中国债权国权力与中美贸易关系——试析中国在美债问题上国际合作的策略
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摘要
在2018年开始的中美贸易摩擦中,对于"中国是否可能将对美债权作为中美关系的政策杠杆"这一问题的政策建议重新回温。那么,中国持有美债的经济与政治影响力到底有多大?如何使中国对美债权发挥作用?既有研究与解释都将重点放在了中国单方面抛售美债可能产生的市场影响力上,却较少从美债交易网络视角考察在美债问题上中国与其他主要美债持有者进行合作的可能性与策略。本文首先从市场规模和减持速度两方面重新评估中国单方面减持美债对美国可能产生的影响力;在此基础上,基于TIC历史数据,分析了在中国大规模减持美债过程中,美债主要境外持有者与中国政策的趋同度,以此提出了掌握美债主要境外持有者的"三个三分之一"策略,尝试从美债交易网络视角拓展对于中国所持美债影响力的理解。
During the U.S.-China trade friction in early 2018, the suggestion that China should dump its U.S. government securities as a leverage to make the U.S. change its current policy is keeping on brought up. However, what is, after all, the political and economic power of the US federal bonds held by China, and how to utilize it? Current relevant researches focus on the market reaction when China starts to sold its U.S. debts. Yet little is known about the potential cooperative opportunities and strategies between China and other major U.S. securities sovereign holders from debts transaction network aspect. We agree that if China reduced its holding-shares of U.S. debts, the U.S. would bear little pressure considering market size and sold-out speed. By analyzing TIC historical data and tracing back 11 major U.S. securities international holder's behavior when China sold its U.S. in large-scale, we argue that based on convergence degree between China and other 11 major holders, China should divide the 11 holders into three categories and take different strategies to advance common interests and coordinate U.S. debts policy.
During the U.S.-China trade friction in early 2018, the suggestion that China should dump its U.S. government securities as a leverage to make the U.S. change its current policy is keeping on brought up. However, what is, after all, the political and economic power of the US federal bonds held by China, and how to utilize it? Current relevant researches focus on the market reaction when China starts to sold its U.S. debts. Yet little is known about the potential cooperative opportunities and strategies between China and other major U.S. securities sovereign holders from debts transaction network aspect. We agree that if China reduced its holding-shares of U.S. debts, the U.S. would bear little pressure considering market size and sold-out speed. By analyzing TIC historical data and tracing back 11 major U.S. securities international holder's behavior when China sold its U.S. in large-scale, we argue that based on convergence degree between China and other 11 major holders, China should divide the 11 holders into three categories and take different strategies to advance common interests and coordinate U.S. debts policy.
引文
① 文中“中国”美债持有量全部是指不包括港、澳、台地区的持有量,下同。
② 参见Wayne M.Morrison,“China-U.S.Trade Issues,” Congressional Research Service,January 7,2011,p.13.Nicholas C.Malokofsky,Blood and Treasure:The U.S.Debt And Its Implications For National Defense And Security,United States Navy (California Naval Postgraduate School,2012).实际上,美国研究者一直在追踪美债外国持有者的增减持状况以及美债交易网络。例如Benn Steil,Benjamin Della以及Brad W.Setser 就分别分析过俄罗斯减持美债行为、比利时所持美债与中国所持美债,英国所持美债变化与中国所持美债之间的相关性,以及新兴国家所持美债的发展趋势。https://www.cfr.org/blog/secrets-safe-part-1-look-uk-find-some-chinas-treasuries-and-agencies,访问时间2009年1月3日。https://www.cfr.org/blog/did-russia-really-dump-its-us-debt,访问时间2018年8月13日。
(1)Derek Scissors and Arvind Subramanian,“The Great China Debate:Will Beijing Rule the World?”,Foreign Affairs 91.1 (2012):173-177.
(2)Daniel C.K.Chow,“Can the United States Impose Trade Sanctions on China for Currency Manipulation?”,Washington University Global Studies Law Review 16.2 (2017):295-328.
(3)参见Brad W.Setser,https://www.cfr.org/blog/what-would-happen-if-china-started-selling-its-treasury-portfolio,访问时间:2018年6月21日。https://www.cfr.org/blog/few-words-chinas-holdings-us-bonds,访问时间:2018年1月17日。以及高占军:《中国该不该打美国国债牌?》,《财新周刊》2018年第4期;张启迪:《抛售美国国债对美国影响的分析》,《金融理论与教学》2017年第4期。
(4)参见巫强、王嘉:《中国持有美国国债规模影响因素的实证分析》,《南京大学学报》(哲学·人文科学·社会科学)2010年第6期。以及HS Brian,Public Debt,Inequality,and Power:The Making of a Modern Debt State (Oakland:University of California Press,2016) 32.李潇、郑辉:《中国购买美国国债与美国长期利率之谜的实证研究》,《世界经济情况》2012年第6期。
(5)孙海泳、李庆四:《美债问题对中美关系的影响》,《教学与研究》2012年第10期。
(6)参见宋国友:《中国购买美国国债:来源、收益与影响》,《复旦学报》(社会科学版)2008年第4期。张启迪:《抛售美国国债对美国影响的分析》,《金融理论与教学》2017年第4期。
(7)宋国友:《美元陷阱、债务武器与中美金融困境》,《国际观察》2010年第4期。
(8)Daniel O.Beltran,Maxwell Kretchmer,Jaime Marquez,Charles P.Thomas,“Foreign Holdings of U.S.Treasuries and U.S.Treasury Yields,”Journal of International Money and Finance 32 (2013):1120–1143.
(9)孙海泳、李庆四:《美债问题对中美关系的影响》,《教学与研究》2012年第10期。
(10)②③⑤⑥ 数据来源:Treasury International Capital (TIC).
(11)美债流动性降低了美国政府融资的成本,是衡量美债市场结构以及健康度的重要指标。而决定美债流动性的,主要是美债的成本、时间线、市场深度、效率,因为它们决定了市场中资产以合理价格变现的能力。参见“Market Structure and Liquidity in the U.S.Treasury and Agency Mortgage-Backed Security (MBS) Markets,” https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2016/wue160517,访问时间:2016年5月17日。
(12)数据来源:Treasury International Capital (TIC).
(13)Brad W.Setser,https://www.cfr.org/blog/what-would-happen-if-china-started-selling-its-treasury-portfolio,访问时间:2018年6月21日。https://www.cfr.org/blog/few-words-chinas-holdings-us-bonds,访问时间:2018年1月17日。
(14)Brad W.Setser,https://www.cfr.org/blog/what-would-happen-if-china-started-selling-its-treasury-portfolio,访问时间:2018年6月21日。https://www.cfr.org/blog/few-words-chinas-holdings-us-bonds,访问时间:2018年1月17日。
(15)Daniel C.K.Chow,“Can the United States Impose Trade Sanctions on China for Currency Manipulation?”,Washington University Global Studies Law Review 16.2 (2017):299-300.
(16)J.Peter Ferderer,“Were there Liquidity Black Holes during the Great Depression?An Analysis of the U.S.Government Bond Market,” https://www.macalester.edu/～ferderer/Ferderer_BlackHoles_November2006.pdf,访问时间:2006年11月7日。
(17)张明:《中国投资者是否是美国国债市场上的价格稳定者》,《世界经济》2012年第5期。
(18)https://www.cfr.org/blog/did-russia-really-dump-its-us-debt______https://www.cfr.org/blog/asias-central-banks-and-sovereign-funds-are-back.
(19)Lisa L.Martin,Coercive Cooperation:Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions (Princeton:Princeton University Press,1992);and Daniel W.Drezner,“Bargaining,Enforcement,and Multilateral Economic Sanctions,” International Organization 54.1 (2000):73-102.
(20)数据来源:Treasury International Capital (TIC).
(21)② 数据来源:FED,Securities Holdings and Transactions.
(22)④ 数据来源:Treasury International Capital (TIC).
(23)Daniel O.Beltran,Maxwell Kretchmer,Jaime Marquez,Charles P.Thomas,“Foreign holdings of U.S.Treasuries and U.S.Treasury Yields,”Journal of International Money and Finance 32 (2013):1120–1143.
(24)Shalendra D.Sharma,“China as the World's Creditor and the United States as the World's Debtor:Implications for Sino-American Relations,” China Perspectives 4 (2010):108.
(25)1971年前,美国首先通过马歇尔计划和租借补偿条款等贷出美元,同时利用债务谈判迫使外国用其借入的美元购买包括机器设备在内的各种美国生产的产品,由此美元实现回流,然后再借出,之后再回流。这种循环模式输出的是产品和技术,而回流的是曾经贷出去的美元。参见许平祥:《“滥币陷阱”与国际体系的不稳定性》,《经济学家》2017年第4期。
② 参见Wayne M.Morrison,“China-U.S.Trade Issues,” Congressional Research Service,January 7,2011,p.13.Nicholas C.Malokofsky,Blood and Treasure:The U.S.Debt And Its Implications For National Defense And Security,United States Navy (California Naval Postgraduate School,2012).实际上,美国研究者一直在追踪美债外国持有者的增减持状况以及美债交易网络。例如Benn Steil,Benjamin Della以及Brad W.Setser 就分别分析过俄罗斯减持美债行为、比利时所持美债与中国所持美债,英国所持美债变化与中国所持美债之间的相关性,以及新兴国家所持美债的发展趋势。https://www.cfr.org/blog/secrets-safe-part-1-look-uk-find-some-chinas-treasuries-and-agencies,访问时间2009年1月3日。https://www.cfr.org/blog/did-russia-really-dump-its-us-debt,访问时间2018年8月13日。
(1)Derek Scissors and Arvind Subramanian,“The Great China Debate:Will Beijing Rule the World?”,Foreign Affairs 91.1 (2012):173-177.
(2)Daniel C.K.Chow,“Can the United States Impose Trade Sanctions on China for Currency Manipulation?”,Washington University Global Studies Law Review 16.2 (2017):295-328.
(3)参见Brad W.Setser,https://www.cfr.org/blog/what-would-happen-if-china-started-selling-its-treasury-portfolio,访问时间:2018年6月21日。https://www.cfr.org/blog/few-words-chinas-holdings-us-bonds,访问时间:2018年1月17日。以及高占军:《中国该不该打美国国债牌?》,《财新周刊》2018年第4期;张启迪:《抛售美国国债对美国影响的分析》,《金融理论与教学》2017年第4期。
(4)参见巫强、王嘉:《中国持有美国国债规模影响因素的实证分析》,《南京大学学报》(哲学·人文科学·社会科学)2010年第6期。以及HS Brian,Public Debt,Inequality,and Power:The Making of a Modern Debt State (Oakland:University of California Press,2016) 32.李潇、郑辉:《中国购买美国国债与美国长期利率之谜的实证研究》,《世界经济情况》2012年第6期。
(5)孙海泳、李庆四:《美债问题对中美关系的影响》,《教学与研究》2012年第10期。
(6)参见宋国友:《中国购买美国国债:来源、收益与影响》,《复旦学报》(社会科学版)2008年第4期。张启迪:《抛售美国国债对美国影响的分析》,《金融理论与教学》2017年第4期。
(7)宋国友:《美元陷阱、债务武器与中美金融困境》,《国际观察》2010年第4期。
(8)Daniel O.Beltran,Maxwell Kretchmer,Jaime Marquez,Charles P.Thomas,“Foreign Holdings of U.S.Treasuries and U.S.Treasury Yields,”Journal of International Money and Finance 32 (2013):1120–1143.
(9)孙海泳、李庆四:《美债问题对中美关系的影响》,《教学与研究》2012年第10期。
(10)②③⑤⑥ 数据来源:Treasury International Capital (TIC).
(11)美债流动性降低了美国政府融资的成本,是衡量美债市场结构以及健康度的重要指标。而决定美债流动性的,主要是美债的成本、时间线、市场深度、效率,因为它们决定了市场中资产以合理价格变现的能力。参见“Market Structure and Liquidity in the U.S.Treasury and Agency Mortgage-Backed Security (MBS) Markets,” https://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/speeches/2016/wue160517,访问时间:2016年5月17日。
(12)数据来源:Treasury International Capital (TIC).
(13)Brad W.Setser,https://www.cfr.org/blog/what-would-happen-if-china-started-selling-its-treasury-portfolio,访问时间:2018年6月21日。https://www.cfr.org/blog/few-words-chinas-holdings-us-bonds,访问时间:2018年1月17日。
(14)Brad W.Setser,https://www.cfr.org/blog/what-would-happen-if-china-started-selling-its-treasury-portfolio,访问时间:2018年6月21日。https://www.cfr.org/blog/few-words-chinas-holdings-us-bonds,访问时间:2018年1月17日。
(15)Daniel C.K.Chow,“Can the United States Impose Trade Sanctions on China for Currency Manipulation?”,Washington University Global Studies Law Review 16.2 (2017):299-300.
(16)J.Peter Ferderer,“Were there Liquidity Black Holes during the Great Depression?An Analysis of the U.S.Government Bond Market,” https://www.macalester.edu/～ferderer/Ferderer_BlackHoles_November2006.pdf,访问时间:2006年11月7日。
(17)张明:《中国投资者是否是美国国债市场上的价格稳定者》,《世界经济》2012年第5期。
(18)https://www.cfr.org/blog/did-russia-really-dump-its-us-debt______https://www.cfr.org/blog/asias-central-banks-and-sovereign-funds-are-back.
(19)Lisa L.Martin,Coercive Cooperation:Explaining Multilateral Economic Sanctions (Princeton:Princeton University Press,1992);and Daniel W.Drezner,“Bargaining,Enforcement,and Multilateral Economic Sanctions,” International Organization 54.1 (2000):73-102.
(20)数据来源:Treasury International Capital (TIC).
(21)② 数据来源:FED,Securities Holdings and Transactions.
(22)④ 数据来源:Treasury International Capital (TIC).
(23)Daniel O.Beltran,Maxwell Kretchmer,Jaime Marquez,Charles P.Thomas,“Foreign holdings of U.S.Treasuries and U.S.Treasury Yields,”Journal of International Money and Finance 32 (2013):1120–1143.
(24)Shalendra D.Sharma,“China as the World's Creditor and the United States as the World's Debtor:Implications for Sino-American Relations,” China Perspectives 4 (2010):108.
(25)1971年前,美国首先通过马歇尔计划和租借补偿条款等贷出美元,同时利用债务谈判迫使外国用其借入的美元购买包括机器设备在内的各种美国生产的产品,由此美元实现回流,然后再借出,之后再回流。这种循环模式输出的是产品和技术,而回流的是曾经贷出去的美元。参见许平祥:《“滥币陷阱”与国际体系的不稳定性》,《经济学家》2017年第4期。