控制权性质、审计师行业专长与审计定价
|
摘要
控制权性质如何影响审计定价是一个中国会计理论界和实务界广泛关注的问题。利用审计收费管制解除后2012—2014年中国上市公司的面板数据,考察了控制权性质、审计师行业专长与审计定价的关系。研究结果表明:终极控制人为国有的上市公司比非国有的支付了相对较低的审计费用,行业专长审计师比非行业专长审计师收取了相对较高的审计费用,支持了审计定价中存在风险溢价和行业专长溢价的观点。进一步的分组研究发现,在国有控股的上市公司中按市场份额衡量的审计师行业专长与审计收费显著正相关,按客户数量衡量的审计师行业专长与审计收费微弱正相关;而在非国有控股的上市公司中两种方法衡量的审计师行业专长均与审计收费显著正相关,这在一定程度上表明结果基本稳健。
How the nature of control rights affects audit pricing is an issue which has drawn extensive attention of domestic accounting theory circle and practice circle. The relation between the nature of control rights, auditor industry specialization and audit pricing was studied by using panel data of listed companies in China for the period from 2012 to 2014. The study results showed that ultimate controllers which were state-owned listed companies paid less audit fees than non-state-owned companies,while auditors with industry specialization charged higher audit fees than auditors without industry specialization. A further grouping study showed that the auditor industry specialization in state-controlled listed companies measured by market shares had a positive correlation with audit pricing, while the auditor industry specialization measured by the number of customers had a non-significant correlation with audit pricing; auditor industry specialization in non-state-controlled listed companies measured by each of the two methods had a positive correlation with audit pricing. The conclusions of this paper are of significance to guiding auditors to make audit pricing decisions in consideration of control-related risks and to purposefully develop industry specialization.
How the nature of control rights affects audit pricing is an issue which has drawn extensive attention of domestic accounting theory circle and practice circle. The relation between the nature of control rights, auditor industry specialization and audit pricing was studied by using panel data of listed companies in China for the period from 2012 to 2014. The study results showed that ultimate controllers which were state-owned listed companies paid less audit fees than non-state-owned companies,while auditors with industry specialization charged higher audit fees than auditors without industry specialization. A further grouping study showed that the auditor industry specialization in state-controlled listed companies measured by market shares had a positive correlation with audit pricing, while the auditor industry specialization measured by the number of customers had a non-significant correlation with audit pricing; auditor industry specialization in non-state-controlled listed companies measured by each of the two methods had a positive correlation with audit pricing. The conclusions of this paper are of significance to guiding auditors to make audit pricing decisions in consideration of control-related risks and to purposefully develop industry specialization.
引文
[1]李增泉.关系型交易的会计治理——关于中国会计研究国际化的范式探析[J].财经研究,2017(2):4-33.
[2] WONG T J. Corporate governance research on listed firms in china:institutions,governance and accountability[J]. Foundations&Trends in Accounting,2016,9(4):259-326.
[3] FACCIO M. Politically connected firms[J]. Social Science Electronic Publishing,2006,96(1):369-386.
[4] WANG Q,WONG T J,XIA L. State ownership,the institutional environment,and auditor choice:evidence from China[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2008,46(1):112-134.
[5] DEFOND M L,WONG T J,LI S. The impact of improved auditor independence on audit market concentration in China[J].Journal of Accounting&Economics,1999,28(3):269-305.
[6]宋铁波,吴小节.市场分割前提的多元化战略:解析中央企业与地方国企[J].改革,2013(5):127-136.
[7]李骥,孙健敏,刘向阳,等.关于国有企业股份制改革的实证研究[J].管理世界,2005(1):120-130.
[8]郭梦岚,李明辉.公司治理、控制权性质与审计定价[J].管理科学,2009(6):71-83.
[9]高燕.所有权结构、终极控制人与盈余管理[J].审计研究,2008(6):59-70.
[10] CHEN H,CHEN J Z,LOBO G J,et al. Effects of audit quality on earnings management and cost of equity capital:evidence from China[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research,2011,28(3):892.
[11]陈波,吴卫军.国有企业审计招标的制度安排及其优化研究[J].审计研究,2015(4):39-46.
[12]赵奇伟,张楠.所有权结构、隶属关系与国有企业生存分析[J].经济评论,2015(1):54-65.
[13]吴溪,张俊生.中国本土会计师事务所的市场地位与经济回报[J].会计研究,2012(7):80-88.
[14]韩洪灵,陈汉文.会计师事务所的行业专门化是一种有效的竞争战略吗?——来自中国审计市场的经验证据[J].审计研究,2008(1):53-60.
[15]朱小平,余谦.我国审计收费影响因素之实证分析[J].中国会计评论,2004(2):393-408.
[16] ZEFF S A,FOESUM R L. An analysis of large audit clients[J]. The Accounting Review,1967,42(2):298-320.
[17] GRAMLING A A,STONE D N. Audit firm industry expertise:a review and synthesis of the archival literature[J]. Journal of Accounting Literature,2001,20:1-29.
[18] DEFOND M L,FRANCIS J R,WONG T J. Auditor industry specialization and market segmentation:evidence from Hong Kong[J]. Auditing:A Journal of Practice&Theory,2000,19(1):49-66.
[19] AUDOUSSET-COULIER S,JENY A,JIANG L. The validity of auditor industry specialization measures[J]. Auditing:A Journal of Practice&Theory,2016,35(1):139-161.
[20] PALMROSE Z. Audit fees and auditor size:further evidence[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1986,24(1):97-110.
[21] SIMUNIC D A. The pricing of audit services:theory and evidence[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1980,18(1):161-190.
[22] NAGY A L. Audit partner specialization and audit fees[J]. Managerial Auditing Journal,2014,29(6):513-526.
[23] ZERNI M. Audit partner specialization and audit fees:some evidence from Sweden[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research,2012,29(1):312-340.
[24] FUNG S Y K,GUL F A,KRISHNAN J. City-level auditor industry specialization,economies of scale,and audit pricing[J]. The Accounting Review,2012,87(4):1281-1307.
[25] FERGUSON A C,FRANCIS J R,STOKES D J. What matters in audit pricing:industry specialization or overall market leadership?[J]. Accounting and Finance,2006,46(1):97-106.
[26] FRANCIS J R,REICHELT K,WANG D. The pricing of national and city-specific reputations for industry expertise in the U.S.audit market[J]. The Accounting Review,2005,80(1):113-136.
[27] FERGUSON A,FRANCIS J R,STOKES D J. The effects of firm-wide and office-level industry expertise on audit pricing[J].The Accounting Review,2003,78(2):429-448.
[28]斯托克,沃森.计量经济学(第3版):英文[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2013.
[29] WOOLDRIDGE J M,费剑平,林相森,等.计量经济学导论:现代观点[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2015.
[30] ZEFF S A,FOSSUM R L. An analysis of large audit clients[J]. Accounting Review,1967,42(2):298.
[31] SCHIFF A,FRIED H D. Large companies and the big eight:an overview[J]. Abacus,1976,12(2):116-124.
(1)一般也用BigN指代。1989年以前为国际“八大”,1989年国际“八大”合并为国际“六大”、1997年进一步合并为国际“五大”,2002年安然事件爆发,安达信会计师事务所被强制解散,国际“五大”变成国际“四大”。目前国际“四大”特指普华永道(PWC)、毕马威(KPMG)、德勤(DTT)和安永(EY),在中国境内都有合作所。
(2)本文中的审计师一般指会计师事务所,下同。
(1)实际控制人的认定标准:按照《上市公司收购管理办法》的标准,如果有下列情形之一的,构成对一个上市公司的实际控制:(1)在一个上市公司股东名册中持股数量最多的;但是有相反证据的除外;(2)能够行使、控制一个上市公司的表决权超过该公司股东名册中持股数量最多的股东的;(3)持有、控制一个上市公司股份、表决权的比例达到或者超过30%的;但是有相反证据的除外;(4)通过行使表决权能够决定一个上市公司董事会半数以上成员当选的;(5)中国证监会认定的其他情形。
(2)编码采用国泰安CSMAR股东研究数据库对公司实际控制人性质的分类。
[2] WONG T J. Corporate governance research on listed firms in china:institutions,governance and accountability[J]. Foundations&Trends in Accounting,2016,9(4):259-326.
[3] FACCIO M. Politically connected firms[J]. Social Science Electronic Publishing,2006,96(1):369-386.
[4] WANG Q,WONG T J,XIA L. State ownership,the institutional environment,and auditor choice:evidence from China[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2008,46(1):112-134.
[5] DEFOND M L,WONG T J,LI S. The impact of improved auditor independence on audit market concentration in China[J].Journal of Accounting&Economics,1999,28(3):269-305.
[6]宋铁波,吴小节.市场分割前提的多元化战略:解析中央企业与地方国企[J].改革,2013(5):127-136.
[7]李骥,孙健敏,刘向阳,等.关于国有企业股份制改革的实证研究[J].管理世界,2005(1):120-130.
[8]郭梦岚,李明辉.公司治理、控制权性质与审计定价[J].管理科学,2009(6):71-83.
[9]高燕.所有权结构、终极控制人与盈余管理[J].审计研究,2008(6):59-70.
[10] CHEN H,CHEN J Z,LOBO G J,et al. Effects of audit quality on earnings management and cost of equity capital:evidence from China[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research,2011,28(3):892.
[11]陈波,吴卫军.国有企业审计招标的制度安排及其优化研究[J].审计研究,2015(4):39-46.
[12]赵奇伟,张楠.所有权结构、隶属关系与国有企业生存分析[J].经济评论,2015(1):54-65.
[13]吴溪,张俊生.中国本土会计师事务所的市场地位与经济回报[J].会计研究,2012(7):80-88.
[14]韩洪灵,陈汉文.会计师事务所的行业专门化是一种有效的竞争战略吗?——来自中国审计市场的经验证据[J].审计研究,2008(1):53-60.
[15]朱小平,余谦.我国审计收费影响因素之实证分析[J].中国会计评论,2004(2):393-408.
[16] ZEFF S A,FOESUM R L. An analysis of large audit clients[J]. The Accounting Review,1967,42(2):298-320.
[17] GRAMLING A A,STONE D N. Audit firm industry expertise:a review and synthesis of the archival literature[J]. Journal of Accounting Literature,2001,20:1-29.
[18] DEFOND M L,FRANCIS J R,WONG T J. Auditor industry specialization and market segmentation:evidence from Hong Kong[J]. Auditing:A Journal of Practice&Theory,2000,19(1):49-66.
[19] AUDOUSSET-COULIER S,JENY A,JIANG L. The validity of auditor industry specialization measures[J]. Auditing:A Journal of Practice&Theory,2016,35(1):139-161.
[20] PALMROSE Z. Audit fees and auditor size:further evidence[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1986,24(1):97-110.
[21] SIMUNIC D A. The pricing of audit services:theory and evidence[J]. Journal of Accounting Research,1980,18(1):161-190.
[22] NAGY A L. Audit partner specialization and audit fees[J]. Managerial Auditing Journal,2014,29(6):513-526.
[23] ZERNI M. Audit partner specialization and audit fees:some evidence from Sweden[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research,2012,29(1):312-340.
[24] FUNG S Y K,GUL F A,KRISHNAN J. City-level auditor industry specialization,economies of scale,and audit pricing[J]. The Accounting Review,2012,87(4):1281-1307.
[25] FERGUSON A C,FRANCIS J R,STOKES D J. What matters in audit pricing:industry specialization or overall market leadership?[J]. Accounting and Finance,2006,46(1):97-106.
[26] FRANCIS J R,REICHELT K,WANG D. The pricing of national and city-specific reputations for industry expertise in the U.S.audit market[J]. The Accounting Review,2005,80(1):113-136.
[27] FERGUSON A,FRANCIS J R,STOKES D J. The effects of firm-wide and office-level industry expertise on audit pricing[J].The Accounting Review,2003,78(2):429-448.
[28]斯托克,沃森.计量经济学(第3版):英文[M].上海:上海人民出版社,2013.
[29] WOOLDRIDGE J M,费剑平,林相森,等.计量经济学导论:现代观点[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2015.
[30] ZEFF S A,FOSSUM R L. An analysis of large audit clients[J]. Accounting Review,1967,42(2):298.
[31] SCHIFF A,FRIED H D. Large companies and the big eight:an overview[J]. Abacus,1976,12(2):116-124.
(1)一般也用BigN指代。1989年以前为国际“八大”,1989年国际“八大”合并为国际“六大”、1997年进一步合并为国际“五大”,2002年安然事件爆发,安达信会计师事务所被强制解散,国际“五大”变成国际“四大”。目前国际“四大”特指普华永道(PWC)、毕马威(KPMG)、德勤(DTT)和安永(EY),在中国境内都有合作所。
(2)本文中的审计师一般指会计师事务所,下同。
(1)实际控制人的认定标准:按照《上市公司收购管理办法》的标准,如果有下列情形之一的,构成对一个上市公司的实际控制:(1)在一个上市公司股东名册中持股数量最多的;但是有相反证据的除外;(2)能够行使、控制一个上市公司的表决权超过该公司股东名册中持股数量最多的股东的;(3)持有、控制一个上市公司股份、表决权的比例达到或者超过30%的;但是有相反证据的除外;(4)通过行使表决权能够决定一个上市公司董事会半数以上成员当选的;(5)中国证监会认定的其他情形。
(2)编码采用国泰安CSMAR股东研究数据库对公司实际控制人性质的分类。