摘要
耐用品经济作为国民经济的重要组成部分,为微观经济理论研究者提供了大量值得研究的问题。在我国,随着经济的飞速发展,耐用品企业的供给能力和消费者的消费能力都显著提升。人们对耐用品的消费经历了从低端到高端,从“老四件”到“新四件”,再到家用轿车以及商品房等高档耐用消费品的发展历程。现在,我国汽车产销量已经连续几年占据世界第一的位置。
虽然我国耐用品产业在过去三十多年中取得了辉煌的成绩,但在新的时期,耐用品产业的市场环境正在发生复杂而深刻的变化,一些新现象和新问题也不断出现,值得我们持续关注和研究。比如,长期以来,我国新车主要是通过销售方式营销的,但这种状况正在发生变化。2009年12月18日,东风日产“易租车”正式露面,“易租车”品牌服务是东风日产以其专营店服务网络和服务能力为支撑的、针对其购车客户或潜在的购车客户提供的汽车租赁服务。在2010年,一汽-大众奥迪、北京奔驰以及宝马汽车等豪车品牌也相继进军汽车租赁市场。另外,随着社会生产力水平的提升,大多数耐用品的供给由短缺逐步转变为过剩,消费者的选择权力越来越大,因此不同类型消费者在购物选择时行为的差异性也明显地表现出来。
针对我国耐用品产业出现的新现象和新问题,本文从消费者效用角度出发,以新耐用品租赁问题为研究对象,研究单一产品与多产品系列、信息对称与信息不对称以及垄断与寡头竞争时的相关问题。全文由五个部分和结论与展望部分组成。
(1)本文的研究意义和国内外的研究现状。
在本部分,首先分析了现实耐用品市场环境的变化趋势,指出了本文的研究背景和意义；随后,较为全面地回顾了国内外有关耐用品问题研究的成果,并指出了已有研究中存在的有待进一步深入研究的问题,同时介绍了论文的研究目标和研究的基本内容。
(2)耐用品企业租赁单一耐用品时的定价问题研究。
在本部分的研究中,首先从效用角度出发,通过消费者租赁选择行为分析,得到不同类型消费者的租赁情况。随后,运用动态规划思想,研究了耐用品企业在两个周期上的定价决策问题。在此基础上,进一步研究了耐用品企业租赁时如何处理旧耐用品对新耐用品替代竞争影响的问题等。
(3)耐用品企业租赁两种不同质量耐用品时的定价问题研究。
本部分考虑耐用品企业同时租赁两种不同质量的新耐用品,因此在第二期时,消费者将有四种不同质量的耐用品可选择。通过对消费者租赁选择行为的分析,得到不同质量价格组合的耐用品自动将消费者分为不同类型群体组合的结论。随后,研究了耐用品企业的最优租赁定价决策问题并分析其特征。
(4)信息不对称时耐用品企业租赁定价问题研究。
本部分考虑耐用品企业与消费者对旧耐用品质量信息不对称,且新耐用品租赁价格在两个周期上动态变化时,研究了耐用品企业租赁与逆向选择的问题。在此基础上,对研究的问题进一步进行了算例分析。
(5)双寡头耐用品企业租赁定价问题研究。
本部分考虑两个耐用品租赁企业拥有较大的市场话语权,且他们向消费者提供的产品质量不同时,研究了双寡头耐用品租赁企业在两周期上动态博弈的问题。在此基础上,通过MATLAB仿真,进一步分析了耐用度以及竞争强度对双寡头耐用品企业博弈均衡的影响。
As an important component of the national economy, durable goods economy provides researchers of microeconomics theories with a great number of topics worthy of study. In China, with the rapid development of economy, both the capacity of supply end and consumption end of durable goods has grown significantly. Such growth is characterized by a process in which the consumption focus of durable goods has shifted from low end to high end, from "old four major items" to "new four major items" and eventually to such high-class consumer durable goods as cars and commercial housings. Currently, the volume of production and marketing of cars in China has been the first in the world for several consecutive years.
Despite the remarkable achievement in durable goods industry in the past three decades, it is worth continuous attention and study that complicated and profound changes are happening in the market of durable goods and with them new phenomena and problems are emerging constantly. For instance, the marketing of new cars in China has long been carried out by sales but this mode is changing. On December18th,2009, the E Rent a Car service provided by Dongfeng-Nissan made its official debut. It is a brand-style car-renting service targeted at the company's car buyers or potential car buyers with the support of the service network and service capacity of its franchises, In2010, some upscale car brand like Faw-VW Audi, Beijing Benz and BMW also entered the car rental market one after another. At the same time, ever-higher social productivity level results in the excess supply of most of the durable goods instead of shortage in the past and consequently the consumers have more and more options. As a result, the behavior differences of different types of consumers in selecting goods are notable.
To address such new phenomena and problems, this paper studies issues related to single product and product series, information symmetry and information asymmetry and monopoly and oligarch competition from a consumer utility point of view and with the rental of durable goods as the study object. This paper consists of five parts with a conclusion and outlook after them.
(1) Research significance and research actuality
This part analyzes the changing trend in the current durable goods market and presents the study background and significance; then, it reviews the research findings on durable goods at home and abroad in a general way, on the basis of which it points out issues worth further study and introduces the study objective and basic content of this paper.
(2) Study on the rental pricing of single durable goods provided by durable goods manufacturers
In this part, on the basis of consumer utility, the renting habits of different types of consumes are obtained by analyzing their renting choice behavior. After this, a study is made on the durable goods manufacturers' pricing decision problem in two periods using dynamic programming. On such basis, a further study is conducted on the effect of old durable goods on the replacement competition of new durable goods faced by enterprises doing rental business.
(3) Study on the rental pricing of two durable goods of different qualities provided by durable goods manufacturers
This part considers a situation in which the durable goods manufacturer provides two types of goods with different qualities at the same time which means, in the second period, the consumers have four different durable goods to choose from. The analysis on the renting behavior of the consumers leads to the conclusion that durable goods combinations of different qualities and prices automatically divide consumers into different groups. Then, a study is carried out on the optimum rental pricing decision from the durable goods manufacturers and an analysis is made on its characteristics.
(4) Study on the rental pricing problem in the case of information asymmetry
This part studies the durable goods manufacturer's rental and reverse selection problem on the assumption that there is information asymmetry between the enterprise and consumers over the quality of old durable goods and the price of new durable goods changes dynamically on two periods. On this basis, an example analysis is carried out.
(5) Study on the rental pricing problem in the case of duopoly
This part studies the duopoly dynamic game of two duopolistic durable goods enterprises on two periods considering the situation in which there are two major durable goods rental providers which have a great say over the market and the products they offer to consumers are of different qualities. On this basis, a further analysis is made using MATLAB simulation on the effect of durability and competitive intensity on the game equilibrium of duopoly durable goods manufacturers.
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