政策不确定性与企业投资-现金流敏感性
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  • 英文篇名:Policy Uncertainty and Enterprises' Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity
  • 作者:张兆慧 ; 冯展斌
  • 英文作者:ZHANG Zhaohui;FENG Zhanbin;School of Economics and Management, Shihezi University;School of Economics and Management, Shanghai Maritime University;
  • 关键词:官员更替 ; 政策不确定性 ; 投资-现金流敏感性 ; 融资成本
  • 英文关键词:Officials Replacement;;Policy Uncertainty;;Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity;;Financing Cost
  • 中文刊名:CJLC
  • 英文刊名:Collected Essays on Finance and Economics
  • 机构:石河子大学经济与管理学院;上海海事大学经济管理学院;
  • 出版日期:2019-05-10
  • 出版单位:财经论丛
  • 年:2019
  • 期:No.246
  • 基金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(71362004;71762024)
  • 语种:中文;
  • 页:CJLC201905007
  • 页数:11
  • CN:05
  • ISSN:33-1388/F
  • 分类号:66-76
摘要
本文实证检验了官员更替这一"准自然实验"引致的政策不确定性对企业投资-现金流敏感性的影响及融资成本的中介效应。研究发现:官员更替引致的政策不确定性会提升企业投资-现金流敏感性,且这种提升作用在非国企样本、低市场化水平样本以及非交流官员样本中更加显著。动态联立方程、因果内生性、替换变量衡量指标等检验验证了回归结果的稳健性。进一步研究发现,政策不确定性通过提升企业外部融资成本,增强了企业外部融资约束,进而提高了企业投资-现金流敏感性,同时,中介效应检验排除了代理成本假说的替代性解释。中央应减少官员频繁更替对企业经营活动的冲击。
        This paper empirically examines the influence of policy uncertainty caused by officials replacement which is a quasi nature experiment on enterprises' investment-cash flow sensitivity, and further studies the intermediary effect of the financing cost. It finds that policy uncertainty caused by officials replacement will significantly enhance enterprises' investment-cash flow sensitivity, and the promotion effect is more significant in non-state-owned enterprises samples, low-marketization-level samples and non-exchange officials samples. The results are still valid after the robustness tests such as the dynamic simultaneous equations, the causal endogeneity test, and the replacing variable measurement index. Further studies find that policy uncertainty enhances enterprises' external financing constraint by increasing enterprises' external financing cost, thus improving enterprises' investment-cash flow sensitivity, while the intermediary effect test excludes the agency cost hypothesis' s alternative explanation. The central government should reduce the impact of officials frequent turnover on enterprises' business activities.
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