摘要
负债融资不仅是上市公司的一种主要资金筹集方式,同时也是一项重要的公司治理工具。有效的负债融资公司治理不但能够降低股东和经理人员之间的代理成本,而且有利于保障债权人利益,从而提高公司绩效。本文在充分借鉴国内外文献的基础上,按照先理论演绎负债融资治理的模式、治理主体与治理途径,后实证分析负债融资治理效应及治理中的功能问题的逻辑顺序,以上市公司负债融资治理现实考察为起点,以会计信息披露与银行监管为重点,全面系统研究负债融资治理问题。
首先,本文以不完全契约理论和社会责任理论为基础,分析对利益相关者的保护只能是以“有限”的关键利益相关者为基础,并深入探讨其治理的主体和治理方式等问题,在此基础上提出以银行债权人为主体的关键利益相关者治理模式；其次,采用均值检验、Pearson相关性分析等方法对上市公司负债融资治理现状进行考察,为后文深入分析负债融资治理效应与其中的功能等问题做铺垫。研究表明,伴随着中国股权分置改革的顺利进行,上市公司负债融资治理状况取得了可喜的变化,但是上市公司中流动负债比率较高,长期负债比率较低的状况表明债权人既缺乏热情也没有机会参与到公司治理的行列中来；再次,采用主成分分析和多元线性回归方法从负债融资来源结构与期限结构两方面系统全面检验负债融资治理效应问题,发现短期负债的增加在一定程度上提高了企业的绩效,而长期负债与债券融资对企业绩效的影响则不显著。因此,上市公司为了有效地降低代理成本,提高公司绩效,应充分考虑债务融资方式,优化公司债务融资结构,适当增大长期负债融资比例和企业债券融资比例；最后,分别采用Logisitic回归、主成分分析与多元线性回归方法检验会计信息和银行在负债融资治理中的功能。研究发现,会计信息质量较差的公司倾向于通过向银行贷款而不是发行债券来获得债务融资,其中私人企业的会计信息的债务契约有用性要强于国有企业,而且银行并没有在上市公司负债融资治理中充当有效角色,没有能够替代公司治理机制来承担监管公司的职责。
本文以不完全契约理论与社会责任理论为基础,构建以银行为主体的关键利益相关者治理模式下的治理框架。充分考虑银行债权人的利益,除了从法律法规等制度层面上加强对银行债权人的保护外,还研究制定有关银行等关键债权人的利益保护信息披露的有关会计准则,并与《金融行业会计准则》的相关披露相协调,在充分试点后要求各上市公司强制披露银行债权人利益保护信息并经审计签证后发布。另外,在公司内部重构有银行参与的董事会和监事会,并在董事会下设银行等关键利益相关者利益保护委员会,与薪酬等委员会相并行,为债务契约的签订、后续跟踪提供服务。
同时,本文对上市公司负债融资治理状况进行了现实考察,并较早地系统研究会计信息质量差异性对负债融资偏好的选择问题、会计信息质量差异对债务契约有用性的影响问题以及通过设计内外部治理指标来考察银行在负债融资治理中的监管功能问题等。它不仅为以银行债权人为主体的关键利益相关者治理模式的构建提供了实证依据,而且也为积极改善负债融资公司治理效应,提高企业绩效提供了政策建议。
Debt financing of listed companies is not only a major fund-raising mode, but also an important tool for corporate governance. Effective debt financing corporate governance not only reduces agency costs between shareholders and managers, but also is conducive to protect the interests of creditors, thereby enhancing company performance. In this thesis, our research is based on extensive references to domestic and international literatures. At first, we make a theoretical interpretation for the mode, governance body and methods of debt financing governance. Then we make use of real examples to study governance impact and effect for debt financing. Examining the reality of debt financing governance for listed companies as a starting point, followed by focusing on disclosure of accounting information and banking supervision, this thesis makes a comprehensive and systematic study on governance issues of debt financing.
At first, based on incomplete contract theory and social responsibility theory, we analyze the topic that stakeholders'interest protection can only be based on "limited" key stakeholders; then we make an in-depth study on the main body and the ways of governance to be carried out to protect the interests of shareholders. Based on this study, we put forward a governance mode to use bank creditors as main body for key stakeholders. Secondly, using mean value test, Pearson correlation analysis and other methods, we inspect the status quo of debt financing governance for listed companies. This research is to pave the way of subsequent further study on impact and function of debt financing governance. This research demonstrates that, with the Chinese split share structure reform going smoothly, the state of debt financing governance for listed companies makes very encouraging changes; However, high current liabilities rate and low long-term debt rate for listed companies show that creditors not only lack enthusiasm but also have no opportunity to participate corporate governance; Again, using principal component analysis and multiple linear regression methods, we systematically and comprehensively examine the impact of debt financing governance as respect to source structure and debt maturity structure. We find that an increase in short-term liabilities will increase the firm's performance, while long-term debt and bond payable will be no significant relationship to the company's performance. Therefore, in order to effectively reduce agency costs and to improve corporate performance, the listed companies should take full account of debt financing, optimizing the structure of corporate debt financing, appropriately increasing the proportion of long-term debt and corporate bond financing ratio; Finally, using Logistic regression, principal component analysis and multiple linear regression method, respectively, we test the role of accounting information and banks in debt financing governance. The study find that companies with poor quality of accounting information tend to borrow from banks rather than to issue bonds to obtain debt financing; it also finds that debt contract accounting information of private companies is more useful than that of state-owned enterprises; it shows that banks do not take an effective role in debt financing governance for listed companies, and that banks are also not able to take responsibilities for monitoring companies alternative to corporate governance mechanisms.
In this thesis, based on incomplete contract theory and social responsibility theory, it builds a framework of governance mode, within which banks dominate as the main body of key stakeholders. To give full consideration to the interests of bank creditors, in addition to strengthening the protection interest of bank creditors based on laws and regulations at institutional level, we also set accounting standards relevant to information disclosure of interest protection of banks and other key creditors and coordinate with related disclosure related to the "financial institution accounting standards". After extensive pilot tests in some places, we request listed companies to mandatory disclose interest protection information of bank creditors after being audited. In addition, within companies we request to reconstruct board of directors and board of supervisors with banks participated. Under board of directors and in parallel to remuneration and other commissions, we also request to reconstruct an interest protection commission consisting of banks and other key stakeholders to provide service to signing of debt contracts and follow-up tracking.
At the same time, the thesis makes a pioneer study on the reality of situation for debt financing governance of listed companies. It also systematically examines the effects of accounting information quality difference on preferences and choices of debt financing and on usefulness of the impact of debt covenants. Through the design of internal and external governance indicators, it examines the corporate governance relationship issues between banks and debt financing companies. It not only provides empirical basis for construction of governance model for key shareholders with bank creditors as main body of it, but also provides a number of policy recommendations to actively improve company performances and improve the corporate governance effects for debt financing companies.
引文
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