摘要
当今世界,国际贸易具有强烈的冲撞与协调、竞争与合作的博弈特征。在这场博弈中,人们所期待的平和、有序、共赢的局面并没有如期出现。相反,国际贸易摩擦却频繁发生。贸易摩擦的发生,严重影响了世界经济的持续发展。因此,探究最优路径化解贸易摩擦、实现各贸易方的正和博弈成为各国面临的重大课题。
然而,现今的贸易学文献相当多还停留在完全分散和就事论事的状态,很难找到解释所有贸易摩擦行为的一般基础性原理,更缺乏对国际贸易摩擦产生的时代背景即技术快速变迁的分析,对贸易实践中出现的产业结构趋同现象也视而不见。鉴于此,本文试图从制度、结构和技术的视角来探讨国际贸易摩擦问题。希望能为实现国际贸易的健康发展提供有价值的分析。
本文在系统地综述已有的国际贸易摩擦研究成果的基础上,从当今世界贸易摩擦此起彼伏的事实出发,以产业结构、制度差异和技术扩散为切入点,研究了国际贸易摩擦发生的原因、呈现的特征、产生的效应,构建了一个“结构互补──技术驱动──制度协调”三位一体的国际贸易共赢的理论框架。并解读了中外贸易摩擦,为正在崛起的中国提供了应对之策。
国际贸易理论阐释了完全分工与贸易互利性的双赢理念。现实的贸易实践却是:在规模经济显著的钢铁、汽车等行业,在关乎国计民生具有重要战略意义的农业以及能带来巨额利润的高科技产业和其它行业,出现了国与国之间的同构。出口相似性指数和产品相似系数显示了这种同构日趋严重。文中的博弈模型论证了产业结构的同构致使贸易摩擦风起云涌,呈现出广泛性特征。因此,要避免国际贸易摩擦,就得进行国际产业政策的协调,建构结构互补、水平分工与垂直分工交织并存的国际分工网络体系。
“北-南贸易模型”和“蛙跳模型”认为技术的国际扩散会降低发达国家的相对福利水平,威胁发达国家的国际领先地位。基于以上认识,发达国家严格限制高新技术产品的出口,这种限制使得设限方国际贸易收支不平衡持续扩大,而受限方却遭遇各种各样的贸易壁垒,贸易双方陷入冲突的困境。文章设计了走出困境的“技术驱动”型贸易模式。模式展示了国际贸易的新型合作竞争关系,揭示了国际贸易双赢的可能性,指出了知识产权等相关制度的约束更新了传统的贸易壁垒、降低了贸易摩擦发生的概率。
正如诺斯提出的“制度启动贸易”的命题,制度在国际贸易中具有十分重要的作用。文章运用进化博弈模型和回应反倾销博弈模型侧重剖析了WTO保障措施规则、反倾销协议及争端解决机制存在的漏洞和模糊性诱发国际贸易摩擦的机理,探讨了企业技术标准的国别差异与国际贸易摩擦的相关性。探寻了避免国际贸易摩擦,实现共赢性博弈的路径:建立激励相容的自由贸易机制、以公平为实质原则完善WTO各项制度、进行制度差异的协调。
文章还对中外贸易摩擦进行了分析,得出的基本判断为:中国正在面临着日益严重的“国际贸易摩擦潮”。中国的崛起决定了“摩擦潮”出现的不可避免,经济结构的不合理及制度的缺陷是“摩擦潮”形成的自身因素。基于此,文章提出了今后中国应对贸易摩擦的策略:优化产业结构、不断地开展技术创新,完善与对外贸易有关的各项制度等。
文章中还有许多问题需要进一步研究:汇率制度、知识产权保护制度的国别差异引发国际贸易摩擦的问题,“技术驱动”贸易模式如何构建的问题、国际贸易摩擦理论的系统化问题等等。
In the world of today, international trade has shown strong game characteristic of collision and coordination, and that of competition and cooperation. In this game, the placid, orderly and all-win situation has not appeared as expected. Instead, international trade frictions frequently take place. The occurrence of trade frictions has seriously hindered the sustainable development of the world economy. So, the major problem that countries of the world face is to find out an optimum route to dissolve such friction and bring about positive-sum games between all trading parties.
However, quite a lot of trade literature today still remain dispersed and discuss only individual cases, making it difficult to find a general basic principle to explain all trade friction behaviors, not to mention the lack of analysis of the time background with prompt technology development, in which international trade frictions occur and the ignorance of the convergence of industrial structure that appears in trade practices. This thesis attempts to probe into the problem of friction in international trade from the perspective of institutions, structure and technology, with a view to providing some valuable analysis for the healthy development of international trade.
Based on the systematic summary of existing research findings of international trade friction, and on the fact that international trade frictions frequently occur, this thesis, taking industrial structure, system difference and technological diffusion as the cut-in points, studies the reasons, characteristics and effects of international trade friction, in an attempt to construct an all-win theoretical framework of international trade with the trinity of“structure complementation--technology actuation-- institution coordination”. The thesis, by analyzing trade frictions between China and other countries, offers some countermeasures for the rising China.
International trade theory has explained the win-win philosophy of complete division of work and mutual benefit in trade. But in actual trade practice, in industries with remarkable scale, such as steel and automobile, in industries with important and strategic significance to national economy and people’s livelihood such as agriculture and in Hi-Tech and other industries that can bring enormous profits, the similarity of structure between countries appears. Exportation similarity index and product similarity coefficient show that this similarity of structure is becoming more serious. The game model in this thesis demonstrates that it is the similarity of industrial structure that causes frequent trade frictions, embodied with the characteristics of universality. So, to avoid international trade friction, international industrial policy should be coordinated, and a system of international division network with structural complementation and coexistence of horizontal and vertical divisions of labor should be established.
According to“the North-South trade model”and“the leapfrog model”, international diffusion of the technology will reduce the relative welfare level of developed countries and threaten their leading status. So developed countries impose strict restrictions on the export of new high-tech products, which in turn brings about more trade conflicts, with the result of more imbalance of international trade on the part of countries that impose these restrictions and more trade barriers for those countries who are victims of these restrictions. This thesis designs a“technology actuation”trade model, with a view to helping countries out of the present predicament. The model shows a new-type of cooperative competition relations in international trade, demonstrates the win-win possibility in international trade, and points out that the restraint of relevant systems, such as intellectual property right will upgraded traditional trade barrier and reduce the probability of trade friction.
Just as the proposition that“Institutions start trade”put forward by North, institutions play a very important function in international trade. By using the evolution game model and responsive anti-dumping model, this thesis has laid particular emphasis on analyzing the friction-inducing mechanism of the loopholes and ambiguity in the WTO Safeguard Measure System, Anti-dumping Agreement, Dispute Settlement Understanding, discusses the difference in technical standards handled by different enterprises in different countries and the correlativity of such difference to international trade friction. In the thesis, the author proposes a way to avoid international trade friction and realize the win-win game: to establish a free trade mechanism which encourages compatibility, to perfect the various systems of the WTO according to the principle of equity and to coordinate institutions differences.
The thesis also analyzes trade frictions between China and other countries, and comes to the basic conclusion: China is faced with an ever serious“international trade friction tide”, which is an inevitable result of the rise of China. The irrationality of its economic structure and the defect in its system are the internal factors that cause such a“friction tide”. The thesis finally proposes stratagems to deal with trade friction: optimize China’s industrial structure, engage in constant technological innovation and perfect the rules and regulations to suit international trade.
There are still many questions that need further discussion in the thesis, such as: the international trade friction caused by the country origin differences of exchange rate system and intellectual property right protection system, the construction of "technology actuation" trade model, systematization of the international trade friction theory.
引文
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①参见:海闻、P.林德特、王新奎著,《国际贸易》上海人民出版社 2003.85
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