摘要
继2006年12月底,全国首例会计师事务所——沈阳华伦会计师事务所因蓝田股份造假案而被判决承担连带赔偿责任之后,2007年6月15日最高法院关于会计师事务所必须承担民事侵权赔偿责任的规定也开始实施,会计师事务所必须为其未恪尽职守“买单”的序幕已经拉开。与此同时,两个新准则尤其是公允价值计量方式的引入,在某种程度上已成为某些公司盈余操纵的新手段。由于公允价值旨在及时体现会计信息与股票价值的相关性,而充满了不确定性的股票价格则加剧了会计信息的不确定性和风险。加上客户经营环境的瞬息万变,凡此种种,无形中极大地放大了会计师事务所的风险。面对日益上升的诉讼风险,如何迅速做出最优选择,已成为其目前亟待解决的难题。对审计师个人和会计师事务所而言,要始终做出正确的判断无疑是一个难度极高的挑战。身处风口浪尖,其管理理念和管理策略不能不有所变化。在上述因素首次起作用的2007年,与往年相比,会计师事务所对我国深沪两市上市公司出具非标准审计意见的数量陡然增加。然而,仅仅通过这种策略能否完全规避风险以求生存,尚需进一步检验。
与国际会计准则、审计准则趋同,是2006年至今乃至今后相当一段时期我国会计信息制度改革的重点,我国会计师事务所的应对策略是否也应与国际同行的管理策略趋同,则成为其未来一段时间内需要探索的难题。2002年至今,国外大的会计师事务所辞聘客户的数量逐年增加,其目的无非是扔掉那些烫手的“山芋”以规避风险。可见,会计师事务所不是在任何时候、对任何客户都可以依靠出具非标准的审计意见而将所有的风险化解于无形。因此,就迫切需要探讨在我国的具体制度背景和环境下,如何使其迅速掌握一套最佳的客户组合风险管理策略和方法以求生存、谋发展。而且,其意义之深远远不止于此,要想真正实现我国本土会计师事务所的做大做强、走向海外,没有高超的规避风险的策略和方法,极有可能会导致“出师未捷身先死”的悲剧上演。
本文正是基于上述考虑,来探讨我国会计师事务所如何应对和化解客户组合的风险的。首先,基于会计师事务所客户组合风险管理的特殊性,建立会计师事务所的收益最大化模型,得到客户组合风险管理决策理论上的主要影响因素;再运用我国深沪两市1998-2003/2007年的经验数据对前述结论进行实证检验,并分析了不成立结论的原因;其次,在前述影响因素的基础上,建立会计师事务所客户组合风险管理的静态最优决策模型,从理论上揭示了法律诉讼损失与客户数量之间的关系,同样进行了实证检验和讨论;再次,运用不确定性条件下的投资理论,对会计师事务所客户组合风险管理动态策略进行理论分析和实证检验,并结合我国的制度背景进行了较为深入的剖析;最后,针对我国会计师事务所客户管理的现状,分别从微观和宏观层面提出对策建议,以及本文研究的不足和未来的研究方向。
在国内外相关文献少之又少的条件下,本文的主要创新点在于:
第一,对于会计师事务所客户组合其风险的影响因素,分别从理论和实证层面发现:在有限合伙制和赔偿机制完善的前提下,随着客户数量的增多,时间预算压力的增大,审计师诚信度的提高,客户组合的风险也随之下降;
第二,对于会计师事务所客户组合的风险管理静态策略,从理论层面予以证明:会计师事务所发生审计失败的诉讼损失越大,可接受的客户组合的风险越小,风险大的客户被拒聘(辞聘)的概率越大;
第三,对于会计师事务所客户组合的风险管理动态策略,从理论上证明了:长期而言,大事务所的最优策略是不断剔除风险大的客户,小事务所的最优决策策略是接受前者辞聘的客户,由于客户在大小事务所之间的不断流动使整个审计市场达到动态均衡。而且大事务所的最优策略在实证层面也被予以证实。
After the first time that ShenYang Hua-lun auditing firm has been adjudged to be charged with related atonement because of Lan-Tian joint stock limited corporate in China by the end of December, 2006,the Super Court has brought the rule about auditing firm to take on paying for civil tortuous conviction into effect on June,15,2007. And the prelude that an auditing firm has to pay for its not sticking to its duty has been undrawed. In the meantime, two new guideline especial fair vale accounting rule being acted, have becoming new instruments by some firms to manipulate its earning. Because the aim of fair value is at timely showing accounting relativity between accounting information and stock value, the stock price full of uncertainty and the business environments of clients all pricked up the uncertainty and risk of accounting information and enlarged the risk for auditing firm. It has been a difficult problem desiderating solved that how auditing firm can face the increasingly rising litigation risk and choose promptly the best way. No doubt, it is a larger challenge for an auditor and auditing firm that can correctly estimate all the time. On the fire, its management thoughts and strategies cannot be any changeable. Although compared with past years, in 2007 when such factors are coming into being, the quantities of qualified audit opinion by an auditing firm is suddenly rising in Shen Zhen and ShangHai stock exchange marketing, it needs future test that whether only can this strategy absolutely avoid risk.
Tending equality to international accounting rules and auditing rules is an emphasis of an accounting information system reform up to the present and for a long time tomorrow in our country. And whether the countermeasure of the auditing firm in our country needs be gradually equal to the international partners is becoming its inevitably hard problem explored in a longer period of time. From 2002 to the present, the amount of clients resignated by the larger auditing firm aboard is rising year after year, and its aim is nothing but throwing out such scalding“poi”to avoid risk. It is obvious that no auditing firm can turn risk to zero by setting an unqualified audit opinion in any time for any client. Therefore, we have to instantly probe into how to make auditing firm grasp a number of the best client portfolio strategies in order to pursuit survive and develop in our material system and environments. Moreover, it has not only this importance, but also has far-reaching meaning that it is more possible to lead to tragedy of death before“dispatching troops”without lofty strategy and method for the sake of realizing auditing firm to larger and stronger of our own country .
The article is just based by such reasons to discuss how our auditing firm to counter and cut the throat of risk. And the content of the article is arranged as follows:
First of all,based upon the specialties of an auditing firm client’s portfolio risk management, the author proves several mainly factors affecting clients portfolio risk by setting up the optimized model for an auditing firm.Then the author tests the theoretical conclusions and deeply analyzes the reasons which are not coming into existence by using Chininese listed companises’data from 1998-2003. Second, the author presents the stable optimized decision model and gives a number of theoretical analyses, and posts the relationship among litigation losses, acceptable risk level and the final client amounts, next supports corresponding empirical tests by using real data in our country.Thirdly, by employing uncertainty investment theory, and analyzing the client portfolio optimized dynamic strategy and the stochastic dynamic equilibrium, the author makes some conclusions, and then gives some empirical test by using our country’s listing firm data. Forth, the author also anatomies those conclusions which don’t have reality by integrating system background of our country. Lastly, based the foregoing theoretical conclusion and empirical findings, aimed at the actuality of auditing firm’s client management in our country, the author presents some relevant suggestions and makes some primary conclusions, then points the deficiencies, limits and the directions for future research.
Under the relative documents is very scarce around the world, the article has the following three findings:
First, the author found theatrically and emperically that under the limited partnership and perfect payment mechanism, with the increasing of client quantity, the time budget dress, and the level of auditors’honesty, the client portofolio risk also was decreasing;
Secondly, on the client portifolio risk managent stable strategy of an auditng firm, the author theoritically makes the following conclusions: the larger litigation loss of an auditing failure for an auditing firm is, the higher auditing costs are, and the smaller acceptable client portfolio risk is, moreover, the larger the riskier client are resigned or refused.
Thirdly, the author concludes that the best decision of a larger auditing firm is a process to pick out riskier client continuously, but the most optimized decision for a smaller auditing firm is to accept the resigned client by a larger auditing firm, and the flow between these two scale auditing firms endlessly produces the dynamic equilibrium in the auditing market. After the empirical test by employing actual data from our country, the result shows that the larger auditing firm would like to resign riskier clients, and its acceptable risk boundary is smaller, but the client’s quantities accepted by smaller auditing firm is no relative with auditing risk.And the first conclusion has been tested it is correctly in our country.
引文
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