated Stackelberg game and retailer dominated Stackelberg game,both the wholesale price and the retail price will decrease,under supply chain concentration,the wholesale price will remain the same,and the retail price will decrease;with the fair-concern increasing,supply chain performances will increase,under Nash equilibrium game,manufacturer dominated Stackelberg game and retailer dominated Stackelberg game,the wholesale price will decrease,and the retail price will increase,keep unchanged and increase respectively,performances of manufacturer and retailer will decrease and increase respectively,under supply chain concentration,pricing decisions of enterprises will remain unchanged;supply chain performances are the largest under supply chain concentration,and the smallest under manufacturer dominated Stackelberg game.
Considering the loss-aversion of consumer and the fair-concern of retailer,effects on pricing decisions of manufacture,retailer and supply chain performances are discussed under four competition structures in this paper.Results show that,with the loss-aversion increasing,performances of enterprises and supply chain will decrease,under Nash equilibrium game,manufacturer dominated Stackelberg game and retailer dominated Stackelberg game,both the wholesale price and the retail price will decrease,under supply chain concentration,the wholesale price will remain the same,and the retail price will decrease;with the fair-concern increasing,supply chain performances will increase,under Nash equilibrium game,manufacturer dominated Stackelberg game and retailer dominated Stackelberg game,the wholesale price will decrease,and the retail price will increase,keep unchanged and increase respectively,performances of manufacturer and retailer will decrease and increase respectively,under supply chain concentration,pricing decisions of enterprises will remain unchanged;supply chain performances are the largest under supply chain concentration,and the smallest under manufacturer dominated Stackelberg game.
引文
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[12]Liu Q,Shum S.Pricing and Capacity Rationing with Customer Disappointment Aversion[J].Production and Operations Management,2013,22(5):1269-1286.
[13]张新鑫,申成霖,侯文华.考虑顾客行为和成员风险规避性的供应链收益共享契约的设计与协调[J].预测,2015,34(1):70-75.
[2]He X D,Zhou X Y.Portfolio Choice under Cumulative Prospect Theory:An Analytical Treatment[J].Management Science,2011,57(2):315-331.
[3]刘家和,金秀,苑莹,等.状态依赖和损失厌恶下的鲁棒投资组合模型及实证[J].管理工程学报,2018,32(2):196-201.
[4]申成霖,张新鑫.消费者策略行为和成员损失规避下的供应链协调[J].软科学,2016,30(4):114-119.
[5]柳键,邱国斌,黄健.面对损失厌恶顾客的零售商订货定价策略及激励影响[J].控制与决策,2014,29(1):107-112.
[6]Kahneman D,Knetsch J L,Thaler R.Fairness Competition on Profit Seeking Entitlements in the Market[J].American Economics Review,1986,76(4):728-741.
[7]Qin F,Mai F,Fry M,et al.Supply Chain Performance Annomalies:Fairness Concerns under Private Cost Information[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2016,252(1):170-182.
[8]Ho T H,Su X M,Wu Y Z.Distributional and Peer-Induced Fairness in Supply Chain Contract Design[J].Production and Operations Management,2014,23(2):161-175.
[9]李波,李宜楠,侯丽婷,等.具有公平关切的零售商对双渠道供应链决策影响分析[J].控制与决策,2015,30(5):955-960.
[10]何丽红,李政道.考虑零售商公平关切的双渠道供应链合作广告决策分析[J].工业工程与管理,2017,22(4):107-114.
[11]杜少甫,杜婵,梁樑,等.考虑公平关切的供应链契约与协调[J].管理科学学报,2010,13(11):41-48.
[12]Liu Q,Shum S.Pricing and Capacity Rationing with Customer Disappointment Aversion[J].Production and Operations Management,2013,22(5):1269-1286.
[13]张新鑫,申成霖,侯文华.考虑顾客行为和成员风险规避性的供应链收益共享契约的设计与协调[J].预测,2015,34(1):70-75.