摘要
近年来，经济的快速发展尤其是全球化的推动使得资本市场不断的完善，商业环境竞争加剧，公司对资本的竞争日益激烈。公司对资本的竞争最终将表现为对投资者的竞争，在高度竞争的投资环境中，如何与投资者构建的共同信任和理解的关系已经成为公司的重要战略之一。通过立法和司法体系的改革或法律法规所进行的强制性治理在新的经济环境下已经难以满足投资者日益变化的信息权需求，经济环境变化速度的加快和信息不对称问题的加剧使得公司管理者开始从公司层面进行治理创新，即自主性治理机制，以赢得资本竞争的胜利。作为上市公司在强制性治理基础上的开展一种治理创新活动，自主性治理可以优化信息权配置、提高公司透明度、改善股票流动性，同时提高公司声誉、降低公司融资成本、优化公司治理，并最终实现公司的价值创造。
目前为止，多数国内相关研究发现自主性治理对公司绩效有显著的正向影响，但基于投资者关系管理层面的自主性治理对公司绩效的影响机制研究还较少，尤其是自主性治理不同层面对公司绩效影响的内在传导机制还值得进一步的研究与探索。为此，本研究从投资者关系层面的自主性治理理论出发，在对投资者关系管理层面的自主性治理的构成因子进行研究的基础上，探究自主性治理中各个维度与绩效关系间的关系。本研究整体的研究思路为：首先介绍了选题的背景，提出了研究的问题，研究方法以及主要创新点。其次，对基于投资者关系的自主性治理相关文献进行评述，并在此基础上对我国的制度背景进行了介绍。再次，针对中国上市公司自主性治理的特征，以中国上市公司的实践为基础，结合自主性治理的理论研究成果，探索了自主性治理的构成维度，并以此为基础分别考察了以股票流动性为中介变量的自主性治理各维度对公司绩效的影响，以及自主性治理各维度对公司绩效的直接影响。最后，得出了研究结论，并指出未来研究方向。
本研究的主要结论如下：
1、基于投资者关系的自主性治理主要由三个维度构成，即单向自愿性信息披露维度、双向互动沟通维度和自主性治理组织保障维度。单向自愿性信息披露维度是较为传统的自主性治理模式，以公司自主性的单向向投资界披露公司信息为主要特征，在自主性治理中占据着重要的位置；双向互动沟通维度以公司与投资界的互动沟通为主要特征，与前者相比，增加了及时准确获得投资界反馈的功能，对自主性治理有着重要的意义，将是上市公司投资者关系从业人员特别关注的重点；自主性治理组织保障维度是保证上述两个维度有效实施的关键。
2、公司股票流动性是双向互动沟通维度作用于公司绩效的重要中介变量。在自主性治理中，双向互动沟通水平不但会直接的影响公司绩效，同时还会通过资本市场中的股票流动性间接影响公司绩效，即存在着不完全中介效应。而单向自愿性信息披露水平和自主性治理组织保障水平通过股票流动性影响公司绩效的效应并不明显，即对资本市场股票流动性的影响有限。当资本市场出现不利公司的影响时，积极主动的双向沟通是进行公司资本市场上危机管理的有效途径。
3、自主性治理各维度对公司绩效的直接影响效果存在着差异。单向自愿性信息披露维度与公司绩效间存在着显著倒U型关系，双向互动沟通维度与公司绩效间存在着显著的正相关关系，自主性治理组织保障维度与公司绩效间存在着显著的U型关系。
本研究基于中国上市公司投资者关系层面的自主性治理实践来探索自主性治理不同维度对公司绩效的影响机制。本研究试图进行如下创新：首先，从投资者关系层面构建了自主性治理维度，细化了自主性治理的研究；其次，以股票流动性为中介变量，考察了自主性治理各维度对公司绩效的影响，旨在探索自主性治理维度、股票流动性及公司绩效间的内在关系；第三，进一步考察自主性治理各维度对公司绩效的直接影响，并构建模型进行检验。
In recent years, rapid economic development, especially globalization, is drivingthe improvement of capital markets, and increasing competition of the businessenvironment, the company's capital competition will eventually embodied as itscompetition for investors. To build mutual trust and understanding with investors in ahighly competitive investment environment has become one of the important strategyof the company. Mandatory governance system through legislative and judicialreform laws and regulations in the new economic environment has been difficult tomeet the demand of investor’s right to information, the intensification of theeconomic environment changes accelerated and the problem of informationasymmetry allows the company to initiate the governance of innovation from thecompany level, namely, voluntary governance mechanisms, in order to win thecompetition for capital. As governance innovation activities carried out by listedcompany on the basis of mandatory governance, voluntary governance can optimizethe configuration of the right to information, and improve corporate transparency andstock liquidity. At same time, it can redouble the company's reputation, reducecorporate financing costs, optimize corporate governance and ultimately realize thecompany's value creation.
So far, many domestic researchers hold voluntary governance has a positivesignificant influence on corporate performance, but voluntary governance’s influenceon corporate performance mechanism has been less researched, especially howdifferent dimensions of voluntary governance affect corporate performance, suchintrinsic mechanism, is worth further research and exploration. Therefore, thisdissertation, from the perspective of voluntary governance theory of investor relations,aims to construct the dimension factors of voluntary governance, and to exploreintermediary and mesomeric effects of voluntary governance factors to corporateperformance. The dissertation frame is as follows: it first introduces the researchbackground, and proposes the research question and its methods and innovation.Secondly, in a point of view of the investor relations, voluntary governance literature is to be reviewed, and so is the institutional background in China. Thirdly, accordingto the characteristics of voluntary governance of listed companies and the practice oflisted companies in China, combining results of theoretical studies of voluntarygovernance, the dissertation is to explore the dimension of voluntary governancestructure, and investigates the impact on corporate performance with stock liquidityas the mediating variables, as well as the influence of various dimensions of voluntarygovernance on corporate performance. Finally, the conclusions are drawn, the furtherdirection of research is recommended.
The dissertation concludes as follows:
From respective of the investor relations, voluntary governance consists of threemain dimensions, namely, one-way voluntary information disclosure factor, bilateralinteractive communication factor and voluntary governance organization factor.One-way voluntary information disclosure is the traditional fashion, which still playsan important role in investor relations management. Bilateral interactivecommunication is characterized as direct information exhange between the companyand investor, which shall be one of research focuses in future due to it has animportant significant impact on investor relations practice, and it should call moreattension from investor relations practitioners in listed company.As for voluntarygovernance organization factor, it is considered as the effective implementation keyto the above two factors.
The stock liquidity is found to play an important intermediary role for thetwo-way interactive communication factor to affect the corporate performance. Involuntary governance, bilateral interactive communication factor will not onlydirectly affect the company's performance, but also indirectly affect corporateperformance through the stock liquidity in capital markets, namely the existence ofincomplete intermediary effect. It is also found that stock liquidity does notsignificantly mediate relationship between one-way voluntary information disclosurefactor, voluntary governance organization factor and corporate performance.
Three factors of voluntary governance are significantly related with corporateperformance even though their relation is different. One-way voluntary informationdisclosure factor and corporate performance is found to exist inverted U-shaped relationship. Bilateral interactive communication factor has a significant positivecorrelation with corporate performance. The protection factor has a significantU-shaped relationship with corporate performance.
Based on the investor relations practice of voluntary governance in listedcompanies of China, this article tries to reveal the intrinsic role of different factors ofvoluntary governance on corporate performance in term of theory.Its possiblebreakthroughs can be summarized as follows,
First of all, from the prospective of investor relations, the framework ofvoluntary governance has been constructed;
Secondly, stock liquidity has been introduced as mediating variables to study theinfluence of the factors of voluntary governance on corporate performance, exploringthe intrinsic relationship among voluntary governance factors, stock liquidity andcorporate performance;
Thirdly, it explored the direct impact of voluntary governance factors oncorporate performance, and the models were built and tested.
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