摘要
企业产权竞争是与构成该企业产权的不同控制权相联系的利益相关者围绕企业合约的控制权所展开的竞争。控制权是一种可以带来收益的权利,因而也可以将其看成是一种资产,从而可以通过市场竞争来进行分配。国有企业的改制可以看成是政府对企业控制权结构的不断调整过程,而国有企业控制权的不可交易和不可转让性影响了国有企业的效率,因此对国有企业的进一步改革应该引入控制权竞争机制,在保证国有企业产权转让效率的前提下,最大化政府的收入,而国有企业改制中产权转让的收入和效率成为社会关注的焦点。根据科斯定理,当交易成本为零时,企业控制权的最终配置结果和初始产权结构是没有关系的,产权市场的竞争可以自动实现产权的最优配置。但是产权市场上存在的信息不对称以及不完全竞争等因素,可能对国有企业产权转让的收入(价格)和效率(社会福利水平)产生不利影响。
本文运用机制设计理论和拍卖理论的分析方法,将不完全合约理论有关企业控制权最优分配的分析方法和机制设计理论相结合,从产权竞争的角度分析利益相关者的行为对产权转让收入和效率的影响。
论文首先在第二章对产权、竞争以及企业绩效之间关系的有关研究文献进行了回顾,对企业产权交易市场以及交易机制理论研究中存在的不足进行了分析。然后在第三章分析了企业产权和产权竞争的含义,讨论了合作博弈框架下企业最优所有权分配的有关结论,并在此基础上进一步分析了非合作博弈下的产权市场竞争对最优所有权分配的影响。本章还讨论了国有企业改制以及产权转让过程中的收入和效率,并对国有企业产权转让的不同方式进行了比较和分析。接下来,本文在第四章运用机制设计理论,对国有企业产权转让机制进行了分析。在第五、六、七、八章中分析了股权结构、市场结构、外资并购、合谋和腐败对产权竞争机制的收入和效率的影响。
根据显示原理以及机制设计理论的研究,当报价人是风险中性的、拥有对称信息、不存在流动性限制,并且参与人的报价是估值的增函数时,所有能够保证报价最高的参与人赢得产权竞争的交易机制(拍卖、招标、挂牌转让等)都是有效率的并且是收入等价的(Myerson,1981)。当这些基本条件不被满足的时候,企业产权竞争的收入和效率会受到影响。在不对称信息条件下,当企业拥有唯一股东时,对企业产权转让的双边交易(协议或者讨价还价)往往难以达成有效的交易结果(Myerson and Satterthwaite,1983)。而当企业的股权结构比较分散,并且股东持股比较均匀,不存在严重的不对称持股结构时,对企业股权的转让可以是有效的。企业的股权结构(水平交叉持股、垂直交叉持股以及金字塔控股结构)会对产权竞争的收入和效率产生影响,控制权的不对称分布以及控制权私人收益是企业产权有效转让的一个不利因素,但是允许更多的外部投资人对企业的产权进行报价竞争,并适当提高转让股权的数量或者尽可能的降低控制权拥有者获得控制权私人收益的能力有利于提高股权转让的效率。在产权转让之前,先对国有企业进行改制,引入一些战略股东或者外部投资人,可以提高产权转让的收入,但是这些投资人的持股比例不能妨碍事后的产权竞争。在国有企业产权转让过程中,投资人的竞争将影响租金在投资人和政府之间的分配,而消费者剩余以及总的社会福利的大小,主要受事后市场结构的影响。政府和投资人之间的信息不对称将提高投资人可以获得的租金,而吸引更多的潜在投资人参与竞争总是有利于政府,并有利于降低信息不对称的影响,但是过多的竞争会对社会总剩余产生不利的影响。在跨国竞争中,如果外资企业对企业产权具有较高的估值优势,政府在产权转让过程中适当地采用差别政策,对控制权私人收益进行限制并适当提高产权转让的份额,可以促进产权竞争,增加转让收入并提高转让效率。产权竞争中的腐败和合谋联盟的存在会降低国有企业产权转让收入和效率,因此,对于政府来说,吸引更多的投资人参与产权竞争,有利于提高转让的效率,并降低合谋联盟的稳定性及其不利影响。
第九章的分析表明,国有企业控制权的变革构成了我国国有企业改革的主线,来自于政治、经济、社会等方面的约束决定国有企业的控制权分配采取分享方式可能是最优的选择,而控制权的分享将影响控制权转让的最优机制选择以及国有企业的产权转让的效率和收入。
第十章对本文的相关研究进行了总结并给出有待进一步研究的问题和建议。
总之,在企业产权竞争过程中,不同利益相关者的信息和行为特征将不可避免的影响到企业控制权的最优配置,而企业的控制权结构也会影响产权竞争的效率。在国有企业改制过程中,对企业进行改制,使得股权结构多元化,并根据企业初始产权结构、市场结构、环境等因素,设计合理的产权市场交易机制和控制权分享机制,将提高企业产权的转让效率并有利于提高企业的绩效。相应地,如何根据产权交易内容和交易环境设计合适的产权市场交易机制是国有企业产权转让中值得进一步研究和关注的问题,当然对这个问题的研究也必然是将产权竞争理论和有关产权转让的实践相结合的一个过程。
The competing for ownership can be regareded as the competition anmong the stakeholders who have the different control rights provided by the contracts of the firm. The control rights which can benefit the owner can be treated as a sort of assets that can be traded in a competitive market. The reforms of the SOEs can be regarded as a procedure; along which the government has been adjusting the structure of the controls of the firms. The improvement on the efficiency of the SOEs are affected by the non-transaction and non-transformations of the control rights of the SOEs, so the next step of the reform should introduce the competitive mechanism into the transactions of control rights. On the condition of the efficiency of the transaction of the SOEs control rights, the mechanism can maximiz the revenue of the government. Now more and more attention has been put on the price and the efficiency in the market for ownership during the reform of the SOEs. Without transaction cost, according to the Coase theorem, the ex post allocation of the control rights of the firm separates from the ex ante allocation of the rights, so the most efficient structure of the control will appear as the result of the market competition. But the information asymmetric and the incomplete competition have negative effects on the payment ( price) and efficiency (the level of the social welfare) of the transaction in the market for ownership.
In this paper, putting the methods of the distribution of control rights of the firm under the incomplete contracts and of mechanism design theory together, we use the mechanism design theory and auction theory to study the effects of the stakeholders actions on the revenue and the efficiency in the transfer of the control rights of SOEs from the view of competing for ownership.
First, in chapter two, it summarizes the existing literature on the subject about the relationships among property rights, competition and the performance of the firm, and points out the deficiency in the literature on the market for ownership and the mechanisms for transactions on controls. Next, it analyzes the concepts of the ownership and of the competing for ownership in chapter three, and the effects of the competition for ownership on the optimal allocation of the ownership. This chapter also discusses the payment and efficiency in the reform of the SOEs and transfers of the ownership, and compares the methods used in the transactions of the ownership of the SOEs.
Next, it analyzes the trade mechanism for SOEs' ownership from the view of the mechanism design theory. First, in the chapter four, it uses the non-cooperative game theory to discuss the characteristics of the optimal direct mechanism on the transaction of the ownership, and analysis the effects of risk attitude, asymmetric, and constraints of the liquidity of the participators on the payment and efficiency of the ownership trade mechanism. Then, the paper also discusses the effects of shares structure, market structure, competition from the foreign investors and the collusion and corruption in the following chapters.
According to revelation principle and the mechanism design theory, when the bidders are risk neutral, symmetric information, without the constraints of liquidity, and the bid is the increasing function of bidders' valuation, all the mechanisms which can chose the highest bidder as winner are efficiency and revenue equality (Myerson, 1981). When one of these conditions is destroyed, the revenue and efficiency will be affected. Under the condition of asymmetric information, when there is only one owner, the bilateral trade of the ownership can't result an efficiency transaction. When the firm has a dispersed ownership structure and the shares are almost equally held, the transaction in ownership will be efficiency. The structures of the ownership (cross-shareholding, pyramid structure etc.) have effects on revenue and efficiency of transfer of ownership. The asymmetric structure of control and the private benefit of control have negative effects on transaction in ownership, but attracting more bidders in bidding for control and increasing the shares for transaction or reducing the private benefit from control will enhance the efficiency of selling the shares. Before the trade on ownership, it can increse the revenue from the transaction in ownership by restructuring the SOEs and giving toeholds to some strategic shareholders or outside investors. Whereas, the proportion of the shares which owned by the outside investors shouldn't disturb the transaction in ownership. During the transaction in SOEs ownership, the competition among investors will affect the distribution of the rents from trade between investors and government, and the market structure after the transaction will affect the surplus of the consumer and the social welfare. The investors can obtain the rents as the asymmetric information between the investors and government. And attracting more invetors in the transaction will always benefit the government and will reduce the influence of the asymmetric information. But more competition will have negative effect on social surplus. When there are some foreign investors and they also have higher valuation, the government can improve the competition and increase the revenue and enhance the efficiency of the transaction by adopting the discrimination policy, restricting the private benefit from control and increasing the shares for transferring properly. The corruptions and collusions in the transaction will decrease the revenue and efficiency of the transaction in ownership of SOEs, therefore in order to improve the efficiency in transaction and destroy the robust of the collusion rings, the government should attract more investors to participate in the competitions.
As analysis in chapter nine, the evolution of the assignment of control in SOEs constitutes the reform of the SOEs. The best choice is that the control should be shared when the assignment of control of the SOEs have the constraints from the political, economy, and society. The share of the control has effect on the assignment of control and on the revenue and efficiency of transaction in ownership.
Finally, it summarizes the research and indicates the drawbacks and problems await to study in the next step.
In conclusion, during the competing for the ownership, the information and the actions of the different stakeholders will affect the assignment of the control rights of the firm, and the structure of the control will affect the efficiency of the competing for ownership. During the reform of the SOEs, according to the factors such as the initial structure of the ownership, the market structure and the environment, restructuring the firm by designing a right transaction mechanism and control sharing mechanism, it can improve the efficiency of the transaction in ownership and increase the performance of the firms. Accordingly, more attention should be put on how to design a right trade mechanism which can suit for the contents and environment for transaction, of course, the research on these questions must be the procedure which combining the theory and practice of the transaction in ownership perfectly.
引文
1 John E.Kwoka,The comparative advantage of public ownership:evidence from U.S.electric utilities,Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'Economique,2005,38(2).
2 Hart,Oliver,Andrei Shleifer,and Robert Vishny,The proper scope of government:theory and an application to prisons,' Quarterly Journal of Economics,2001,112:1127-61.
3 Garnaut、末立刚、Tenev、姚洋.中国企业的所有制改革:进程、成效及其前景.中国财政经济出版社,2006:P94.
4 Eva Meyersson Milgrom,Paul Milgrom,and Ravi Singh,When Should Control Be Shared?Preliminary Draft,April 22,2007.
5 同 4.
6 James Maw.Partial privatization in transition economies.Economic Systems,2002(26):271-282.
7 Garnaut、宋立刚、TeneV、姚洋.中国企业的所有制改革:进程、成效及其前景.中国财政经济出版社,2006:P107.
[1] Aghion, Ph., Tirole, J.. Formal and real authority in organizations [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1997,55(1): 1-27.
[2] Aidt, Aidt S. Economic Analysis of Corruption: A Survey [J]. The Economic Journal, 2003, 113:632-652.
[3] Barclay M. J., C. G. Holderness. Private benefits from control of public corporations [J]. Journal of Financial Economics. 1989, 25(2): 371-395.
[4] Bai Chong-En, Qiao Liu, Joe Lu, Frank M. Song and Junxi Zhang. Corporate governance and market valuation in China [J]. Journal of Comparative Economics, 2004, 32(4): 599-616.
[5] Bebchuk L.. Efficient and Inefficient Sales of Corporate Control [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1994, 109: 957-993.
[6] Becht M., Roell A. Blockholding in Europe: An International Comparison [J]. Europe Economic Review, 1999, 43(4-6): 1049-1056.
[7] Boubakri, N., Cosset, J.C., and Guedhami O.. Postprivatization corporate governance: The role of ownership structure and investor protection [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2005, 76(2): 369-399.
[8] Boardman Anthony E., Aidan R. Vining. Ownership and Performance in Competitive Environments: A Comparison of the Performance of Private, Mixed, and State-Owned Enterprises [J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 1989, 32(1): 1-33.
[9] Branco, F.. Favoring domestic firms in procurement contracts [J]. Journal of International Economics, 1994, 37(1): 65- 80.
[10] Branco, F.. Procurement favoritism and technology adoption [J]. European Economic Review, 2002, 46(1): 73-91.
[11] Burguet R., Y. Che,. Competitive procurement with corruption [J]. Rand journal of economics, 2004, 35(1): 50-68.
[12] Bulow, Jeremy and D. John Roberts,. The simple economics of optimal auctions [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1989, 97(5): 1060-1090.
[13] Bulow, Jeremy and P. Klemperer. Auctions Versus Negotiations [J]. The American Economic Review, 1996, 86(1): 180-194.
[14] Bulow Jeremy; Ming Huang; Paul Klemperer,. Toeholds and Takeovers [J], The Journal of Political Economy, 1999, 107(3): 427-454.
[15] Burkart M., D. Gromb and F. Panunzi. Large Shareholders, Monitoring, and the Value of the Firm [J]. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1997, 112(3): 693-728.
[16] Capen, E. C, Clapp, R. V. and Campell, W. M.. Competitive Bidding in High-Risk Situations [J]. Jornal of Petroleum Technology, 1971, 23: 641-653.
[17] Cho, M-H.. Ownership structure, investment and the corporate value: an empirical analysis [J]. Journal of Financial economics, 1998, 47(1): 103-121.
[18] Che, Y.-K.. Design Competition Through Multidimensional Auctions [J]. Rand Journal of Economics, 1993, 24: 668-680.
[19] Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, J., Lang L.. Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholders [J]. Journal of Finance, 2002, 57(6): 2741-2771.
[20] Cramton, P., Gibbons, R., Klemperer, P.. Dissolving a partnership efficiently [J]. Econometrica, 1987, 55: 615-632.
[21] Compte, O., A. Lambert-Mogiliansky, T. Verdier,. Corruption and competition procurement auctions [J], Rand Journal of Economics, 2005, 36(1): 1-15.
[22] Celentani, M., Ganuza, J.-J.. Corruption and competition in procurement [J]. European Economic Review, 2002, 46(7): 1273-1303.
[23] Dana, J., Spier, K.. Designing a Private Industry: Government Auctions with Endogenous Market Structure [J], Journal of Public Economics, 1994, 53(1): 127-147.
[24] Dasgupta S., K. Tsui, Auctions with cross-shareholdings [J], Economic Theory, 2004, 24: 163-194.
[25] DeAlessi, L.. The economics of property rights: A review of the evidence. In R. Zerbe Jr. (Ed.), Research in law and economics, 1980, 2:1-47.
[26] Demsetz, H. Why regulate Unilities? [J]. Journal of Law and Economics, 1968, 11(1): 55-65.
[27] Demsetz, H.. The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm [J]. Journal of Law and Economics. 1983, 26(2): 375-390.
[28] Demsetz, H. and Lehn K. (1985), The structure of ownership: Causes and consequences [J]. Journal of Political Economy 93 (6): 1155-1177.
[29] Demsetz, H. and Villalonga, B. (2001), Ownership structure and corporate performance [J]. Journal of Corporate Finance 7(3): 209-233.
[30] Dennis Leech,. Ownership Concentration and the Theory of the Firm: A Simple Game Theoretic Approach [J]. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 1987, 35(2), 225-240.
[31] Dyck,A., Zingales,. Private benefits of control: an international comparison [R]. NBER working paper, 2001.
[32] Earle, J., Estrin, S.. After voucher privatisation: the structure of corporate ownership in Russian manufacturing industry [R]. Discussion Paper 1736, Centre for Economic Policy Research, 1997.
[33] Eduardo Engel, Ronald Fischer, Alexander Galetovic. A New Approach to Private Roads [J]. Regulation, 2002: 18-22.
[34] Eduardo Engel, Ronald Fischer, Alexander Galetovic. Least Present Value of Revenue Auctions and Highway Franchising [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 2001, 109: 993-1020.
[35] Ehrlich Isaac, Georges Gallais-Hamonno, Zhiqiang Liu and Randall Lutter. Productivity Growth and Firm Ownership: An Analytical and Empirical Investigation [J]. The Journal of Political Economy, 1994, 102(5): 1006-1038.
[36] Ettinger D.. Efficiency in auctions with crossholdings [J], Economics Letters, 2003, 80: 1-7.
[37] Ettinger D.. Auctions and shareholdings [R], 2002, Working papers.
[38] Faccio, M. and Lang, L.H.P.. The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2002, 65: 365-395.
[39] Ferreira D., E. Ornelas, J. L. Turner,. Unbundling Ownership and Control [R]. 2007, Working paper.
[40] Fieseler, K., Kittsteiner, T., Moldovanu, B.. Partnerships, lemons and efficient trade [J]. Journal of Economy Theory, 2003, 113: 223-234.
[41] Flavio M. Menezes, Paulo Klinger Monteiro.. Corruption and auctions [J]. Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2006, 42: 97-108.
[42] Flavio M. Menezes, Paulo Klinger Monteiro. Corruption and the choice of Auction Format [J], 2000, Working papers, EPGE/FGV.
[43] Florencio Lopez-Silanes. Determinants of privatization prices [J]. Quarterly journal of economics, 1997, 112(4): 965-1025.
[44] Francesca Cornelli, David D. Li,. Large Shareholders, Private Benefits of Control, and Optimal Schemes of Privatization [J]. The Rand Journal of Economics, 1997, 28(4): pp. 585-604.
[45] Grosfeld, 1. and Hashi, I.. The emergence of large shareholders in mass privatized firms: Evidence from Poland and from the Czech Republic[R]. PSE Working Paper 2005-01.
[46] Grosfeld I., T. Tressel. Competition and ownership structure: Substitutes or complements? Evidence from the Warsaw Stock Exchange [J]. The Economics of Transition, 2002, 10: 525-551.
[47] Grossman, S.J. and Hart, O.D.. The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1986, 94:691-719.
[48] Gugler, K. and Weigand, J.. Is ownership really endogenous [J]. Applied Economics Letters, 2003, 10:483-486.
[49] Gary H Jefferson, and Thomas G Rawski. China's emerging market for property rights: Theoretical and empirical perspectives [J]. The Economics of Transition, 2002, 10: 585-617.
[50] Gans, J.S.. When will efficient ownership arise? Trading over property rights [R]. Working Paper, No. 2004-12, Melbourne Business School.
[51] Gans, J.S.. Markets for Ownership [J]. Rand Journal of Economics, 2005, 36(2): 433-445.
[52] Gomes, A., Jehiel, P.. Dynamic processes of social and economic interactions: On the persistence of inefficiencies [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 2005, 113(3): 626-667.
[53] Grossman, S.J., Hart, O.D.. The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral integration [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1986, 94(4): 691-719.
[54] Grimm, V. and Riedel, F. and Wolfstetter, E.. Implementing Efficient Market Structure: Optimal Licensing in Natural Oligopoly when Tax Revenue Matters [J]. Review of Economic Design, 2003, 7: 443-463.
[55] Gugler K., Weigand J.. Is ownership really endogenous [J]. Applied Economics Letters, 2003, 2: 483-486.
[56] Gaasch, J.L.. Granting and Renegotiating Infrastructure Concessions: Doing it Right [R]. World Bank, 2004.
[57] Hart, O., Moore, J.. Incomplete contracts and ownership: some new thoughts [J]. American Economic Review, 2007, 97: 182-186.
[58] Hart, O.D., Moore, J.. Property rights and the theory of the firm [J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1990, 98(6): 1119-1158.
[59] Hart, O., A. Shleifer, R. Vishny,. The proper scope of government: theory and an application to prisons [J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1997, 112: 1127-1161.
[60] Hauswald, R and U. Hege. Ownership and Control in Joint Ventures: Theory and Evidence [R]. Discussion paper No. 4056, C.E.P.R., 2003.
[61] Helwege J., Pirinsky, C. and Stulz, R. M.. Why do firms become widely held? An Analysis of the dynamics of corporate ownership [J]. The Journal of Finance, 2007, 62 (3): 995-1028.
[62] Hermalin, B. and Weisbach, M.. The effects of board composition and direct incentives on firm performance [J]. Financial Management, 1991, 20: 101-112.
[63] Himmelberg, C.P., Hubbard, R.G. and Palia, D.. Understanding the determinants of managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1999, 53: 353-384.
[64] Hendricks, Kenneth and Robert H. Porter,. Collusion in auctions [J]. Annales d'Economie et de Statistique, 1989, 15/16: 217-230.
[65] Hongbin Cai. A Theory of Joint Asset Ownership [J]. Rand Journal of Economics, 2003, 34: 63-77.
[66] Holmstrom B., J. Tirole. Market Liquidity and Performance Monitoring [J]. The Journal of Political Economy, 1993, 101(4): 678-709.
[67] James Maw. Partial privatization in transition economies [J]. Economic Systems, 2002, 26: 271-282.
[68] Krishna, V., Perry, M.. Efficient mechanism design [R]. 2000, Mimeo.
[69] Jehiel, P., B. Moldovanu. Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations [J], Econometrica, 2001, 69(5): 1237-1259.
[70] Jehiel, P., Moldovanu, B.. Resale markets and the assignment of property rights [J]. Review of Economic Studies, 1999, 66 (4): 971-986.
[71] Jehiel, P., Pauzner, A.. Partnership dissolution with interdependent values [J]. Rand Journal of economics, 2006, 37: 1-22.
[72] Jensen, M., and Meckling, W.. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1976, 3: 305-360.
[73] Johnson, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., and Shleife, A.. Tunnelling [J]. American Economic Review, 2000, 90 (2): 22-27.
[74] John E. Kwoka. The comparative advantage of public ownership: evidence from U.S. electric utilities [J]. Canadian Journal of Economics / Revue canadienne d'Economique, 2005, 38(2): 622-640.
[75] Kahn, C, and Winton, A.. Ownership structure, speculation and shareholder intervention [J]. Journal of Finance, 1998, 53 (1): 99-129.
[76] Kai Guo, and Yang Yao,. Causes of privatization in China Testing several hypotheses [J]. The Economics of Transition, 2005, 13(2): 211-238.
[77] Khanna Arun. Is Managerial Ownership Related To Firm Value?[EB/OL]. 2007, SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=686413
[78] Klapper, L.F., Laeven, L., Love, I.. What drives corporate governance reform? Firm level evidence from Eastern Europe[R]. World Bank, 2005, Policy Research Working Paper 3600.
[79] Kole, S.. Managerial ownership and firm performance: incentives or rewards? [R]. Rochester, NY, Bradley Policy Research Center, 1993, Working paper 93-19.
[80] La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., and Shleifer, A.. Corporate Ownership Around the World [J]. Journal of Finance, 1999, 54 (2): 471-517.
[81] Laffont, J.-J. and Tirole, J.. Privatization and Incentives[J]. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1991, 7: 84-105.
[82] Lehmann E., and Weigand, J.. Does the governed corporation perform better? Governance structures and corporate performance in Germany [J]. European Economic Review, 2000, 4: 157-195.
[83] Liang Zou. Ownership structure and efficiency: An incentive mechanism approach [J]. Journal of Comparative Economics, 1992, 16:399-431.
[84] Lixin Colin Xu. Control, Incentives and Competition: The Impact of Reform on Chinese State-owned Enterprises [J]. The Economics of Transition, 2000, 8(1): 151-173.
[85] Loderer C, K. Martin. Executive ownership and performance: tracking faint traces [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1997,45: 223-255.
[86] Marc S. Robinson. Collusion and the choice of auction [J]. Rand Journal of economics, 1985, 16(1): 141-145.
[87] Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Scott Wallsten, Lixin Colin Xu,. Ownership, investment climate and firm performance. Evidence from Chinese firms [J]. The Economics of Transition, 2006, 14: 629-647.
[88] Maskin, E.,Riley, J.. Asymmetric Auctions [J]. Review of Economic Studies, 2000, 67(3): 413-438.
[89] Maskin, Eric and John G. Riley. Optimal auctions with risk averse buyers [J]. Econometrica, 1984,52: 1473-1518.
[90] Maskin, Eric. Auctions development and privatization: Efficient auctions with liquidity constrained buyers [J], European Economic Review, 2000, 44: 667-681.
[91] Matthews, Steven A.. Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes [J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 1983, 30: 370-400.
[92] Matthews, Steven A.. Comparing auctions for risk averse buyers: A buyer's point of view [J]. Econometrica, 1987, 55(3): 633-646.
[93] Mankiw, N. G. and Whinston, M. D.. Free Entry and Social Inefficiency [J], Rand Journal of Economics, 1986, 17(1): 48-58.
[94] Martimort, David, Philippe De Donderand, Etienne Billettede Villemeur. An Incomplete Contract Perspective on Public Good Provision [J]. Journal of Economic Surveys, 2005, 19(2): 149-180.
[95] Mailath, George and Peter Zemsky. Collusion in second price auctions with heterogeneous bidders [J]. Games and Economic Behavior, 1991, 3: 467-486.
[96] McAfee, R. P, and J. McMillan, Bidding Rings [J]. The American Economic Review, 1992, 82(3), 579-599.
[97] McAfee, R.P., McMillan, J.. Government procurement and international trade [J]. Journal of International Economics, 1989, 26: 291-308.
[98] McAfee, R. Preston and John McMillan. Auctions and bidding [J]. Journal of Economic Literature, 1987, 25: 699-738.
[99] McConnell, J., and Servaes, H.. Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1990, 27(2): 595-612.
[100] McGuire, T., Riordan, M.. Incomplete information and optimal market structure: public purchases from private providers [J]. Journal of Public Economics, 1995, 56: 125- 141.
[101] Milgrom, Paul. Auctions and bidding: a primer [J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1989,3:3-22.
[102] Milgrom, Paul and Robert J. Weber. A theory of auctions and competitive bidding [J]. Econometrica, 1982,50(5): 1089-1122.
[103] Milgrom, E. M., Milgrom, P., Ravi Singh,. When Should Control Be Shared? [R]. 2007, Working paper.
[104] Miyagiwa, K.. Oligopoly and discriminatory government procurement policy [J]. American Economic Review, 1991, 81: 1320- 1328.
[105] Morck R., Shleifer A. and Vishny, R.. Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1988, 20: 293-315.
[106] Mougeot, M., F. Naegelenz,. Designing a Market Structure When Firms Compete for the Right to Serve the Market [J]. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 2005, 53(3): 393-416.
[107] Moldovanu, B.. How to dissolve a partnership [R]. Journal Institutial Theoretical Economic, 2002, 158:66-80.
[108] Myerson, R. B.. Optimal Auction Design [J], Mathematics of Operations Research, 1981,6:58-73.
[109] Myerson, R.B., Satterthwaite, M.. Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading [J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 1983, 29: 265-281.
[110] Naegelen, F., Mougeot, M.. Discriminatory public procurement and cost reduction incentives [J]. Journal of Public Economics, 1998,67: 349-367.
[111] Ornelas, Emanuel, and John L. Turner,. Efficient Dissolution of Partnerships and the Structure of Control [J]. Games and Economic Behavior, 2007, 60: 187-199.
[112] Ortorino Chillemi. Cross-owned firms competing in auctions [J], Games and Economic Behavior, 2005, 51: 1-19.
[113] Pierre Garroustea, and Stephane Saussiera. Looking for a theory of the firm: Future challenges [J]. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2005, 58(2): 178-199.
[114] Pindado, Julio, De La Torre, and, Chabela,. Why is ownership endogenous? [J]. Applied Economics Letters, 2004, 11: 901-904.
[115] Paul Povel, and Rajdeep Singh. Using bidder asymmetry to increase seller revenue [J]. Economics Letters, 2004, 84(1): 17-20.
[116] Riley, John G. Expected revenues from open and sealed bid auctions [J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1989, 3: 41-50.
[117] Riley, John G. and William F.. Samuelson. Optimal auctions [J]. American Economic Review, 1981,71:381-392.
[118] Rosenkranz, S., Schmitz, P.W.. Optimal allocation of ownership rights in dynamic R&D alliances [J]. Games and Economic Behavior, 2003, 43: 153-173.
[119] Shirley Mary and Patrick Walsh,. Public versus Private Ownership: The Current State of the Debate [R], 2002, working papers no.2420.
[120] Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R.. A survey of corporate governance [J]. Journal of Finance, 1997,52:737-783.
[121] Schmidt, K.M.. The Costs and Benefits of Privatization: An Incomplete Contracts Approach [J]. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 1996, 12: 1-24.
[122] Schmidt, K.M.. Incomplete contracts and privatization [J]. European Economic Review, 1996,40:569-579.
[123] Schmidt, Klaus M. and Monika Schnitzer. Methods of Privatization: Auctions, Bargaining and Give Aways[C]. appeared in: Giersch, Herbert (ed.), Privatization at the End of the Century, Berlin: Springer, 1997: 97-134.
[124] Schmidt, Klaus M.. Managerial Incentives and Product Market Competition [J]. Review of Economics Studies, 1997,64: 191-213.
[125] Schmitz, P. W.. Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered [J]. FinanzArchiv, 2000, 57(4): 394-411.
[126] Schmitz, P.W.. The hold-up problem and incomplete contracts: a survey of recent topics in contract theory [J]. Bulletin of Economic Research, 2001, 53: 1-17.
[127] Schmitz, P.W.. Simple contracts, renegotiation under asymmetric information, and the hold-up problem [J]. European Economic Review, 2002, 46: 169-188.
[128] Schmitz, P.W.. On the interplay of hidden action and hidden information in simple bilateral trading problems [J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 2002, 103: 444-460.
[129] Schmitz, P. W.. Information gathering, transaction costs, and the property rights approach [J]. American Economic Review, 2006, 96: 422-434.
[130] Schmitz, P.W. Incomplete contracts, the hold-up problem, and asymmetric information [J]. Economics Letters, 2007, doi:10.1016/j. econlet.2007.06.007
[131] Schmitz, P. W.. Joint ownership and the hold-up problem under asymmetric information [J], Economics Letters, 2008, doi: 10.1016/j. econlet.2007.10.008
[132] Schwartz Alan, Joel C. Watson,. Ex Post Inefficiencies in a Property Rights Theory of the Firm [J]. The Journal of Law, Economics, & Organizations, 2004, 20 (1): 125-147.
[133] Shapiro, C. and R.D. Willig. Economic rationales for the scope of privatization. in: E. N. Suleiman and J. Waterbury, eds., The political economy of public sector reform and privatization [C], Westview Press, Boulder, CO., 1990.
[134] Simon J. Evenett, Bernard M. Hoekman. Government procurement: market access, transparency, and multilateral trade rules[J], European Journal of Political Economy, 2005,21(1): 163-183.
[135] Sun Qian, Wilson Tong, Jing Tong. How Does Government Ownership Affect Firm Performance? Evidence from China Privatization Experience [J]. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 2002, 29(1-2): 1-27.
[136] Sun Qian and Wilson H. S. Tong. China share issue privatization: the extent of its success [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2003, 70(2): Pages 183-222.
[137] Stulz R.M.. Managerial control of voting rights: Financing policies and the market for corporate control [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 1988, 20 (1): 25-54.
[138] Tian Lihui, Government Shareholding and the Value of China's Modern Firms [R]. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 39, 2001, University of Michigan Business School.
[139] Trionfetti, F.. Discriminatory public procurement and international trade[J]. World Economy, 2000, 23: 57- 76.
[140] Ulf von Lilienfeld-Toal. Asset Ownership and the Threat to Sell [J]. Journal of Economics, 2003, 80 (1): 1-25.
[141] Vianney Dequiedt. Efficient collusion in optimal auctions [J] Journal of Economic Theory, 2007, 136:302-323.
[142] Vickrey, William. Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders [J]. Journal of Finance, 1961, 16: 8-37.
[143] Vickers J., G. Yarrow. Economic Perspectives on Privatization [J]. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1991,5(2): 111-132.
[144] Werner Guth, Nikos Nikiforakis, Hans-Theo Normann,. Vertical cross-shareholding: Theory and experimental evidence [J]. International Journal of Industrial Organization,2007, 25: 69-89.
[145] Wilson, Robert,. Strategic analysis of auctions [C]. in Handbook of Game Theory, Vol 1 (ed. R. Aumann and S. Hart), Elsevier Sci. Pub., 1992.
[146] Williams, Steven R.. A Characterization of Efficient, Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms [J]. Economic Theory, 1999, 14: 55-80.
[147] Williamson, O.E.. The theory of the firm as governance structure: from choice to contract [J]. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2002, 16: 171-195.
[148] Xu X., Y. Wang. Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance in Chinese Stock Companies [J]. China Economic Review, 1999, 10(1): 75-98.
[149] Yvan Lengwiler, Elmar Wolfstetter, Auctions and Corruption: An Analysis of Bid Rigging by a Corrupt Auctioneer [R]. 2007, Working paper.
[150] Zeckhauser, R., and J., Pound. Are large shareholders effective monitors? An investigation of share ownership and corporate performance, in Asymmetric Information, Corporate Finance, and Investment[C]. (Hubbard R. G. ed.). IL: University of Chicago Press, 1990: 149-180.
[151] Zhou, X.. Understanding the determinants of a managerial ownership and the link between ownership and performance: a comment [J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2001,62:559-571.
[152] Yvan Lengwiler, Elmar Wolfstetter. Corruption in procurement auctions [C]. in Dimitri, N. and G. Piga and G. Spagnolo (eds.), Handbook of Procurement: Theory and Practice for Managers, Cambridge University Press, 2006.
[153] Reny Philip J., Geoff Jehle. Advanced Microeconomic Theory (2nd Edition) [M]. Addison Wesley, 2000: 373-403.
[154] Krishna Vijay. Auction Theory [M]. Academic Press, 2002.
[155] Menezes F. M., P. K. Monteiro. An Introduction to Auction Theory [M]. Oxford University Press,2005.
[1]白云霞、吴联生、徐信忠.资产收购与控制权转移对经营业绩的影响[J].经济研究,2004,(12):35-44.
[2]白重恩、路江涌、陶志刚.国有企业改制效果的实证研究[J].经济研究,2006,(8):4-14.
[3]白重恩、刘俏、陆洲、宋敏、张俊喜.中国上市公司治理结构的实证研究[J].经济研究,2005,(2):81-91.
[4]白明.国有产权与市场竞争[J].经济体制改革,2006,(4):54-57.
[5]陈晓、江尔.股权多元化、公司业绩与行业竞争型[J].经济研究,2000,(8):28-35.
[6]陈小悦、徐晓东.股权结构、企业绩效与投资者利益的保护[J].经济研究,2001,(11):3-11.
[7]程承坪.竞争、产权与管理:基于企业绩效的分析--兼论国有企业改革[J].武汉大学学报(哲学社会科学版),2004,(05):664-669.
[8]崔宏、夏冬林.全流通条件下的股东分散持股结构与公司控制权市场失灵[J].管理世界,2006,(10):114-127.
[9]樊纲.“循序渐进”还是“平行推进”?--论体制转轨最优路径的理论与政策[J].经济研究,2005,(1):4-14.
[10]樊纲、王小鲁.中国各地区市场化相对进程报告[J].经济研究,2003,(3):9-18.
[11]樊纲.论当前国有企业产权关系的改革[J].改革,、995(1):17-23.
[12]冯飞、张永生、张定胜.企业绩效与产权制度[J].管理世界,2006,(4):130-139.
[13]费方域、郑育家.接管的约束作用:一个文献综述[J].世界经济文汇,2006,(04):66-73.
[14]郭东杰.改制企业所有权结构的现实选择与问题分析[J].财经科学,2002,(S2):331-334.
[15]胡一帆.竞争、产权、公司治理三大理论的相对重要性及交互关系[J].经济研究,2005(09):44-57.
[16]胡一帆.所有制结构改革对中国企业绩效的影响[J].中国社会科学,2006,(04):50-64.
[17]胡一帆、宋敏、张俊喜.中国国有企业的民营化绩效研究[J].纤济研究,2006,(7):49-60.
[18]郝大明.国有企业公司制改革效率的实让分析[J].经济研究,2006,(7):61-72.
[19]黄非.1990年斤上海重大道路交通基础设施项目投融资研究[J].城市发展研究,2004 (6):64-72.
[20]黄少安.国有中小企业产权改革及政府在改革进程中的角色--山东诸城国有中小企业改革[J].经济研究,2000,(10):14-23.
[21]吕长江、肖成民.民营上市公司所有权安排与掏空行为[J].管理世界,2006,(10):128-138.
[22]刘芍佳、李骥.超产权论与企业绩效[J].经济研究,1998,(08):3-12.
[23]李稻葵.转型经济中的模糊产权理论[J].经济研究,1995,(4);42-50.
[24]李利英.市场竞争、激励机制与国有企业的生产率决定[J].南方经济.2006,(6):30-37.
[25]林毅夫、刘明兴、章奇.政策性负担与企业的预算软约束:来自中国的实证研究[J].管理世界,2004,(08):81-91.
[26]林毅夫、李志赞.政策性负担、道德风险与预算软约束[J].经济研究,2004,(02):17-27.
[27]林毅夫、刘明兴、章奇.企业预算软约束的成因分析[J].江海学刊,2003,(05):49-55.
[28]林毅夫、刘培林.自生能力和国企改革[J].经济研究,2001,(9):60-70.
[29]林毅夫、蔡防、李周.国有企业改革的核心是创造竞争的环境[J].改革,1995,(03):17-28.
[30]刘芍佳.终极产权论、股权结构及公司绩效[J].经济研究,2003,(04):51-63.
[31]刘芍佳、李骥.超产权论与企业绩效[J].经济研究,1998,(08):3-12.
[32]刘小玄、李利英.企业产权变革的效率分析[J].中国社会科学,2005,(02):4-17.
[33]刘小玄.民营化改制对中国产业效率的效果分--2001年全国普查工业数据的分析[J].经济研究.2004,(08):16-26.
[34]刘小玄.中国转轨过程中的企业行为和市场均衡[J].中国社会科学,2003a,(02):61-73.
[35]刘小玄.中国转轨经济中的产权结构和市场结构--产业绩效水平的决定因素[J].经济研究,2003b,(01):21-30.
[36]刘小玄.企业边界的重新确定:分立式的产权重组--次中型国有企业的一种改制模式[J].经济研究,2001,(04):3-14.
[37]刘小玄.中国工业企业的所有制结构对效率差异的影响--1995年全国工业企业普查数据的实证分析[J].经济研究,2000,(02):17-25.
[38]刘小玄.国有企业与非国有企业的产权结构及其对效率的影响[J].经济研究,1995,(07):11-20.
[39]路风.国有企业转变的三个命题[J].中国社会科学,2000,(05):4-28.
[40]陆挺、刘小玄.企业改制模式和改制绩效--基于企业数据调查的经验分析[J].经济研究,2005(6):94-103.
[41]刘德光.基于超产权理论对公司管理层收购的思考[J].中国工业经济,2005,(3):113-120.
[42]李增泉.掏空、支持与并购重组--来自我国上市公司的经验证据[J].经济研究,2005,(1):95-105.
[43]宋立刚、姚洋.改制对企业绩效的影响[J].中国社会科学,2005,(2):17-32.
[44]孙永祥、黄祖辉.上市公司的股权结构与绩效[J].经济研究,1999(12):23-30.
[45]唐国正.上市公司国有控制权协议转让的效率[J].金融学季刊,2005,(1):48-64.
[46]王克敏、陈井勇.所有权结构、投资者保护与管理者行为控制[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2001,(11):66-69.
[47]王珏.产权问题在经济改革和经济学发展中的地位[J].经济研究,2001,(07):12-14.
[48]徐向艺.股权结构与公司治理绩效实证分析[J].中国工业经济,2005.(06):112-119.
[49]王静.公司股权结构调整与治理结构的优化[J].经济体制改革,2005,(06):84-86.
[50]佘晓明.中国上市公司的股权结构与公司绩效[J].世界经济,2003,(09):50-55.
[51]敬志勇.最优股权结构设计的博弈分析[J].中国工业经济,2003,(09):60-65.
[52]潘新兴.上市公司股权结构问题研究综述[J].当代经济科学,2003,(02):86-92.
[53]王鹏.投资者保护、代理成本与公司绩效[J].经济研究,2008,(2):68-82.
[54]王鹏,周黎安.控股股东的控制权所有权与公司绩效基于中国上市公司的证据[J].金融研究,2006(2):88-98
[55]汪丁丁.产权博弈[J].经济研究,1996,(10):70-80.
[56]汪海、张卫东.附加职工安置约束的国企产权拍卖机制研究[J].经济研究,2007,(10):115-125.
[57]危启才.不完全信息下拍卖市场的结构与交易效率[J].数量经济技术经济研究,2005,(10):142-150.
[58]王晋斌.内部职工持股计划与企业绩效--对西方和我国企业案例的考察[J].经济研究,1998,(05):65-72.
[59]许小年.以法人机构为主建立公司治理机制和资本市场[J].改革,1997,(5):28-34.
[60]夏立军、方轶强.政府控制、治理环境与公司价值[J].经济研究,2005,(05):40-51.
[61]谢贞发.民营化改革的所有权结构选择[J].财经研究,2005,(7):40-50.
[62]徐晓东、陈小悦.第一大股东对公司治理、企业绩效的影响分析[J].经济研究,2003(2):64-74.
[63]杨瑞龙、周业安.一个关于企业所有权安排的规范性分析框架及其理论含义--兼评张维迎、周其仁及崔之元的一些观点[J].经济研究,1997,(01):12-23.
[64]杨瑞龙.国有企业股份制改造的理论思考[J].经济研究,2005,(02):10-22.
[65]杨晓维.技术、市场与企业所有权安排[J].经济研究,2000,(02):40-48.
[66]叶林祥:非国有经济的成长与国有企业的民营化--以中国经济转型为背景的分析[J].南方经济,2006,(05):95-103.
[67]张威威.国有企业现代企业制度公司化改制的实证研究[J].经济科学,2002(1):27-34.
[68]张维迎.产权安排与企业内部的权力斗争[J].经济研究,2000,(06):41-51.
[69]张维迎.恶性竞争的产权基础[J].经济研究,1999,(06):11-20.
[70]张维迎.控制权损失的不可补偿性与国有企业兼并中的产权障碍[J].经济研究,1998,(07):3-14.
[71]张维迎.从公司治理结构看中国国有企业改革的成效、问题与出路[J].社会科学战线,1997,(02):42-51.
[72]张维迎.公有制经济中的委托人--代理人关系:理论分析和政策含义[J].经济研究,1995a,(4):10-20.
[73]张维迎.从现代企业理论看国有企业改革[J].改革,1995b,(01):30-33.
[74]张军、王祺.权威、企业绩效与国有企业改革[J].中国社会科学,2004,(05):106-117.
[75]曾亚敏.所有权结构与产出效率:对中国企业的实证研究[J].财经研究,2004,(7):89-96.
[76]郑志刚.利益相关者对公司控制权的分享、承诺可置信成本和公司治理的股东价值导向.世界经济,2007,(8):86-97.
[77]朱红军、陈继云、喻立勇.中央政府、地方政府和国有企业利益分歧下的多重博弈与管制失效[J].管理世界,2006,(4):115-129.
[78]朱武祥、宋勇.股权结构与企业价值-对家电行业上市公司实证分析[J].经济研究,2001,(12):66-72,92.
[79]周冰.公有制企业改革中控制权的分配--河南注油器厂产权制度改革案例研究[J].经济研究,2001,(01):38-44.
[80]周其仁.公有制企业的性质[J].经济研究,2000,(11):3-12.
[81]钟鸿均.信息披露:拍卖后的市场竞争和拍卖选择[J].产业经济评论,2002,11(2):1-20.
[82]步艳红.产权、拍卖与并购,企业产权交易中的拍卖机制设计[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2006.
[83][美]巴泽尔.产权的经济分析[M].上海:三联书店和上海人民出版社,1997.
[84]陈钊.经济转轨中的企业重构:产权改革与放松管制[M].上海三联书店,上海人民出版社,2004.
[85]费方域.企业的产权分析[M].上海:三联书店和上海人民出版社,1998.
[86]蒋学模.高级政治经济学--社会主义本体论[M].上海:复旦大学出版社,2001.
[87]蒋学模,张晖明.高级政治经济学--社会主义总论IM].上海:复旦大学出版社,2001.
[88]赖建清.所有权、控制权与公司绩效[M].北京:北京大学出版社,2007.
[89]史正富、刘昶.民营化还是社会化:国企产权改革的战略选择[M].上海:世纪出版集团、上海人民出版社,2007:8-25,63-93.
[90]史正富、张军.走向新的政治经济学[C].上海:上海人民出版社,2004:59-69.
[91]盛洪主编.现代制度经济学(上卷)[C].北京:北京大学出版社,2003.
[92][美]埃里克·弗鲁博顿、[德]鲁道夫·芮切特.新制度经济学-一个交易费用分析的范式[M].上海:上海人民出版社、上海三联书店,2006.
[93][美]加里·D·利贝 卡普.产权的缔约分析[M].北京:中国社会科学出版社,2001.
[94][美]哈罗德·德姆塞茨.所有权、控制与企业[M].北京:经济科学出版社,1999.
[95][美]奧利弗·E·威廉姆森.资本主义经济制度[M].北京:商务印书馆,2002.
[96][美]奥利弗·哈特.企业、合同与财务结构[M].上海:上海人民出版社、上海三联书店,1998.
[97][美]R·科斯、A·阿尔钦、D·诺斯.财产权利与制度变迁--产权学派与新制度学派译文集(C).上海:上海人民出版社、上海三联书店,1994.
[98][美]斯蒂芬·马丁.高级产业经济学[M].上海:上海财经大学出版社,2003.
[99][美]哈尔·瓦里安.高级微观经济学(第三版)[M].北京:经济科学出版社,1997.
[100][美]保尔·米格罗姆.拍卖理论与实务[M].北京:清华大学出版社,2007.
[101][德]约翰纳·伯爵·兰斯多夫.腐败与改革的制度经济学:理论、证据与政策[M].北京:中国方正出版社,2007.
[102][德]亨利·汉斯曼.企业所有权论[M].北京:中国政法大学出版社,2001.
[103]吴敬琏.当代中国经济改革[M].上海:上海远东出版社,2004.
[104]Garnaut,宋立刚,Tenev,姚洋.中国企业的所有制改革:进程、成效及其前景[M].中国财政经济出版社,2006.
[105]杨瑞龙.企业理论:现代观点[M].北京:中国人民大学出版社,2005.
[106]杨瑞龙,周业安.企业的利益相关者理论及其应用[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2000.
[107]张文魁.中国国有企业产权改革与公司治理转型[M].北京:中国发展出版社,2007.
[108]赵文华.串谋及串谋的防范[M].广东:广州出版社,2006.