摘要
现代主流财务理论基本上是外生性新古典完备契约理论的产物,由于持有生产函数的企业观,注定其对企业内部冲突问题存在制度性缺失。而作为内生性的现代企业契约理论中的代理理论,虽然持有企业契约观,并聚焦于企业代理契约冲突的研究,但由于“完备契约”的假设与现实相去甚远,而导致其通过事前缔结激励相容的最优契约来解决冲突问题往往效率不高甚至失灵。本文应用更贴近现实契约行为的现代企业契约理论最新发展——不完备契约理论为基本分析工具,研究财务契约的缔结机制、冲突模式以及履行机制问题,初步建立起了不完备财务契约缔结和履行机制基本理论体系。以全新的理论范式对企业财务契约行为进行相关理论和实证研究,一方面可以弥补外生性主流财务理论内在的制度性缺失,另一方面可为企业财务主体之间缔约、冲突和履约提供相比内生性完备财务契约理论更科学合理的理论指导。
首先,论文以不完备契约理论将企业财务交易性质重构为一系列不完备财务契约的缔结和履行的过程,以及将企业财务目标重构为企业合作盈余或者组织租的最大化,其实质表现为企业剩余最大化,并且与企业剩余控制权的配置内在逻辑一致,具有状态依存性和边际修正的特征。以此为逻辑起点,提出构建不完备财务契约的缔结机制、冲突模式和履行机制等理论研究设想,并论证了不完备财务契约理论问题的本质是冲突性财务理论和剩余控制权配置理论,而其缔结和履行的目标是激励和保护财务缔约主体关系型专用性资产投资。
其次,论文分别运用了不完备契约理论中的交易费用经济学(TCE)和不完备契约产权理论(GHM)剖析了不完备财务契约缔结机制。在TCE的财务契约缔结机制研究中,从交易类型与交易的契约治理结构匹配的基本原理入手,再切入完备程度不同的财务契约与融资交易的匹配,指出当企业为高专用性资产融通资金时应当使用体现关系性契约治理的股权契约要比体现刚性契约治理的债权契约有利于节约交易费用,从而有利于激励和保护缔约主体关系型专用性投资。在GHM的财务缔结机制研究中,论述GHM融资契约缔结目标,以此引出了GHM融资契约缔结的一般机理。为了深化研究,论文以Aghion-Bolton模型为基础分析和讨论了财务契约缔结的状态依存性问题,论证债权契约的特殊意义。同时,以我国企业为样本检验了不完备财务契约缔结的一般机制。
再次,论文研究了不完备股权契约和不完备债权契约冲突的内在机理以及我国企业冲突的现状。在不完备股权契约冲突研究方面,创建了一个基于不完备契约理论的股权契约冲突分析框架,论证了经理自利行为的代理问题Ⅰ和大股东掏空效应的代理问题Ⅱ两类冲突模式具有同质性,即均是剩余搭配错位(也即企业产权残缺)引起缔约主体敲竹杠的机会主义行为。同时也论证了股权契约冲突追随契约结构而具有状态依存性。这个结论在以我国企业为样本的实证研究中得检验。在不完备债权契约冲突研究方面,论文剖析了导致债权契约不完备及其冲突的基础和根源,并从不完备契约理论视角重点分析和论证了债权契约冲突的两类基本模式,即过度投资和投资不足,指出两类冲突均是股东利用债权契约关键变量可观察而不可证实性,攫取债权人专用性投资准租金的机会主义行为。实证也检验了我国企业债权契约冲突的基本模式,发现我国企业债权契约冲突的形态和特征在具有一般性的同时更具有特殊性。
最后,论文研究了不完备财务契约的履行一般机制及其相机控制的基本实施路径。论文论证了不完备财务契约自我履行机制的基本原理、影响因素以及促进自我履行的基本途径。同时也指出第三方私人裁决履行以及公共强制履行机制是自我履行机制的救济性机制。在此基础上,论文重点研究了不完备财务契约最重要的履行机制——再谈判机制,分析了再谈判基本要素,构建了再谈判模型,同时,对反映不完备财务契约再谈判机制具体形式的剩余控制权动态配置的原理进行了深度剖析,指出一个有效率的动态配置是实现缔约主体非合作博弈向合作博弈转换,这意味着不完备财务契约具有相机控制特征。因此,论文分析了不完备财务契约相机控制最基本的实施路径,即股东常态治理和债权人相机治理。
The mainstream of the modern finance theory basically is the works of exogenous neoclassic complete contract theory. Regarding firm as the production function, it is doomed to have the institutional flaw to the firm interior conflict question. Although agency theory, as the endogenous modern firm contract theory, has the view of firm contract, and focuses on the conflict of firm agency contract, the big difference between its supposition of complete contract and the reality leads to inefficiency or failure of ex ante optimal contract to govern conflict. The paper applies incomplete contracting theory, the most recent development of the modern firm contract theory which draws close to the realistic contract behavior, to research finance contract question of signing mechanism, conflict model,fufillment mechanism, and the establish the basic incomplete financial contract theory system. The relevant theories and the empirical research to the finance contract behavior by the new paradigm, on the one hand, may make up the exogenous mainstream finance theory intrinsic institutional flaw, on the other hand, may provide more scientific and reasonable theory instruction to firm finance contract of signing, conflict and fufillment, comparing the endogenous complete finance contract theory.
Firstly, the paper applies incomplete contracting theory to restructure the firm finance transaction nature as the process of a series of incomplete financial contract's signing and fufillment, the finance objective as the maximization of firm cooperation earnings or the organization rent, equaling the maximization of firm residuals, being consistent with intrinsic logics of firm residual control rights allocation which manifests contingent-state and marginal revision. Taking these as the logical beginning, the paper proposes the construction of incomplete finance contract theory including its' signing mechanism, conflict model and fufillment mechanism. Meanwhile, the paper proves the essence of incomplete financial contract theory is about the conflicting financial theory and the residual control rights allocation theory, the objective of its' signing and implementation is to incentive and protect investment of the relation-specific asset of the financial contractual subject.
Secondly, the paper has utilized in transaction cost economic theory (TCE) and incomplete contract property right theory (GHM), the two kinds of incomplete contracting theory, to analyzes the incomplete financial contract's signing mechanism. The financial contract signing mechanism research in TCE begins at the basic principle that transaction type should match the contractual governance structure of transaction. Finance contracts should match the different financing transaction due to the same logic. So, a conclusion is draw that equity contract which manifests the relationship-contractual governance, rather than the creditor's rights contract which manifest the rigid contract governance, is more suitable to finance for the high- specific-asset to save transaction cost, and it is also more advantageous to incentive and protect the relationship- specific asset investment. The financial contracts signing mechanism researches in GHM begin at the signing objective of financial contract, and then draw the conclusion about the general mechanism of incomplete financial contract. For further research, the paper discusses the state contingent of financial contract signing and analyzes special significance of creditor's rights contract based on Aghion-Bolton model. Then, take china firm as the samples, the paper empirically study the incomplete financial contract signing general mechanism.
Thirdly, the paper researches conflict intrinsic mechanism of the incomplete equity contract and the incomplete creditor's rights contract as well as china firm conflict in realty. the research founds analytical frame about incomplete equity contract conflict based on the incomplete contract theory, and proves that the two conflicting models, the managers self-seeking (agency I) and first stockholder tunneling (agency II), have same essence, that is the residuals are not matching (i.e. property rights of firms is incomplete ) . Simultaneously, the paper also proves the equity contract conflict model is state contingent following the contract structure. The above conclusions are supported by the empirical study as the samples of china firm. In the research aspect of incomplete creditor's rights contract conflict, the paper analyzes the conflict foundation and the root of the creditor's rights contract. and especially research the two conflict model of overinvestment and underinvestment based on incomplete contracting theory , pointing out that two conflict models are caused by the shareholder to deprive of the quasi-rent of creditor's specific investment making use of the"observable but non-verifiable" contract provision. Then the empirical study also test china firm creditor's rights contract conflict fundamental mode, discovering the characteristic of china firm creditor's rights contract conflict is general, also has the particularity.
Finally, the paper studies incomplete financial contract's general fulfillment mechanism and the fundamental implementation of its' state contingent control mechanism. The paper proves the basic principle, the influencing factors, and the essential ways to promote the self-fulfillment of the mechanism. Based on this, the paper studies with emphasis the most important fulfillment mechanism of incomplete financial contract------renegotiation mechanism, analyzing the fundamental renegotiationelements, constructing negotiated renegotiation model. Simultaneously, the paper also studies the principle of dynamic allocation of the residual control rights which is concrete form of renegotiation mechanism, pointing out the effective dynamic allocation is to realize transformation from non-cooperation game to the cooperation game among the subject of financial contract. According to dynamic allocation of residual control rights, the control of incomplete financial contract is state contingent, meaning that its' fundamental implementation path is shareholders' regular governance and creditors' state-contingent governance.
引文
[1]O.哈特:《企业、合同与财务结构》(中文版),上海三联书店/上海人民出版社,2006年,第19页
[1]该部分的模型主要参考了张维迎的《博弈论与信息信息经济学》,上海三联书店/上海人民出版社,第403-408页。
[1]对于企业财务目标的不完备契约理论解构和重构,详细讨论参见作者论文:不完备契约与财务目标的状态依存及其边际修正,《会计研究》,2007年第4期。
[1]为了便于分析,Williamson首先假设不确定性足够大,因而交易实行适应性的、连贯性的决策。
[2]依照Macneil(1974,1978)对契约的划分方法,契约关系有古典契约关系、新古典契约关系和关系型契约关系。
[3]见易宪容:《交易行为与合约选择》,经济科学出版社,1998年,第83-89页。
[1]见齐行黎,范方志:最优资本结构研究——基于交易成本经济学视角,《经济问题》,2005年第3期。
[2]所谓刚性、规则性治理的特点如同市场契约所治理的交易特征那样,行或不行对缔约主体双方而言一目了然,这即所谓的take-it-or-leave-it(要么接受,要么拉倒)的契约。
[1]见孙杰:《资本结构、治理结构和代理成本:理论、经验和启示》,社会科学文献出版社,2006年,第224页。
[2]Israel模型的研究假设也不同于H-R模型和Stulz模型。Israel模型可以考虑个人借贷,而另两个模型是严格限制个人借贷;另外,Israel模型不考虑企业所有权结构,也不考虑企业现有控制者(经理或大股东)与其它(消极)股东之间的代理问题。三个模型的具体分析,见沈艺峰、沈洪涛:《公司财务理论主流》,东北财经大学出版社,2004年第1版,第312-328页。
[1]本文此处的讨论和分析所引用的A-B模型主要参考了哈特的《企业、合同与财务结构》,上海三联书店/上海人民出版社,2006版,第121-125页。
[2]A-B模型是不考虑任何关系专用性投资。这点是与GHM理论逻辑不完全一致。
[1]图5-5和图5-6的博弈分析参考了纪玉俊:“控股股东与中小股东代理问题分析”,《华东经济管理》,2007第8期。
[1]一个更为详细的实证分析参见作者论文:经理自利行为还是大股东掏空效应,抑或其它——基于中国制造业上市公司的实证研究,《财经理论与实践》,2008年,第3期。
[1]见张维迎:《企业理论及其对我国国有企业改革的意义》,北京大学出版社,1999年,第53页。
[1]参见本杰明·克莱因:契约与激励:契约条款在确保履约中的作用,载《契约经济学》,经济科学出版社,1999年,第198-204页
[1]陈赤平:《公司治理的契约分析》,中国经济出版社,2006年,第41-54页
[1]陈赤平:《公司治理的契约分析》,中国经济出版社,2006年,第41-54页
[1]见沈艺峰、沈洪涛、张俊生:中国上市公司的负债是否发挥控制作用,《证券市场导报》,2006年第2期。
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