摘要
寻租一直是影响公共管理绩效的关键性因素。公共权力是一种资源,权力资源的配置对于公共管理绩效具有关键性的影响作用。本质上来说,公共权力执行者也是受利益驱动的“理性人”,当通过寻租行为所获得收益远远大于监督和惩罚的成本时,“理性”的公共权力执行者将可能通过寻租行为追求个人利益最大化。同时,由于公共权力执行者具有配置权力资源的自由裁量权,这就使得缺乏监管的公共权力很容易产生寻租问题,从而降低政府绩效的管理水平。因此,本文旨在通过对寻租问题的深入分析,研究提高政府绩效管理水平的方法和路径。
笔者认为,寻租问题的关键是如何根据可观测到的信息(政府行政作为、公众利益方面的收益等)来奖惩公共权力执行者,以激励其采取对公众最有利的行动。为此,论文借助信息经济学中的委托一代理理论,分析公共权力执行者与公众之间的利益博弈关系,从中探讨影响公共权力寻租行为的关键因素,为遏制寻租行为的产生寻找理论依据。论文从如何获取与运用绩效评价信息、如何实现绩效评估的规范化、常规化以及如何优化政府绩效评估的运行机制等三个方面,通过政府绩效管理有关机制的创新对寻租行为展开研究,并提供对策建议。
政府权力寻租,无论是在政府还是在学术界都是个被关注的热点问题。学者们通过大量的理论研究及实践上的创新,从不同的角度探究着治理政府权力寻租行为的有效途径,也收获了不少有有价值的研究成果。本文从政府绩效评估(具有评价与监督职能的信息机制)这一管理工具的角度审视权力寻租的表现,针对如何规制权力寻租行为提出了一些政策性建议,并试图在以下三方面有所新意：一是在政府公共受托责任理论的基础上,揭示了政府绩效评估和权力寻租的关系；二是运用定量与定性相结合的研究方法,即信息经济学中的委托——代理理论,分析公共权力代理人与公众之间的利益博弈关系,并从中探讨影响公共权力寻租行为的关键因素,为遏制寻租行为的产生提供理论依据和对策建议；三是基于政府绩效评估视角分析研究权力寻租问题,从实践上探究政府绩效评估中相关机制的设计和解决权力寻租问题途径。
解决政府的权力寻租等腐败问题是一项纷繁复杂的系统工程,也是个世界性难题。由于发展中国家的民主进程缓慢,民主政治建设还不够成熟,在法制不健全、道德约束乏力的状况下,政府权力运行所留存的寻租空间很大,这在发展达国家也同样存在。因而,无论在深度上还是在广度上都给我们留下了广阔的研究空间。
Impact of rent-seeking has been the key factor in the performance of public administration. The allocation of public power resources has a crucial function in public administration. Essentially, the public authority performer is also a "rational man" driven by profit, when the rent-seeking profit is far greater than the cost of supervision and punishment, the "rational" public power will maximize the pursuit of personal interests by means of implementing rent-seeking behavior. Meanwhile, the public authority have the power of resources reallocation, this makes the public power prefers to lead to rent-seeking issues when lack of supervision, thereby reducing the level of government performance management. Therefore, this article aims to do in-depth analysis of rent-seeking behavours, to improve the methods and paths of government performance management
In my standpoint, the key of preventing rent-seeking is how to reward and punish public power executives according to observable information (government administrative act, income of public interest aspect and etc) to motivate them to take the most favorable action to the public. With the help of information economics, this paper apply principal-agent theory To solve this problem. This paper analyzes the game relationship between public power executive and public to investigate the key factors of public power rent-seeking activity, which provides theoretical basis and countermeasures to restrict rent-seeking activity. This paper makes the study of rent-seeking activity through Government Performance Management Innovation and from three aspects of how to obtain and use performance evaluation information, how to achieve the standardization and normalization of performance evaluation, and how to optimize the assessment of government performance, and provide suggestions.
Rent-seeking by the authority of government, is a hot issue both in government and academia. Scholars according to a lot of theories and practice innovation, from different perspectives, to explore the effective way to manage governmental authority rent-seeking behavior, also gain a lot of beneficial effects. This paper uses government performance evaluation (the information system with the evaluation and supervision functions) as a management tool to survey the performance of rent-seeking, providing some political suggestions about how to regulate power rent-seeking behavior and make innovative study in the following three aspects:First, a theoretical innovation. On the basis of the theory of public entrusted responsibility, this paper reveals the connection of government performance assessment and power rent-seeking to achieve a theoretical innovation. Second is the methodological innovation. This paper uses a combination of quantitative and qualitative research methods, which is the theory of principal-agent theory in information economics, to analyze the game relationship between public power executive and public to investigate the key factors of public power rent-seeking activity, which provides theoretical basis and countermeasures to contain rent-seeking behavior. Third is the innovation of the practice. Based on Government Performance Evaluation aspect to analyze the power rent-seeking issues, from practice to explore the related mechanisms innovation in Government Performance Evaluation and find ways to solve power rent-seeking behavior.
To solve the problem of corruption like power seek-renting is a complex system engineering, which is also a global problem. As the slow process of developing democracy, democratic politics is not mature enough, the space for Government to run rent-seeking is very big under the circumstances of imperfect legal system and weak moral constraint, which is also exist in developed country. Thus, both in depth and breadth this provides us wide research space.
引文
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