基于主从博弈的新型城镇配电系统产消者竞价策略
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摘要
随着能源互联技术的发展以及售电侧市场的逐步放开,新型城镇配电系统在优化运行和交易模式上呈现多能协同、交易开放的特征。新型城镇配电系统的电力零售交易机制被重新定义,产消者通过非合作竞争上报最优竞标曲线获取最大售电收益,电网公共服务企业收取过网费并提供保底供电服务,用户可基于实时电价与激励政策参与需求响应降低用电成本。在此背景下,充分考虑配电网内多角色的主动参与以及运营商的经济调度要求,建立一种基于主从动态博弈理论的产消者非合作竞价双层模型。以改进的IEEE 33节点配电网为算例,采用改进粒子群优化算法与CPLEX求解器相结合的方法,求得该主从博弈模型的均衡解。仿真结果表明,该策略可以在保证电网公共服务企业和用户利益基础上实现产消者利润最大化,为新型城镇电力零售市场的交易模式提供参考。
With the development of energy interconnection technology and the gradual liberalization of electricity retail market,the new urban power distribution system is characterized by multi-resource coordination in the optimization operation and free transaction in the trading mode.The electricity transaction mechanism in the new urban power distribution system will be redefined.The prosumers will submit optimal bidding curves through non-cooperative competition to get the maximum revenue.The utility company charges wheeling costs and provides guaranteed power supply services.The users participate in the pricebased and incentive demand response to reduce power purchase costs.In this context,the active participation of multiple roles and the optimal economic dispatching are fully considered,and a two-layer model of Stackelberg game based bidding strategy for non-cooperative prosumers is established.Taking the improved IEEE 33-bus distribution power network as an example,the improved particle swarm algorithm combined with the CPLEX solver is used to obtain the Nash equilibrium solution of the Stackelberg game model.The simulation result shows that the model can maximize the revenue of prosumers based on ensuring the interests of utility company and users,which can provide some reference for the establishment of electricity transaction mode in the new urban electricity retail market.
With the development of energy interconnection technology and the gradual liberalization of electricity retail market,the new urban power distribution system is characterized by multi-resource coordination in the optimization operation and free transaction in the trading mode.The electricity transaction mechanism in the new urban power distribution system will be redefined.The prosumers will submit optimal bidding curves through non-cooperative competition to get the maximum revenue.The utility company charges wheeling costs and provides guaranteed power supply services.The users participate in the pricebased and incentive demand response to reduce power purchase costs.In this context,the active participation of multiple roles and the optimal economic dispatching are fully considered,and a two-layer model of Stackelberg game based bidding strategy for non-cooperative prosumers is established.Taking the improved IEEE 33-bus distribution power network as an example,the improved particle swarm algorithm combined with the CPLEX solver is used to obtain the Nash equilibrium solution of the Stackelberg game model.The simulation result shows that the model can maximize the revenue of prosumers based on ensuring the interests of utility company and users,which can provide some reference for the establishment of electricity transaction mode in the new urban electricity retail market.
引文
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[21] 刘小聪,王蓓蓓,李扬,等.基于实时电价的大规模风电消纳机组组合和经济调度模型[J].电网技术,2014,38(11):2955-2963.LIU Xiaocong,WANG Beibei,LI Yang,et al.Large-scale wind power consumption unit combination and economic dispatch model based on real-time electricity price[J].Power System Technology,2014,38(11):2955-2963.
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[24] JIN S,BOTTREUD A,RYAN S M.Impact of demand response on thermal generation investment with high wind penetration[J].IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid,2013,4(4):2374-2383.
[25] 任佳依,顾伟,王勇,等.基于模型预测控制的主动配电网多时间尺度有功无功协调调度[J].中国电机工程学报,2018,38(5):1397-1407.REN Jiayi,GU Wei,WANG Yong,et al.Multi-time scale active and reactive coordination scheduling of active distribution network based on model predictive control[J].Proceedings of the CSEE,2018,38(5):1397-1407.
[26] 杨铮,彭思成,廖清芬,等.面向综合能源园区的三方市场主体非合作交易方法[J].电力系统自动化,2018,42(14):32-39.DOI:10.7500/AEPS20170915007.YANG Zheng,PENG Sicheng,LIAO Qingfen,et al.Non-cooperative trading method for three market entities in integrated community energy system[J].Automation of Electric Power Systems,2018,42(14):32-39.DOI:10.7500/AEPS20170915007.
[27] KIA R,SHAHNAZARI-SHAHREZAEI P,ZABIHI S.Solving a multi-objective mathematical model for a multi-skilled project scheduling problem by CPLEX solver[C]// 2016 IEEE International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management (IEEM),December 4-7,2016,Bali,Indonesia:1220-1224.
[2] D’ADAMO C,JUPE S,ABBEY C.Global survey on planning and operation of active distribution networks:update of CIGRE C6.11 working group activities[C]// 20th International Conference and Exhibition on Electricity Distribution (CIRED 2009),June 8-11,2009,Prague,Czech Republic:1-4.
[3] CALDERARO V,CONIO G,GALDI V,et al.Active management of renewable energy sources for maximizing power production[J].International Journal of Electrical Power and Energy Systems,2014,54:64-72.
[4] 蒲天骄,陈乃仕,王晓辉,等.主动配电网多源协同优化调度架构分析及应用设计[J].电力系统自动化,2016,40(1):17-23.PU Tianjiao,CHEN Naishi,WANG Xiaohui,et al.Active distribution network multi-source collaborative optimization scheduling architecture analysis and application design[J].Automation of Electric Power Systems,2016,40(1):17-23.
[5] RATHNAYAKA A J D,POTDAR V M,KURUPPU S J.An innovative approach to manage prosumers in smart grid[C]// 2011 World Congress on Sustainable Technologies (WCST),March 21,2011,London,UK:141-146.
[6] 谢玮.“电改”再出发,售电侧改革是亮点[J].中国经济周刊,2015(48):46-47.XIE Wei.Electricity retail side is the bright spot in the“reformation of electric power system”[J].China Economic Weekly,2015(48):46-47.
[7] 黄伟,李宁坤,李玟萱,等.考虑多利益主体参与的主动配电网双层联合优化调度[J].中国电机工程学报,2017,37(12):3418-3428.HUANG Wei,LI Ningkun,LI Wenxuan,et al.Double-layer joint optimization scheduling of active distribution network considering multi-stakeholder participation[J].Proceedings of the CSEE,2017,37(12):3418-3428.
[8] LU T,WANF Z,WANG J,et al.A data-driven Stackelberg market strategy for demand response-enabled distribution systems[J].IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid,2019,10(3):2345-2357.
[9] YU M,HONG S H.A real-time demand-response algorithm for smart grids:a Stackelberg game approach[J].IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid,2016,7(2):879-888.
[10] 郝然,艾芊,姜子卿.区域综合能源系统多主体非完全信息下的双层博弈策略[J].电力系统自动化,2018,42(4):194-201.DOI:10.7500/AEPS20170612013.HAO Ran,AI Qian,JIANG Ziqing.Double-layer game strategy under multi-agent incomplete information of regional integrated energy system[J].Automation of Electric Power Systems,2018,42(4):194-201.DOI:10.7500/AEPS20170612013.
[11] NEKOUEI E,ALPCAN T,CHATTOPADHYAY D.Game-theoretic frameworks for demand response in electricity markets[J].IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid,2015,6(2):748-758.
[12] CHERUKURI A,CORTES J.Decentralized Nash equilibrium learning by strategic generators for economic dispatch[C]// 2016 American Control Conference (ACC),July 6-8,2016,Boston,USA:1082-1087.
[13] MACAN C A,POTA H R.Optimal energy management system for strategic prosumer microgrids:an average bidding algorithm for prosumer aggregators[C]// 2017 11th Asian Control Conference (ASCC),December 17-20,2017,Gold Coast,Australia:705-710.
[14] SU W,HUANG A Q.A game theoretic framework for a next-generation retail electricity market with high penetration of distributed residential electricity suppliers[J].Applied Energy,2014,119:341-350.
[15] MARZBAND M,JAVADI M,DOMINGUEZ-GARCIA J L,et al.Non-cooperative game theory based energy management systems for energy district in the retail market considering DER uncertainties[J].IET Generation,Transmission & Distribution,2016,10(12):2999-3009.
[16] LIANG Z,SU W.Game theory based bidding strategy for prosumers in a distribution system with a retail electricity market[J].IET Smart Grid,2014,1(3):104-111.
[17] 张小平.电力系统重组——基于均衡模型的电力市场分析[M].北京:中国电力出版社,2016.ZHANG Xiaoping.Restructured electric power systems—analysis of electricity markets with equilibrium models[M].Beijing:China Electric Power Press,2016.
[18] 方燕琼,甘霖,艾芊,等.基于主从博弈的虚拟电厂双层竞标策略[J].电力系统自动化,2017,41(14):61-69.DOI:10.7500/AEPS20170104005.FANG Yanqiong,GAN Lin,AI Qian,et al.Double-layer bidding strategy for virtual power plants based on master-slave game[J].Automation of Electric Power Systems,2017,41(14):61-69.DOI:10.7500/AEPS20170104005.
[19] 梅生伟,刘峰,魏韡.工程博弈论基础及电力系统应用[M].北京:科学出版社,2016.MEI Shengwei,LIU Feng,WEI Wei.Foundation of engineering game theory and application of power system[M].Beijing:Science Press,2016.
[20] 林俐,许冰倩,王皓怀.典型分布式发电市场化交易机制分析与建议[J].电力系统自动化,2019,43(4):1-8.DOI:10.7500/AEPS20180829001.LIN Li,XU Bingqian,WANG Haohuai.Analysis and recommendations of typical market-based distributed generation trading mechanisms[J].Automation of Electric Power Systems,2019,43(4):1-8.DOI:10.7500/AEPS20180829001.
[21] 刘小聪,王蓓蓓,李扬,等.基于实时电价的大规模风电消纳机组组合和经济调度模型[J].电网技术,2014,38(11):2955-2963.LIU Xiaocong,WANG Beibei,LI Yang,et al.Large-scale wind power consumption unit combination and economic dispatch model based on real-time electricity price[J].Power System Technology,2014,38(11):2955-2963.
[22] SOTKIEWICZ P M,VIGNOLO J M.Nodal pricing for distribution networks:efficient pricing for efficiency enhancing DG[J].IEEE Transactions on Power Systems,2006,21(2):1013-1014.
[23] 方宇娟,魏韡,梅生伟,等.考虑节点边际价格的热电联产机组主从博弈竞价策略[J].控制理论与应用,2018,35(5):682-687.FANG Yujuan,WEI Wei,MEI Shengwei,et al.The master-slave game bidding strategy for cogeneration units considering the marginal price of nodes[J].Control Theory and Applications,2018,35(5):682-687.
[24] JIN S,BOTTREUD A,RYAN S M.Impact of demand response on thermal generation investment with high wind penetration[J].IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid,2013,4(4):2374-2383.
[25] 任佳依,顾伟,王勇,等.基于模型预测控制的主动配电网多时间尺度有功无功协调调度[J].中国电机工程学报,2018,38(5):1397-1407.REN Jiayi,GU Wei,WANG Yong,et al.Multi-time scale active and reactive coordination scheduling of active distribution network based on model predictive control[J].Proceedings of the CSEE,2018,38(5):1397-1407.
[26] 杨铮,彭思成,廖清芬,等.面向综合能源园区的三方市场主体非合作交易方法[J].电力系统自动化,2018,42(14):32-39.DOI:10.7500/AEPS20170915007.YANG Zheng,PENG Sicheng,LIAO Qingfen,et al.Non-cooperative trading method for three market entities in integrated community energy system[J].Automation of Electric Power Systems,2018,42(14):32-39.DOI:10.7500/AEPS20170915007.
[27] KIA R,SHAHNAZARI-SHAHREZAEI P,ZABIHI S.Solving a multi-objective mathematical model for a multi-skilled project scheduling problem by CPLEX solver[C]// 2016 IEEE International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management (IEEM),December 4-7,2016,Bali,Indonesia:1220-1224.