摘要
1991年10月31日,奇卢巴领导的“多党民主运动”在选举中击败执政27年的(1964-1991)“联合民族独立党”,其本人也接替卡翁达成为赞比亚历史上的第二任总统。奇卢巴政府上台以后,根据国际货币基金组织等国际金融机构的“建议”,对赞比亚的国民经济进行了以“新自由主义经济思想”为指导的经济自由化改革。
奇卢巴政府的经济自由化改革可大致根据其任期分为两个阶段,在第一任期内(1991-1996)为了稳定宏观经济,奇卢巴政府放开了对汇率和银行利率的管制；改革税制,调低对内税收和对外关税的税率,并用增值税取代了销售税；采用现金预算制度,严格财政预算纪律。在农业领域,奇卢巴政府取消了对玉米和化肥的补贴。同时对正式部门进行改革,大幅裁减政府职员,并对除矿产业外的国有企业进行了大规模私有化改革。到了第二任期时(1996-2001),奇卢巴政府的经济自由化政策进行了较大幅度的调整。政府放宽了对现金预算制度的实施要求；实施临时性征税方案,调高了国内税率；再次加强了对农业市场的干预；暂停了政府职员的裁减计划；“赞比亚联合铜矿公司”的私有化改革也未得到及时的执行。
就自由化经济政策实施情况来看,奇卢巴政府第一任期内的实施情况要好于第二任期,尤其在最初几年。这一时期改革的目的也是为了转变经济体制,推动经济发展。然而到了第二任期时,政府却对改革政策进行了较大的调整。许多政策的实施被暂停,尤其是在最后的几年时间里,奇卢巴政府经济自由化改革的目的转变成了获取国际社会的援助。在奇卢巴两届任期内,尽管有些政策的实施出现过波折,有些政策的实施过程也极为拖沓,但整体看来,奇卢巴政府对赞比亚的国民经济仍进行了较为彻底的自由化改革,且这些经济政策都没有再发生大的逆转。自由汇率、自由贸易、税制改革、私有化改革等自由经济政策都得到了落实。
从经济发展的实际效果来看,赞比亚的经济自由化改革却是失败的。赞比亚的各项经济指标在这十年时间里均出现了大幅下滑。人均国民生产总值大幅下降,外债总额却继续上升。铜矿产量和人均粮食拥有量也均低于奇卢巴政府上台之时。2001年10月,赞比亚财政部长在《减贫战略报告》中不得不承认,“赞比亚的经济自由化改革加重了国家的贫困程度”。同年12月,世界银行和国际货币基金组织认定赞比亚为“重债穷国”,而联合国开发计划署的2001年度《人类发展报告》也将赞比亚列为世界上唯一一个人类发展指数低于其1975年水平的国家。
1991年举行的多党制选举曾被西方树立为非洲以和平方式从一党制过渡到多党制的“样板”,并对这一“样板”的经济改革提供了大量的援助和建议。然而,“集权政治”下未能解决的经济问题,在“民主政治”时期同样没能得到解决。笔者通过对奇卢巴两届政府时期内的经济改革政策分析,总结了撒哈拉以南非洲国家在经济发展方面的一些经验教训。
On Oct.31 1991, Zambia hold the democratic president election for the first time. The only one year old party, Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) defeated the United National Independence Party (UNIP) which had been on power for 27 years. And Frederick.Chiluba became the second president of Zambia in history.
After Chiluba came into office, he followed the advises of IMF to implement economic reforms according to the theory of Neo-liberalism Economic Thoughts. His purposes was to recover and promote the economy development. In the first few years after the major election, the MMD government pursued their reforming policies, and the economic prospects for Zambia also seemed good. Those policies included freeing the interest and exchange rates, introducing VAT to replace the consuming tax, introducing cash budget, removing the subsides on maize and fertilizer. But on the second-term government(1996-2001), Chiluba adjusted his economic policies. The government relaxed the disciplines on implying cash budget, introduced temporary taxation, re-tightened the grip on the agriculture market and frizzed the privatization of ZCCM. After almost a decade of continuous structural adjustment programmes, the record on Zambian policy reforms in the 1990s is exceedingly complex and mixed. On the one hand, during the 1990s the foundations were laid for a shift from a state oriented to a market based economy. Most importantly, despite several exogenous shocks and uneven implementation, none of the reform measures implemented have been reversed. But, over time, the MMD government's commitment to economic reform waned. Clearly, much less progress was made in terms of restructuring the economy by the second MMD government (1996-2001).
After almost a decade of uninterrupted policy reforms, the record in terms of economy is week. In terms of macro-economic growth indicators, the Zambian economy has shrunk and is now smaller than before. Per-capital GDP has dropped, but the external debt has increased. The output of copper production has been declining for the whole decades. In Dec.2000, Zambia is judged by the World Bank and IMF to have reached the decision point of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries(HIPC) initiative. In Oct.2001, Minister of Finance concedes that his government's liberal economic reforms have increased poverty in Zambia. And the UNDP argued that Zambia is the only country in the world with a worse human development index than it had in 1975.
The major election of Zambia once be taken as an pattern for the other African countries by western countries, and the western countries also provided a large number of suggestions and assistance to their "pattern". However, Chiluba's democracy government didn't solve those problems which had been existed since Kaunda's government. The author will to conclude the experiences of economic development in sub-Saharan African countries through analyzing the economic reform policies of Chiluba's government.
引文
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② Zambia:Prospects for Sustainable Growth, Economic Management and Social Policy Group, World Bank: Washington DC.转引自：Neil McCulloch, Bob Baulch, Milasoa Cherel-Robson. Poverty, Inequality and Growth in Zambia during the 1990s [R].Helsinki:UNU/WIDER,2001:8.
③不列颠百科全书(国际中文版),18卷[M].北京：中国大百科全书出版社,1999：460.
④中国大百科全书(简明版)修订本11卷[M].北京：中国大百科全书出版社,2004：6003.
⑤中国大百科全书(简明版)修订本11卷[M].北京：中国大百科全书出版社,2004：6003.
①中国大百科全书(简明版)修订本11卷[M].北京：中国大百科全书出版社,2004：6682.
①注：其中最为典型的代表是撒切尔在英国实施的改革和里根在美国实施的经济改革。
②资料源自：http://cn.netor.com/m/minren/chen/ch2r6.htm
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①《新自由主义与拉美的新结构主义之争》, 《拉美经委会评论》1988年4月号.转引自：程恩富.新自由主义的起源、发展及其影响[J].求是,2005(3)：38-41.
①注：倪峰在《八十年代以来赞比亚的经济改革浅析》中的数据显示,1975年的赞比亚人均收入为1000美元。这可能是根据不同固定价格计算所致,此处笔者采用的是世界银行在《世界发展报告》中按1993年固定价格计算得出的数据。参考资料：倪峰.八十年代以来赞比亚的经济改革浅析[J].《西亚非洲》,1989,(6):44-51. World Development Report 1999/2000, Selected World Development Indicators, Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.转引自:Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia[M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:31.
②注：受第一次石油危机的影响,世界主要工业国出现了经济衰退,世界市场对铜的需求量下滑,此外,基础金属(Base Metal)等原材料使用模式的升级、通信领域的技术革命和世界铜矿供应迅速增长等因素也共同导致了国际铜价自1974年下半年开始的大幅下滑。
③注：政府最严重的错误在于认为铜价的下跌仅是短暂现象,乐观的以为短期内将会得到恢复。这使其非但没有削减政府开支,反而仍然不断的增加预算,通过借贷的方式维持财政开支,这又导致了政府债务的急剧上涨。1978年,政府债务占到了GDP的50%。源自：Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia[M].Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government, 2004:38.
④注：在1986年12月和1990年7月,赞比亚曾两次因试图取消玉米粉补贴而引发骚乱,迫使政府不得不再次控制玉米价格。这将在卡翁达政府第二阶段时期的经济改革中加以阐述。
⑤Neil McCulloch, Bob Baulch, Milasoa Cherel-Robson. Poverty, Inequality and Growth in Zambia during the 1990s [R].Helsinki:UNU/WIDER,2001:8.
①Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:366.
②Chanthunya,C.L.,V. Murinde, Trade Regime and Economic Growth, Aldershot and Brookfield, Ashgate Publishing:Vermont.转引自:Neil McCulloch, Bob Baulch, Milasoa Cherel-Robson. Poverty, Inequality and Growth in Zambia during the 1990s [R].Helsinki:UNU/WIDER,2001:11.
③Zambia, Country Profile 1997～1998, The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited,1997.转引自:Lise Rakner. Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991—2001[M].Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute,2003:112.
④Zambia, Country Profile 1997～1998, The Economist Intelligence Unit Limited,1997.转引自:Lise Rakner. Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991—2001[M].Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute,2003:113.
⑤注：相关数据见附表5.2.
⑤Zambia:Poverty Assessment, Human Resources Division, Southern Africa Department, World Bank: Washington DC. Report No.12985-ZA,1994:16.资料源自: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTPA/0,,contentMDK:20204786-is CURL:Y-menuPK:443279-pagePK:148956～piPK:216618～theSitePK:430367,00.html
⑦White, H., T. Edstand. Aid and Macroeconomic Performance:Theory, Empirical Evidence and Four Country Cases, Institute of Social Studies and Macmillan:The Hague and Basingstoke,1998.转引自:Neil McCulloch, Bob Baulch, Milasoa Cherel-Robson. Poverty, Inequality and Growth in Zambia during the 1990s[R].Helsinki: UNU/WIDER,2001:7.
①Lise Rakner. Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991—2001[M].Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute,2003:12.
②World Development Report 1999/2000[R], Selected World Development Indicators, Washington, D.C.:The World Bank.转引自:Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M].Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:48.
③注：1973年和1976年赞比亚政府两次同国际货币基金达成援助协议。在1978年世界银行主办的赞比亚同“协商集团”(consultative group)的首次会议上,世界银行改变以前的看法,将赞比亚视作贫穷国家,并准许其申请“国际开发协会”(International Development Association, IDA)的资金。同时承诺在今后的五年时间里,将每年向赞比亚提供5000万美元的援助。
④注：在1978年之前,世界银行和双边援助国都未有对提供给赞比亚的援助附加任何条件。国际货币基金组织在1973年和1976年两次提供的援助也未附加过多条件。受经济持续下滑的影响,到1978年,赞比亚的经济形势迫使其不得不寻求更多的援助。不过,赞比亚在此之后所申请的国际援助都被附加了越来越严格的,以实施经济自由化改革为主要内容的附加条件。
⑤ Hawkins J., Understanding the failure of IMF reform:The Zambia case[M].World Development, Vol.19, No.7, 1991:839-849.转引自Lise Rakner. Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991— 2001[M].Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute,2003:55.
①Lise Rakner. Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991—2001[M].Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute.2003:57.
②Callaghy, Lost between state and market.The politics of economic adjustment in Ghana, Zambia and Nigeria', in Nelson J.M., Economic Crisis and Policy Choice. The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World. Princeton: Princeton University Press,1990:296.转引自:Lise Rakner. Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991—2001[M].Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute,2003:55.
①Julius O. Ihonvbere, Economic crisis, civil society, and democratization:the case of Zambia Trenton[M].N.J.: Africa World Press,1996:86.
②"ZCTU's Response to the Recent Developments vis-a-vis Press Statement on the Economic Recovery Programme in which Zambia Ditched the IMF'. Kitwe:ZCTU Secretariat Archves.转引自:Lise Rakner. Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991—2001 [M].Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute,2003:62.
①Times of Zambia,Dec.31,1989.转引自:Lise Rakner.Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1994— 2001[M].Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute,2003:63.
②注：20世纪80年代末90年代初正值国际社会发生剧烈调整的时期。在国际政治中,东欧发生巨变,苏联在戈尔巴乔夫改革过后正频临解体,社会主义阵营处于瓦解过程中。
③张宏明.多维视野中的非洲政治发展,[M].社会科学文献出版社,2007：24～25.
④注：关于此处的“1000美元”,已经在第一阶段时期的经济繁荣部分进行了阐述。资料源自：倪峰.《八十年代以来赞比亚的经济改革浅析》[J].《西亚非洲》,1989(6)：44-51.
①Julius O. Ihonvbere, Economic crisis, civil society, and democratization:the case of Zambia Trenton[M].N.J.: Africa World Press,1996:60.
②Lise Rakner. Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991—2001[M].Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute,2003:59.
③Lise Rakner. Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991—2001[M].Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute.2003:63.
④Julius O. Ihonvbere, Economic crisis, civil society, and democratization:the case of Zambia Trenton[M].N.J.: Africa World Press.1996:61.
⑤Julius O. Ihonvbere, Economic crisis, civil society, and democratization:the case of Zambia Trenton[M].N.J.: Africa World Press,1996:65.
⑥Impasse in Zambia:the economics and politics of reform Word Bank,1989:18.资料源 自:http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/02/14/00017 8830 98101901353829/Rendered/PDF/multi page.pdf
①注：“多党民主运动”作为政党的注册完全打乱并重组了赞比亚的政治联盟。数周内,政治势力不断的结盟和重组。被认为非常忠于卡翁达和“联合民族独立党”的人,也公开抛弃了执政党加入了反对党。1990年12月,当“联合民族独立党”的缔造者之一,前任秘书长汉弗莱(Humphrey)宣布加入“多党民主运动”时,整个“联合民族独立党”都被震动了。随之引发了一波退出“联合民族独立党”,转而加入“多党民主运动”的高潮。“一月份,前任国民议会发言人罗宾逊(Robinson Nabulyato)加入了“多党民主运动”。超过2000名“联合民族独立党”成员转而加入“多党民主运动”；还有300人退出“联合民族独立党”。除此之外,赞比亚大学的学生也都成群结队的加入“多党民主运动”,“因为他们认为“一党制”政府打压不同的政见,许多表达与“联合民族独立党”意见相左的学生刊物被禁止了。”学生们同时也认为,“许多年来,卡翁达在提高教育方面的承诺仅停留在口头上,应当将赞比亚从帝制中解放出来,允许合适的团体参与政治。”资料源自：Julius O. Ihonvbere, Economic crisis, civil society, and democratization:the case of Zambia Trenton[M].N.J.:Africa World Press,1996:68-70.
②Julius O. Ihonvbere, Economic crisis, civil society, and democratization:the case of Zambia Trenton[M].N.J.: Africa World Press,1996:66.
①注：奇卢巴在就任总统之前为赞比亚工会大会的主席,而赞比亚工会大会是卡翁达时期反对经济自由化改革的主要力量。
②注：根据马尔科姆·F·麦弗逊(Malcolm. F. Mcpherson)在”The New Economic Recovery Programme:The Second Time Around一文中的表述,“国际社会迅速向赞比亚提供了接近90万吨的粮食援助,约为1991/1992年度赞比亚玉米总产量的一半。”源自：Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia[M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:54.
③Lise Rakner. Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991—2001[M].Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute,2003:68.
①Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:50.
②注：第一轮新经济复苏计划是在与国际货币基金组织之间的结构调整方案失败以后,于1987年5月根据“依靠自身资源推动发展”的理念开始实施的。根据马尔科姆·F·麦弗逊(Malcolm. F. Mcpherson)在"The New Economic Recovery Programme:The Second Time Around'’一文中的表述：“两轮新经济复苏计划的不同主要是,第一轮注重于对关键经济变量的控制,而第二轮的中心则在于自由化和消除政府干预。”转引自：Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:51.
③这在第一章“卡翁达政府第二阶段时期的经济改革”部分已经进行了阐述,这些尝试主要包括同国际援助社会合作的经济改革,以及在1987年,政府根据“依靠自身资源推动发展”的理念,制定的“新经济复苏计划”。
①注：在1992和1995年,赞比亚的经济发展都出现过危机,这将在正文中将得以具体阐述。
②注：自1998年起,赞比亚政府的年度预算报告,开始脱离实际制定空大的目标,其目的也在于响应国际援助社会提出的各项指标和要求,以获得其援助。这也将在后文得到具体阐述。
③用于债务偿还、发展援助以及日用品补贴的外国资金不被计算入财政收入。源自：Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia[M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government.2004:55.
④这些预算外的支出与取消玉米粉补贴的措施形成了鲜明的对比。这些措施公布以后,人们对政府作出的制定公平、公正、审慎的经济措施的承诺产生了疑问。
⑤ GRZ, Budget Address 1993:3转引自:Lise Rakner. Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991— 2001 [M].Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute,2003:69.
⑥Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:55.
①Adam, C.S, D.L.Bevan, "Stabilization and The Risk of Hyperinflation Issues in Zambia Macroeconomic Performance 1992-1993" [R]. Draft report for GRZ and European Development Fund,转引自Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:56.
②注：这使得政府高层官员非常紧张。他们本期望在1992年12月的巴黎会议上向国际社会申请更多的援助。源自：Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:56.
③注：严格的财政预算需要有准确可靠的经济数据作为依据。但在当时,赞比亚银行和预算办公室这两个主要的经济数据统计机构却仍停留于管控经济时代的运作模式下,无法根据实际经济情况独立运作,并提供准确的经济数据。银行自1988年以来就没有审过账,账目混乱,常年累月以后,积重难返。源自：Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:56.
④Lise Rakner. Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991—2001[M].Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute,2003:69.
⑤ GRZ, Budget Address 1993:10转引自:Lise Rakner. Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991— 2001[M].Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute,2003:69.
①GRZ, Budget Address 1993转引自Lise Rakner. Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991— 2001[M].Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute,2003:70.
②GRZ, Budget Address 1994转引自Lise Rakner. Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991— 2001[M].Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute,2003:70.
③自从60年代矿产业国有化以来,矿产企业就不被允许自由支配其赚取的外汇收入。这使得仅有有限的资金被用于矿业部门的再投资。外汇领域这一最后壁垒的消除使这种情况得到了改变。Bank of Zambia(BOZ), Annual Reports 1997.Lusaka.转引自:Lise Rakner. Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991— 2001[M].Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute,2003:70.
④ Bruce R. Bolnick. The Sequencing of Financial Market Liberalization,1992-1994.源自:Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:215.
⑤注：准备货币是银行准备金加上社会大众手中所持有的通货合计数。准备货币是创造货币供给的基础,能产生货币乘数效果,因而亦可称为货币基数(money base)或强力货币(high-power money)。资料源自：http://translate.google.com.hk/translate?hl=zh-CN&s1=zh-TW&u=http://fund.bot.com.tw/z/glossary/glexp_1615.dj htm&ei=WBCbTeGJO4a8cITGwNoF&sa=X&oi=translate&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0CCwQ7gEwBA&prev=/ search%3Fq%3Dreserve%2Bmoney%25E8%25B4%25A7%25E5%25B8%2581%26h1%3Dzh-CN%26newwindo w%3D1%26safe%3Dstrict%26client%3Daff-1616dh%26hs%3Dkv1%26affdom%3D1616dh.com%26channel%3D footer%26prmd%3Divns
⑥Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:58.
⑦Neil McCulloch, Bob Baulch, Milasoa Cherel-Robson. Poverty, Inequality and Growth in Zambia during the 1990s [R].Helsinki:UNU/WIDER,2001:7.
①转引自:Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:225.
②Neil McCulloch, Bob Baulch, Milasoa Cherel-Robson. Poverty, Inequality and Growth in Zambia during the 1990s [R].Helsinki:UNU/WIDER,2001:8.
①Zambia:Macroeconomic Policies and Poverty in Zambia, World Bank:Washington DC.转引自:Neil McCulloch, Bob Baulch, Milasoa Cherel-Robson. Poverty, Inequality and Growth in Zambia during the 1990s [R].Helsinki:UNU/WIDER.2001:7.
②GRZ/Ministry of Agriculture Food and Fisheries(MAFF) 1995:3转引自:Lise Rakner. Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991—2001[M].Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute,2003:71.
③Zambia Poverty Assessment, Human Resources Division, Southern Africa Department, Word Bank:Washingon DC.转引自:Neil McCulloch, Bob Baulch, Milasoa Cherel-Robson. Poverty, Inequality and Growth in Zambia during the 1990s [R].Helsinki:UNU/WIDER,2001:9.
④注：关于政府重新返回农产品市场的问题存在着分歧。Neil McCulloch在Poverty, Inequality and Growth in Zambia during the 1990s,以及Lise Rakner在Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991—2001,中认为是由于自由化的农业市场缺乏成熟的个体投资部门而迫使重新对市场进行干预。而Malcolm F. Mcpherson在The Role of Agriculture and Mining in Sustaining Growth and Development in Zambia一文中的表述却认为是由于政府从未真正从农业领域撤离,从而导致了农业领域难以培育出成熟的个体投资者。笔者认为这是一种恶性循环的相互影响,在当时严格的货币制度下,农产品市场的巨大风险和国债市场的巨额利润促使投资者纷纷回避刚刚开放的农业市场,这使得政府不得不对市场重新干预,而这种干预的长期进行,又导致了投资者进一步回避这一领域。参考文献：Neil McCulloch, Bob Baulch, Milasoa Cherel-Robson. Poverty, Inequality and Growth in Zambia during the 1990s [R].Helsinki:UNU/WIDER,2001:9.; Lise Rakner. Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991—2001[M].Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute,2003:72.
①Botchwey et al. External evaluation of the ESAF. Washington DC:IMF.转引自:Lise Rakner. Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991—2001[M].Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute,2003:72.
②Copestake, JG.(1998), Agricultural Credit Management in Zambia:Business Development, Social Security or Patronage?[J], Development Policy Review 16,1:5-28. Neil McCulloch, Bob Baulch, Milasoa Cherel-Robson. Poverty, Inequality and Growth in Zambia during the 1990s [R].Helsinki:UNU/WIDER,2001:9.
③Copestake, JG.(1998), Agricultural Credit Management in Zambia:Business Development, Social Security or Patronage?[J], Development Policy Review 16,1:5-28. Neil McCulloch, Bob Baulch, Milasoa Cherel-Robson. Poverty, Inequality and Growth in Zambia during the 1990s [R].Helsinki:UNU/WIDER,2001:9.
④International Monetary Fund, Zambia:Statistical Appendix, World Bank:Washington DC.转引自:Neil McCulloch, Bob Baulch, Milasoa Cherel-Robson. Poverty, Inequality and Growth in Zambia during the 1990s [R].Helsinki:UNU/WIDER,2001:9.
①注：关于政府介入的原因笔者在已26页注释5中作出了解释。
②Republic of Zambia (1999) Economic Report 1998,Ministry of Finance and Economic Development:Lusaka. 转引自:Neil McCulloch, Bob Baulch, Milasoa Cherel-Robson. Poverty, Inequality and Growth in Zambia during the 1990s [R].Helsinki:UNU/WIDER,2001:10.
③Euston K. Chiputa, From Copper-dependence to Foreign-Dependence:Zambia's Economic Transition, 1975-2004[J].Joumal of Humanities. Lusaka:the University of Zambia Press,2007:42.
④Zambia:Poverty Assessment, Human Resources Division, Southern Africa Department, World Bank: Washington DC. Report N o.12985-ZA,1994:16.资料源自: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTTPOVERTY/EXTPA/0,,contentMDK:20204786～is CURL:Y～menuPK:443279～pagePK:148956～piPK:216618～theSitePK:430367,00.html
①Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:107.
②Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:125.
①Catharine B.Hill.在 Trade Policy Reform and Liberalization during the 1990s一文中阐述道1991年的关税税率范围为0-50%。然而,Neil McCulloch在Poverty, Inequality and Growth in Zambia during the 1990s,Lise Rakner在Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991—2001中,以及Malcolm F. Mcpherson.在The New Economic Recovery Programme:The Second Time Around文中的数据却显示此时的税率范围为0～100%。多项比较,笔者在此处采用0～100%的数据。参考文献：Neil McCulloch, Bob Baulch, Milasoa Cherel-Robson. Poverty, Inequality and Growth in Zambia during the 1990s [R].Helsinki:UNU/WIDER,2001:10.; Lise Rakner. Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991—2001 [M].Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute,2003:70.; Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:56.
②注：“进口许可税”(Import License Levy)被看作是对进口商品征收的的另一关税,对其取消征收可以简化关税体系,降低保护主义政策。1993年这一关税被取消,但是在1995年底,受财政收入的影响,这一政策又通过征收“进口报税费”(IDF)来得以实施。
③注：消费税上浮20%的规定是对进口商品的隐性征税,目的在于对消费税给国内商品成本造成的负担进行补偿。1995年7月开征增值税以后,这一上浮税才最终停止征收。
④Neil McCulloch, Bob Baulch, Milasoa Cherel-Robson. Poverty, Inequality and Growth in Zambia during the 1990s [R].Helsinki:UNU/WIDER.2001:10.
⑤Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:242.
①注：最初实施装运前检验的目的是增强对外汇的管控。在汇率市场开放以后,政府开始运用该措施来防止偷漏关税。源自：Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:243.
② Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:243.
③Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:244.
①Catharine B. Hill, Trade Policy Reform and Liberalization during the 1990s[J],源自Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia[M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:244.
②注：增值税的征收同时彻底废除了消费税上浮20%的规定,这在上一小节有所陈述。不过这一税制改革在最初并没有将铜矿业和电信业纳入到其适用范围内。
③ Republic of Zambia(1994a) Quarterly Digest of Statistics:1994 Fourth Quarter Bulletin, Central Statistical Office:Lusaka.; Republic of Zambia(1999) Economic Report 1998, Ministry of Finance and Economic Development:Lusaka.转引自:Neil McCulloch, Bob Baulch, Milasoa Cherel-Robson. Poverty, Inequality and Growth in Zambia during the 1990s [R].Helsinki:UNU/WIDER,2001:10.
④Neil McCulloch, Bob Baulch, Milasoa Cherel-Robson. Poverty, Inequality and Growth in Zambia during the 1990s [R].Helsinki:UNU/WIDER,2001:10.
①World Bank (1994a) Zambia Poverty Assessment, Human Resources Division, Southern Africa Department, World Bank:Washington DC. Neil McCulloch, Bob Baulch, Milasoa Cherel-Robson. Poverty, Inequality and Growth in Zambia during the 1990s [R].Helsinki:UNU/WIDER,2001:10.
②World Bank (1994b) Macroeconomic Policies and Poverty in Zambia, World Bank:Washington DC.转引自: Neil McCulloch, Bob Baulch, Milasoa Cherel-Robson. Poverty, Inequality and Growth in Zambia during the 1990s [R].Helsinki:UNU/WIDER,2001:11.
③Neil McCulloch, Bob Baulch, Milasoa Cherel-Robson. Poverty, Inequality and Growth in Zambia during the 1990s [R].Helsinki:UNU/WIDER,2001:11.
④Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:37.
⑤注：在对赞比亚的经济进行研究的过程中,西方学者通常把政府机构、国有企业以及私有企业等部门统称为正式部门。
①注：1991年的“多党民主运动”施政纲领中认为：“赞比亚联合铜矿公司这一庞大的矿业帝国应当进行反思和改组。”源自：Movement for Multiparty Democracy,1991:Party Manifesto 1991-1996,Lusaka.转引自：Lise Rakner. Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991—2001[M].Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute.2003:73.
②Times of Zamibia,September 22,1992.转引自:Lise Rakner.Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991—2001[M].Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute,2003:73.
③Times of Zamibia,September 24,1992.转引自:Lise Rakner.Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991—2001[M].Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute.2003:73.
④Financial Mail,November 24-30,1992.转引自:Lise Rakner.Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991—2001[M].Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute.2003:73.
⑤注：有关至1995年中期国有企业实现私有化的数目,Neil McCulloch在Poverty,Inequality and Growth in Zambia during the 1990s中数据为15家.此处笔者采用了赞比亚私有化管理局的统计数据.
⑥注：世界银行将这一成绩的取得归因于“赞比亚私有化管理局”的积极推动和奇卢巴政府对这些私有化项目的极少干涉。源自Lise Rakner. Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991— 2001[M].Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute,2003:73.
⑦注：赞比亚工业与矿业集团(ZIMCO)是赞比亚联合铜矿公司(ZCCM)和工业发展集团(INDECO)的控股公司,掌控着矿产、电信、能源、金融以及农业商业(agri-business)等领域。1991年,其掌控产业的产值占到了赞比亚GDP的3/4。源自Chanthunya C.L,V Murinde(1998),Trade Regime and Economic Growth, Aldershot and Brookfield, Ashgate Publishing:Vermont.转引自:Neil McCulloch, Bob Baulch, Milasoa Cherel-Robson. Poverty, Inequality and Growth in Zambia during the 1990s [R].Helsinki:UNU/WIDER,2001:11.
①注：此处关于国有企业私有化的数量仍存在着差异,Neil McCulloch在Poverty, Inequality and Growth in Zambia during the 1990s援引Rakner,L.,N. van de Walle, et al.在The Politics of Economic Reform Implementation in Zambia的数据认为1997年底完成私有化企业的数量为274家中的244家。此处笔者仍旧以“赞比亚私有化管理局”的数据为准。Lise Rakner. Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991— 2001[M].Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute,2003:74.
②转引自：Lise Rakner. Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991—2001[M].Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute,2003:74.
①注：在取消对外汇的管控后,赞比亚银行大概有1/3的员工被闲置。因此赞比亚银行缩减了其规模并加强了金融监管和经济调研的能力,同时在提升员工素质和管理水平方面做出了大量的努力。源自:Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:62.
②Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:82.注：有关公共部门职员的工资开支,笔者在赞比亚学习期间有直观感受,赞比亚大学讲师和赞比亚银行职员的平均工资都维持在5000美元左右,对于一个86.3%的人口日开支不足2两美元的国家来说(1993年数据),这样的工资水平显然过高。
③政府在征收“进口报关费”过程中,通过实现信息化办公,使得三五名职员便维持了这一政策的正常执行。其增加的财政收入与几百人完成的关税征收相当。这在前面加强关税征收的举措中进行了阐述。
④Financial Mail, November 24-30,1992.转引自Lise Rakner. Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991—2001[M].Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute,2003:71.
①Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia[M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:87.
②Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:87.
③注：如前文36页所述,政府在1992年裁减了1.2名临时雇员后直到1998年才再次裁员。
①Public Expenditure Review,1994, p.101 (World Bank Report No.13854-ZA)转引自:Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:91.
②Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:91.
③Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:90.
④注：1990年时经常性支出与工资支出的比例为1.04,1995和1996年降至0.55,1997年降为0.43,1998在政府裁减部分职员后,这一比例回升至0.5。源自Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:91
⑤Public Expenditure Review,1994:110 (World Bank Report No.13854-ZA)转引自:Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:90.
⑥注：在耗费了这么久的时间和精力后,赞比亚政府肯定对裁员所需的费用进行了准确的预算。“未准确预算”的说法只不过是其阻碍实施的托词而已。源自Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:64.
①注：根据赞比亚税务局的数据,1994年下半年的免税商品占进口商品的比例为53%,而在1995年的第一季度,这一数值便长到了65%。源自：Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:245.
②Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:127.
③Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:138.
①注：玉米的种植面积在90/91季度到96/97季度之间下降率23%。在这同一时期,花生的种植面积增长了一倍,棉花的种植面积增长了50%。这在第一节农业自由化方面进行了阐述。
②注：1994年11月,政府引入了“农业信贷管理项目”,目的是通过私有企业在基层培育出可以自我维系的农业信贷体系。在最初的主要任务是向小农提供化肥和种子。源自:Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:324.
③Lise Rakner. Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991—2001[M].Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute,2003:76.
④Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:324.
⑤Economist Intelligence Unit:Country Report:Zambia,1st Quarter 1997.转引自:Lise Rakner. Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991—2001[M].Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute,2003:76.
⑥注：早在1993年10月,政府成立的专家特别小组在向农业部和财政部提交的关于政府推出农业市场的报告中就建议政府组建独立的“粮食储备局”,以保证粮食安全。Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:316.
⑦注：2000年1月份的邮报刊登了拖欠“粮食储备局”债务的人员名单。这其中不乏有显赫政治地位的人士。The Post, January 28转引自Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:317.
⑥Lise Rakner. Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991—2001 [M].Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute,2003:76.
①Economist Intelligence Unit:Country Report:Zambia,1st Quarter 1998:18.转引自:Lise Rakner. Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991—2001[M].Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute,2003:76.
②Lise Rakner. Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991—2001[M].Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute,2003:76.
③Barraclough 1998:Trouble in Lusaka, Institutional Investor International Edition,Vol.23,No.12(December).转 引自:Lise Rakner. Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991—2001[M].Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute,2003:77.
④注：卡富埃财团在1998年3月立即提交了份更低报价的标书,但该标书同样遭到了拒绝。
①Barraclough 1998:Trouble in Lusaka, Institutional Investor International Edition,Vol.23,No.12(December).转 引自:Lise Rakner. Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991—2001 [M].Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute,2003:78.
②注：2002年1月底,“英美集团”(Anglo-American Corporation)表示由于国际铜价的持续下滑给公司造成了亏损,因此计划出售赞比亚这一最大的铜矿“康谷拉铜矿”。其实2000年3月,“英美集团”在赞比亚投资的主要目的就是通过“肯格拉迪普铜矿项目”来获取资金。
③Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report, February 2002:25.转引自:Lise Rakner. Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991—2001[M].Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute,2003:77. Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia[M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:68.
①注：宏观经济指标(Macroeconomic Indicators)的数据显示1992年至1997年间,赞比亚的人均实际收入下降了14%。Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:68.
②注：1999年3月,宏观经济数据(Macroeconomic Indicators)公布的1998年实际经济数据为GDP下降了1.8%,通货膨胀上升了28.7%。源自Macroeconomic Indicators March 1999,转引自：Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:68.
③Budget speech delivered to the Parliament, January 30,1998,par.93.转引自:Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M].Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:69.
④Budget speech delivered to the Parliament, January 30,1998,par.5.转引自:Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia[M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:69.
⑤Budget speech delivered to the Parliament, January 30,1998,par.101.转引自:Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:69.
⑥注：早在1994年同瑞典大使的会谈中,双方便在援助的附加条件上产生了分歧。部长激动的声称“赞比亚有决定自身政策的权利”,而大使则回答到“援助社会同样有中止援助的权利”。Budget speech delivered to the Parliament, January 30,1998,par.102.转引自:Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:69.
①注：假若没能获得国际援助,则可以将经济建设未完成的责任归咎于此。这与1955年史密斯所提的“高压预算”(coercive deficit)的意思相同。然而,这仅在双方都在虚张声势的情况下才有效。进几年来,大多数援助方都越来越不情愿被拖入该情况中。源自Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:69.
②注：国际援助社会最终并未对政府裁员和债务减免提供援助。
③注：后备方案应当按惯例压缩部门经费(RDCs Recurrent Departmental Charges)和资金支出(capital expenditure capex),减少国内剩余(domestic surplus),向中央银行及国内外借贷等。源自:Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:70.
④注：继任者为前劳工和社会安全部长伊迪丝·纳瓦奎(Edith Nawakwi)。
⑤1998年的经验使高层决策者明白,尽管援助方要求非常多,且有时候变幻无常显得不尽情意,但其援助对于经济复苏来说却是至关重要的。
①Lise Rakner. Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991—2001[M].Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute,2003:206.
②Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:70.
①Neil McCulloch, Bob Baulch, Milasoa Cherel-Robson. Poverty, Inequality and Growth in Zambia during the 1990s [R].Helsinki:UNU/WIDER,2001:11.
①转引自:Lise Rakner.Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991—2001[M].Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute,2003:207.
②Human Development Report[R].UNDP,Oxford:Oxford University Press 2001:213.资料来源: http://hdr.undp.ogr/en/reports/global/hdr2001/
③Catharine B.Hill,Malcolm F.Mcpherson.Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F.Kennedy School of Government,2004:31.
①注：《非洲发展数据》显示,以1989-1991年的人均粮食产量为基准,1980年的人均占有粮食指数为94,而1996年的仅为92。而统计范围更久的《世界银行发展数据》显示,以1989-1991年的人均粮食产量为基准,1970-1979年的人均占有粮食指数为114.3,而1990到1998年的这一平均数值仅为91.6。转引自：Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:304.
②注：1970年赞比亚人口为418.9万人,1998年人口为966.6万人。资料源自：Zambia Country Economic Memorandum "Policy for Growth and Diversification", Document of the World Bank, Report No.28069-ZA,2004:18.
③Neil McCulloch, Bob Baulch, Milasoa Cherel-Robson. Poverty, Inequality and Growth in Zambia during the 1990s [R].Helsinki:UNU/WIDER,2001:6.
①注：受政策的影响,农民纷纷降低一些抗旱作物,如高粱、粟的种植,转而种植玉米。这一做法严重降低了粮食安全。
①数据转引自Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:299.
①Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:306.
②注：政府最严重的错误在于认为铜价的下跌仅是短暂现象,乐观的以为短期内将会得到恢复,并且仍然不断的增加预算。
③注：“世界货币基金组织”的文件曾在2000年揭露了“钻交易”丑闻,随后当地和国际媒体也对这一事件进行了报道,政府也承诺进行调查。转引自：Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson.Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:305.
①数据转引自：Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:303.
①Zambia Country Economic Memorandum "Policy for Growth and Diversification", Document of the World Bank, Report No.28069-ZA,2004:58.
②Republic of Zambia 1994; Republic of Zambia 1999.转引自:Neil McCulloch, Bob Baulch, Milasoa Cherel-Robson. Poverty, Inequality and Growth in Zambia during the 1990s [R].Helsinki:UNU/WIDER,2001:5.
①Neil McCulloch, Bob Baulch, Milasoa Cherel-Robson. Poverty, Inequality and Growth in Zambia during the 1990s [R].Helsinki:UNU/WIDER,2001:6.
①Zambia Country Economic Memorandum "Policy for Growth and Diversification", Document of the World Bank, Report No.28069-ZA,2004:61.
②The Economist Intellegece Unit Limited:Country Profile 2001:Zambia,2001转引自：张子珩,冯九璋.赞比亚私有化对经济现代话的作用[J].西亚非洲,2005(3)：25.
①注：尽管有些外部震荡,而且在国内的执行过程也不算顺利,然而自由贸易体制却在两届奇卢巴政府中一直得以坚持推行,2000年10月赞比亚开始实施“东南非共同市场”(Common Market for East and Southern Africa, COMESA)的自由贸易协定,成为了该地区第一个这样做的国家。国内外贸易体制的自由化改革成为了10年改革中鲜有的成果。
②Lise Rakner. Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991—2001[M].Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute,2003:171.
②Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004:87.
①注：1987年的“结构调整方案”失败以后,卡翁达政府通过“新经济复苏计划”全面逆转了“结构调整方案”中的经济政策；1989年的《政策框架文件》也因卢萨卡等地区的骚乱和军官的未遂政变而被放弃,并再次恢复了对玉米粉等的补贴。这些内容在第一章“卡翁达政府经济改革的背景”部分进行了详细的阐述。
②注：1987年5月份的“新经济复苏计划”依靠的是“依靠自身资源推动发展”的理念,但这一“计划”与其说是一次经济改革,不如说是一次通过经济政策的逆转来平息国内反对力量愤怒的权宜之策。
③注：相关数据源自：World Development Indicators 2002, World Bank; International Financial Statistics,2002 and February 2003,IMF. Human Development Report 2001 [R]. UNDP.
④注Catharine B. Hill, Lise Rakner, Julius O. Ihonvbere等人在其著作中均认为奇卢巴政府的经济改革是失败的。详细资料见Catharine B.Hill, Malcolm F. Mcpherson. Promoting and Sustaining Economic Reform in Zambia [M]. Massachusetts:John F. Kennedy School of Government,2004.;Lise Rakner, Political and economic liberalisation in Zambia 1991-2001[M], Uppsala; Sweden:Nordic Africa Institute 2003. Economic crisis, civil society, and democratization:the case of ZambiaTrenton, N.J.:Africa World Press,1996.
①注：在奇卢巴政府上台之初,国内民众和内阁成员对经济改革总体上持积极支持的态度,然而这一支持的态度并未持续很久。随着改革的实施触动了相关利益集团的利益,以及广大民众未从改革中获得实惠,致使内阁和民众转而对改革持消极态度。这在奇卢巴第二届政府时期表现的尤为明显,在这一阶段,赞比亚经济改革的动力变成了国际援助社会的压力。
②张文海.斯蒂格利茨批评新自由主义的结构调整[J],国外理论动态.2001,12：24-25.
③注：1992年赞比亚政府解除对利率的控制以后,国债利率飞涨,导致资金纷纷涌入,进而推高了贷款利率,严重扭曲了资本的价值,阻碍了农业和制造业的投资。张文海.斯蒂格利茨批评新自由主义的结构调整[J],国外理论动态.2001,12：24-25.
④注：20世纪90年代的10年间,整个拉美地区贫困人数上升到总人口数的44%。拉美占世界贸易的份额1970年为8%,1980年降为5%,1990年只有3%。1982—1991年,拉美地区经济增长率仅为1.8%,大大低于世界3.3%的平均增长率,1982年墨西哥金融危机引发的拉美债务危机；1994年墨西哥再次爆发金融危机；1999年巴西发生金融危机；2001年阿根廷爆发金融危机。实行新自由主义改革的拉美地区社会经济危机不断。资料源自：程恩富.新自由主义的起源、发展及其影响[J].求是,2005,03：41.
①注：1999年,政府职员工资上调30%,2000年4月奇卢巴承诺将把公共部门的工资水平提高至20万卡瓦查。详见附录二。
②注：1996年5月,奇卢巴签署了修改后的宪法,规定“总统候选人父母和本人必须是赞比亚人”。从而将最大的竞争对手——前总统卡翁达排除在外。这被援助社会视为“民主的倒退”,认为奇卢巴政府并不会致力于发展民主政治和实施经济自由化。
①注：“赞比亚联合铜矿公司”的出售给奇卢巴政府带来了国际援助社会的大量贷款,并减免了其大量的债务。
②The Economist Intelligence Unit:Country Profile:Zambia.2001,p10.转引自:Lise Rakner, Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991—2001, Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute,2003:173.
②The Post, March 30,2001.转引自:Lise Rakner, Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991—2001, Sweeden:The Nordic Africa Institute,2003:173.
①注：赞比亚人用玉米粉做成的主食。
②注：笔者在此并无歧视或取笑之意。只为引用原话以便分析其对经济上的影响。
③Human Development Report 2010-20th Anniversaru[R].UNDP,New York:United Nations Development Programme Press 2010:145.资料来源:http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2010/chapters/
④注：2010年5月份,笔者前往赞比亚经济中心恩多拉对中国中小企业在赞比亚的生存状况进行调研。在当地经营铜矿冶炼及物流生意的“东方联合有限公司”董事长甄白朗先生告诉笔者“中国人在赞比亚赚到的是文化差异上的钱,这些技术并非高科技,中国人能经营下来,而当地人却不行,因为我们守诚信,吃苦耐劳,又懂得守财。”
①注：有关政府机构的工作效率,笔者在赞比亚学习期间也深有体会。抵达赞比亚以后,赞比亚大学用1个月的时间为我们制定了课表,又用了1个月的时间才办完学习签证。而我国派驻赞比亚的军事医疗队的境况更糟,直至其完成任务回国时都没有办完工作签证。
②注：实际上,此处的“馈赠”早已超出了馈赠的程度,更接近于“索要”。
③Human Development Report:2003[R]. UNDP, New York:United Nations Development Programme Press2003：281.资料来源：http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2003/
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