社会扶贫中多方协作的互动式治理——一个乡村创客项目的案例研究
|
摘要
社会扶贫项目成功的关键,在于政府部门、社会公益组织、基层社区组织和纯市场化组织建立网络型协作关系,其行动协调有赖于互动式治理发挥作用。作为一种新治理范式,互动式治理致力于推动国家行动者、市场主体和社会行动者之间的制度化互动,让社群机制、市场机制和行政机制以互补增强的方式嵌入在一起,从而在公共治理中发挥协同之效。其中,国家行动者发挥合法化和元治理的作用,助推项目的启动和实施;社会公益组织扮演着跨界者的角色,同多层级、多部门的国家行动者以及社会行动者和市场行动者进行互动;本土的市场行动者和基层自治组织利用其经济信息与社会资本优势,促成关系型契约的制度化。以社群机制为主导,让行政机制和市场机制发挥补充作用,互动式治理的形成才能理顺社会扶贫实践中的政治、社会和经济行动逻辑,真正达成政府主导、社会协同的"大扶贫"格局。
The key to the success of social poverty alleviation projects lies in the establishment of network-based collaborative relationships among government departments,social public welfare organizations,grass-roots community organizations and purely market-oriented organizations. As a new governance paradigm,the community mechanism,market mechanism and administrative mechanism are embedded in a complementary and enhanced way so as to play a synergistic role in public governance. Governments play the role of legalization and meta-governance. Social welfare organizations play a cross-border role. Local market and grass-roots autonomous organizations promote the institutionalization of relational contracts.The formation of interactive governance can rationalize the logic of political,social and economic action in the practice of social poverty alleviation,and truly achieve the"Great Poverty Alleviation"pattern led by the governments and coordinated by the society.
The key to the success of social poverty alleviation projects lies in the establishment of network-based collaborative relationships among government departments,social public welfare organizations,grass-roots community organizations and purely market-oriented organizations. As a new governance paradigm,the community mechanism,market mechanism and administrative mechanism are embedded in a complementary and enhanced way so as to play a synergistic role in public governance. Governments play the role of legalization and meta-governance. Social welfare organizations play a cross-border role. Local market and grass-roots autonomous organizations promote the institutionalization of relational contracts.The formation of interactive governance can rationalize the logic of political,social and economic action in the practice of social poverty alleviation,and truly achieve the"Great Poverty Alleviation"pattern led by the governments and coordinated by the society.
引文
[1]李周.社会扶贫的经验、问题与进路[J].求索,2016(11).
[2]李爱玲.中国社会组织扶贫现状、类型及趋势(2015-08-26)[EB/OL].http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.org.cn/news-17932.html.
[3]覃志敏.民间组织参与我国贫困治理的角色及行动策略[J].中国农业大学学报(社会科学版),2016(5).
[4]Torfing,Jacob,B.Guy Peters,Jon Pierre,Eva S?倠rensen.Interactive Governance:Advancing the Paradigm[M].New York:Oxford University Press,2012.
[5]苏海,向德平.社会扶贫的行动特点与路径创新[J].中南民族大学学报(人文社会科学版),2015(3).
[6]Kooiman,Jan,Svein Jentoft,Roger Pullin&Maarten Bavinck(eds.).Fish for Life:Interactive Governance for Fisheries[M].Amsterdam:Amsterdam University Press,2005.
[7]Bowles,S.Microeconomics:Behavior,Institutions,and E-volution[M].Princeton:Princeton University Press,2004.
[8]Cole,D.H.,&Mc Ginnis,M.D.Elinor Ostrom and the Bloomington School of Political Economy:A Framework for Policy Analysis[M].New York:Lexington Books,2017.
[9]Ostrom,E.Governing the Commons:The Evolution of Institutions of Collective Action[M].New York:Cambridge U-niversity Press,1990.
[10]Ostrom E,Walker J,Gardner R.Covenants With and Without a Sword:Self-Governance is Possible[J].American Political Science Review,1992(2).
[11]Ostrom,E.,Gardner,R.,&Walker,J.Rules,Games and Public Common-pool Resources[M].Ann Arbor,MI.:U-niversity of Michigan Press,1994.
[12]Cole,D.H.,&Mc Ginnis,M.D.Elinor Ostrom and the Bloomington School of Political Economy:Polycentricity in Public Administration and Political Science[M].New York:Lexington Books,2014.
[13]Le Grand,J.The Other Invisible Hand:Delivering Public Services through Choice and Competition[M].Princeton:Princeton University Press,2007.
[14]S?rensen,Eva,&Jacob Torfing.Theories of Democratic Network Governance[M].Basingstoke,UK:Palgrave Macmillan,2007.
[15]Thaler,Richard H.,Cass R.Sunstein.Nudge:Improving Decisions about Health,Wealth,and Happiness[M].New Haven:Yale University Press,2008.
[16]顾昕.公民社会发展的法团主义之道——能促型国家与国家和社会的相互增权[J].浙江学刊,2004(6).
[17]Wang X.Mutual Empowerment of State and Society:Its Nature,Conditions,Mechanisms,and Limits[J].Comparative Politics,1999(2).
[18]Lu.Y.Non-Governmental Organizations in China:The Rise of Dependent Autonomy[M].London and New York:Routledge,2009.
[19]王诗宗,宋程成.独立抑或自主:中国社会组织特征问题重思[J].中国社会科学,2013(5).
[20]郭占锋.被动性“入场”与依附性“运作”:对一个国际NGO在中国工作过程的社会学分析[J].中国农业大学学报(社会科学版),2012(1).
[21]Williams P.The Competent Boundary Spanner[J].Public Administration,2002(1).
[22]Jemison,D.B.The importance of boundary spanning roles in strategic decision-making[J].Journal of Management Studies,2007(2).
[23]江华,等.利益契合:转型期中国国家与社会关系的一个分析框架——以行业组织政策参与为案例[J].社会学研究,2011(3).
[24]Williamson,O.The Economic Institutions of Capitalism:Firms,Markets,Relational Contracting[M].New York:The Free Press,1985.
[25]Baker W E,Faulkner R R,Fisher G A.Hazards of the Market:The Continuity and Dissolution of Interorganizational Market Relationships[J].American Sociological Review,1998(2).
[26]Uzzi B.The Sources and Consequences of Embeddedness for the Economic Performance of Organizations:The Network Effect[J].American Sociological Review,1996(4).
[27]Koppenjan J.F.M.The Formation of Public‐Private Partnerships:Lessons from Nine Transport Infrastructure Projects in The Netherlands[J].Public Administration,2005(1).
[28]马克·彭宁顿.埃莉诺·奥斯特罗姆:公共池塘资源和古典自由主义传统[A].埃莉诺·奥斯特罗姆.公共资源的未来:超越市场失灵与政府管制[C].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2015.
[29]徐宇珊.非对称性依赖:中国基金会与政府关系研究[J].公共管理学报,2008(1).
[30]冯仕政.政治市场想象与中国国家治理分析——兼评周黎安的行政发包制理论[J].社会,2014(6).
[31]田凯.组织外形化:非协调约束下的组织运作——一个研究中国慈善组织与政府关系的理论框架[J].社会学研究,2004(4).
[32]周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究,2007(7).
[33]Weaver R K.The Politics of Blame Avoidance[J].Journal of Public Policy,1986(4).
[34]Hood C.The Blame Game:Spin,Bureaucracy,and SelfPreservation in Government[M].Princeton:Princeton U-niversity Press,2011.
[35]倪星,王锐.从邀功到避责:基层政府官员行为变化研究[J].政治学研究,2017(2).
[36]Weisbrod,Burton A.Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Non-Profit Sector in a Three-Sector Economy[M].Edmund S.Phelps(ed.).Altruism,Morality and Economic Theory.New York:Sage Publications,1974.
[37]王名.中国公益慈善:发展、改革与趋势[J].中国人大,2016(7).
[38]唐悦.跨界融合,新公益搭上“顺风车”[N].新华日报,2017-09-12.
[39]孙飞宇,等.生产“社会”,还是社会的自我生产?——以一个NGO的扶贫困境为例[J].社会,2016(1).
[40]折晓叶,陈婴婴.项目制的分级运作机制和治理逻辑——对“项目进村”案例的社会学分析[J].中国社会科学,2011(4).
(1)黑土麦田由耶鲁大学和哈佛大学的中国毕业生联合创办,2014年在民政部登记注册为“民办非企业单位”,旨在培育杰出的乡村创客。2015年,黑土麦田开始在各地选择合适的项目,翌年设立了“乡村创客计划”,从顶尖学府的优秀毕业生中招募志愿人员成为“乡村创客”,并为入选创客提供薪资福利、履职支持、出路选择等多方面保障,到国家级贫困县的乡村从事精准扶贫和创业创新。
(1)《关于印发〈夏津县创新发展扶贫小额信贷工作实施方案〉的通知》(夏办发[2016]3号),夏津县政府网(http://www.xiajin.gov.cn/n708922/n914438/n27249920/n27250644/c27402209/content.htm)。
(1)《六和公司生猪家庭代养项目资金申请书》,2016年10月19日。
(2)根据《夏津县创新发展扶贫小额信贷工作实施方案》,担保公司应该是县财政局、扶贫办委托夏津县经济开发投资中心来承担。所以从法律关系上讲,担保公司与县财政局、扶贫办是委托—代理关系,而不是行政隶属关系。D君所描述的是县担保公司的实际运作,它是由县发改局直接领导的,所以二者实质上构成了上下级的行政隶属关系。那么,担保与否就取决于县发改局的一把手领导。
[2]李爱玲.中国社会组织扶贫现状、类型及趋势(2015-08-26)[EB/OL].http://www.chinadevelopmentbrief.org.cn/news-17932.html.
[3]覃志敏.民间组织参与我国贫困治理的角色及行动策略[J].中国农业大学学报(社会科学版),2016(5).
[4]Torfing,Jacob,B.Guy Peters,Jon Pierre,Eva S?倠rensen.Interactive Governance:Advancing the Paradigm[M].New York:Oxford University Press,2012.
[5]苏海,向德平.社会扶贫的行动特点与路径创新[J].中南民族大学学报(人文社会科学版),2015(3).
[6]Kooiman,Jan,Svein Jentoft,Roger Pullin&Maarten Bavinck(eds.).Fish for Life:Interactive Governance for Fisheries[M].Amsterdam:Amsterdam University Press,2005.
[7]Bowles,S.Microeconomics:Behavior,Institutions,and E-volution[M].Princeton:Princeton University Press,2004.
[8]Cole,D.H.,&Mc Ginnis,M.D.Elinor Ostrom and the Bloomington School of Political Economy:A Framework for Policy Analysis[M].New York:Lexington Books,2017.
[9]Ostrom,E.Governing the Commons:The Evolution of Institutions of Collective Action[M].New York:Cambridge U-niversity Press,1990.
[10]Ostrom E,Walker J,Gardner R.Covenants With and Without a Sword:Self-Governance is Possible[J].American Political Science Review,1992(2).
[11]Ostrom,E.,Gardner,R.,&Walker,J.Rules,Games and Public Common-pool Resources[M].Ann Arbor,MI.:U-niversity of Michigan Press,1994.
[12]Cole,D.H.,&Mc Ginnis,M.D.Elinor Ostrom and the Bloomington School of Political Economy:Polycentricity in Public Administration and Political Science[M].New York:Lexington Books,2014.
[13]Le Grand,J.The Other Invisible Hand:Delivering Public Services through Choice and Competition[M].Princeton:Princeton University Press,2007.
[14]S?rensen,Eva,&Jacob Torfing.Theories of Democratic Network Governance[M].Basingstoke,UK:Palgrave Macmillan,2007.
[15]Thaler,Richard H.,Cass R.Sunstein.Nudge:Improving Decisions about Health,Wealth,and Happiness[M].New Haven:Yale University Press,2008.
[16]顾昕.公民社会发展的法团主义之道——能促型国家与国家和社会的相互增权[J].浙江学刊,2004(6).
[17]Wang X.Mutual Empowerment of State and Society:Its Nature,Conditions,Mechanisms,and Limits[J].Comparative Politics,1999(2).
[18]Lu.Y.Non-Governmental Organizations in China:The Rise of Dependent Autonomy[M].London and New York:Routledge,2009.
[19]王诗宗,宋程成.独立抑或自主:中国社会组织特征问题重思[J].中国社会科学,2013(5).
[20]郭占锋.被动性“入场”与依附性“运作”:对一个国际NGO在中国工作过程的社会学分析[J].中国农业大学学报(社会科学版),2012(1).
[21]Williams P.The Competent Boundary Spanner[J].Public Administration,2002(1).
[22]Jemison,D.B.The importance of boundary spanning roles in strategic decision-making[J].Journal of Management Studies,2007(2).
[23]江华,等.利益契合:转型期中国国家与社会关系的一个分析框架——以行业组织政策参与为案例[J].社会学研究,2011(3).
[24]Williamson,O.The Economic Institutions of Capitalism:Firms,Markets,Relational Contracting[M].New York:The Free Press,1985.
[25]Baker W E,Faulkner R R,Fisher G A.Hazards of the Market:The Continuity and Dissolution of Interorganizational Market Relationships[J].American Sociological Review,1998(2).
[26]Uzzi B.The Sources and Consequences of Embeddedness for the Economic Performance of Organizations:The Network Effect[J].American Sociological Review,1996(4).
[27]Koppenjan J.F.M.The Formation of Public‐Private Partnerships:Lessons from Nine Transport Infrastructure Projects in The Netherlands[J].Public Administration,2005(1).
[28]马克·彭宁顿.埃莉诺·奥斯特罗姆:公共池塘资源和古典自由主义传统[A].埃莉诺·奥斯特罗姆.公共资源的未来:超越市场失灵与政府管制[C].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2015.
[29]徐宇珊.非对称性依赖:中国基金会与政府关系研究[J].公共管理学报,2008(1).
[30]冯仕政.政治市场想象与中国国家治理分析——兼评周黎安的行政发包制理论[J].社会,2014(6).
[31]田凯.组织外形化:非协调约束下的组织运作——一个研究中国慈善组织与政府关系的理论框架[J].社会学研究,2004(4).
[32]周黎安.中国地方官员的晋升锦标赛模式研究[J].经济研究,2007(7).
[33]Weaver R K.The Politics of Blame Avoidance[J].Journal of Public Policy,1986(4).
[34]Hood C.The Blame Game:Spin,Bureaucracy,and SelfPreservation in Government[M].Princeton:Princeton U-niversity Press,2011.
[35]倪星,王锐.从邀功到避责:基层政府官员行为变化研究[J].政治学研究,2017(2).
[36]Weisbrod,Burton A.Toward a Theory of the Voluntary Non-Profit Sector in a Three-Sector Economy[M].Edmund S.Phelps(ed.).Altruism,Morality and Economic Theory.New York:Sage Publications,1974.
[37]王名.中国公益慈善:发展、改革与趋势[J].中国人大,2016(7).
[38]唐悦.跨界融合,新公益搭上“顺风车”[N].新华日报,2017-09-12.
[39]孙飞宇,等.生产“社会”,还是社会的自我生产?——以一个NGO的扶贫困境为例[J].社会,2016(1).
[40]折晓叶,陈婴婴.项目制的分级运作机制和治理逻辑——对“项目进村”案例的社会学分析[J].中国社会科学,2011(4).
(1)黑土麦田由耶鲁大学和哈佛大学的中国毕业生联合创办,2014年在民政部登记注册为“民办非企业单位”,旨在培育杰出的乡村创客。2015年,黑土麦田开始在各地选择合适的项目,翌年设立了“乡村创客计划”,从顶尖学府的优秀毕业生中招募志愿人员成为“乡村创客”,并为入选创客提供薪资福利、履职支持、出路选择等多方面保障,到国家级贫困县的乡村从事精准扶贫和创业创新。
(1)《关于印发〈夏津县创新发展扶贫小额信贷工作实施方案〉的通知》(夏办发[2016]3号),夏津县政府网(http://www.xiajin.gov.cn/n708922/n914438/n27249920/n27250644/c27402209/content.htm)。
(1)《六和公司生猪家庭代养项目资金申请书》,2016年10月19日。
(2)根据《夏津县创新发展扶贫小额信贷工作实施方案》,担保公司应该是县财政局、扶贫办委托夏津县经济开发投资中心来承担。所以从法律关系上讲,担保公司与县财政局、扶贫办是委托—代理关系,而不是行政隶属关系。D君所描述的是县担保公司的实际运作,它是由县发改局直接领导的,所以二者实质上构成了上下级的行政隶属关系。那么,担保与否就取决于县发改局的一把手领导。