众筹中价值共创行为的演化博弈分析——以科技类项目为例
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  • 英文篇名:An Evolutionary Game Analysis of Value Co-creation Behavior in Crowdfunding ——A Case Study of Science and Technology Projects
  • 作者:曾江洪 ; 林苇荞 ; 黄向荣
  • 英文作者:Zeng Jianghong;Lin Weiqiao;Huang Xiangrong;Business School,Central South University;
  • 关键词:科技众筹 ; 价值共创 ; 演化博弈 ; 机会主义 ; 复制动态方程 ; 学习能力
  • 英文关键词:science and technology crowdfunding;;value co-creation;;evolutionary game theory;;opportunism;;replicate dynamic equation;;learning ability
  • 中文刊名:GHZJ
  • 英文刊名:Journal of Industrial Technological Economics
  • 机构:中南大学商学院;
  • 出版日期:2019-04-26
  • 出版单位:工业技术经济
  • 年:2019
  • 期:v.38;No.307
  • 基金:国家社会科学基金项目“众筹模式中价值共创机制研究”(项目编号:14BJY008)
  • 语种:中文;
  • 页:GHZJ201905003
  • 页数:10
  • CN:05
  • ISSN:22-1129/T
  • 分类号:21-30
摘要
本文针对国内众筹环境普遍缺少互动、价值共创质量低下的问题,通过分析真实案例,构建价值共创模型,并进行支持者与发起者的策略演化博弈分析,探究提高双方价值共创参与意愿的途径及影响因素。研究结果表明:支持者与发起者的学习能力、价值共创效率、成本控制能力及发起者选择机会主义时的惩罚提高,能提高双方参与意愿;平台提供技术支持,对价值共创的参与者施加激励,能促进双方参与价值共创,但可能造成一方参与而另一方不参与的局面。
        Aiming at the problem of the general lack of interaction and low quality of value co-creation in the domestic crowdfunding environment,based on the real cases,the paper constructs the value co-creation model,and carries on the strategy evolution game analysis of the supporters and initiators,and probes into the ways and influencing factors to improve the mutual willingness of the two sides to participate.The results show that the learning ability of supporters and initiators,the efficiency of value co-creation,the ability of cost control and the increase of punishment when the initiator chooses opportunism can enhance the willingness of both parties to participate,and the platform provides technical support,inspires the participants,and promotes the participation of both parties in value co-creation.However,there may be a situation in which one party is involved and the other party is not involved.
引文
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