智能投顾信用风险的生成逻辑与治理策略
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摘要
信用是经济交往之根本,正在全面嵌入金融市场的各个领域。相较于传统金融交易模式,智能投顾交易依托科技而具有了更高的虚拟性。技术带来创新的同时也会带来风险,智能投顾信用风险呈现出生成更为隐蔽、传播更快、破坏性更大的新型特征,智能投顾行业正在遭遇着来自实践的审视。现实困境使得我们重新检视智能投顾信用风险的生成逻辑。智能投顾信用风险是信息不对称、算法歧视等内部因素和监管缺位、信用体系不完善等外部因素共同导致的。规制智能投顾信用风险,只有从内外两个维度入手,通过构建信息传导机制、加强监管科技、重塑监管模式以及完善信用体系,才能充分发挥智能投顾的正向作用,推动金融市场的良好有序发展。
Credit is the foundation of economic exchanges and is being fully embedded in all areas of financial markets. Compared with the traditional financial transaction mode, robo-advisor transactions rely on technology and have higher virtuality. While technology brings innovation, it also brings risks. The robo-advisor credit risk presents new features that are more concealed, faster and more destructive. The robo-advisor industry is experiencing a practice review. The real dilemma makes us re-examine the logic of generating credit risk for robo-advisor. Robo-advisor credit risk is caused by internal factors such as information asymmetry, c, and external factors such as lack of supervision and imperfect credit system. In order to regulate robo-advisor credit risk, we must start from the internal and external dimensions by constructing information transmission mechanism, strengthening supervision technology,reshaping supervision mode and improving credit system so as to give full play to the positive role of robo-advisor and promote financial market into orderly development.
Credit is the foundation of economic exchanges and is being fully embedded in all areas of financial markets. Compared with the traditional financial transaction mode, robo-advisor transactions rely on technology and have higher virtuality. While technology brings innovation, it also brings risks. The robo-advisor credit risk presents new features that are more concealed, faster and more destructive. The robo-advisor industry is experiencing a practice review. The real dilemma makes us re-examine the logic of generating credit risk for robo-advisor. Robo-advisor credit risk is caused by internal factors such as information asymmetry, c, and external factors such as lack of supervision and imperfect credit system. In order to regulate robo-advisor credit risk, we must start from the internal and external dimensions by constructing information transmission mechanism, strengthening supervision technology,reshaping supervision mode and improving credit system so as to give full play to the positive role of robo-advisor and promote financial market into orderly development.
引文
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[2]刘雅琨.金融科技视阈下我国智能投顾监管制度的构建[J].浙江金融,2017(12):51-57,50.
[3]米晓文.机器人投顾对我国金融消费者权益保护的启示[J].华北金融,2016(7):58-60.
[4]李晴.智能投顾的风险分析及法律规制路径[J].南方金融,2017(4):90-98.
[5]李文莉,杨玥捷.智能投顾的法律风险及监管建议[J].法学,2017(8):15-26.
[6]于文菊.我国智能投顾的发展现状及其法律监管[J].海南金融,2017(6):61-67.
[7]Megan Ji.Are robots good fiduciaries?Regulating robo-advisors under the investment advisers act of 1940[J].Columbia Law Review,2017(9):42.
[8]Melanie L.Fein.Are robo-advisors fiduciaries?[J].Research paper,2017(9):23.
[9]周一懋,张强.新兴技术企业信用风险的成因与特征[J].价值工程,2017(25):67-69.
[10]任全民.国内互联网金融信用风险状况和发展路径浅析[J].吉林金融研究,2017(2):23-27.
[11]杨东.互联网金融的法律规制--基于信息工具的视角[J].中国社会科学,2015(4):107-126,206.
[12]郑佳宁.论智能投顾运营者的民事责任--以信义义务为中心的展开[J].法学杂志,2018(10):62-72.
[13]王文寅.科技信用风险管理[M].北京:科学出版社,2015:6.
[14]李嫚.我国供应链金融信用风险:特征及防范措施[J].商业文化(下半月),2012(4):157.
[15]李劲松,刘勇.智能投顾[M].北京:机械工业出版社,2018:47.
[16]张成岗.人工智能时代:技术发展、风险挑战与秩序重构[J].南京社会科学,2018(5):42-52.
[17]徐杰.信息不对称与金融市场脆弱性[J].中央财经大学学报,2004(4):30-34.
[18]张玉宏,秦志光,肖乐.大数据算法的歧视本质[J].自然辩证法研究,2017(5):81-86.
[19]周昌发.论互联网金融的激励性监管[J].法商研究,2018(4):15-25.
[20]许传华.构建我国金融风险预警机制的宏观思考[J].中州学刊,2010(5):39-41.
[21]朱娟.区块链金融消费者权益保护:实验性规制的路径[J].南京社会科学,2018(12):100-105.
[22]马长山.人工智能的社会风险及其法律规制[J].法律科学(西北政法大学学报),2018(6):47-55.