摘要
尽管公司治理与企业竞争力之间的内在联系已被实业界甚至公众所感知,但在理论上,这种内在联系还没有得到有效揭示,如何以企业的竞争力为导向来优化公司治理机制,更是鲜有令人满意的研究成果,本文正是这一背景的产物。
鉴于以往对公司治理问题和企业竞争力问题的研究往往单独进行,各自形成独立的体系,因此,将两者结合起来研究首先需要构建一个合理的研究框架。本文认为,现代企业理论可以为这一研究框架的构建提供理论基础。因此,在本文的第二章和第三章,论文以现代企业理论为平台,从企业的基本性质和功能出发,首先对公司治理的核心问题进行了科学界定,然后对企业竞争力理论进行了梳理,找出公司治理和企业竞争力之间内在联系的脉络,最终构建了一个合理的研究框架。论文的分析表明,企业竞争力可以分为运营竞争力和资源获取竞争力,而决定企业运营竞争力的核心治理机制包括企业所有权安排机制和隐性激励机制,决定企业资源获取竞争力的核心治理机制包括企业的外部制度安排机制和合约的自我实施机制。
在构建了合理研究框架的基础上,论文进一步对基于企业竞争力的公司治理核心机制进行了理论和实证研究。在第四章,论文专门研究了基于企业运营竞争力的企业所有权安排机制。论文的分析表明,企业所有权安排取决于企业参与人之间的博弈,现代经济中,人力资本所有者拥有更多的企业所有权是一个趋势。现实中,人力资本所有者也确实在以各种不同的方式在拥有企业所有权,人力资本股份化在理论上具有必要性和可行性。在第五章,论文用逻辑和经验实证的方法对基于企业运营竞争力的隐性激励机制进行了研究。论文的分析表明,隐性激励机制对企业竞争力具有重要的治理作用,控制权收益等可以作为企业经营者的重要隐性激励因素,有力地促进企业竞争力的提高;在第六章,论文在对交易中信任问题进行探讨的基础上,用博弈论等方法分别对基于企业资源获取竞争力的外部制度安排和合约的自我实施机制进行了研究。研究表明,企业外部制度的约束力和保障效率是保证企业资源获取竞争力的基础因素,合约的自我实施机制是保证企业资源获取竞争力的关键,但合约自我实施机制发挥作用需要一定的条件。在第七章,针对第四章至第六章的研究结论,论文对核心治理机制与企业竞争力之间的关系进行了经验实证研究。第八章是论文对本研究的总结。
Although the inner links between corporation governance and the competitive advantages of enterprise have already been perceived by the people of the business circles or even the public, these links haven’t been effectively revealed yet theoretically. The achievements in the research on the optimization of corporation governance mechanisms with the competitive advantages of enterprise as its guidance are rarely seen. This thesis is just the product of the setting.
Because the study of corporation governance and that of the competitive advantages of enterprise were made respectively in the past and independent systems have formed, a rational research framework should be set up first in order to combine these studies. The author holds that modern business theories can provide the theoretical foundation for the construction of the framework. Therefore, in chapters 2 and 3, based on modern business theories and proceeding from the basic features and functions of enterprise, The thesis eventually construct a rational research framework through scientifically ascertaining the key problems in corporation governance, straightening out the enterprise competitive theories and identifying the line of thought in the inner links between corporation governance and the competitive advantages of enterprise. Our analysis indicates that enterprise competitiveness includes operating competitiveness and resourse-obtaining competitiveness. The core governance mechanisms which determine the enterprise operating competitiveness include enterprise’s ownership arrangement mechanism and implicit incentive mechanism. The mechanisms determining enterprise resourse-obtaining competitiveness include enterprise’s external institutional arrangement mechanism and the contract’s self-enforcement mechanism.
Based on the rational research framework, the thesis makes further theoretical and positive studies of corporation governance mechanisms in view of the competitive advantages of enterprise. Chapter 4 deals with enterprise’s ownership arrangement mechanism, and the analysis shows that the arrangement for enterprise’s ownership depends on the negotioations among the participants. In modern economy, it is the trend that the owners of human capital have more ownership of the enterprise. In reality, they indeed possess enterprise’s ownership in different ways. Modeling the share of human capital is necessary and feasible. In chapter 5, through logical and empirical positive studies of implicit incentive mechanism in view of the enterprise operating competitiveness, the thesis finds that this mechanism plays an important role in governing enterprise competitiveness. The operator’s control of the enterprise can be taken as an important implicit incentive factor, which will greatly enhance its competitiveness. In chapter 6, based on the investigation of the problem of trust in business and the theories such as the game theory, the thesis makes a study of enterprise’s external institutional arrangement mechanism and the contract’s self-enforcement mechanism in view of the enterprise resourse-obtaining competitiveness. The study shows that the binding force and the supportability rate of the enterprise’s external institutions are the basic factors which guarantee the enterprise resourse-obtaining competitiveness. It also shows that the contract’s self-enforcement mechanism is a key to the guarantee of the enterprise resourse-obtaining competitiveness, but it is only under certain circumstances that the contract’s self-enforcement mechanism can play its part. In chapter 7, in order to test the conclutions from chapter 4 to chapter 6, the thesis does a empirical study to analysis the relationship between the core governance mechanisms and the competitive advantage of the enterprise. Chapter 8 is the summary of this study.
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