论王阳明对朱熹的三重解构——以海德格尔现象学为视角
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摘要
以海德格尔现象学为视角,剖析王阳明对朱熹的批判与继承,进而探索王阳明心学的后现代价值和意义。王阳明心学蕴涵着对朱熹理学的三重解构:首先,在本体论上,王阳明以"万物一体"在世结构方式解构朱熹"理一分殊",重新诠释本体与万物关联方式。其次,以"心理为一"解构朱熹"心理二分",建构"心即性即理"心学体系。最后,以自我伦理实现的途径解构朱熹"格物"和"进学"方法。通过实践日常伦理生活的忠孝礼仪之事,磨砺本性,回归平静心,自下而上体悟道体,通达"天人合一"。
From the perspective of Heidegger's phenomenology, the paper explores Wang Yang-ming's criticism and inheritance of Zhu Xi's philosophy, and the postmodern value and significance of Wang Yang-ming's philosophy of the mind. Wang Yang-ming's philosophy of the mind contains the triple deconstruction of Zhu Xi's philosophy. Firstly, Wang Yang-ming deconstructs Zhu Xi's "multiple modes share a single substance" by his "all things are one", to reinterprets the correlation of ontology and things. Secondly, Wang Yang-ming deconstructed Zhu Xi's "mind and principle are two different things" by his "mind and principle are one thing" to construct the mind philosophy of "mind is nature and also principle". Finally, Wang Yang-ming deconstructed Zhu Xi's "attaining knowledge by studying the essence of things" by the way of realizing self-ethics. Through the practice of daily ethics of loyalty and filial piety and etiquette, one should cultivate oneself, return to a calm heart, and understand the "unity of man and nature".
From the perspective of Heidegger's phenomenology, the paper explores Wang Yang-ming's criticism and inheritance of Zhu Xi's philosophy, and the postmodern value and significance of Wang Yang-ming's philosophy of the mind. Wang Yang-ming's philosophy of the mind contains the triple deconstruction of Zhu Xi's philosophy. Firstly, Wang Yang-ming deconstructs Zhu Xi's "multiple modes share a single substance" by his "all things are one", to reinterprets the correlation of ontology and things. Secondly, Wang Yang-ming deconstructed Zhu Xi's "mind and principle are two different things" by his "mind and principle are one thing" to construct the mind philosophy of "mind is nature and also principle". Finally, Wang Yang-ming deconstructed Zhu Xi's "attaining knowledge by studying the essence of things" by the way of realizing self-ethics. Through the practice of daily ethics of loyalty and filial piety and etiquette, one should cultivate oneself, return to a calm heart, and understand the "unity of man and nature".
引文
[1] 黎靖德.朱子语类[M].北京.中华书局,1986.
[2] 朱杰人,严佐之,刘永翔.朱子全书(修订本)[M].上海:上海古籍出版社,合肥:安徽教育出版社,2010:1574.
[3] 斯宾诺莎.伦理学[M].贺麟译.北京:商务印书馆,1983.
[4] 黑格尔.哲学史讲演录[M].贺麟,王太庆译.北京:商务印书馆,1978:103.
[5] 王阳明.传习录[M].张靖杰译注.南京:江苏凤凰文艺出版社,2016.
[6] 澄观.华严法界玄镜[M]//石竣,等.中国佛教思想资料选编:第2卷第2册.北京:中华书局,1987:339.
[7] 陈荣捷.西方对王阳明的研究[M]//中国哲学:第9辑.北京:生活·读书·新知三联书店:1983.
[8] 海德格尔.现象学之基本问题[M].丁耘译.上海:上海译文出版社,2008.
[9] 郭朋.坛经校释[M].成都:巴蜀书社,1996:125.
[10] 赫伯特·施皮格伯格.现象学运动[M].王炳文,张金言译.北京:商务印书馆,2011:541.
[11] 唐君毅.中国哲学原论·原性篇[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,2005.
[12] 牟宗三.心体与性体:第3册[M].台北:正中书局,1987:248.
[13] 钱穆.王阳明学述要[M].北京:九州出版社,2015.
(1)朱熹与斯宾诺莎的区别在于:朱熹的“天理”“道”“太极”相互联系、相互规定,具有相同地位、作用和功能。它们不能脱离人事日用,离开人事日用便无“道”无“理”。气为天理之实现。天理较之气在先,理气亦不离不杂,相互依存,万物之必有,故“即物穷理”。斯宾诺莎的观念与事物是二元对立。真理只关涉观念,真理就是真观念,与事物无关。他的身心平行论先在地假设了观念的次序和联系与事物的次序和连续是相同的两个序列。如何打通本质与现象分离,朱熹的路径和方法有二:一是格物致知;一是进学致知。既要格物参透物理(物性),又要博览群书渐进式体悟。斯宾诺莎的实体是一块不动的“铁板”,通过纯理性的逻辑演绎推理和比较建立的观念系列,无需关涉外部经验与事物。因此,实体与样态、本质与现象是永恒分离的两个世界。朱熹与斯宾诺莎的区别与本文内容相去甚远,故不赘述。
[2] 朱杰人,严佐之,刘永翔.朱子全书(修订本)[M].上海:上海古籍出版社,合肥:安徽教育出版社,2010:1574.
[3] 斯宾诺莎.伦理学[M].贺麟译.北京:商务印书馆,1983.
[4] 黑格尔.哲学史讲演录[M].贺麟,王太庆译.北京:商务印书馆,1978:103.
[5] 王阳明.传习录[M].张靖杰译注.南京:江苏凤凰文艺出版社,2016.
[6] 澄观.华严法界玄镜[M]//石竣,等.中国佛教思想资料选编:第2卷第2册.北京:中华书局,1987:339.
[7] 陈荣捷.西方对王阳明的研究[M]//中国哲学:第9辑.北京:生活·读书·新知三联书店:1983.
[8] 海德格尔.现象学之基本问题[M].丁耘译.上海:上海译文出版社,2008.
[9] 郭朋.坛经校释[M].成都:巴蜀书社,1996:125.
[10] 赫伯特·施皮格伯格.现象学运动[M].王炳文,张金言译.北京:商务印书馆,2011:541.
[11] 唐君毅.中国哲学原论·原性篇[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,2005.
[12] 牟宗三.心体与性体:第3册[M].台北:正中书局,1987:248.
[13] 钱穆.王阳明学述要[M].北京:九州出版社,2015.
(1)朱熹与斯宾诺莎的区别在于:朱熹的“天理”“道”“太极”相互联系、相互规定,具有相同地位、作用和功能。它们不能脱离人事日用,离开人事日用便无“道”无“理”。气为天理之实现。天理较之气在先,理气亦不离不杂,相互依存,万物之必有,故“即物穷理”。斯宾诺莎的观念与事物是二元对立。真理只关涉观念,真理就是真观念,与事物无关。他的身心平行论先在地假设了观念的次序和联系与事物的次序和连续是相同的两个序列。如何打通本质与现象分离,朱熹的路径和方法有二:一是格物致知;一是进学致知。既要格物参透物理(物性),又要博览群书渐进式体悟。斯宾诺莎的实体是一块不动的“铁板”,通过纯理性的逻辑演绎推理和比较建立的观念系列,无需关涉外部经验与事物。因此,实体与样态、本质与现象是永恒分离的两个世界。朱熹与斯宾诺莎的区别与本文内容相去甚远,故不赘述。