控制权、社会审计与高管腐败
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摘要
以2012—2017年沪深两市A股上市公司为研究样本,实证分析社会审计与高管腐败之间的关系,并在此基础上探讨高管权力对其腐败行为的影响。实证结果表明:高管的强控制权是诱发腐败的重要因素,且控制权越强,高管越有可能发生腐败行为;高质量的社会审计在一定程度上能抑制高管的腐败行为,提高公司治理水平;随着控制权的增强,社会审计对腐败的治理功效会被强权高管牵制,无法发挥其应有的监管作用。因此,要遏制高管的腐败行为,必须在企业内部完善对高管权力的监督制约机制,同时要加强外部审计的治理和监管,提升注册会计师的独立性,优化企业内外部治理结构。
Taking A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2012 to 2017 as samples,this paper makes an empirical analysis of the relationship between social audit and executive corruption. On this basis,this paper discusses the influence of executive power on its induced corruption. The empirical results find that strong executive control power is one of the important factors to induce the corruption and the enhanced executives' control power can increase the corruption. With the enhancement of control power,the effect of social audit on corruption will be held back by the powerful executives,which makes the social audit not play the desired functions of supervision in corporate governance. Therefore,it is necessary to perfect supervision and restriction mechanism of executive power in enterprises to curb executive corruption. At the same time,it is also pre-requisite to strengthen the governance and supervision of external audit,enhance the independence of certified public accountants,optimize the internal and external structure of enterprise governance.
Taking A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2012 to 2017 as samples,this paper makes an empirical analysis of the relationship between social audit and executive corruption. On this basis,this paper discusses the influence of executive power on its induced corruption. The empirical results find that strong executive control power is one of the important factors to induce the corruption and the enhanced executives' control power can increase the corruption. With the enhancement of control power,the effect of social audit on corruption will be held back by the powerful executives,which makes the social audit not play the desired functions of supervision in corporate governance. Therefore,it is necessary to perfect supervision and restriction mechanism of executive power in enterprises to curb executive corruption. At the same time,it is also pre-requisite to strengthen the governance and supervision of external audit,enhance the independence of certified public accountants,optimize the internal and external structure of enterprise governance.
引文
[1]Aidt T S. Economic analysis of corruption:A survey[J]. Economic Journal,2003,113(491):F632-F652.
[2]赵璨,杨德明,曹伟.行政权、控制权与国有企业高管腐败[J].财经研究,2015(5):78-89.
[3]杨德明,赵璨.国有企业高管为什么会滋生隐性腐败?[J].经济管理,2014(10):64-74.
[4]Tien C,Chen C N,Chuang C M. A study of CEO power,pay structure,and firm performance[J]. Journal of Management&Organization,2013,19(4):424-453.
[5]Pearce C L,Manz C C,Sims H P. The roles of vertical and shared leadership in the enactment of executive corruption:Implications for research and practice.[J]. Leadership Quarterly,2008,19(3):353-359.
[6]盛明泉,车鑫.管理层权力、高管薪酬与公司绩效[J].中央财经大学学报,2016(5):97-104.
[7]Lambsdorff J G. Corruption and rent-seeking[J]. Public Choice,2002,113(1-2):97-125.
[8]王曾,符国群,黄丹阳,等.国有企业CEO“政治晋升”与“在职消费”关系研究[J].管理世界,2014(5):157-171.
[9]杨瑞龙,王元,聂辉华.“准官员”的晋升机制:来自中国央企的证据[J].管理世界,2013(3):23-33.
[10]杨理强,陈爱华,陈菡.反腐倡廉与企业经营绩效——基于业务招待费的研究[J].经济管理,2017(7):45-66.
[11]钟覃琳,陆正飞,袁淳.反腐败、企业绩效及其渠道效应——基于中共十八大的反腐建设的研究[J].金融研究,2016(9):161-176.
[12]Williams C C,Kedir A M. The impacts of corruption on firm performance:Some lessons from 40 africancountries[J].Journal of Developmental Entrepreneurship,2016,21(4):165-184.
[13]马可哪呐,唐凯桃,郝莉莉.社会审计监管与资本市场风险防范研究——基于股价崩盘风险的视角[J].山西财经大学学报,2016(8):25-34.
[14]王彦超,赵璨.社会审计、反腐与国家治理[J].审计研究,2016(4):40-49.
[15]Bebchuk L A,Fried J M,Walker D I. Managerial power and rent extraction in the design of executive compensation[J].University of Chicago Law Review,2002,69(3):751-846.
[16]Pei H H. Do financial expert directors affect the incidence of accruals management to meet or beat analyst forecasts?[J]. Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting&Economics,2015,22(4):406-427.
[17]张嘉兴,傅绍正.内部控制、独立审计与国企费用归类操纵[J].北京工商大学学报(社会科学版),2017(3):76-84.
[18]吴伟荣,刘亚伟.公共压力与审计质量——基于会计师事务所规模视角的研究[J].审计研究,2015(3):82-90.
[19]Beck M J,Mauldin E G. Who's really in charge? Audit committee versus CFO power and audit fees[J]. Accounting Review,2014,89(6):2057-2085.
[20]梁上坤,陈冬,胡晓莉.外部审计师类型与上市公司费用粘性[J].会计研究,2015(2):79-86.
[21]权小锋,吴世农,文芳.管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵[J].经济研究,2010(11):73-87.
[22]卢锐,魏明海,黎文靖.管理层权力、在职消费与产权效率——来自中国上市公司的证据[J].南开管理评论,2008,11(5):85-92.
[23]Christensen B E,Glover S M,Omer T C,et al. Understanding audit quality:Insights from audit professionals and investors[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research,2016,33(4):1648-1684.
[24]Trombetta M. Mandatory audit firm rotation and audit quality[J]. European Accounting Review,2016,25(1):35-58.
[25]徐细雄,刘星.放权改革、薪酬管制与企业高管腐败[J].管理世界,2013(3):119-132.
[26]Cai H B,Fang H M,Xu L X. Eat,drink,firms,government:An investigation of corruption from the entertainment and travel costs of Chinese firms[J]. Food&Machinery,2014,54(1):55-78.
[27]褚剑,方军雄.政府审计能够抑制国有企业高管超额在职消费吗?[J].会计研究,2016(9):82-89.
[28]Luo W,Zhang Y,Zhu N. Bank ownership and executive perquisites:New evidence from an emerging market[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2011,17(2):352-370.
(1)限于篇幅,本文未列示内生性检验结果,数据备索。
(2)限于篇幅,本文未列示稳健性检验结果,数据备索。
[2]赵璨,杨德明,曹伟.行政权、控制权与国有企业高管腐败[J].财经研究,2015(5):78-89.
[3]杨德明,赵璨.国有企业高管为什么会滋生隐性腐败?[J].经济管理,2014(10):64-74.
[4]Tien C,Chen C N,Chuang C M. A study of CEO power,pay structure,and firm performance[J]. Journal of Management&Organization,2013,19(4):424-453.
[5]Pearce C L,Manz C C,Sims H P. The roles of vertical and shared leadership in the enactment of executive corruption:Implications for research and practice.[J]. Leadership Quarterly,2008,19(3):353-359.
[6]盛明泉,车鑫.管理层权力、高管薪酬与公司绩效[J].中央财经大学学报,2016(5):97-104.
[7]Lambsdorff J G. Corruption and rent-seeking[J]. Public Choice,2002,113(1-2):97-125.
[8]王曾,符国群,黄丹阳,等.国有企业CEO“政治晋升”与“在职消费”关系研究[J].管理世界,2014(5):157-171.
[9]杨瑞龙,王元,聂辉华.“准官员”的晋升机制:来自中国央企的证据[J].管理世界,2013(3):23-33.
[10]杨理强,陈爱华,陈菡.反腐倡廉与企业经营绩效——基于业务招待费的研究[J].经济管理,2017(7):45-66.
[11]钟覃琳,陆正飞,袁淳.反腐败、企业绩效及其渠道效应——基于中共十八大的反腐建设的研究[J].金融研究,2016(9):161-176.
[12]Williams C C,Kedir A M. The impacts of corruption on firm performance:Some lessons from 40 africancountries[J].Journal of Developmental Entrepreneurship,2016,21(4):165-184.
[13]马可哪呐,唐凯桃,郝莉莉.社会审计监管与资本市场风险防范研究——基于股价崩盘风险的视角[J].山西财经大学学报,2016(8):25-34.
[14]王彦超,赵璨.社会审计、反腐与国家治理[J].审计研究,2016(4):40-49.
[15]Bebchuk L A,Fried J M,Walker D I. Managerial power and rent extraction in the design of executive compensation[J].University of Chicago Law Review,2002,69(3):751-846.
[16]Pei H H. Do financial expert directors affect the incidence of accruals management to meet or beat analyst forecasts?[J]. Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting&Economics,2015,22(4):406-427.
[17]张嘉兴,傅绍正.内部控制、独立审计与国企费用归类操纵[J].北京工商大学学报(社会科学版),2017(3):76-84.
[18]吴伟荣,刘亚伟.公共压力与审计质量——基于会计师事务所规模视角的研究[J].审计研究,2015(3):82-90.
[19]Beck M J,Mauldin E G. Who's really in charge? Audit committee versus CFO power and audit fees[J]. Accounting Review,2014,89(6):2057-2085.
[20]梁上坤,陈冬,胡晓莉.外部审计师类型与上市公司费用粘性[J].会计研究,2015(2):79-86.
[21]权小锋,吴世农,文芳.管理层权力、私有收益与薪酬操纵[J].经济研究,2010(11):73-87.
[22]卢锐,魏明海,黎文靖.管理层权力、在职消费与产权效率——来自中国上市公司的证据[J].南开管理评论,2008,11(5):85-92.
[23]Christensen B E,Glover S M,Omer T C,et al. Understanding audit quality:Insights from audit professionals and investors[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research,2016,33(4):1648-1684.
[24]Trombetta M. Mandatory audit firm rotation and audit quality[J]. European Accounting Review,2016,25(1):35-58.
[25]徐细雄,刘星.放权改革、薪酬管制与企业高管腐败[J].管理世界,2013(3):119-132.
[26]Cai H B,Fang H M,Xu L X. Eat,drink,firms,government:An investigation of corruption from the entertainment and travel costs of Chinese firms[J]. Food&Machinery,2014,54(1):55-78.
[27]褚剑,方军雄.政府审计能够抑制国有企业高管超额在职消费吗?[J].会计研究,2016(9):82-89.
[28]Luo W,Zhang Y,Zhu N. Bank ownership and executive perquisites:New evidence from an emerging market[J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2011,17(2):352-370.
(1)限于篇幅,本文未列示内生性检验结果,数据备索。
(2)限于篇幅,本文未列示稳健性检验结果,数据备索。