摘要
我国自然人控股的上市公司其股权结构更为接近西方上市公司,由于受到政府有关部门的约束较少,其市场特征更加明显,因此,公司治理机制与治理效应必然不同于其他上市公司。如果将其与其他上市公司一视同仁,则无论对于政府部门制定相关政策还是对于学术界进行理论研究,都具有不利后果。本文以沪深两市2003年至2008年自然人控股的民营上市公司为样本,由于这类上市公司不存在国有股定价、高管激励中的政府影响、国有股权变动中的审批等问题,因此,本文的研究不涉及这些因素和问题,本文主要通过对样本公司进行实证研究,揭示这类公司治理机制的运行规律。
公司治理机制是一个复杂的机制体系,国内外相关研究大多只针对某一单一的机制进行研究,很少将公司治理的各个机制结合起来进行研究,本文通过对公司治理机制的内部机制和外部机制的分析,采用实证研究的方法揭示各个治理机制与治理效应之间的关系。内部治理机制主要涉及三个方面：即股东控制机制、董事会决策机制和高管激励机制,外部治理机制主要以信息披露机制为例,通过实证分析,得到以下结论：(1)我国自然人控股的上市公司的各种公司治理机制更多地只是体现在形式上,并没有真正地落到实处,并不能真正激励和促使公司内部人为实现利益最大化而努力经营；(2)在我国自然人控股的上市公司中,大股东监督对公司价值的正面影响与其侵占小股东利益、降低股票流动性对公司价值产生的负面影响并存,而且第一大股东持股比例与公司价值之间存在“区间效应”；同时,股权制衡对治理效应所产生的影响并不明显；(3)当董事会规模较大、第一大股东持股比例较高、公司规模较大时,董事会独立性较低；同时,董事会会议次数较多时,公司治理效应较高；独立董事制度对自然人控股的上市公司治理效应具有明显的积极作用,但该作用存在滞后性；(4)自然人控股的上市公司第一大股东持股比例较高、独立董事比例较高、董事长与总经理两职兼任时,高管变更次数较少：同时,高管平均薪酬对公司治理效应并不产生明显的促进作用,然而高管变更对公司治理效应具有明显的促进作用,但该作用同样存在滞后性；(5)自然人控股的上市公司外部治理机制对公司治理效应具有显著的负面影响。会计师事务所虽没有纵容市场价值高的上市公司的倾向,但存在纵容财务绩效好的上市公司的倾向；自然人控股的上市公司审计费用越高、规模越大、董事会独立性越高、资产负债率越低,其越有可能获得“标准无保留意见”的审计报告。
本文通过对样本公司(自然人控股的民营上市公司)的治理机制及其治理效应进行全面地分析与评价,最终证实了自然人控股的我国上市公司的治理机制与治理效应之间的关系,为这类公司的公司治理提供了一定的理论与经验依据。
The ownership structure of China's listed companies controlled by natural persons is much closer to the West, due to less constrained by government departments, its market features is more evident. Therefore, its corporate governance mechanism and governance effect is inevitably different from the other listed companies. If they were treated with other listed companies equally, it will have adverse consequences both in government policy and academic research on theory. This paper was based on the natural holding of private listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen of 2003-2008 years as a sample, as this kind of listed companies did not have many questions such as the examination of State-owned equity, the government influence on incentive for senior manager, as well as the approval for change in State-owned stock, etc. Therefore, this paper did not involve these factors above, and tried to reveal operation of such corporate governance rules mainly through the positive analysis.
Corporate governance is a complex system, domestic and international research was merely about a single mechanism, little research combined all the corporate governance mechanisms. Based on the internal and external mechanisms of corporate governance, this paper used positive analysis methods to reveal the relationship between the corporate governance effects and the corporate governance mechanisms. Internal governance mechanism mainly involved three aspects:the mechanisms of shareholder control, decision-making mechanism on board of directors, as well as the senior management incentive mechanism. The external governance mechanism took information disclosure mechanism for example. Through positive analysis we had the following conclusions:(1)The corporate governance mechanisms of China's natural persons holding listed companies was morely reflected in the form, not really practicable, they could not really prompted the insiders to maximize the value of enterprises and to work hard. (2) In the listed companies of natural persons holding, large shareholder controlled the value of the company on one hand, so he or she had a positive impact on the firm value; on the other hand, he had a negative impact on the corporate value due to its occupation of the interests of small shareholders and reducing the stock liquidity. In addition, there was a "range effect" between the largest shareholding ratio and the company value. At the same time, the impact of stock checks and balances on the corporate governance performance was not quite obvious. (3) The larger scale of board of directors, the higher proportion of the largest shareholders, and the large size of company, then the lower board independence. At the same time, the more frequently board meetings, then the higher corporate governance performance. It means that the Independent Directors System had a significantly positive effect on the governance performance of listed companies controlled by natural persons, but this effect existed lagging. (4) The higher proportion of the largeset shareholder in natural holding listed companies, the higher proportion of independent directors, and the chairman and general manager concurrently, then the fewer of the executive changetimes; furthermore, the average of executive pay did not produce significant promoting role on corporate governance effect, but the executive changes had an obvious promoting effect on corporate governance performance, but the effect also lagged. (5) The external governance mechanism of listed companies controlled by natural persons has significant negative effects on corporate governance performance. While CPA firms did not have a tendency to connive the listed companies which had high market value, there was tendency to connive listed companies which had good financial performance. In addition, the higher audit fees of listed companies controlled by natural persons, the larger size of company, the higher independence of the board, the lower of asset-liability ratio, then the more likely the company could obtain "a clean audit opinion".
In brief, this paper ultimately proved the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and governance performance in the listed companies controlled by natural persons through analyzing and evaluating the corporate governance mechanisms and governance performance of the sample companies, and provided a theoretical and empirical basis for its corporate governance.
引文
①参见：封面报道.不可忽视的特征[J].新财经,2004(7)：46-49
[1]Agrawal A. and G. Mandelker. Large Shareholders and the Monitoring of Managers:The Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments [J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1990,V25:143-161
[2]Agrawal, A. and C. Knoeber. Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency Problems between Managers and Shareholders [J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,1996, V31:377-397
[3]Alchian A, Harold Demsetz. Production, information costs and economic organization [J].American Economic Review,1972, V62:717、795
[4]Anderson, Ronald C., and Reeb David M. Founding-Family Ownership and Firm Performance: Evidence from the S& P 500 [J]. Journal of Finance,2003
[5]Andrelis and Vishny.R W. Large shareholders and corporate control [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1986, V94:461-488
[6]Bai C E, et al. Corporate governance and market valuation in China [J]. Journal of Comparative Economics,2004, V32:599-616
[7]Baliga. Moyer and Ran R. S. CEO Duality and Firm Performance:What's the fuss? [J].Strategic Management Journal,1996,V1:41-53
[8]Barclay and Holderness. Private Benefits from Control of Public Corporations [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1991, V25:371-395
[9]Baysinger, B. D. and Bulter. H. Corporate governance and the boards of directors: performance effects of change in board composition [J]. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization,1985, Vl:101-124
[10]Bennedsen M. and Wolfenzon D. The Balance of Power in Closely Held Corporations [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2000, v58:113-139
[11]Berle A.& Means G. The Modern Corporation and private property [M]. Macmillan, New York, N.Y,1932
[12]Bhagat S and Black B. The uncertain relationship between board composition and firm performance [J]. Business Lawyer,1999, V54:921-963
[13]Bhagat S. and Black B. The non-correlation between board independence and long-term firm
performance [J]. Journal of Corporation Law,2002, V27:231-273
[14]Bloch F. and U. Hege. Multiple Shareholders and Control Contests [R]. Working Paper, 2001,from ssrn.com
[15]Boyd.B.K. Board Control and CEO Compensation [J]. Strategic Management Journal,1984, V15:335-344
[16]Brick Ivan E and Chidambaram N K. Board Meeting Committee Structure and Firm Performance [R]. Rutgern Business School——New York& New Brunswick of Rutgers University:Working Paper Series,2007, V33 (1):87-116
[17]Brickley, James A, Jeffrey L., et al. Leadership structure:separating the CEO and Chairman of the Board [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,1997, V3:189-220
[18]Burkart, Mike, Denis Gromb, et al. Large shareholders, monitoring, and the value of the firm [J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,1997, V112:693-728
[19]Byrd J. W., and K. A. Hickman. Do outside directors monitor managers Evidence from tender offer bids [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1992, V32:195-222
[20]CCER经济研究服务中心.色诺芬数据库[DB/OL]. www.ccerdata.com
[21]Chang, Sea Jin. Ownership structure, expropriation, and performance of group-affiliated companies in Korea [EB]. The 2nd Asia Corporate Governance Conference Program. http://biz.korea.ac.kr/-aicg/paper_2nd/ownership_structure_ exploration_and. pdf,2002
[22]Charles E Jordan. Stanley J Clark. An Examination of audit reporting for accounting principles changes [J]. Journal of Applied Business Research,1996, V12 (3):1-8
[23]Chen C, S Chen, X Su. Profitability regulation, earnings management and modified audit opinions:Evidence from China [J]. Auditing:A Journal of Practice& Theory,2001, V20 (2):9-30
[24]Chinmoy G and Sirmans C.F. Board independence, ownership structure and performance: evidence from real estate investment trusts [J]. Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 2003, V1:287-318
[25]Claessens.S, Djankov. S and Lang. L. H. P. The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporation [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2000, V58:81-112
[26]Claessens S, Djankov S., Fan J. P.H.,et al. Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholders [J]. Journal of Finance,2002, V57:2741-71
[27]Claessens, Stijn& Djankov, et al. Ownership Concentration and Corporate Performance in the Czech Republic [R]. CEPR Discussion Papers,1999:2145.
[28]Cochran, Philip L., and Steven L. Wartick. Corporate Governance:A Literature Review [J], USA:Financial Executives Research Foundation.1998.
[29]Core.J, Guay W. Stock Options Plans for Non-executive Employees [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2001,V39:273-287
[30]Coughlan, Anne T., and Ronald M. Schmidt. Executive Compensation, Management Turnover, and Firm Performance:An Empirical Investigation [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1985, vol.7:13-21
[31]Cronqvist H, and Nilsson M. Agency costs of controlling minority shareholders [J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2003, V38 (4):695-719
[32]Dayton K. N. Corporate Governance:the other side of the coin [J]. Harvard Business Review, 1984.
[33]DeAngelo L. Auditor Size and Audit Quality [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1981,V3 (3):183-199
[34]Demsets.H. and Lehn.K. The structure of corporate ownership:cause and consequence [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1985, V93:1155-1177
[35]Faccio, M. and Lang H. P. L. The ultimate ownership of Western European Corporations [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2002, V65:365-395
[36]Fama E F, Jensen M C. Separation of Ownership and Control [J]. Journal-of Law and Economics,1983, V6:301-325
[37]Fernandez, Carlos, and Ruben A, et al. The effects of ownership Structure and Board composition on the Audit Committee Meeting Frequency:Spanish evidence [J]. Corporate Governance:an international Review,2007, V15 (5):909-922
[38]Ferris, Stephen P, Murali Jagannathan, et al. Too Busy to Mind the Business? Monitoring by Directors with Multiple Board Appointments [J]. Journal of Finance,2003, V58:1087-1112
[39]Gedajlovic E and D. Shapiro. Ownership structure and firm profitability in Japan [J]. Academy of Management Journal,2002, V45 (2):105-139
[40]Gedajlovic E and D. Shapiro. Management and Ownership Effects:Evidence from Five Countries [J]. Strategic Management Journal,1998, V19:533-553
[41]Gomes A and Novaes W. Sharing of Control as a corporate governance mechanism [R]. University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research in Economics and Social Science (CARESS), Working Paper,2001, from ssrn.com.
[42]Gomes A and Novaes.W. Sharing of Control versus Monitoring [R]. PIER Working paper, University of Pennsylvania Law School,2005:1-29
[43]Goton G. and F. Schmidt. Universal Banking and the Performance of German Firms [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2000, V58 (1):114-138
[44]Grossman S& Hart O. One share-one vote and the market for corporate Control [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1988, V20:175-202
[45]Gutierrez M, Tribo J A.. Private benefits extraction in closely2held corporations:the case for multiple large shareholders [J]. European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), Finance Working Paper,2004, No.53
[46]Hall B. Liebman. CEO's really paid like bureaucrats [J]. Quarterly Journal Economics,1998,V113 (3):653-691
[47]Hanson R. C. and Song M. H. Managerial ownership, board structure, and the division of gains in divestitures [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2000, V6:55-70
[48]Harris M, Raviv A. Corporate governance:Vote rights and majority rules [J], Journal of financial economics,1988, V20:203-235
[49]Hermailin, Weisbach. Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and their monitoring of the CEO [J]. Financial Management,1998 (88), March:96-118
[50]Hermalin and Weisbach. The Effect of Board Composition and Direct Incentive on Firm Performance [J]. Financial Management,1991, Winter:101-112
[51]Hermalin B. and M. Weisbach. The Determinants of Board Composition [J]. Journal of Rand Economics,1988, V19:589-606
[52]Hill C.W, Snell S.A. Effects of ownership structure on corporate productivity [J]. Academy of Management Journal,1988, V32:25-46
[53]Holderness C G., Denni P.S. The role of majority shareholders in publicly held corporations [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1988, V20:317-346
[54]Holderness G. and Sheehan P. Constraints on Large-Block Shareholders [A]. NBER Working Paper [C],1998:65-67
[55]Huson M.R., Parrin.R. and Starks.L.T. Internal Monitoring Mechanisms and CEO Turnover: A Long-term Perspective [J]. The Journal of Finance,2001,V56:2265-2296
[56]Jensen M. C, K. J. Murphy. CEO Incentives-It's not How Much You Pay, but How [J]. Harvard Business Review,1990a, V68 (3):138-153
[57]Jensen M. C, K. J. Murphy. Performance Pay and Top Management Incentive [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1990b, V98 (2):225-264
[58]Jensen M.. The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit and the Failure of Internal Control Systems [J]. Journal of Finance,1993,V48:831-880
[59]Jensen M.C. and W.H. Meckling. Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Capital Structure [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1976, V3:305-360
[60]John A, Pearce II, Shaker A Zahra. Board composition from a strategic contingency perspective [J]. Journal of Management Studies, July,1992:411-438
[61]Johnson.S, et al. Tunneling [J] American Economic Review,2000, V90:22-27
[62]Kaplan S. N, Top executive rewards firm performance:A comparison of Japan and the United States [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1994a, V102:510-546
[63]Kaplan, S. N., and B. A. Minton. Appointments of Outsiders to Japanese Boards: Determinants and Implications for Managers [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1994b, V36:225-258
[64]Kato T., Long C. CEO turnover, firm performance and enterprise reform in China:evidence from micro data [J]. Journal of Corporative Economics.2006, V10:1-12
[65]Klein A. Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure [J]. Journal of Law& Economics, 1998, V41 (1):275-303
[66]Knapp. M. C. Audit Conflict:An Empirical Study of the Perceived Ability of Auditors to Resist Management Pressure. The Accounting Review,1985
[67]Kren, J. and L. Kerr. Effects of Outside Directors and Board Shareholdings on the Relation between the Chief Executive Compensation and Firm Performance [R]. Accounting and Business Research,1997, V27 (4):297-309
[68]Leech D, Leahy.J, Ownership Structure, Control Type Classifications and the Performance of Large British Companies [J]. The Economic Journal,1991, V101 (409):1418-1437
[69]Lehmann.E and Weigand J, Does the Governed Corporation Perform Better? Governance
Structures and the Market for Corporate Control in Germany [J]. European Finance Review, 2000, V4:157,162
[70]Lin Laura. The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence [R]. Northwest University Law Review,1996:89
[71]Lipton, M. and J. Lorsch. A modest proposal for improved corporate governance [J]. Business Lawyer,1992,V48:59-77
[72]Mark, Y. T. and Y. Li. Determinations of Corporate Ownership and Board structure: Evidence from Singapore [J]. Journal of corporate Finance,2001,V7:235-256
[73]Maury B., Pajuste A. Multiple large shareholders and firm value [J]. Journal of Banking& Finance.2005, V29:1813-1834
[74]McConnell. John and Servaes, Henri. Equity Ownership and the Two-faces of Debt [J]. Journal Of Financial Economics,1995,V39,131-157
[75]McConnell's., and H. Servaes. Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership and Corporate Value [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1990,V27,595-612
[76]McNeil A.J., R. Frey and P. Embrocates. Quantitative Risk Management:Concepts, Techniques and Tools [M]. Princeton University Press, New Jersey.2005:205-230
[77]Meehan H.. Executive compensation structure, ownership and firm performance [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1995:38
[78]Merck.R, Shleifer. A. and Vishny.R. W. Management ownership and market Valuation:an empirical analysis [J]. Journal Of Financial Economics,1988,V20:293-315
[79]Miguel A, Pindado J, Torre C, How do Entrenchment and Expropriation Phenomena Affect Control Mechanisms? [J]. Corporate Governance:An International Review,2005, V13 (4): 505-516.
[80]Millstein I.M.& P.W.Macavoy. The active board of directors and performance of the large publicity traded corporation [J]. Journal of Columbia Law Review,1998, V5:1283-1321
[81]Morck R., M. Nakamura and A. Shivdasani. Banks Ownership Structure and Firm Value in Japan [J]. The Journal of Business,2000, V73 (4):539-567
[82]Mudambi R., and C. Nicosia, Ownership Structure and Firm Performance:Evidence from the UK Financial Services Industry [J], the Accounting Review,1998, V2:269-284
[83]Murphy. Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration:An Empirical Analysis [J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,1984, V7:11-42
[84]O'Beilly III C. A., Main B.G, Crystal G.S. CEO compensation as tournament and social comparison:a tale of two theories [J]. Administration Science Quarterly,1988, V33(2)：257-274
[85]OCED.公司治理原则(2004年修订版)[M].中国财政经济出版社,2005
[86]Oswald S. L, Jahera J. S. The Influence of Ownership on Performance:An Empirical Study [J]. Strategic Management Journal,1991.V12:218-228
[87]Pagano M., Roell A. The choice of stock ownership structure:agency costs, monitoring and the decision to go public [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics,1998,V113:187-225
[88]Pedersen& Thomsen. Economic and Systemic Explanations of Ownership Concentration among Europe's Largest Companies [J].International Journal of the Economics of Business, 1999,V3:367-382
[89]Prowse Stephen. The structure of corporate ownership in Japan [J]. Journal of Finance, 1992,V47:1121-1140
[90]Qi D., W. Wu, and H. Zhang. Shareholding Structure and Corporate Performance of Partially Privatized Firms:Evidence from Listed Chinese Companies [J]. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal,2000. V8:587-610
[91]Raheja C G. Determinants of Board Size and Composition:A Theory of Corporate Boards [M]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,2005
[92]Rechner P. L. and Dalton D. R. CEO Duality and Organizational Performance:A Longitudinal Analysis [J]. Strategic Management Journal,1991,V12 (2):155-160
[93]Ronald J G. Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency:When Do Institutions Matter? [J]. Washington University Law Quarterly,1996, V74:327,336
[94]Rosenstein S, Wyatt J G. Inside Directors, Board Independence and Shareholder Wealth [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1997, V44:229-50
[95]Rosenstein S., Wyatt J. G. Outside Directors, Board Independence, and Shareholder Wealth [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1990, V26:175-91
[96]Rosentein S, J.G. Wyatt. Outside directors, board independence and shareholder wealth [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1990, V44:229-250
[97]Shleifer A and Vishny R.. Large shareholders and corporate control [J]. Journal of Political Economy,1986, V94:461-488
[98]Shleifer A. and Vishny R. A Survey of corporate Governance [J]. Journal of Finance,1997, V52:737-783
[99]Simunic D. and Stein M. Product Differentiation in Auditing:Auditor Choice in the Market for Unseasoned New Issues [M]. Research Monograph 13, The Canadian Certified General Accountants Research Foundation,1987
[100]Sirmans G. S., Friday H.S., Price R. M. Do management changes matter? An empirical investigation of REIT performance [J]. Journal of Real Estate Research,2006,V28:131-148
[101]Slovin.M, Sushka M. E, and Polonchek E. The Value of Bank Durability:Borrowers as Bank Stakeholders [J], Journal of Finance,1993, V48:247-266
[102]Standard and Poor Corporate Governance Scores:Criteria, Methodology and Definitions [EB/OL]. www.standard and poors.com
[103]Sternberg E. and Diamantopoulos A. Corporate Governance [J]. European Environmental Law Review,2002, V13 (2):105-122
[104]Stutz.R. Managerial control of voting rights:financial policies and the market for corporate control [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1988, V20:25-54
[105]Thomsen S, Pedersen T, and Kvist H K. Block holder ownership:Effects on firm value in market and control based governance systems [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,2006, V12 (2):246-269
[106]Tian G Lihui. State shareholding and the value of-China's firms [R]. London Business School, working paper,2001
[107]Tricker.R.I, Corporate Governance [M]. Gower Publishing Company Limited,1984:54.
[108]Trond, Randoy and Jan J. Corporate Governance:An International Review [M],2004,V12 (13):281-289
[109]Turley S& Zaman M. The Corporate Governance Effects of Audit Committees [J]. Journal of Management and Governance,2004,V8 (3):305-332
[110]Vafeas Nikos. Board Meeting Frequency and Firm Performance [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1999,113-142
[111]Volpin, Paolo F. Governance with poor investor protection:evidence from top executive turnover in Italy [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,2002, V64:61-90
[112]Warner J, Watts J and Wruck K. Stock Prices and top management changes [J] Journal of Financial Economics,1988, V20:461-492
[113]Warther V. A., Board effectiveness and board dissent:A model of the board's relationship to management and shareholders [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance,1998, V4 (1):53-70
[114]Weisbach M. Outside Directors and CEO Turnover [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1988,V20:431-460
[115]Xu X.N., Wang Y. Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance in Chinese Stock Companies [J]. China Economic Review,1999,V10:75-98
[116]Yermack D. Higher Market Valuation of Companies with a Small Board of Directors [J]. Journal of Financial Economics,1996, V40:185-211
[117]白重恩,刘俏,陆洲等.中国上市公司治理结构的研究[J].经济研究,2005(2)：81-91
[118]蔡春,杨麟等.上市公司审计意见类型影响因素的实证分析[J].财经科学,2005,208(1)：95-102
[119]蔡祥,李志文,张为国.中国证券市场中的财务问题：实证研究述评[J].中国会计评论,2003(2)：1-23
[120]曹廷求.大股东治理机制与公司绩效：来自中国上市公司的调查证据[J].山东社会科学,2005(1)：59-64
[121]曹中,王梦丹.我国上市公司信息披露机制研究[J].会计之友.2008(10)：101-102
[122]曾晓涛.股权结构与高级管理人员变更研究文献综述[J].上海商学院学报·2009(11)：40-42
[123]陈红.公司控制权配置模式与治理效率研究[J].投资研究,2005(6)：56-63
[124]陈宏辉,贾生华.企业利益相关者的利益协调与公司治理的平衡原理[J]·中国工业经济,2005(8)：114-121
[125]陈宏辉,贾生华.企业利益相关者三维分类的实证分析[J]..经济研究,2004(4)：78-86
[126]陈军,刘莉.上市公司董事会特征与公司业绩关系研究[J].中国软科学,2006(11)：13
[127]陈丽萍,张蕾.高管激励与财务绩效关系实证分析[J].中国农业会计,2009(11)4-5
[128]陈晓,江东.股权多元化、公司业绩与行业竞争性[J].经济研究,2000(8)：21-29
[129]陈晓,王琨.关联交易、公司治理与国有股改革——来自我国资本市场的实证证据 [J].经济研究,2005(4)：77-86
[130]陈小悦,徐晓东.股权结构、企业绩效和投资者利益保护[J].经济研究,2001(11)：3-10
[131]谌新民,刘善敏.上市公司经营者报酬结构性差异的实证研究[J].经济研究,2003(8)：55-63
[132]陈信元,汪辉.股东制衡与公司价值：模型及经验证据[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2004(11)：102-110
[133]陈旭东,谷静.上市公司高管薪酬与企业绩效的相关性研究[J].财会通讯(学术版)2008(6)：87-89
[134]陈志广.高管管理人员报酬的实证研究[J].当代经济科学,2002(5)：58-63
[135]褚仁凤.公司治理效应的理论基础及制度安排[J].财会通讯(学术版),2006(4)：13-15
[136]崔学刚.公司治理机制对公司透明度的影响：来自中国上市公司的经验数据[J].会计研究,2004(8)：72-80
[137]董志强,孙方诚.董事会与公司治理效率[J].当代财经,2004(5)：57-65
[138]窦洪权.银行公司治理分析[M].北京：中信出版社,2005.189
[139]杜兴强,王丽华.高层管理当局薪酬与上市公司业绩的相关性实证研究[J].会计研究,2007(1)：58-65
[140]杜兴强,王丽华.高管薪酬与企业业绩相关性的影响因素分析——基于股权结构、行业特征及最终控制人性质的经验证据[J].上海立信会计学院学报,2009(1)：53-65
[141]杜莹,刘立国.中国上市公司债权治理效率的实证分析[J].证券市场导报,2002(12)：66-69
[142]范容慧,蓝海林.中国民营上市公司大股东控制对公司治理有效性的影响研究[M].北京：经济科学出版社,2007：96
[143]范英杰,唐静.基于系统科学的公司治理内部监督研究[J].首都经济贸易大学学报,2006(2)：11-15
[144]费方域.什么是公司治理[J].上海经济研究.1996(5)：36-39
[145]冯根福,闫冰.公司股权的“市场结构类型”与股东治理行为[J].中国工业经济,2004(6)：85-92
[146]冯晓琦,刘宪.竞争的产品市场、企业家与公司治理效率[J].对外经济贸易大学学报, 2005(4)：76-79
[147]高闯,郭舒.公司治理的演进论解释[J].辽宁大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2006,34(2)：125-128
[148]高闯,刘冰.公司治理合约的制度基础、演进机理与治理效率[J].中国工业经济,2003(1)：70-77
[149]高闯,邵剑兵.公司治理模式的演进机理和发展模式[J].经济社会体制比较,2006(1)：129-132
[150]高明华,马守莉.独立董事制度与公司绩效关系的实证分析—兼论中国独立董事有效行权的制度环境[J].南开管理评论,2002(2)：64-68
[151]葛蓉蓉.股权结构对公司治理影响的状态依存性[J].金融研究,2006(7)：151-156
[152]耿志民.大股东治理、机构投资者与公司治理结构改革[J].经济研究,2005,24(5)：131-134
[153]宫汝凯、杨旭辉.股权结构的公司治理效应——后股权分置时代的实证分析[J].上海第二工业大学学报,2007(12)：331
[154]龚玉池.公司绩效与高层互换[J].经济研究,2001(10)：75-82
[155]谷祺,于东智.公司治理,董事会行为与经营绩效[J].财经问题研究,2001(1)：58-65
[156]郭春丽.上市公司的股权结构、公司治理与经营绩效[J].经济管理,2002(6)：72-79
[157]韩冰,马若微.我国公司治理机制的建立与完善[J].集团经济研究,2004(11)：36-43
[158]韩瑾,李娜.股权结构与公司绩效关系的分析与研究[J].经济师,2009(1)：104-105
[159]韩亮亮,宋力.大股东持股比例对代理成本的影响[J].南开管理评论,2005(1)：30-34
[160]韩亮亮,宋力.民营上市公司的股权结构特征分析[J].南开管理评论,2004(4)：69-71
[161]郝臣,李礼.公司治理模式的多维度比较研究：构建公司治理权变模式[J].南开管理评论,2006(2)：84-89
[162]何进日,喻美.股权结构与公司绩效的相关性研究——以我国A股石油类上市公司为例[J].湖南师范大学社会科学学报,2009(1)：103-108
[163]何艳,张芬.发达国家如何保护小股东利益——论两种公司治理模式下小股东保护体系[J].北方经济,2007(1)：143-144
[164]何玉长.国有公司产权结构与治理结构[M].上海：上海财经大学出版社,1997
[165]何志国,于惠川.高管激励与上市公司经营业绩的相关性分析[J].辽宁石油化工大学学报,2007(12)：77-79
[166]胡洁,胡颖.上市公司股权结构与公司绩效关系的实证分析[J].管理世界,2006(3)：142-143
[167]胡良平..现代统计学与SAS应用[M].北京：军事医学科学出版社,2000：49-53
[168]胡铭.我国上市公司董事会与经营绩效的实证分析[J].吉林财税高等专科学校学报,2002(04)：46-49
[169]胡勤勤,沈艺峰.独立外部董事能否提高上市公司的经营业绩[J].世界经济,2002(7)：55-62
[170]胡铁军,关明坤,李焱斌.股权分置改革后上市公司高管激励与企业绩效关系的实证研究[J].辽宁石油化工大学学报,2008(3)：97-98
[171]胡晓阳,李少斌,冯科.我国上市公司董事会行为与公司绩效变化的实证分析[J].中国软科学,2005(6)：121-126
[172]黄磊,闫存岩,孟宪伟.现代公司治理理论基础的分析[J].经济问题,2008(8)：14
[173]黄少安,宫明波.共同治理理论评析[J].经济学动态,2002(4)：56-62
[174]黄速建,黄群慧.现代企业管理—变革的观点[M].北京：经济管理出版社,2002
[175]黄速建,余青.国有企业的性质、目标与社会责任[J].中国工业经济,2006(2)：68-75
[176]黄泰岩,杨万东.中国经济热点前沿(第二辑)[M].北京：经济科学出版社出版,2004：255-263
[177]黄渝祥,李军.中国上市公司股权制衡研究[J].上证研究,2002(2)：101-104
[178]黄渝祥,孙艳,邵颖红等.股权制衡与公司治理研究[J].同济大学学报(自然科学版),2003(9)：1102-1110
[179]黄中生.论大股东的公司治理效应[J].管理现代化,2008(1)：27
[180]姜秀华.治理内核与综合业绩的相关性研究[M].上海：上海财经大学出版社,2003：87-95
[181]金雪军,张学勇.公司控制权研究的新进展[J].经济理论与经济管理,2005(8)：35-40
[182]孔翔,陈炜.我国上市公司应选择什么样的股权结构[R].深圳证券交易所综合研究所2005年研究报告,2005：2-6
[183]蓝文永,韦明升.我国上市公司信息披露机制实证检验——基于投资者保护的视角[J].广西社会科学,2009(8)：46-51
[184]李斌,张耀南.治理主体公司价值与公司治理[J].东北财经大学学报,2006(2)： 7-10
[185]李常青,赖建清.董事会特征影响公司绩效吗[J].金融研究,2004(5)：64-77
[186]李东平,黄德华,王振林. “不清洁”审计意见、盈余管理与会计师事务所变更,会计研究,2001(6)：51-57
[187]李广存,陈妙.公司治理力结构问题探析[J].生产力研究,2005(8)：186-190
[188]李广存.公司治理力的新视野[J].企业改革与管理,2004(4)：7-9
[189]李汉军,张俊喜.董事会独立性和有效性的动态分析[J].南开经济研究,2009(6)：61-75
[190]李汉军.民营上市公司的治理机制与绩效[J].北京：中国金融出版社,2007：23-24
[191]李凯,秦丽娜,刘烨.自然人控股公司中的高管特征与绩效[J].管理评论,2007(4)：56
[192]李立清.企业社会责任理论与实践研究[J].南方经济,2006(1)：105-118
[193]李玲娟.浅议高管激励对企业绩效的影响[J].现代商业,2008(14)：30-31.
[194]李明辉,何海.我国上市公司内部控制信急披露状况的分析[J].审计研究,2005(1)：18-25
[195]李善民,叶会.股权结构与公司绩效的差异分析——基于产业要素密集度的视角[J].证券市场导报,2007(4)：35-43
[196]李寿喜.产权、代理成本与代理效率[J].经济研究,2007(1)：102-113
[197]李爽,吴溪.中国证券市场中的审计报告行为：监管视角与经验证据[M].北京：中国财政经济出版社,2003：37-55
[198]李婉丽,张晓岚.我国上市公司年度报告披露状况研究[J].金融研究,2002(3)：103-109
[199]李维安,曹廷求.股权结构、治理机制与城市银行绩效[J].经济研究,2004(12)：4-15
[200]李维安,李汉军.股权结构、高管持股与公司绩效——来自民营上市公司的证据[J].南开管理评论,2006(5)：4-10
[201]李维安,张耀伟.中国上市公司董事会治理评价实证研究[J].当代经济科学,2005(1)：17-23
[202]李维安.公司治理理论前沿：第四届公司治理国际研讨会论文集[C],北京：中国财政经济出版社,2009：18-22
[203]李义超.我国上市公司融资结构实证分析[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2003(6)：147-150
[204]李有根,赵西萍,李怀祖.上市公司的董事会结构和公司绩效研究[J].中国工业经济, 2001(5)：48-53
[205]李增泉,孙铮,王志伟.“掏空”与所有权安排——来自我国上市公司大股东资金占用的经验证据[J].会计研究,2004(12)：3-13
[206]李增泉.国家控股与公司治理的有效性——一项基于中国证券市场的实证研究[D].上海财经大学博士论文,2002：57-63
[207]李增泉.激励机制与企业绩效—一项基于上市公司的实证研究[J].会计研究,2000(10)：24-30
[208]林浚清,黄祖辉,孙永祥.高管团队内薪酬差距、公司绩效和治理结构[J].经济研究,2003(4)：31-40、92
[209]林谦.面板数据的模型建立与检验分析[J].统计与信息论坛,2006(5)：35-39.
[210]林毅夫,李周.现代企业制度的内涵与国有企业改革方向[J].经济研究[J],1997(03)：3-10
[211]刘斌,孙回回,李嘉明.自愿性会计政策变更与非标审计意见的相关性研究——来自1998-2002年深沪上市公司的经验证据[J].财贸研究,2004(3)：101-107
[212]刘冰,高闯.高技术企业的权变治理、管理者更替与企业永续发展[J].中国工业经济,2004(12)：75-78
[213]刘红霞,刘敏.家族企业公司治理成本研究[J].财经理论与实践,2006(6)：101-106.
[214]刘剑.上市公司董事会结构、会议次数和公司绩效统计分析[J].统计与决策,2007(21)：90
[215]刘玉敏.我国上市公司董事会效率与公司绩效的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2006(1)：84-90
[216]刘忠瑞.上市公司董事会构成,会议次数和公司绩效统计分析[J].统计与决策,2007(2)：90-92
[217]吕长江,王斌.上市公司董事会设置与公司业绩的实证研究——以东北地区为例[J].财经问题研究,2004(10)：65-73
[218]南开大学公司治理研究中心公司治理评价课题组.中国上市公司治理指数与公司绩效的实证分析[J].管理世界,2004(2)：104-113
[219]宁向东.公司治理理论[M].北京：中国发展出版社,2006年第2版：324
[220]平新乔,李自然.上市公司再融资资格的确定与虚假信息披露[J].经济研究,2003(2)：55-93
[221]秦丽娜,李凯.自然人控股公司的治理特征与绩效的实证研究[J].中国软科学,2007 (3)： 99
[222]任冷.公司治理的内部机制和外部机制[J].南开经济研究,1999(3)：20-24
[223]邵国良,田志龙.两类民营上市公司治理问题分布及绩效研究[J].系统工程,2005(6)：73-79
[224]邵少敏,吴沧澜,林伟.独立董事和董事会结构、股权结构研究——以浙江省上市公司为例[J].世界经济,2004(2)：66-78
[225]沈艺峰,江伟.资本结构、所有权结构与公司价值关系研究[J].管理评论,2007(11)：49-54
[226]施东晖.中国上市公司治理水平及对绩效影响的经验研究[J].世界经济,2004(5)：p：69-79
[227]宋敏,张俊喜,李春涛.股权结构的陷阱[J].南开管理评论,2004(1)：49-56
[228]宋增基,张宗益,朱健.上市公司经营者股权激励的影响分析[J].管理评论,2005(3)：3
[229]苏启林.代理问题、公司治理与企业价值——以民营上市公司为例[J].中国工业经济,2004(4)：100-106
[230]孙敬水.独立董事制度：公司治理的创新与革命[M].合肥：安徽大学出版社,2003：130
[231]孙永祥,黄祖辉.上市公司股权结构与绩效[J].经济研究,1999(12)：23-30
[232]孙永祥,章融.董事会规模、公司治理与绩效[J].企业经济,2000(10)：13-15
[233]孙永祥.所有权、融资结构与公司治理机制[J].经济研究,2001(1)：45-53
[234]谭晶荣,王谦.民营上市公司股权结构与经营绩效的实证研究[J].商业经济与管理,2005(8)：74-79
[235]谭卓,缪柏其,方世建.中国上市公司股权集中度、董事会独立性和公司绩效——基于结构方程模型的研究[J].运筹与管理,2008(10)：125-130
[236]汤发喜,马卓然,孙琳.股权结构与公司绩效的相关性研究——来自我国制造业上市公司的经验数据[J].金融教学与研究,2009(2)：71-73
[237]唐建强,现代公司治理理论文献综述[J].科技信息,2009(32)：436
[238]汪建雄.浅析基于公司治理理论下的治理主体与公司价值[J].华商,2008(20)：10
[239]王革平.中国上市公司信息披露机制的研究与改进[J].科技信息,2008(29)：501-502
[240]王华,黄之骏.经营者股权激励、董事会组成与企业价值—基于内生性视角的经验分 析[J].管理世界,2006(9)：101-116
[241]王俊杰.国有公司治理结构与现实动作关系个案研究[M].知识产权出版社,2009：174-176
[242]王俊(?).股权结构与公司治理绩效研究[D].山东大学硕士学位论文,2005：4
[243]王满四,邵国良.民营上市公司大股东机制的公司治理效应实证分析——考虑各种主体治理机制的相关性[J].金融研究,2007(2)：133-145
[244]王满四.负债融资的公司治理效应及其机制研究[M].北京：中国社会科学出版社,2005：98
[245]王满四.民营上市公司的公司治理机制及其公司治理效应分析[J].财经论丛,2006(3)：84-89
[246]王晓坤,余谦.上市公司董事会独立性的影响因素[J].财会月刊,2004(12)：32
[247]王跃堂,赵子夜,魏晓燕.董事会的独立性是否影响公司绩效[J].经济研究,2006(5)：62-73
[248]魏刚.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效[J].经济研究,2003(3)：：32-39
[249]吴谦立.公司治理——建立利益共存的监督机制[M].北京：中国政法大学大学出版社,2006：23
[250]吴淑琨.董事长和总经理两职状态的实证检验[J].证券市场导报,2002b(3)：26-30
[251]吴淑琨.股权结构与公司绩效U型关系研究——1997—2000年上市公司的实证研究[J].中国工业经济,2002a(1)：12-17
[252]西北民族大学经济管理学院.科学发展观与民族地区经济发展论文集[C].北京：民族出版社,2005：222-223
[253]谢立中,何玉长.发达国家的社会发展战略[M].昆明：云南人民出版社,1997：147-158
[254]谢永珍.中国上市公司董事会独立性与监督效率关系实证研究[J].山东大学学报(哲社版),2007(4)：72-83
[255]辛广海,夏芸,胡朝晖.董事会独立性与公司绩效之间关系的文献综述[J].现代管理科学,2008(9)：50-52
[256]徐莉萍,辛宇,陈工孟.股权集中度和股权制衡及其对公司经营绩效的影响[J].经济研究,2006(1)：90-94
[257]徐雪莲.中国上市公司高管激励之约束问题研究[J].经营者管理,2009(9)：142
[258]许学军,周尚志.资本结构、代理人行为与上市公司绩效[J].山西财经大学学报,2002 (2)： 58-61
[259]严若森.论上市公司股权结构与经营绩效的关系[J].财经问题研究,2009(6)：80-83
[260]杨晓明,张秋.公司治理的理论基础及主要模式[J].经济研究参考,2009(24)：27
[261]于东智,池国华.董事会规模、稳定性与公司绩效：理论与经验分析[J].经济研究,2004(4)：70-79
[262]于东智.董事会、公司治理与价值：对中国上市公司的经验分析[J].中国社会科学,2003(3)：29-41
[263]余明桂.中国上市公司控股股东的代理问题[D].华中科技大学博士学位论文,2004：28
[264]原红旗,李海建.会计师事务所组织形式、规模与审计质量[J].审计研究,2003(1)：32-37
[265]袁萍,刘士余,高峰.关于中国上市公司董事会、监事会与公司业绩的研究[J],金融研究,2006(6)：23-32
[266]袁涌波.公司治理理论：一个文献回顾及述评[J].资料通讯,2006(6)：28
[267]翟林瑜.从代理理论看国有企业改革的方向[J].经济研究,1995(2)：23-30
[268]张纯,方平.论我国民营上市公司股权结构与绩效[J].上海大学学报(社科版),2009(3)：90-105
[269]张根明,柳超,温秋兴.上市公司股权结构对公司绩效影响的实证研究[J].价值工程,2009(1)：160-163
[270]张光荣,曾勇.股权制衡可以改善公司治理吗——基于公平与效率视角的实证检验[J].系统工程,2008(8)：71-79
[271]张俊瑞,董南雁.公司治理与审计意见：来自中国上市公司的经验证据[C].中国会计学会2005年学术年会论文集：1121-1130
[272]张俊瑞,董南雁.公司治理与审计意见：来自中国上市公司的证据[J].当代财经,2006(11)：18-26
[273]张俊瑞,赵进文,张建.高级管理层激励与上市公司经营绩效相关性的实证分析[J].会计研究,2003(9)：29-34
[274]张俊喜,张华.民营上市公司的经营绩效、市场价值和治理结构[J].世界经济,2004(11)：1-13
[275]张维迎.从公司治理结构看中国国有企业改革的成效、问题与出路[J].社会科学战线, 2000(3)：42-51
[276]张维迎.所有制、治理结构与委托代理关系——兼论崔之元和周其人的一些观点[J].经济研究,1996(9)：3-15
[277]张卫国,吴静和陈学梅.电子电器行业上市公司的股权结构与绩效关系[J],重庆大学学报(自然科学版),2004(4)：146-150
[278]张雪昆.谈自然人控股上市公司的私有非流通股问题[J].商场现代化,2006(7)：313-314
[279]张一新.自然人控股公司行为特征分析与完善[J].现代经济探讨,2002(2)：62-64
[280]赵景文,于增彪.股权制衡与公司经营业绩[J].会计研究,2005(12)：59-64
[281]赵钼铭.我国上市公司强制性会计信息披露问题研究[J].财经与管理,2009(1)：159
[282]赵宇龙.会计盈余披露的信息含量——来自上海股市的经验数据[J].经济研究,1998(7)：41-49
[283]周建波,孙菊生.经营者股权激励的治理效应研究[J].经济研究,2003(5)：74-93
[284]周勤业,卢宗辉、金瑛.上市公司信息披露与投资者信息获取的成本效益问卷调查分析[J].会计研究,2003(5)：3-11
[285]朱红军,汪辉.“股权制衡”可以改善公司治理吗?——宏智科技股份有限公司控制权之争的案例研究[J].管理世界,2004(11)：71-79
[286]朱明秀.我国上市公司股权结构与股利政策关系的实证研究[J].审计与经济研究,2005(3)：87-95
[287]朱武祥,宋勇.股权结构与企业价值[J].经济研究,2001(12)：66-72
[288]朱武祥,张帆.股权结构与企业价值——对家电行业上市公司实证分析[J].经济研究,2001(12)：66-72、92
[289]朱武祥.自然人直接控股上市公司喜与忧[J].新财经,2003(5)：11
[290]朱杏珍.董事会的规模与效能探析[J].当代财经,2002(6)：68-70
[291]邹华.股权结构和企业价值关系的行业分析[J].商业文化,2009(3)：67-68
[292]左志鹏.公司治理理论综述[J].大众文艺(理论),2009(8)：13