外部监管、在职消费与企业绩效
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摘要
本文利用规范国有企业在职消费行为的政策颁布为准自然实验契机,研究了外部监管对企业在职消费的影响及其经济结果。研究发现:监管政策能够有效抑制企业在职消费,特别是对地方国企,并且在市场化程度低的地区效果更强。进一步的经济效应检验表明:在市场化程度高的地区,在职消费的监管政策能够促进企业绩效的提升。在市场化程度较弱的地区,尽管监管政策弱化了民营企业的短期绩效,对地方国企绩效的提升具有一定的延迟效应,但是随着反腐进程的持续,监管政策的长期绩效促进作用开始凸显。同时,进一步加强市场化建设,完善国企薪酬制度,对于提升监管政策的业绩促进效应有着积极的影响。
Taking advantage of regulatory policies related to perquisite consumption of state-owned enterprise as a quasi-experimental opportunity,this paper empirically researches the impact of external supervision on enterprise perquisite consumption and its economic outcome. We find that external supervision policies restrain the perquisite consumption,especially for local state-owned companies,and this effect is stronger in low marketization regions. Further research on economic effects indicated that supervision policies improved enterprise performance in high marketization regions. Meanwhile,in low marketization regions,the effect of supervision policies has a lag for local state-owned companies. For non-state-owned enterprise,external supervision has a negative effect on short-term performance,but the positive effect began to highlight with anti-corruption campaign moving forward. Deepening market-oriented reform,optimizing salary system of state-owned enterprises,further promoting anti-corruption will help supervision policies to play a greater role in improving enterprise performance.
Taking advantage of regulatory policies related to perquisite consumption of state-owned enterprise as a quasi-experimental opportunity,this paper empirically researches the impact of external supervision on enterprise perquisite consumption and its economic outcome. We find that external supervision policies restrain the perquisite consumption,especially for local state-owned companies,and this effect is stronger in low marketization regions. Further research on economic effects indicated that supervision policies improved enterprise performance in high marketization regions. Meanwhile,in low marketization regions,the effect of supervision policies has a lag for local state-owned companies. For non-state-owned enterprise,external supervision has a negative effect on short-term performance,but the positive effect began to highlight with anti-corruption campaign moving forward. Deepening market-oriented reform,optimizing salary system of state-owned enterprises,further promoting anti-corruption will help supervision policies to play a greater role in improving enterprise performance.
引文
陈冬华,陈信元,万华林.2005.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费.经济研究,2:92~101
陈冬华,梁上坤,蒋德权.2010.不同市场化进程下高管激励契约的成本与选择:货币薪酬与在职消费.会计研究,11:56~64
褚剑,方军雄.2016.政府审计能够抑制国有企业高管超额在职消费吗?会计研究,9:82~89
郝颖,刘星.2009.资本投向、利益攫取与挤占效应.管理世界,5:128~144
黄玖立,李坤望.2013.吃喝、腐败与企业订单.经济研究,6:71~84
黎文靖,池勤伟.2015.高管职务消费对企业业绩影响机理研究——基于产权性质的视角.中国工业经济,4:122~134
李艳丽,孙剑非,伊志宏.2012.公司异质性、在职消费与机构投资者治理.财经研究,6:27~37
聂辉华,张彧,江艇.2014.中国地区腐败对企业全要素生产率的影响.中国软科学,5:37~48
潘越,宁博,肖金利.2015.地方政治权力转移与政企关系重建——来自地方官员更替与高管变更的证据.中国工业经济,6:135~147
魏尚进.2001.经济中的贿赂:是润滑剂还是沙子.经济社会体制比较,1:33~43
魏下海,董志强,金钊.2015.腐败与企业生命力:寻租和抽租影响开工率的经验研究.世界经济,1:105~125
叶康涛,臧文佼.2016.外部监督与企业费用归类操纵.管理世界,1:121~128
翟胜宝,徐亚琴,杨德明.2015.媒体能监督国有企业高管在职消费么?会计研究,5:57~63
张璇,王鑫,刘碧.2017.吃喝费用、融资约束与企业出口行为——世行中国企业调查数据的证据.金融研究,5:176~190
赵璨,朱锦余,曹伟.2013.高薪能够养廉么?——来自中国国有上市公司的实证证据.中国会计评论,4:491~512
Ai,J.2006.Guanxi Networks in China:Its Importance and Future Trends.China&World Economy,14(5):105~118
Cai,H.,H.Fang,L.C.Xu.2011.Eat,Drink,Firms,Government:An Investigation of Corruption from the Entertainment and Travel Costs of Chinese Firms.Journal of Law and Economics,54(1):55~78
Liu,Q,T.Luo,G.Tian.2016.Political Connections with Corrupt Government Bureaucrats and Corporate M&A Decisions:A Natural Experiment from the Anti-corruption Cases in China.Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,37():52~80
Luo,W.,Y.Zhang,N.Zhu.2011.Bank Ownership and Executive Perquisites:New Evidence from an Emerging Market.Journal of Corporate Finance,17(2):352~370
Rajan,R.G.,J.Wulf.2006.Are Perks Purely Managerial Excess?.Journal of Financial Economics,79(1):1~33
Yermack,D.2006.Flights of Fancy:Corporate Jets,CEO Perquisites,and Inferior Shareholder Returns.Journal of Financial Economics,80(1):211~242
(1)党的十九大报告指出:着力构建市场机制有效、微观主体有活力、宏观调控有度的经济体制,不断增强我国经济创新力和竞争力。清理废除妨碍统一市场和公平竞争的各种规定和做法,激发各类市场主体活力。
(2)“这种关系”也可能包括政府官员为达到自己的政治目的而干预企业,从企业主动谋取的部分。
(3)限于篇幅限制,我们没有列出检验结果,有兴趣的读者可向我们索取,cquhaoying@163.com。
陈冬华,梁上坤,蒋德权.2010.不同市场化进程下高管激励契约的成本与选择:货币薪酬与在职消费.会计研究,11:56~64
褚剑,方军雄.2016.政府审计能够抑制国有企业高管超额在职消费吗?会计研究,9:82~89
郝颖,刘星.2009.资本投向、利益攫取与挤占效应.管理世界,5:128~144
黄玖立,李坤望.2013.吃喝、腐败与企业订单.经济研究,6:71~84
黎文靖,池勤伟.2015.高管职务消费对企业业绩影响机理研究——基于产权性质的视角.中国工业经济,4:122~134
李艳丽,孙剑非,伊志宏.2012.公司异质性、在职消费与机构投资者治理.财经研究,6:27~37
聂辉华,张彧,江艇.2014.中国地区腐败对企业全要素生产率的影响.中国软科学,5:37~48
潘越,宁博,肖金利.2015.地方政治权力转移与政企关系重建——来自地方官员更替与高管变更的证据.中国工业经济,6:135~147
魏尚进.2001.经济中的贿赂:是润滑剂还是沙子.经济社会体制比较,1:33~43
魏下海,董志强,金钊.2015.腐败与企业生命力:寻租和抽租影响开工率的经验研究.世界经济,1:105~125
叶康涛,臧文佼.2016.外部监督与企业费用归类操纵.管理世界,1:121~128
翟胜宝,徐亚琴,杨德明.2015.媒体能监督国有企业高管在职消费么?会计研究,5:57~63
张璇,王鑫,刘碧.2017.吃喝费用、融资约束与企业出口行为——世行中国企业调查数据的证据.金融研究,5:176~190
赵璨,朱锦余,曹伟.2013.高薪能够养廉么?——来自中国国有上市公司的实证证据.中国会计评论,4:491~512
Ai,J.2006.Guanxi Networks in China:Its Importance and Future Trends.China&World Economy,14(5):105~118
Cai,H.,H.Fang,L.C.Xu.2011.Eat,Drink,Firms,Government:An Investigation of Corruption from the Entertainment and Travel Costs of Chinese Firms.Journal of Law and Economics,54(1):55~78
Liu,Q,T.Luo,G.Tian.2016.Political Connections with Corrupt Government Bureaucrats and Corporate M&A Decisions:A Natural Experiment from the Anti-corruption Cases in China.Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,37():52~80
Luo,W.,Y.Zhang,N.Zhu.2011.Bank Ownership and Executive Perquisites:New Evidence from an Emerging Market.Journal of Corporate Finance,17(2):352~370
Rajan,R.G.,J.Wulf.2006.Are Perks Purely Managerial Excess?.Journal of Financial Economics,79(1):1~33
Yermack,D.2006.Flights of Fancy:Corporate Jets,CEO Perquisites,and Inferior Shareholder Returns.Journal of Financial Economics,80(1):211~242
(1)党的十九大报告指出:着力构建市场机制有效、微观主体有活力、宏观调控有度的经济体制,不断增强我国经济创新力和竞争力。清理废除妨碍统一市场和公平竞争的各种规定和做法,激发各类市场主体活力。
(2)“这种关系”也可能包括政府官员为达到自己的政治目的而干预企业,从企业主动谋取的部分。
(3)限于篇幅限制,我们没有列出检验结果,有兴趣的读者可向我们索取,cquhaoying@163.com。