规模不经济下奖惩机制对闭环供应链制造商合作策略影响
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摘要
存在第三方回收商的闭环供应链中,研究了制造商规模不经情形下,政府奖惩机制对其合作策略的影响。分别构建了制造商仅与零售商(回收商)合作、制造商与零售商和回收商都合作以及均不合作四种合作策略。研究发现:制造商与零售商或回收商均存在合作动机。但是其合作动机的大小则与制造商规模不经济系数及政府奖惩力度有关。若制造商规模不经济系数较小:当政府奖惩力度较小时,制造商倾向与零售商合作;当政府奖惩力度较大时,制造商更倾向与回收商合作;若制造商规模不经济系数较大,制造商总是倾向与回收商合作。此外,无论制造商与零售商或回收商合作总是有利增加旧产品回收总量。
To achieve higher supply chain efficiency and improve completive edge,the manufacturer can cooperate with other member in the closed-loop supply chain.Even though conventional wisdoms such as Nie(2012)and Ma et al.(2016)studied industry profits of different cooperative models in closed-loop supply chain,they ignored the fact that many countries set premium and penalty mechanism to order manufactures to engage in remanufacturing fields.Then scholars did not consider that situation that manufacturers maybe be under scale diseconomies as well.Therefore,the effects of premium and penalty mechanism on manufacturer's cooperative strategies in the closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer,a retailer and a recycler under manufacturer's scale diseconomies are investigated.First,whether the manufacture has an incentive to cooperative with another member is explored.Second,we need to explore which kind of cooperation bring more profit increment for partners.Third,how different cooperation affect the industry profit is analyzed.To settle these problems,four cooperative models based on game theory:no cooperation mode(Model N),cooperation only with the recycler(Model MC),and cooperation only with the retailer(Model MR),and cooperation with both the retailer and recycler(Model MCR)are developed.Model MCR and N just are made as benchmarks.Especially,Model MCR is the upper bound,and Model N is the bottom in these models.Through our analysis,it is found that the manufacturer always has an incentive to cooperate with recycler or retailer.However,whether it is more possible to cooperate with the retailer or recycler depends on both production diseconomies and degree of premium and penalty mechanism.If both production diseconomy and degree of premium and penalty are small,the manufacturer prefers to cooperate with the retailer.Otherwise,the manufacturer prefers to cooperate with the recycler.The relations of industry profits in different models are still decided by both production diseconomies and degree of premium and penalty mechanism.In addition,the collecting quantity of end-of-life product always improves thanks to the alliance between the manufacturer and the retailer or recycler.
To achieve higher supply chain efficiency and improve completive edge,the manufacturer can cooperate with other member in the closed-loop supply chain.Even though conventional wisdoms such as Nie(2012)and Ma et al.(2016)studied industry profits of different cooperative models in closed-loop supply chain,they ignored the fact that many countries set premium and penalty mechanism to order manufactures to engage in remanufacturing fields.Then scholars did not consider that situation that manufacturers maybe be under scale diseconomies as well.Therefore,the effects of premium and penalty mechanism on manufacturer's cooperative strategies in the closed-loop supply chain consisting of a manufacturer,a retailer and a recycler under manufacturer's scale diseconomies are investigated.First,whether the manufacture has an incentive to cooperative with another member is explored.Second,we need to explore which kind of cooperation bring more profit increment for partners.Third,how different cooperation affect the industry profit is analyzed.To settle these problems,four cooperative models based on game theory:no cooperation mode(Model N),cooperation only with the recycler(Model MC),and cooperation only with the retailer(Model MR),and cooperation with both the retailer and recycler(Model MCR)are developed.Model MCR and N just are made as benchmarks.Especially,Model MCR is the upper bound,and Model N is the bottom in these models.Through our analysis,it is found that the manufacturer always has an incentive to cooperate with recycler or retailer.However,whether it is more possible to cooperate with the retailer or recycler depends on both production diseconomies and degree of premium and penalty mechanism.If both production diseconomy and degree of premium and penalty are small,the manufacturer prefers to cooperate with the retailer.Otherwise,the manufacturer prefers to cooperate with the recycler.The relations of industry profits in different models are still decided by both production diseconomies and degree of premium and penalty mechanism.In addition,the collecting quantity of end-of-life product always improves thanks to the alliance between the manufacturer and the retailer or recycler.
引文
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[13]王银河,王旭.随机需求和奖惩机制下的闭环供应链决策模型[J].计算机应用研究,2013,30(10):2927-2931.
[14]聂佳佳,王文宾,吴庆.奖惩机制对零售商负责回收闭环供应链的影响[J].工业工程与管理,2011,16(2):52-59.
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[18]Swami S,Shah J.Channel coordination in green supply chain management:The case of package size and shelf-space allocation[J].Technology Operation Management,2011,2(1):50-59.
[19]Savaskan R C,Bhattacharya S,Van Wassenhove L N.Closed-loop supply chain models with product remanufacturing[J].Management Science,2004,50(2):239-252.
[20]Savaskan R C,Wassenhove L N V.Reverse channel design:The case of competing retailers[J].Management Science,2006,52(1):1-14.
[21]Wu Xiaole,Zhou Yu.The optimal reverse channel choice under supply chain competition[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2017,259(1):63-66.
[22]Xiong Yu,Zhao Quanwu,Zhou Yu.Manufacturerremanufacturing vs supplier-remanufacturing in a closed-loop supply chain[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2016,176:21-28.
[23]聂佳佳.渠道结构对第三方负责回收闭环供应链的影响[J].管理工程学报,2012,26(3):151-158.
[24]Ma Zujun,Zhang Nian,Dai Ying,et al.Managing channel profits of different cooperative models in closed-loop supply chains[J].Omega,2016,59:251-262.
[25]Shang Weixin,Ha A Y,Tong Shilu.Information sharing in a supply chain with a common retailer[J].Management Science,2016,62(1):245-263.
[26]Griffin J M.The process analysis alternative to statistical cost functions:An application to petroleum refining[J].American Economic Review,2001,62(62):46-56.
[27]Mollick A V.Production smoothing in the Japanese vehicle industry[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2004,91(1):63-74.
[28]石纯来,聂佳佳,李增禄.规模不经济下信息分享对制造商渠道选择的影响[J].工业工程与管理,2016,21(2):73-80.
[29]Ha A Y,Tong Shilu,Zhang Hongtao.Sharing demand information in competing supply chains with production diseconomies[J].Management Science,2011,57(3):566-581.
[30]赵海霞,艾兴政,滕颖,等.基于制造商规模不经济的链与链竞争数量折扣合同选择[J].管理工程学报,2013,27(4):110-118.
[31]赵海霞,艾兴政,唐小我.链与链基于规模不经济的纵向联盟和利润分享[J].管理科学学报,2014,17(1):48-56.
[32]聂佳佳,石纯来.规模不经济对制造商开通直销渠道的影响[J].运筹与管理,2017,26(2):68-75.
[2]Atasu A,Guide V D R,Van Wassenhove L N.So what if remanufacturing cannibalizes my new product sales?[J].California Management Review,2010,52(2):56-76.
[3]Zhu Qinghua,Tian Yihui.Developing a remanufacturing supply chain management system:A case of a successful truck engine remanufacturer in China[J].Production Planning&Control,2016,27(9):708-716.
[4]Giutini R,Gaudette K.Remanufacturing:The next great opportunity for boosting US productivity[J].Business Horizons,2003,46(6):41-48.
[5]Diallo C,Venkatadri U,Khatab A,et al.State of the art review of quality,reliability and maintenance issues in closed-loop supply chains with remanufacturing[J].International Journal of Production Research,2016,55(5):1277-1296.
[6]Huang Yanting,Wang Zongjun.Information sharing in a closed-loop supply chain with technology licensing[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2017,191:113-127.
[7]Genc T S,Giovanni P D.Trade-in and save:A twoperiod closed-loop supply chain game with price and technology dependent returns[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2016,183:514-527.
[8]马祖军,胡书,代颖,等.政府规制下混合渠道销售/回收的电器电子产品闭环供应链决策[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(1):82-90.
[9]王文宾,达庆利.奖惩机制下电子类产品制造商回收再制造决策模型[J].中国管理科学,2008,16(5):57-63.
[10]王文宾,达庆利.奖惩机制下闭环供应链的决策与协调[J].中国管理科学,2011,19(1):36-41.
[11]王文宾,达庆利.考虑政府引导的电子类产品逆向供应链奖惩机制设计[J].中国管理科学,2010,18(2):62-67.
[12]易余胤,梁家密.奖惩机制下的闭环供应链混合回收模式[J].计算机集成制造系统,2014,20(1):215-223.
[13]王银河,王旭.随机需求和奖惩机制下的闭环供应链决策模型[J].计算机应用研究,2013,30(10):2927-2931.
[14]聂佳佳,王文宾,吴庆.奖惩机制对零售商负责回收闭环供应链的影响[J].工业工程与管理,2011,16(2):52-59.
[15]Karakayali I,Emir-Farinas H,Akcali E.An analysis of decentralized collection and processing of end-oflife products[J].Journal of Operations Management,2007,25(6):1161-1183.
[16]Bylinsky G,Moore A H.Manufacturing for reuse[J].Fortune,1995:102-112.
[17]Li S X,Huang Zhimin,Zhu J,et al.Cooperative advertising,game theory and manufacturer-retailer supply chains[J].Omega,2002,30(5):347-357.
[18]Swami S,Shah J.Channel coordination in green supply chain management:The case of package size and shelf-space allocation[J].Technology Operation Management,2011,2(1):50-59.
[19]Savaskan R C,Bhattacharya S,Van Wassenhove L N.Closed-loop supply chain models with product remanufacturing[J].Management Science,2004,50(2):239-252.
[20]Savaskan R C,Wassenhove L N V.Reverse channel design:The case of competing retailers[J].Management Science,2006,52(1):1-14.
[21]Wu Xiaole,Zhou Yu.The optimal reverse channel choice under supply chain competition[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2017,259(1):63-66.
[22]Xiong Yu,Zhao Quanwu,Zhou Yu.Manufacturerremanufacturing vs supplier-remanufacturing in a closed-loop supply chain[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2016,176:21-28.
[23]聂佳佳.渠道结构对第三方负责回收闭环供应链的影响[J].管理工程学报,2012,26(3):151-158.
[24]Ma Zujun,Zhang Nian,Dai Ying,et al.Managing channel profits of different cooperative models in closed-loop supply chains[J].Omega,2016,59:251-262.
[25]Shang Weixin,Ha A Y,Tong Shilu.Information sharing in a supply chain with a common retailer[J].Management Science,2016,62(1):245-263.
[26]Griffin J M.The process analysis alternative to statistical cost functions:An application to petroleum refining[J].American Economic Review,2001,62(62):46-56.
[27]Mollick A V.Production smoothing in the Japanese vehicle industry[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2004,91(1):63-74.
[28]石纯来,聂佳佳,李增禄.规模不经济下信息分享对制造商渠道选择的影响[J].工业工程与管理,2016,21(2):73-80.
[29]Ha A Y,Tong Shilu,Zhang Hongtao.Sharing demand information in competing supply chains with production diseconomies[J].Management Science,2011,57(3):566-581.
[30]赵海霞,艾兴政,滕颖,等.基于制造商规模不经济的链与链竞争数量折扣合同选择[J].管理工程学报,2013,27(4):110-118.
[31]赵海霞,艾兴政,唐小我.链与链基于规模不经济的纵向联盟和利润分享[J].管理科学学报,2014,17(1):48-56.
[32]聂佳佳,石纯来.规模不经济对制造商开通直销渠道的影响[J].运筹与管理,2017,26(2):68-75.