内部控制、独立审计与国企费用归类操纵
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摘要
"八项规定"引发的国企费用归类操纵行为严重降低了企业会计信息质量。文章利用"八项规定"实施前两年(2010—2011年)和实施后两年(2013—2014年)沪深两市A股上市公司为研究样本,实证了考察内部控制和独立审计对国企费用归类操纵行为的抑制效果。研究发现:相比于内部控制指数较高的国有企业,内部控制指数较低的国有企业的费用归类操纵行为更严重;相比于聘请四大会计师事务所的国有企业,聘请非"四大"的国有企业的费用归类操纵行为更严重。研究表明,完善的内部控制和高质量的独立审计均可有效抑制国企费用归类操纵行为。研究结论对于治理国企费用归类操纵行为,提升"八项规定"政策效果具有重要启示。
The expense classification shifting in the SOEs due to the execution of"Eight Rules"seriously reduces the quality of enterprise accounting information. Using the data of A-stock listed companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange two years prior to the execution of "Eight Rules"( from 2010 to 2011) and two years after the execution of"Eight Rules"( from 2013 to 2014) as research sample,this paper makes an empirical research on the inhibitory effect of internal control and independent auditing upon the SOE's expense classification shifting. This paper finds that the expense classification shifting is more serious in the SOEs with lower internal control index than those with higher internal control index,and that it is also more serious in the SOEs audited by non-Big 4 than those audited by Big 4. The research indicates that both perfect internal control and high quality independent auditing can reduce the SOEs' expense classification shifting. The research conclusion in this paper is of important enlightenment to the governance of SOEs' expense classification shifting and the improvement of"Eight Rules"policy effect.
The expense classification shifting in the SOEs due to the execution of"Eight Rules"seriously reduces the quality of enterprise accounting information. Using the data of A-stock listed companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange two years prior to the execution of "Eight Rules"( from 2010 to 2011) and two years after the execution of"Eight Rules"( from 2013 to 2014) as research sample,this paper makes an empirical research on the inhibitory effect of internal control and independent auditing upon the SOE's expense classification shifting. This paper finds that the expense classification shifting is more serious in the SOEs with lower internal control index than those with higher internal control index,and that it is also more serious in the SOEs audited by non-Big 4 than those audited by Big 4. The research indicates that both perfect internal control and high quality independent auditing can reduce the SOEs' expense classification shifting. The research conclusion in this paper is of important enlightenment to the governance of SOEs' expense classification shifting and the improvement of"Eight Rules"policy effect.
引文
[1]梅洁.国有控股公司管理层报酬的政策干预效果评估——基于“限薪令”和“八项规定”政策干预的拟自然实验[J].证券市场导报,2015(12):36-44.
[2]梅洁,葛扬.国有企业管理层在职消费的政策干预效果研究——基于2012年“八项规定”出台所构建的拟自然实验[J].经济学家,2016(2):75-83.
[3]杨蓉.“八项规定”、高管控制权和在职消费[J].华东师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2016(1):138-148.
[4]叶康涛,臧文佼.外部监督与企业费用归类操纵[J].管理世界,2016(1):121-128.
[5]刘启亮,罗乐,张雅曼,等.高管集权、内部控制与会计信息质量[J].南开管理评论,2013(1):15-23.
[6]DEANGELO L E.Auditor size and audit quality[J].Journal of Accounting&Economics,1981,3(3):183-199.
[7]RONEN J,SADAN S.Classificatorysmoothing:alternative income models[J].Journal of Accounting Research,1975,13(1):133-149.
[8]BARNEA A,RONEN J,SADAN S.Classificatorysmoothing of income with extraordinary items[J].Accounting Review,1976,51(1):110-122.
[9]MCVAY S E.Earningsmanagement using classification shifting:an examination of core earnings and special items[J].Accounting Review,2006,81(3):501-531.
[10]BARUA A,LIN S,SBARAGLIA A M.Earningsmanagement using discontinued operations[J].The Accounting Review,2010,85(5):1485-1509.
[11]FAN Y,LIU X.Misclassifying core expenses as special items:cost of goods sold or selling,general,and administrative expenses?[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2017,34(1):400-426.
[12]吴溪.盈利指标监管与制度化的影响:以中国证券市场ST公司申请摘帽制度为例[J].中国会计与财务研究,2006(4):95-137.
[13]张子余,张天西.“特殊损失项目”与“核心费用”之间的归类变更盈余管理研究[J].财经研究,2012(3):70-80.
[14]HAW I,HO S S M,LI A Y.Corporate governance and earnings management by classification shifting[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2011,28(2):517-553.
[15]方红星,金玉娜.高质量内部控制能抑制盈余管理吗?——基于自愿性内部控制鉴证报告的经验研究[J].会计研究,2011(8):53-60.
[16]蔡春,黄益建,赵莎.关于审计质量对盈余管理影响的实证研究——来自沪市制造业的经验证据[J].审计研究,2005(2):3-10.
[17]李仙,聂丽洁.我国上市公司IPO中审计质量与盈余管理实证研究[J].审计研究,2006(6):67-72.
[18]范经华,张雅曼,刘启亮.内部控制、审计师行业专长、应计与真实盈余管理[J].会计研究,2013(4):81-88.
[19]卢锐.管理层权力、薪酬与业绩敏感性分析——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].当代财经,2008(7):107-112.
[20]陈冬华,陈信元,万华林.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费[J].经济研究,2005(2):92-101.
[21]陈信元,陈冬华,万华林,等.地区差异、薪酬管制与高管腐败[J].管理世界,2009(11):130-143.
[22]KRUEGER A O.The political economy of the rent-seeking society[J].American Economic Review,1974,64(3):291-303.
[23]周美华,林斌,林东杰.管理层权力、内部控制与腐败治理[J].会计研究,2016(3):56-63.
[24]张嘉兴,傅绍正.内部控制、注册会计师审计与盈余管理[J].审计与经济研究,2014(2):3-13.
[25]郑军,林钟高,彭琳.高质量的内部控制能增加商业信用融资吗?——基于货币政策变更视角的检验[J].会计研究,2013(6):62-68.
[26]逯东,王运陈,付鹏.CEO激励提高了内部控制有效性吗?——来自国有上市公司的经验证据[J].会计研究,2014(6):66-72.
(1)本文沿用叶康涛、臧文佼(2016)对费用归类操纵的定义,即费用归类操纵是指企业有目的地将原本应当计入期间费用的消费性现金支出计入除期间费用以外的其他会计科目的行为。
(2)叶康涛、臧文佼(2016)还考察了国有企业将部分消费性现金支出归类计入哪些会计科目,但本文并未做相关检验。理由如下:首先,费用归类操纵行为属于错误的会计确认,受企业会计准则约束,国企操纵的数额通常不会太大;其次,进行归类操纵的这部分费用可能散布于多个不同科目中。本文的研究核心并非描绘费用归类操纵行为的整个脉络,所以本文并未深究。
(3)与叶康涛、臧文佼(2016)通过考察费用下降的持续性来区分消费性现金支出费用化比率降低究竟是源于实际费用降低还是源于费用归类操纵不同,本文给出了另外一种检验方法——考察国有企业的消费性现金支出总额在“八项规定”前后是否存在显著变化。
[2]梅洁,葛扬.国有企业管理层在职消费的政策干预效果研究——基于2012年“八项规定”出台所构建的拟自然实验[J].经济学家,2016(2):75-83.
[3]杨蓉.“八项规定”、高管控制权和在职消费[J].华东师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2016(1):138-148.
[4]叶康涛,臧文佼.外部监督与企业费用归类操纵[J].管理世界,2016(1):121-128.
[5]刘启亮,罗乐,张雅曼,等.高管集权、内部控制与会计信息质量[J].南开管理评论,2013(1):15-23.
[6]DEANGELO L E.Auditor size and audit quality[J].Journal of Accounting&Economics,1981,3(3):183-199.
[7]RONEN J,SADAN S.Classificatorysmoothing:alternative income models[J].Journal of Accounting Research,1975,13(1):133-149.
[8]BARNEA A,RONEN J,SADAN S.Classificatorysmoothing of income with extraordinary items[J].Accounting Review,1976,51(1):110-122.
[9]MCVAY S E.Earningsmanagement using classification shifting:an examination of core earnings and special items[J].Accounting Review,2006,81(3):501-531.
[10]BARUA A,LIN S,SBARAGLIA A M.Earningsmanagement using discontinued operations[J].The Accounting Review,2010,85(5):1485-1509.
[11]FAN Y,LIU X.Misclassifying core expenses as special items:cost of goods sold or selling,general,and administrative expenses?[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2017,34(1):400-426.
[12]吴溪.盈利指标监管与制度化的影响:以中国证券市场ST公司申请摘帽制度为例[J].中国会计与财务研究,2006(4):95-137.
[13]张子余,张天西.“特殊损失项目”与“核心费用”之间的归类变更盈余管理研究[J].财经研究,2012(3):70-80.
[14]HAW I,HO S S M,LI A Y.Corporate governance and earnings management by classification shifting[J].Contemporary Accounting Research,2011,28(2):517-553.
[15]方红星,金玉娜.高质量内部控制能抑制盈余管理吗?——基于自愿性内部控制鉴证报告的经验研究[J].会计研究,2011(8):53-60.
[16]蔡春,黄益建,赵莎.关于审计质量对盈余管理影响的实证研究——来自沪市制造业的经验证据[J].审计研究,2005(2):3-10.
[17]李仙,聂丽洁.我国上市公司IPO中审计质量与盈余管理实证研究[J].审计研究,2006(6):67-72.
[18]范经华,张雅曼,刘启亮.内部控制、审计师行业专长、应计与真实盈余管理[J].会计研究,2013(4):81-88.
[19]卢锐.管理层权力、薪酬与业绩敏感性分析——来自中国上市公司的经验证据[J].当代财经,2008(7):107-112.
[20]陈冬华,陈信元,万华林.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费[J].经济研究,2005(2):92-101.
[21]陈信元,陈冬华,万华林,等.地区差异、薪酬管制与高管腐败[J].管理世界,2009(11):130-143.
[22]KRUEGER A O.The political economy of the rent-seeking society[J].American Economic Review,1974,64(3):291-303.
[23]周美华,林斌,林东杰.管理层权力、内部控制与腐败治理[J].会计研究,2016(3):56-63.
[24]张嘉兴,傅绍正.内部控制、注册会计师审计与盈余管理[J].审计与经济研究,2014(2):3-13.
[25]郑军,林钟高,彭琳.高质量的内部控制能增加商业信用融资吗?——基于货币政策变更视角的检验[J].会计研究,2013(6):62-68.
[26]逯东,王运陈,付鹏.CEO激励提高了内部控制有效性吗?——来自国有上市公司的经验证据[J].会计研究,2014(6):66-72.
(1)本文沿用叶康涛、臧文佼(2016)对费用归类操纵的定义,即费用归类操纵是指企业有目的地将原本应当计入期间费用的消费性现金支出计入除期间费用以外的其他会计科目的行为。
(2)叶康涛、臧文佼(2016)还考察了国有企业将部分消费性现金支出归类计入哪些会计科目,但本文并未做相关检验。理由如下:首先,费用归类操纵行为属于错误的会计确认,受企业会计准则约束,国企操纵的数额通常不会太大;其次,进行归类操纵的这部分费用可能散布于多个不同科目中。本文的研究核心并非描绘费用归类操纵行为的整个脉络,所以本文并未深究。
(3)与叶康涛、臧文佼(2016)通过考察费用下降的持续性来区分消费性现金支出费用化比率降低究竟是源于实际费用降低还是源于费用归类操纵不同,本文给出了另外一种检验方法——考察国有企业的消费性现金支出总额在“八项规定”前后是否存在显著变化。