摘要
高管人员薪酬从20世纪80年代起就成为了实务界和学术界日益关注的重点,但现有的文献对于高管团队内部薪酬差距的研究较少,且现有研究都忽视了薪酬差距与业绩之间的内生性。本文从中国的实际情况出发,在控制薪酬差距与业绩内生性的条件下,对影响中国上市公司高管团队内薪酬差距的因素以及薪酬差距对业绩的影响进行了研究。
本文首先分析了影响高管团队内部薪酬差距的因素,结果显示公司业绩、CEO职位竞争人数、CEO权力、独立董事比例、多元化水平对高管团队内的薪酬差距有显著的正向影响,但当上市公司的最终控制人为国家或者当该公司位于内陆地区时,高管团队内的薪酬差距较小。本文随后考察了薪酬差距对公司业绩的影响,发现薪酬差距对公司业绩的影响存在区间效应:当薪酬差距较小时,扩大薪酬差距有利于业绩的提升,此时锦标赛理论起主导作用;但当薪酬差距已经达到一定水平时,过大的薪酬差距会使人们产生强烈的不公平感,进一步扩大薪酬差距将会对业绩产生不利影响,此时行为理论起主导作用。最后,本文对不同环境下薪酬差距对业绩的影响进行了实证检验,研究发现薪酬差距在不同环境下会对业绩产生不同的影响,说明在制定薪酬差距时不能一概而论,必须考虑具体的环境。
Top management team's pay has been subjected to intensive theoretical and empirical investigation since the 80's of last century. But existing studies seldom focused on the pay gap in the top management team, and none of them considered the endogenetic relationship between top management team's pay gap and performance. Based on the background of China, this paper analyses the factors of top management team's pay gap and the pay gap's effect on performance after controlling the endogenetic relationship between top management team's pay gap and performance.
This paper first analyses the factors of top management team's pay gap. The results show that performance, number of the contestants of CEO position, CEO power, proportion of independent directors and diversification strategies have positive relation with the pay gap, but the pay gap will be small when the controller is the government or when the company is inland. This paper then analyses the pay gap's effect on performance. The results show that the effect of pay gap to performance is curve. This means that when the pay gap is small, extending the gap will bring better performance, and at this time the tournament theory is in dominant. But when the gap has reached certain level, raising pay gap will bring unfair feelings and then worse performance, and at this time the behavioral theory is in dominant. At the end, this paper analysis the pay gap's effect on performance in different circumstances and find that in different circumstances the pay gap has different effect on performance. This shows that blindly extending or reducing pay gay wouldn't raise performance all the time and circumstances should be considered.
引文
1 见Lazear与Rosen,S.1981.“Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts”一文(Journal of Political Economy,1981Vol.9),第847页。
2 斯蒂芬·罗宾斯,《管理学》(第四版),第404页,中国人民大学出版社,1996年。
1 具体数据来源于,国家经贸委企业研究中心、中国企业联合会研究部课题组:《国有企业经营者物质激励问题研究》,《中国工业经济研究》1999年第7期。
2 数据来自上海荣正投资咨询有限公司历年的《中国企业家价值报告》,上海:百家出版社。
3 以下规定主要参见国务院国有资产监督管理委员会业绩考核局:《中央企业经营业绩考核暂行办法辅导讲座》,经济科学出版社2004年版,第1-14页。
4 事实上,由于规范中没有做出具体规定,大部分上市公司年报的这一块内容都是非常格式化、一般化的说明,较少有公司披露高管薪酬激励方案的具体内容。
5 姜汝真,中国传统文化的历史阐释与现代价值,山西教育出版社,1997年,第27页。
6 李钢,薪酬公平:样样都要摆平,中国经营报,2004年2月23日。
1 转引自李东明等,1999年,《上市公司董事会结构、职能的实证研究》,《证券市场导报》1999年10月号第34页。
2 转引自梁能,2000年,《公司治理结构:中国的实践与美国的经验》,中国人民大学出版社,第126页。
3 事实上,由于规范中没有做出具体规定,大部分上市公司年报的这一块内容都是非常格式化、一般化的说明,较少有公司披露高管薪酬激励方案的具体内容。
4 李子奈,叶阿忠编著,《高等计量经济学》,清华大学出版社,2000年,第132页。
5 以下关于财务指标与市场指标背离的原因的论述主要参考张思宁2006年发表于《证券市场导报》上的《我国上市公司盈利水平与市场价值关系的实证研究》一文。
1 许小年、王燕,中国上市公司的所有制结构与公司治理,详见梁能主编《公司治理结构:中国的实践与美国的经验》,2000年中国人民大学出版社出版,105-127页。
2 详见《管理激励和业绩评价的会计研究》(魏明海主编,2006年中国财政经济出版社出版)一书193页表11-20。
3 详见汪辉《上市公司债务融资、公司治理与市场价值》一文中(《经济研究》,2003年第8期)表2和表3:以lnasset作为控制变量,在以Tobin's Q为因变量时,负相关;以ROE为因变量时显著正相关。
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