集成化管理模式下基于委托代理模型的契约设计分析
|
摘要
以委托代理理论为工具对传统契约模式进行重新设计,构建以委托人是风险中性、代理人是风险规避型的激励契约模型,促使各参与方在新的契约框架下以项目目标为共同目标,共享收益,共担风险,实现项目参与方的有效集成,为实施集成化管理奠定契约基础。
This article redesigns traditional contract model with the principal-agent theory, and builds the incentive contract model that the client is risk neutral and the agent is risk averse, which aims at making all participants achieve effective integration under the new contractual framework, through considering the project interests to be common interests, sharing the benefits and risks, which lay the basis of the contract for the implementation of integrated management.
This article redesigns traditional contract model with the principal-agent theory, and builds the incentive contract model that the client is risk neutral and the agent is risk averse, which aims at making all participants achieve effective integration under the new contractual framework, through considering the project interests to be common interests, sharing the benefits and risks, which lay the basis of the contract for the implementation of integrated management.
引文
[1]齐二石,姜琳.大型工程项目的复杂性及其集成化管理[J].科技管理研究,2008,28(8):191–193.
[2]陈永鸿,骆汉宾,王广斌.集成化建设模式下的工程项目委托–代理契约设计[J].土木工程与管理学报,2014,31(2):68–72.
[3]张洋.基于BIM的工程项目集成化理论及关键问题研究[D].上海:同济大学,2010.
[4]王榴,陈建明.基于委托代理模型的建筑工程激励合同机制研究[J].工程管理学报,2014,28(1):98–102.
[5]沙凯逊,孙晓冰.规范建设单位行为:一个项目治理的视角[J].项目管理技术,2009,7(10):13–17.
[6]周原.工程项目委托审计最优激励契约研究——基于委托代理模型的分析[J].武汉理工大学学报(社会科学版),2014,27(5):830–833.
[7]沙凯逊.建设项目治理[M].北京:中国建筑工业出版社,2013.
[8]孙舰,郝生跃.基于委托代理理论的BT模式激励问题研究[J].工程管理学报,2014,28(5):42–46.
[2]陈永鸿,骆汉宾,王广斌.集成化建设模式下的工程项目委托–代理契约设计[J].土木工程与管理学报,2014,31(2):68–72.
[3]张洋.基于BIM的工程项目集成化理论及关键问题研究[D].上海:同济大学,2010.
[4]王榴,陈建明.基于委托代理模型的建筑工程激励合同机制研究[J].工程管理学报,2014,28(1):98–102.
[5]沙凯逊,孙晓冰.规范建设单位行为:一个项目治理的视角[J].项目管理技术,2009,7(10):13–17.
[6]周原.工程项目委托审计最优激励契约研究——基于委托代理模型的分析[J].武汉理工大学学报(社会科学版),2014,27(5):830–833.
[7]沙凯逊.建设项目治理[M].北京:中国建筑工业出版社,2013.
[8]孙舰,郝生跃.基于委托代理理论的BT模式激励问题研究[J].工程管理学报,2014,28(5):42–46.