摘要
自20世纪90年代以来,中国的食品工业连续多年高速增长。粮食总产量2009年比1990年增长了22.03%,肉类、水产品、糖料等2009年的产量比1990年分别增长205.19%、320.36%、69.92%,食品工业已成为国家重要的支柱产业。但是食品工业高速发展的背后,重大食品安全事件频繁发生,2008年消费者对食品安全问题的关注度在城市和农村分别达到了95.8%和94.5%。日益严峻的食品安全形势不仅威胁了消费者的健康,而且给食品工业持续发展和国家声誉造成了不利影响,这一背景使得食品安全问题的研究显得更加紧迫。
国内绝大多数文献从政府和市场关系理论角度对食品安全问题进行了研究,强调了政府和市场机制对食品安全的影响,有其合理性,也给政策制定者很多启发,但偏颇之处在于忽略了社会力量的作用,容易形成“市场失灵找政府”、“政府失灵找市场”的二元思维结构。当政府和市场在食品安全领域发生双重失灵时,这种二元思维便陷入困境。本文认为,食品安全的外部性、公共性和企业性,决定了政府、食品供给者和社会中间组织是影响食品安全的三类重要主体,分别代表着国家力量、市场力量和社会力量,这三类主体在食品安全领域的行为直接影响着整体的食品安全状况。因而,理解食品安全问题应该从政府、食品供给者和社会中间组织之间的合作关系来理解。基于此,本文运用制度经济学和公共治理理论的分析方法,对“食品安全治理效率高低取决于政府、食品供给者、社会中间组织三者良性互动的程度”这一命题,从理论和实证两个层面展开分析。
在理论层面上,首先,厘清了食品安全治理的概念,将其理解为“通过食品供给者、社会中间组织和政府之间的良性互动,确保消费者获得他们期望的安全食品的制度安排及其实施过程”。以此概念为基础,提出了问题的研究假设,构建了一个基于制度视角的食品安全治理分析框架,为本文各部分的研究提供了逻辑分析主线。其次,通过分析“食品安全属性一制度安排”之间的逻辑关系,论证了食品安全属性决定治理制度安排的命题,并运用博弈论分析了食品安全治理主体的行为选择与制度结构之间的关系,揭示了食品安全治理主体由非合作博弈走向合作博弈的必然过程。
在实证层面上,分别对政府、食品供应组织和社会中间组织在食品安全治理中的行为及绩效进行了实证考查,分析了这三类组织在食品安全领域非合作行为发生的制度因素,以及对中国食品安全治理整体绩效的影响。在此基础上,进一步论证了选择多主体合作治理食品安全机制的必然性,分析了构建多主体合作治理食品安全机制的前提、核心及保障,并提出了相应的具体构建措施。本文拓展了食品安全问题的研究视角、丰富了制度经济学对食品安全问题的研究内容,所提出的食品安全治理绩效改进的观点及措施,对于中国目前新型食品安全治理机制的构建将提供有益的启示。
Since the 1990s, China's food industry growing rapidly. Total grain output increased by 22.03 per cent in 2009 more than that of the 1990. The total output of meat, aquatic products, and sugar increased by 205.19 per cent,320.36 per cent,69.92 per cent in 2009 respectively more than that of the 1990. The food industry has become an important pillar industry in China. However, the serious incidents of food safety have occurred frequently.95.8 per cent of urban consumers and 94.5 per cent of rural consumers focused on food safety issues in 2008. The increasingly serious food safety endangering not only consumer's health but only the sustainable development of food industry and the state reputation. It leads to an urgent study on food safety issues.
The majority of domestic literatures analyzed the food safety issues from the point of view on the relationship between the government and the market, and emphasized the impacts of the government and the market on food safety. The above analysis had its rationality and given a lot of inspiration to the policy-makers. But it ignored the role of social forces, and formed easily a structure of binary thinking:market failure can be corrected only by the government, while government failure can be corrected only by the market. The structure of binary thinking would be in trouble when the government and market failure in the food safety at the same time. We argue that government, food supplier, and social intermediary organization are three important protagonists of food safety governance based on the nature of food safety. They represent the forces of state, market and society respectively, and their behavior directly impact on the overall performance of food safety governance. So, food safety should be understood on the base of the cooperative relationship of among the government, the food supplier, and the social intermediary organization. Based on the above analysis, this paper applies institutional economics and public management theory to analyze the following hypothesis from the theoretical and empirical aspects:the performance food safety governance depends on the cooperative and interactive relationship of among the government, the food supplier, and the social intermediary organization.
At the theoretical analysis aspects, this thesis firstly definite the concept of food safety governance:it refers to the institutional arrangements and implementation process of which ensures consumers get safe food what they want through the interactive relationship of among the government, the food supplier, and the social intermediary organization. Based the concept of food safety governance, the thesis proposes the research hypothesis, establishes an institutional analysis framework of food safety governance, and provides a logical analysis line for the various parts of this paper. Secondly, the thesis demonstrates the proposition of which the institutional arrangements depend on the food safety attributes through analyzing the logical relationship of between food safety attributes and institutional arrangements. And reveals the inevitable process of turning from the non-cooperative game to the cooperative game by applying game theory to analyze the relationship of between the food safety protagonist's behavior choices and the institutional structure.
At the empirical analysis aspects, the thesis analyzes the performance and behavior of the government, the food supply organizations and the social intermediary organizations in the food safety governance, and analyzes institutional factors of their non-cooperative behavior and its impact on the overall performance of China's food safety. Based on the empirical analysis, the thesis further demonstrates the necessity of mechanism of multiprotagonists cooperative governance in food safety, analyzes the prerequisite, core and guarantee of the mechanism establishment, and proposes the corresponding measures. The thesis extends the research perspective of food safety, and enriches the research content of food safety in institutional economics. The views and measures of performance improvement of food safety governance proposed by this paper would provide enlightenment for the mechanism establishment of China's current food safety governance
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