摘要
股权分置改革以来,我国上市公司的股权激励已经从“初步尝试”
进入到“遍地开花”,对各种股权激励模式的优劣选择,开始成为市
场关注的热点。股票增值权作为一种相对新颖的股权激励方式,自2000年首次
在中国石化使用后,陆续有数十家上市公司先后尝试使用。但究竟其
实施效果如何,在实践中怎样具体运用,是否还需要进一步完善,已
成为亟待解决的问题。本文以此为研究内容,通过对我国已有股票增
值权实施的案例进行总结分析,对其有效性进行综合评判,以期找到
适合我国上市公司股票增值权的合适方案。本文首先综合阐述了股权激励理论、委托-代理理论、人力资本
理论以及最优契约理论框架,具体结合股票增值权的固有特征展开了
理论研究。作者认为,激励力度、激励模式、条款设计的选择是影响
股票增值权实施效果的主要因素；上市公司薪酬委员会的成员构成及
有效运作是股票增值权方案实施成功与否的组织保证；对人力资本定
价是确定激励对象和激励份额的重要参考依据。其次,本文从外在环境的角度分析股票增值权实施有效性的客观
因素,包括政策环境、税务环境、会计环境以及公司环境。研究后作
者认为,股票增值权实施的外部环境亦决定着其激励的有效性,也即
影响实施效率的高低。同时,股票增值权对各利益相关者权益大小的
改变也是衡量股票增值权实施有效性的重要组成部分。股票增值权的合理运用首先离不开对其定价,即公允价值的确
定,然而目前各公司采用的定价模型各不相同。本文在经典
B1ack-Scho1es定价模型的基础上,结合我国资本市场弱有效性和股
票增值权自身特征,通过引入通货膨胀率等新变量,构造了适合我国
的股票增值权定价模型,并用此模型实证分析了招商银行股票增值权
的定价情况,得出经修正后的Black-Scholes模型更适合我国股票增
值权定价的研究成果。接着,本文以目前我国上市公司实施的全部股票增值权计划为样
本,综合比较了股票增值权实施公司的特征,全面对比了各具特色的
实施条款,意图寻找到最适合我国上市公司股票增值权计划安排的模
式,并通过事件研究的方法衡量股票增值权授权和行权的市场反应。
研究表明,股票市场对股票增值权实施存在一定的过度反应；股东、公司、激励对象三者对股票增值权实施的利益诉求存在偏差,并且由于条款设计的不尽合理和股票市场的弱有效性,导致股票增值权实施的总体有效性偏低。
此外,本文还通过数据包络分析中CCR和BCC模型的运用,从成本-收益的角度对股票增值权实施的效率进行综合评价,从而得出我国上市公司股票增值权实施效率普遍偏低的结论。同时,以广州国光为例,比较了股票增值权相对于其它股权激励方式的不同,发现广州国光实施股票增值权激励的效率值优于同期使用其他股权激励方式的公司,股票增值权激励对公司的业绩增长起到了有效作用。
最后,在前述研究的基础上,本文提出了进一步优化我国股票增值权实施方案的具体建议和措施。
After reform of non-tradable shares, Chinese Listed companies have applied the stock option incentive gradually. All of us began to focus on how to choose the best stock option incentive mode.
Relatively, Stock Appreciation Rights (SARs) is a newer stock option incentive mode than others mode. In2000, after the first time of stock appreciation rights has been used in SNP (Sinopec), dozens of listed companies tried to use this stock option incentive tool. How effective is SARs implementation in the companies? How to use it in practice? Is it needed to further improve? These questions are not answers until now. So this article researches all of above questions. Though analyzed and summarize all of SARs cases in our country, this paper evaluated its effectiveness comprehensively, in order to find the suitable stock appreciation rights program to china's listed companies.
Firstly, we elaborated the theory of stock option incentive, principal-agent, human capital pricing and optimal contract, combined with the inherent characteristics of the stock appreciation rights. We believed that the result of SARs was affected by these major factors: Degree of motivation, incentive model, and the choice of terms designed. In order to ensure the success of SARs implementation, the members of the Remuneration Committee of listed companies' structure must suitable. Human capital is important object reference to determine the incentive pricing and incentive share.
Then, this paper analyze the objective factors of effectiveness of the stock appreciation rights to implement from the perspective of the external environment to, including the policy environment, tax environment, the accounting environment and corporate environment. The conclusion is the external environment of stock appreciation rights to implement also determines its incentive effect, thus affecting the efficiency of the implementation level. Meanwhile, stock appreciation rights changed the interests of all stakeholders, and become an important part to measure the effectiveness of the stock appreciation rights implemented.
The rational use of stock appreciation rights is inseparable from its pricing. But most of companies use different pricing models at present. Based on the classic model, Black-Scholes, combined with the weak efficiency of capital market and the character of Stock Appreciation Rights, we constructed the pricing model of Stock Appreciation Rights, and implemented it on the comparison and analysis of Stock Appreciation Rights of CMB (China Merchants Bank). We also apply it more effective that the modified Black-Scholes pricing model than the Black-Scholes model.
Secondly, this paper took the full implementation of China's listed companies of stock appreciation rights plan for the sample, compared the company's characteristics of implement stock appreciation rights comprehensively, contrasted the different implementation of the provisions, intent to find the most suitable arrangement pattern for China's listed companies stock appreciation rights plan. And we through the event study method to measure stock appreciation rights exercised authority and market response. The result show that the stock market overreaction for the implementation of certain stock appreciation rights. Shareholders, the company, incentive objects of stock appreciation rights demanded different interest, and the terms of the design is not quite reasonable and the effectiveness of the weak stock market, the overall insult the effectiveness the implementation low.
In addition, after the discussion of the basic theory of data envelopment analysis, by using the CCR model and BCC model, horizontal and vertical comparisons of the effectiveness to implement Stock Appreciation Rights from the angel of cost-proceed. The conclusion is that the efficiency of implementation SARs in the listed companies in China is generally low efficiency. Meanwhile, take the company Guang Zhou Guo Guang as an example, comparing Stock Appreciation Rights with the other stock option incentive plan, we found the former are more effective. Stock appreciation rights incentive has played an effective role for the company's growth performance.
On the basis of the above study, this paper proposed concrete proposals and measures to further optimize the implementation of China's stock appreciation rights plan.
It is noteworthy that deeper research work is confined by some realities. Due to stock appreciation rights in the application of China's listed companies is also still in its infancy, and the length of time or number of samples are very limited, which has become the next step work direction.
引文
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