摘要
近年来,BOT (Built-Operate-Transfer)模式因其具有缓解政府财政紧张、提高管理和运作效率、促进技术创新等优点,逐渐获得政府和私人投资者的青睐,在交通项目投融资领域中得到越来越广泛的应用。因此,围绕特许期决策的理论研究和实践应用正成为学术界和实践界共同关注的焦点。在此背景下,从不确定性的视角出发探讨BOT项目特许期决策问题是十分必要的。
论文以交通BOT项目为背景,围绕不确定性条件下特许期决策这一核心问题展开论述,共分为八章。第一章阐述选题背景与意义、拟解决的关键问题、研究内容与技术路线；第二章对BOT模式与特许期相关研究进行了文献评述；第三章针对交通BOT项目决策中的不确定性展开分析；第四章进行内生不确定条件下BOT模式有效性研究；第五章针对固定特许期“模式一”,构建外生不确定条件下BOT项目特许期决策模型；第六章针对固定特许期“模式一”,构建外生不确定条件下BOT项目特许期调整模型；第七章针对固定特许期“模式二”,以外生不确定为前提,构建弹性需求下BOT项目特许期决策模型；第八章是本研究的结论、研究局限与展望。论文的主要研究成果如下：
(1)本研究综合比较了“不确定性”在语义分类、经济学、组织理论中的定义和分类,结合交通BOT项目的特定背景,将BOT项目决策中的不确定性界定为“项目公司在特许期决策过程中所处的环境背景,如果项目公司不能完全知道其自身行动的后果,这一决策制定过程就会受不确定性的支配”。按照不确定性的来源,将交通BOT项目决策中的不确定性因素划分为内生不确定性因素和外生不确定性因素。其中,内生不确定性因素主要包括利益外部性、项目公司中途毁约可能性等；外生不确定性因素主要包括建设期、建设成本、收费价格、交通量、运营和维护成本等。
(2)构建了内生不确定条件下BOT项目的契约模型,求解出契约模型的均衡解和完全竞争招标解；通过与传统模式契约模型的比较,从理论上分析了利益外部性与中途毁约的可能性对BOT模式有效性的影响,并给出了项目公司中途毁约的条件。研究得出以下四个命题：①因为存在利益外部性,通过完全竞争招标决定的传统模式契约不能抑制施工公司道德风险的发生；②在禁止项目公司途中毁约的前提下,通过完全竞争招标签订BOT项目特许经营协议可以有效抑制起因于利益外部性的项目公司的道德风险行为,从而实现契约的社会效率；③在BOT模式中,如果无法禁止项目公司中途毁约,将会发生项目公司的道德风险行为；④在签订BOT特许经营协议时,通过事先征收满足特定条件的保证金,可以有效的抑制BOT模式中道德风险的发生。
(3)构建了外生不确定条件下BOT项目特许期决策模型,提出了特许期调整方法。根据实践做法,在固定特许期下设定两种特许期决策模式。针对“模式一”,本研究深入分析了交通BOT项目决策中外生不确定性因素的基本特征,采用符合项目运作实践规律的概率分布函数来反映这些因素对特许期的影响,在此基础上,以项目公司收益最大化为目标,构建了外生不确定性条件下交通BOT项目特许期决策模型,并设计出求解流程。该模型在给定净现值率的条件下,可以确定出较为合理的特许期区间。结合某公路BOT项目案例数据验证模型的有效性,研究表明,在统筹考虑各类不确定性因素基础上确定的特许期,不仅可以激励项目公司节约建设成本、缩短工期以获得更多的运营收入,还可以兼顾政府与项目公司双方的利益,从而提高特许期决策的合理性。
在特许期调整方法的设计方面,不同于现有研究针对单一不确定性因素调整特许期的做法,本研究综合考虑各类外生不确定性因素的影响,提出了特许期缩短、延长、不需调整和调整失效四种情况的判别条件；在项目净现值率超过上限的情况下,以社会福利最大化为目标,构建了特许期缩短决策模型；在项目净现值率低于下限的情况下,以项目公司收益最大化为目标,构建了特许期延长决策模型。应用蒙特卡罗模拟方法对模型加以求解,通过算例验证了模型的可行性,并在不同的折现率水平下对实现预期收益的累积概率加以测算和对比,证明了在单一“调价”方法不适用的情况下通过调整特许期来应对不确定性的合理性。
(4)以外生不确定条件为前提,构建了弹性需求下BOT项目特许期决策模型。在理顺特许期与特许价格决策顺序的基础上,提出了固定特许期“模式二”。与以往研究不同,本研究将这两个具有相互作用的决策变量纳入到同一个博弈模型中,将特许期和特许价格分别作为政府与项目公司的决策变量,以实现政府社会消费者总剩余最大化和项目公司收益净现值最大化为决策目标,在此基础上构建了交通量具备需求价格弹性时的特许期博弈模型。通过对博弈模型均衡解的分析,得出以下几个性质：①当给定交通量需求函数时,最优特许期与最优特许价格应当在交通量需求价格弹性的绝对值大于1的条件下存在；②在其他参数不变条件下,特许期随着建设成本增加而延长,特许价格随着建设成本增加而降低；③在给定交通容量和既定建设标准条件下,项目公司的建设成本存在上限。最后,从价格弹性视角分析了交通量需求不确定性对特许期决策的影响,得出在交通量需求变动条件下,应根据特许经营协议中的价格在新需求曲线上对应点的价格弹性和交通容量,选择相应的特许期调整策略。
Recently, BOT (built-operate-transfer) mode has gradually received the favor of public sector and private sector, because it could mitigate government financial stress, improve effective of management and operation and accelerate technological innovation especially in the field of traffic projects investment and financing. Therefore, the theory research and practice application about concession period is becoming the focus in fields of both academy and practice. In this context, it is necessary to discuss the problem of traffic BOT projects concession period decision-making from the uncertainty perspective.
This dissertation speaks out around the core issue of concession period decision-making under uncertainty condition, including eight chapters. The first chapter described the background and significance of the topic, key issue to be solved, research contend and technology roadmap; the second chapter was the literature review related to the researches of BOT scheme and concession period; Chapter three deployed the uncertainty problem of traffic BOT projects decision-making; Chapter four investigated the effectiveness of BOT scheme under the endogenous uncertainty condition; Chapter five established the BOT project concession period decision-making model under exogenous uncertainty condition, aiming at fixed concession period "model I"; Chapter six built BOT project concession period decision-making adjustment model under exogenous uncertainty condition, aiming at fixed concession period "model I"; Chapter seven, on the premise of exogenous uncertainty, built BOT project concession period decision-making model under flexible demand, aiming at fixed concession period "model II"; Chapter eight consisted of the conclusions, limitations and future research prospects. The main achievements are as follows:
I) This dissertation compared the definition and classification of "uncertainty" in the semantic classification, economics, organization theory comprehensively, combined with the specific context of traffic BOT projects, defined the uncertainty in the BOT projects decision-making as "the environmental background of project company during the concession period decision-making process, if the project company can not fully aware the consequences of its own actions, the decision-making process will be dominated by uncertainty". In accordance with the sources of uncertainty, the uncertain factors of traffic BOT project decision-making were divided into endogenous and exogenous uncertain factors. Endogenous uncertain factors include the exterior of interests, the possibility of the project company to breach the contract; Exogenous uncertain factors include the construction period, construction costs, charges prices, traffic volume, operation and maintenance costs.
II) This dissertation constructed the contract model of BOT projects under endogenous uncertainty condition, calculated the equilibrium solution of the contract model and the tendering solution of perfect competition; Comparing with traditional contract model, analyzed the effects of exterior of interest and the possibility of the project company to breach the contract in the midway to the BOT model, and gave the prerequisite of the project company quit the contract. The study obtained four propositions:i) Because of the existence of exterior of interest, the moral hazard of construction company can not be deterred by the means of traditional perfect competition tender model. ii) On the premise of forbidding the project company quitting the contract, the moral hazard can be efficiently deterred by the perfect competition tendering BOT concession contract, thereby realize the social efficiency of contract. iii) If it is unable to prohibit the project company to quit the contract, it would germinate moral hazard. iv) While signing the concession agreement of BOT projects, it will deter the moral hazard validly by the means of imposing deposit meet certain condition.
III) This dissertation established BOT project concession period decision-making model in the condition of exogenous uncertainty, proposed concession period adjustment method. According to practice, this research set two types of concession period decision-making model under the condition of fixed concession period. This research analyzed the foundational characters of exogenous uncertain factors during traffic BOT projects decision-making process, on the basis of that, with the object of maximizing the revenue of project company, built traffic BOT projects concession decision-making model under the condition of exogenous uncertainty, and designed the solving process. In the condition of net present value rate is given, this model could determine a reasonable concession period. And a BOT highway project case study is provided to demonstrate the validity of the proposed model. The research indicated that, on basis of considering various kinds of uncertain factors, the concession period not only incentive project company saving construction cost, shortening construction period and obtaining more operation revenue, but also take account of the interest of public and project company, thereby improve the rationality of concession decision-making.
In the aspect of design concession period of adjustment methods, this dissertation proposed four kinds of criterions of concession period under the four conditions of shortening, extending, unchanged and invalid adjustment, considering various exogenous uncertain factors; If NPVR exceeds the upper limit, the decision model is built for shortening concession period with the target of social welfare maximum. If the NPVR is under the lower limit, the decision model is built for extending concession period with the target of corporate benefit maximum. Monte Carlo simulation is applied to the model for solution. And the feasibility of the model is proved by numerical example, at the same time, cumulative probability of realization of expected return is calculated and contrasted under different discount rate, so it proves the rationality of allocation of risk by the means of concession period adjustment when single price adjustment method is unsuitable.
IV) On the premise of exogenous uncertainty, this dissertation establishes BOT project concession-making model in the condition of elasticity demand. On the basis of rationalizing the decision-making sequence of concession period and concession price, this dissertation advances fixed concession period "model II". Different from the model previous studied, regarding the concession period and the concession price as the decision variables of government and the project company in order to maximize total consumer surplus and net present value of revenue respectively, this research combines the two interacted factors to the game model of concession period decision-making under elastic demand. Though the analysis of the perfect Nash equilibrium solution, the research draws several properties as followed:i) If the traffic demand function is given, the optimal concession period and optimal concession price are exist when the absolute value of price elasticity of demand is greater than one. ii) If other parameters remained unchanged, the concession period extends with the construction cost increasing, concession price decreases with the construction cost increasing. iii) If the traffic volume and construction standards are given, there is a upper limit of construction cost of project company. Finally, from the perspective of price elasticity, this dissertation analyses the impact of traffic demand uncertainty on concession period decision-making, concludes that if the traffic demand changes, decision-maker should choose concession adjustment strategy correspondingly according to the price elasticity and traffic volume on the new demand curve.
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