摘要
目前,我国国有企业改革正处于关键时期,特殊的制度背景导致了国有企业非效率投资行为的现状,给我国经济的可持续发展带来了较严重的隐患。企业非效率投资包括过度投资和投资不足两种情况：过度投资行为会导致大量的资金沉淀在生产能力过剩而盈利能力恶化的领域,资源和生产要素被浪费,呆坏账及金融风险大量增加；而投资不足则使大量的资金被闲置,导致国有企业增长缓慢甚至零增长,同样也损害投资者的利益。因此,分析我国国有企业非效率投资的风险因素并提出相应解决对策,对促使国有企业采取最优投资决策以提高企业价值,保护投资者利益,促使我国资本市场健康持续发展及提高对管理层的监管效率有着重要意义。
首先,本文在总结国内外学者对国有企业投资效率的研究成果的基础上,从理论上探讨国有企业投资存在的问题。然后,通过实证研究从定量角度研究不同风险因素对国有企业投资效率的影响,并从定性的角度补充管理因素对投资效率的影响。最后,根据研究结论提出国有企业投资风险控制的政策建议。
在理论基础部分,本文首先分析国有非效率投资现象严重的主要原因,即国有企业委托代理关系问题,随后分析了在我国国企特殊产权制度和监督不足状况下的投资效率问题,最后分析了现阶段非效率投资产生的几个主要风险因素,为下文实证研究做准备。
本文对风险因素对投资效率的影响程度研究,采用实证研究的方法,首先按照理论阶段研究的非效率投资的主要风险提出本文研究假设。然后,借鉴Richardson(2006)的研究成果,界定样本企业的过度投资水平,剔除异常样本后,得到2009年在沪深两地上市的国有企业423家的数据作为本文的研究样本。
根据假设和理论分析,在实证研究中,本文构建模型来分析国有企业投资效率及其风险因素。通过模型的描述性统计与回归检验表明：
(1)第一大股东持股可能产生了国有企业投资不足的风险,而股权集中的程度提高可能抑制大股东持股过高给企业带来的风险。
(2)我国国有企业股权激励能有效地抑制过度投资,西方的股权激励经验在我国也同样适用,我国国有企业股权激励不足可能是投资不足的一个风险因素。
(3)我国国有企业缺少对融资的监督和约束,现阶段债务融资约束不足仍然是我国国有企业产生非效率投资的风险因素之一。
(4)说明政府干预是国企过度投资的风险因素。执法水平越高,过度投资的可能性越小,而当企业法律环境不利时可能会成为制约其发展的风险因素。
最后,本文在规范分析和实证研究的基础上,提出了相关的政策建议：
(1)国有上市公司中建立一种股权相对集中,且制衡的股权结构。
(2)内外兼治地完善经理人激励与约束机制,减少经理人的非效率投资行为。
(3)平衡企业与政府之间的利益牵制关系,发挥市场对资源的优化配置作用。
(4)完善债务融资体系,逐步建立债务融资对国有企业非效率投资风险的制约作用。
At present,the reform of China's state-owned enterprises(hereinafter called SOEs)is at a critical period.The special system of China determines the present situation of the inefficient investment behavior of the SOEs,which has brought serious hidden danger to the sustainable development of Chinese economy.The inefficient investments include two situations:over-investment and under-investment. Over-investment will lead to lots of money deposited in the domains with overcapacity but bad profitability,where resources and production factors are wasted, and non-performing loans and financial risks are increased.While under-investment,which leaves large amounts of money unused, will lead to the slow-growth or even zero-growth of the SOEs and the harm of the investors'benefit.Therefore,it is very important to the SOEs that analyzing the inefficiency investment and its risk factors,which is helpful to make the optimal investment decisions of the SOEs to improve the enterprise value,portect the benefit of the investors,promote the supervision of management efficiency and develop the sustainable development of China's capital market.
Firstly, this text summarizes the research investment efficiency ofdomestic and overseas,discussing problems of SOE investment existed in theory. Then, From the Angle of quantitative the text inspects the influence of different risk factors on the efficiency of investment through empirical study; from the angle of qualitative it complement the influence factors of the management on investment efficiency. Finally, according to the research results it put forward policy Suggestions of SOE investment risk control.
In the study of theoretical basis,first of all, this text analyzes the main reason of serious inefficient investment of the SOEs:the principal-agent relationship.Secondly, it analyzes the investment efficiency in the situation of the special property-right system and insufficient supervision.Thirdly, it analyses the major risk factors of the inefficienct investment, preparing for empirical research following in the paper.
In the discussion of the risk factors for investment efficiency of the SOEs,this text uses some empirical research methods.At the begining, proposing hypotheses following the theoretical basis above.Then, defining the sample enterprise over-investment level and eliminating abnormal samples,with reference to the research achievement of Richardson(2006).At last,we get 423 SOEs listing in Shenzhen and Shanghai in 2009 as the study samples of the text.
After the theoretical study and the hypotheses of empirical research,this text construct model to analyze the SOE investment efficiency and its risk factors. Through the statistics and regression model test,it shows as follows:.
(1)The largest share-holder may produce a SOE investment risk.While, Ownership concentration may inhibit the risks of exorbitant shareholdings.
(2) Equities Incentive can restrain over-investment effectively. Western experience of the stock ownership incentive can be used in China as well. Lack of Stock-based incentive may be a investment risk factor.
(3) The lack of finance supervision and restraint, the insufficient debt financing constraints is still one of the SOEs'risk factor of the investment efficiency.
(4) Government intervention is a risk factor of over-investment of SOEs.While the higher Law enforcement level is, the possibility of over-investment,the smaller.
At the end of the text,based on the above normative analysis and the empirical study,it puts forward some valuable suggestions:
(1) Establish a relatively concentrated ownership, and balance the shareholding structure in the SOEs.
(2) Improve incentive and restraint mechanisms inside and outside to reduce the behavior of investment inefficiency.
(3) Balance of benefits and containment between enterprises and government and develop the optimal allocation of resources of the market.
(4) Improve the debt financing system and develop its restriction to reduce the risk of SOEs'efficiency investments.
引文
①许生,“积极财政政策效果评估与对策”,《宏观经济管理》,2010年第7期。
②历年《中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展统计公报》
③“2010年上半年中国宏观经济运行态势”,《上海经济》,2010年8月。
④单羽青,“固定资产投资增速超预期”,2009年6月12日,中国经济时报,第001版。
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