摘要
近几年地方政府债务规模快速扩张,债务风险日益凸显,引起各级政府、国内外理论界、实务界以及社会公众的高度关注,2013年中央经济工作会议也把化解地方政府债务风险作为2014年的重要工作。在城镇化加快发展、地方政府事权不断扩大和债务风险逐步暴露的背景下,能否建立有效的地方政府性债务风险约束机制,无论对防范风险本身还是对维持地方融资和区域经济增长的可持续性,都至关重要；对带动新一轮财税改革、跨越中等收入陷阱,保持国民经济健康发展和国家长治久安也具有重要的意义。
在地方政府性债务风险研究领域存在三方面不足：一是现有研究多基于中央和地方财权事权不对等以及地方经济竞争等方面揭示地方债务的成因,从地方财政可持续性视角研究地方政府性债务风险,而从风险约束视角全面系统地研究地方政府性债务风险的文献不多。二是从风险约束角度研究地方债务风险的文献,也主要集中于对外部监督机制的研究,几乎未涉及地方政府性债务风险的内在约束机制。更没有将财政约束、市场约束和民意约束纳入到一个统一的分析框架中,探讨地方政府性债务风险约束问题。三是对于防范和化解地方政府性债务风险的措施方面,现有文献多移植成熟国家经验,强调采用市场约束机制解决中国地方政府性债务风险。但以中国为代表的转轨国家,在短期内,大政府小市场的现状难以改变、预算软约束问题难以根除、政府破产机制难以构建,所以基于市场约束机制设计的地方政府性债务风险解决方案对我国的适用性不强。
当前我国正处于转方式、调结构、加速推进新型城镇化建设的关键时刻,面对规模庞大的地方政府性债务和日益凸显的地方债务风险,本文力图解决以下三个方面的问题：一是从更为宏观的机制设计层面上,从债务规模约束角度厘清地方政府事权边界；二是在兼顾融资可得性和债务风险约束的条件下,从增强融资主体自身的风险约束激励出发,构建融资可得性、外部监督和风险约束之间激励相容的地方政府融资机制；三是基于激励相容原则,构建市场、财政和民意三重约束相结合的地方政府性债务约束框架。
本文运用归纳演绎、对比及数理分析方法,首先从对地方政府性债务管理的基本内涵和基础理论分析入手,剖析我国地方政府性债务风险的现状及成因,并对我国地方政府性债务风险状况做出总体评价。其次,从财政约束、市场约束和民意约束三个层面对我国地方政府性债务风险约束机制做了分析,并着重从制度层面剖析了我国地方政府性债务风险约束机制软化的原因。第三,基于我国地方政府性债务风险的生成逻辑、发展路径以及约束形式,提出了地方政府性债务风险约束有效性的三个标准。在此基础上,基于地方政府目标函数,构建了地方债务风险自我激励约束理论模型,并以此作为完善我国地方政府性债务风险约束机制的理论依据。第四,从财政体制、融资模式、破产机制视角,对比分析主要国家地方债务风险约束机制的特点及其有效性,以期为化解我国地方政府性债务风险问题提供借鉴。最后,基于本文的理论分析框架,借鉴国外经验,立足于我国经济体制、财政体制和社会发展目标,本着通过设计激励相容机制,增强融资主体自身风险约束动力的思路,在现行体制格局大体不变的前提下,提出完善我国地方政府性债务风险约束机制的政策建议。主要包括,通过设计政绩考核、土地出让金留存比例、自主发债、上级转移支付等与地方政府性债务风险挂钩的激励机制,增强地方政府偿债意愿和风险约束的自觉性。同时,通过完善地方债风险处置机制、强化地方资本预算管理等财政措施,以及资产证券化等风险防范和隔离措施,作为地方政府自我风险约束的补充。
本文的创新之处在于：
一是研究视角创新。1)本文不仅仅局限于探讨如何防范地方债务风险,而是着重从更为宏观的机制设计层面上,研究如何从债务约束角度厘清地方政府事权边界。2)在兼顾融资可得性和风险约束的基础上,从增强融资主体自身的风险约束激励出发,构建融资可得性、外部监督和风险约束之间激励相容的地方政府融资机制,避免单一的外部约束(上级财政和金融监管当局)的不足。3)以动力机制设计为基础,通过必要的外部约束和市场监管,解决地方政府性债务风险的外部性和信息不对称性问题,并设计了地方政府性债务约束的市场、财政和民意约束三重框架。
二是研究观点创新。1)在现行体制基础上,基于激励约束相容原则,提出强化预算管理、限制地方政府性债务规模、增强地方政府偿债意愿、约束债务风险、完善风险处置的政策建议。2)基于理论模型的结果,本文认为要改变当前地方政府盲目追求经济增长目标的偏好,必须改革片面注重经济指标的地方政府官员考核机制；地方政府只有退出产出弹性较大的竞争性投资领域,才有动力增加产出弹性较小的经常性投资支出,增加公共产品供给；削弱地方政府对土地的控制权、降低土地抵押贷款的杠杆率、削弱地方政府对土地财政的依赖,能更好地抑制地方政府投资冲动,减少地方政府性债务风险。
三是研究方法创新。本文采用优化分析法剖析地方政府行为。基于激励相容的机制设计思路,通过构建地方政府行为目标函数,将财政约束、市场约束作为外生变量嵌入地方政府行为目标函数,然后在此基础上求解基于地方政府利益最大化的风险约束机制。
The recent years have witnessed the rapid expansion of China's local government debt, the emerging risk of which has drawn the attention of the central and local governments, the domestic and foreign academics as well as the public. In the2013Central Economic Work Conference, it was set as a priority in2014to properly handle the local government debt risks. Against the backdrop of rapid urbanization, increasing administrative power of local government and gradually emerging debt risks, to build an effective risk-constraining mechanism is key, not only to the risk prevention per se, but also to the sustainability of local government financing and the regional economic growth. It is also of great importance in terms of China's fiscal and taxation reforms, the avoidance of mid-income trap, the sustainable economic growth and social stability.
There are mainly three deficiencies in the previous researches on local government debt risks. First, when looking at the cause of local government debt formation, previous researches are mainly based on two aspects:one is the asymmetry of fiscal and administrative powers between the central and local governments, and the other is the local economic competitions. And they analyze local government debt risks from the perspective of debt sustainability. However, seldom of them has had a comprehensive and systemic analysis of local government debt risks from the risk-constraining perspective. Second, for those researches focusing on risk constraining, they mainly concentrate on the external surveillance mechanisms, but rarely on the internal constraining mechanisms. Neither do they bring fiscal constraints, market constraints and public opinions into a common framework to analyze the risk-constraining issue of local government debts. Third, in terms of risk prevention and mitigation, existing literatures mostly refer to the mature experience of other countries and emphasize the use of market-constraining mechanism in handling local government debt risks in China. However, countries in economic transitions, such as China, are featured with larger governments and smaller markets, soft budgetary constraints and the lack of government bankruptcy mechanism, which cannot be changed within the near future. Therefore, the solution based on market-constraining mechanism to handle local government debt risks is not practical in China's case.
China is currently in a crucial phase of shifting growth pattern, economic restructuring and speeding up urbanization, with large local government debts and corresponding emerging risks. This paper tends to achieve the following three goals. Firstly, from the debt constraining perspective and at the macro level of system design, the paper tries to define clearly the boundary of local government's administrative power. Secondly, while ensuring the financing availability and debt risk constraints, the paper starts with enhancing the incentive mechanism of self risk constraining for financing entities and develops a local government financing mechanism encompassing the financing availability, external surveillance and risk constraints in the principle of incentive compatibility. Thirdly, based on the principle of incentive compatibility, the paper establishes a local government debt-constraining framework which includes elements of fiscal constraints, market constraints and public opinions.
The paper employs the methodology of deduction and induction, comparative analysis, and mathematic analysis. It begins with the basic connotation and fundamental theories of local government debt management, makes analysis of the status quo and the cause of China's local government debt risks, and provides an overall picture of local government debts risks. Secondly, from the three perspectives of fiscal constraints, market constraints and public opinion constraints, the paper makes an analysis of the risk-constraining mechanism of China's local government debt risks, and specially focuses on the institutional arrangements to see how the local government debt risk constraining mechanism is weakened. Thirdly, based on the formation logic, development path and form of constraints of China's local government debt risks, the paper raises three standards for evaluating the effectiveness of local government debt risk constraints. Furthermore, with the objective function of local government, the paper develops a theoretical model of self-constraining mechanism for local government debt risks, which is then used as the theoretical basis for improving China's local government debt constraining mechanism. Fourthly, from the angles of fiscal arrangements, financing pattern and bankruptcy mechanisms, the paper compares the features and effectiveness of local government debt constraining mechanism in major economies, which are expected to serve as useful reference in China's case. Finally, based on said theoretic analytical framework and by referring to the foreign experience, the paper keeps an eye on China's economic and fiscal institutions as well as the objective of social development, applies the principle of incentive compatibility to strengthen the self risk constraining, and provides policy recommendations for improving the risk constraining mechanism of local government debts, while basically maintaining the current institutions. The main recommendations include the designing of incentive mechanism which links local government debt risks to their performance evaluation, retention ratio of land transaction fees, power to issue bonds and transfer payments from upper governments. These measures could improve the willingness of local governments to repay debts and contain risks. At the same time, the paper recommends fiscal measures, such as improving the local debt risk mitigation mechanism and strengthening local budgetary management, as well as risk prevention and isolation measures such as asset securitization, to complement the self risk constraining of local governments.
The paper has the following innovations:
First, in terms of analytical angle.1) the paper does not confine itself to merely dealing with local government debts risks. Instead, it focuses on the macro level institutional design and tries to clarify the boundary of administrative power of local government from the perspective of debt constraints.2) while ensuring the financing availability and debt risk constraints, the paper starts with enhancing incentives for self risk constraining of financing entities and develops a local government financing mechanism encompassing the financing availability, external surveillance and risk constraints in the principle of incentive compatibility. This could help solve the problem of insufficient external constraints (from upper fiscal authorities and financial supervisors).3) based on the design of incentive mechanism, the paper suggests the use of necessary external constrains and market supervision to solve the problem of externality of local government debt risks and the information asymmetry. It also designs a tri-party framework of local government debt constraints, which encompasses market constrains, fiscal constrains and public opinion constrains.
Secondly, in terms of viewpoints.1) based on the current institutional arrangements and in line with the incentive compatibility of different constraints, the paper provides recommendations of strengthening budgetary management, limiting the scale of local government debts, increasing local government's willingness to repay debts, containing risks and improving risk mitigation mechanisms.2) based on the results of the theoretical model, the paper holds the view that, in order to change local government's blind pursuit of economic growth, it is a must to change their performance evaluation system which only emphasizes indicators related to economic growth; that only by exiting from areas with higher output elasticity can local government be more incentivized to invest in areas with lower output elasticity and supply more public goods; and that measures, including reducing local government's control of land, lowering their leverage of land-collateralized borrowing and lessening their reliance on land-related fiscal revenue, could better contain the investment impulse of local governments and reduce their debt risks.
Thirdly, in terms of analytical approaches. The paper applies the method of optimization analysis in analyzing the behavior of local governments. Based on the principle of incentive compatibility, the paper establishes an objective function of local government behaviors and brings fiscal and market constraints into the objective function as exogenous variables. By maximization of local government interests, the function yields the set of solutions and shows the most favorable risk constraining mechanism.
引文
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