摘要
随着知识经济的发展,科技型中小企业已成为我国技术创新的主要载体和经济增长的重要推动力,但其发展中面临融资难的问题,引起社会的广泛关注。专利质押贷款就为该问题提供了一个全新的解决途径。然而专利质押贷款在我国发展比较缓慢,其独特优势和潜力没有得到充分发挥,整体尚处于初期探索阶段。为推动我国专利质押贷款快速发展,社会各界都在进行积极的探索,国务院及相关部委也出台了一系列政策和措施来大力支持和推进专利质押贷款,从而给金融学领域提出了一个新兴的研究课题。然而,无论是理论方面还是实证方面,专利质押贷款都缺少系统性的研究与分析。基于此背景,本文致力于构建起一个专利质押贷款模型,力图从专利的本质特性、不对称信息、政府干预政策及贷款模式创新等多个角度,挖掘专利质押贷款发展缓慢的深层次原因,并提出相应解决方案。这些研究对促进我国专利质押融资的发展,有效缓解中小企业融资难的现状,推动社会经济健康稳定地发展,具有重要的理论和实践意义。
本文分析我国专利质押贷款的发展现状,在实物期权理论框架下,构建了多不确定因素的专利质押贷款的基础模型,发现专利质押贷款合同具有贷款规模小、利率高及期限短的特点,并识别出影响专利质押贷款均衡的关键因素,专利价值的不确定性是专利质押贷款可行性的决定因素,法律风险会增加专利融资成本,提高市场流动性能够显著促进专利质押贷款的开展。在不对称信息下,以贷款额与利率相组合作为甄别工具,设计贷款合同,能够成功区分不同风险类型的企业,为信贷配给问题提供解决途径。运用专利质押贷款模型,探讨现行风险补偿政策：贷款贴息和本金补偿措施的有效性,挖掘收效甚微的深层原因并提出相应改进方案。本文进一步探讨了专利质押贷款的模式创新的可行性和有效性,发现分期还款模式不适合在专利质押贷款中应用,可提前转让专利还款模式对企业和银行双方有利,企业联盟模式具有优胜劣汰的效果,值得大力推广。本文在理论研究的同时,从实证分析角度探讨了我国专利质押贷款的运作机理,检验所构建理论模型及结论的可行性及合理性。实证研究发现专利固有属性是决定专利质押价值的关键因素,企业属性对质押贷款额度有显著影响；专利质押能够减少中小企业贷款中的信息不对称,提高银行授信额度,缓解信贷配给问题。
With the arising of knowledge economy, the technology-based Small and Medium-sized Enterprises have been the main carrier of technological innovation and important engine for economic development in China. At the same time, the difficulties of financing have been one of the factors restricting the technological small and medium-sized enterprises'further development. Patent pledge loan has been a creative settlement for SMEs'financing problem. However, using patents in securing financing developed slowly in our country. The patent pledge financing is still in its infancy and has not exploited its advantages to the full. For this reason, the relative government departments have put forward a series of policies to support and promote the rapid and healthy growth of patent pledge financing. Therefore, new theoretical research tasks for the field of finance have been raised. Up till now, both theoretical and empirical researches on financing with patent as collateral are sparse and lack of systematicness. Under this background, this paper try to establish a theoretical model for patent pledge financing, and dig out the reason of its slow development, and provide solutions to the problems being found. These researches should be beneficial to mitigate the SMEs'financing difficulties, and have important effects on the advancement of our social economy. Therefore, the researches in this paper have important academic and practical significances.
In this paper, we analyze the current situation of patent pledge financing in our country and conclude the distinctive features in the patent securing credit market, then construct the option-based model for patent pledge financing under multi-uncertainties. The equilibrium contract under complete information presents three characters:small loan scale, high interest rate and short loan term. The key factors effecting loan contract is identified. The uncertainty of patent value is the critical factor in determining the feasibility of patent pledge loan. The existence of legal risk will significantly increase the cost of financing with patent as collateral. Enhancing liquidity of technology market can improve the development of patent securing financing obviously. Under asymmetric information, we examine the contract designing by bank to screen enterprises with different types of risks. Combining the loan amount with interest rate as screening tool, the bank can separate low risk enterprises from high risk ones successfully. Therefore, designing and providing diversified contracts to enterprise can alleviate asymmetric information and may solve credit rationing in patent securing credit market. With the application of the basic model, we discuss the efficiency of the risk compensation policies at present:interest subsidizing and loss compensation, examine the intrinsic reasons in unsatisfied policies effect, and propose the improvement suggestions. Moreover, we explore the feasibility and efficiency of innovative modes in patent pledge financing, and study the features and applied scopes of these new modes. Introducing amortization into patent pledge loan is proved be unsuitable. Allowing the enterprise to transfer collateral patents and prepay loan first could significantly increase both the bank's and the enterprise's profits at the same time. Enterprises credit alliance acts as the mechanism of developing the superior and weeding out the inferior, and the bank's enthusiasm of lending enhances to a great extent. Furthermore, we make use of empirical analyses to study the operating mechanism of patent pledge loan, and examine the scientific characters and feasibility of the theoretical model of patent pledge financing. Patent inherent attributes remain important to determine patent collateral value. Firm specific characters could reveal risk level and have significant effect on credit amount. Pledging patents as collateral can lighten the information asymmetry and increase the credit line, and may mitigate the credit rationing problem in SMEs credit market.
引文
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